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The Century Social Science Series

DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL THEORY

BY

JAMES P. LICHTENBERGER, PH.D.

Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania

AUTHOR OF "DIVORCE, A STUDY IN SOCIAL CAUSATION"

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PREFACE

During the academic year 1907-8, while pursuing graduate studies in the Department of Political Science in Columbia University, the author had the good fortune to take a seminar course under Professor Franklin H. Giddings in which a few sessions were devoted to an outline analysis of the development of social theory. So deep was the impression made by the fundamental character of this study of the evolution of social thinking that the ambition was at once aroused, if the opportunity ever should present itself, to expand such an outline into a year's course of graduate study. The opportunity to do this came in the fall of 1909 when the author entered the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania in the Department of Sociology.

In constructing the course several alternatives presented themselves, viz.:

Should it be built around (1) sociological theories, tracing their origin and development as theories, or, should it center about (2) the theorists themselves, as contributors to sociological thinking?

Should an attempt be made (1) to trace the development of social theory in as great detail as possible, or (2) to stress the outstanding features of its development and leave the supplementary work to the student whose time and inclination would permit of more intensive study?

Would it be more practicable (1) to appraise briefly the work of all the writers who have contributed various shades of opinion or who in any way have modified the theories, or (2) to select for more extended treatment a list of conspicuous authors and to bring the student under the spell of their dominating personalities and ideas?

Would it be more desirable (1) to treat the subject critically, attempting at each stage to evaluate the theory in the light of present knowledge, or (2) historically, with the purpose of exhibiting the several epoch-making theories as so many stages in the general process of development?

Should the method of procedure be (1) to begin with contemporaneous social interpretations and to push backward the search for explanations in order to discover the roots of present theories, or (2)

to adopt the evolutionary method of beginning with historic origins and trace the development up to the present?

The latter alternative in each case was chosen as possessing the greater value, at least for the more advanced students, and as better adapted to the building of a solid foundation for future work. The experience gained in teaching the subject by this method during fourteen consecutive years has seemed to the author to justify the wisdom of this decision.

This book is the outgrowth of the first half of this course. It embodies the features and methods described above and covers the period from Plato to the living writers and teachers of the present time.

The limits set by the method adopted present certain obvious disadvantages. The book is not a history of social theory and it lacks the comprehensiveness of the alternate type of treatment. Furthermore, readers will differ, no doubt, in regard to the selection of authors and theories treated in this survey. Some will think that there are notable omissions. Judgment here is relative and no arbitrary list perhaps could be satisfactory to all. The chief epochs or stages, we believe, have been considered. It is hardly likely that any one will feel that any of those which have been included are without sufficient importance or could have been omitted if historic continuity was to be maintained.

There are, however, certain compensations. The method adopted has afforded time and opportunity to trace developing theory as a natural evolution and to exhibit it as the normal product of the mind reacting within a given social environment. In order that this may be made clear a uniformity has been maintained in the construction of the chapters. Each one contains, first, a historic account of the conditions —political, economic, social or scientific—of which the theory is an interpretation; second, a biographical sketch which throws light upon the personal character of the writer and of his equipment which prepared him for his task; and third, a description of the theory itself in sufficient detail, either in epitome or in the language of its author, to enable the student to become acquainted with its fundamental concepts.

Theories like organic structures have a natural history and their evolution can be traced. A familiarity with this concept and a development of this habit of mind in regard to their study, it is believed, may have a value superior to mere knowledge of details which may be supplied with ease if once this principle of causation is grasped.

Historic theories, judged from our present point of vantage, may be inadequate, inaccurate, or even obsolete, but they were the natural

product of the time and should so be judged. They constituted the foundation work upon which future systems were built. It is essential that the student should be familiar with these foundations. The habit of casting aside a theory because it is inapplicable to present conditions, or inaccurate in the present state of knowledge, or of neglecting to study it because it has been modified or superseded seems unfortunately to be characteristic of much of our modern criticism.

Present theories cannot be understood or grasped adequately apart from their history. If the present volume makes any contribution to the subject of sociology it will consist in this: It attempts to uncover the foundations upon which the present structure has been erected and to clarify the processes without which, through the achievements of the centuries, it could not have been built at all.

Two proximate ends have been kept in view in the construction of the volume and which should be explained here:

First, to present the theories unhampered by critical evaluations which divert attention from their proper understanding in the light of their development. Comments within the body of the text are made for the most part, therefore, with a view to elucidation. Criticisms in the light of modern developments are made chiefly by implication and are contained in the "Topics for Critical Study" at the end of the chapters.

Second, in the interest of the less advanced student and the general reader, to present the work in English. Foreign terms as far as possible and references to foreign literature have been omitted from the text. Often it would have been simpler and would have involved less labor to have used original sources than to have searched for translation. Those who are competent or who prefer to use the original languages will find abundant sources in many of the references cited.

J. P. Lichtenberger.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April, 1923.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I PLATO 3

Political and Social Background, Plato, Social Philosophy, The Republic—Form of Presentation, The Argument, Theory of Education, Theory of Communism—Community of Property, Community of Wives and Children. The Laws. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

II ARISTOTLE 31

Historic Background, Aristotle, The Politics,—Origin and Nature of Society, The Natural Basis of Government, Slavery, Individualism vs. Communism, Material Conditions of Civilization, Education. Likenesses and Contrasts in Plato and Aristotle. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

III LATE GREEK AND EARLY ROMAN WRITERS 55

Historic Background, Late Greek Writers—The Stoics—Social Philosophy, Epicureanism — Social Philosophy. Early Roman Writers,—Polybius—Social Philosophy, Cicero—Social Philosophy, Seneca—Social Philosophy. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

IV CHRISTIANITY 73

Historic Background—Judaism, The Alexandrian School, Jesus of Nazareth, Philo, Saul of Tarsus, The Teachings of Jesus, Genesis and Social Doctrines of Christianity.—Summary. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

V SCHOLASTIC SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY—ST. THOMAS AND DANTE 95

Historic Background—The State, The Church, Extra-Political and Ecclesiastical Agencies, The Conflict of the Two Powers, The Doctrine of the Two Powers. Thomas Aquinas,—Social Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Dante Alighieri—De Monarchia. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

VI NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI 125

Historic Developments, Machiavelli, The Prince—Outline and Discussion, Estimates and Criticisms. Bibliography, Topics for Critical Study

VII THE REFORMATION AND BODIN 152

Martin Luther and the Reformation—Historic Background, Luther and the Reformation, Effects of Luther and Calvin upon Social Thinking. Historic Summary of the Period of Bodin, Jean Bodin—Philosophy of the Republic—Origin of Society and Government, Slavery, Theory of Revolutions, Physical Causation, Importance of His Method. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

CHAPTER PAGE

VIII The Social Contract Theorists 178

Historic Background, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract—The State of Nature, Problem—The Origin of Society and Government. Summary and Conclusions. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

IX Montesquieu 206

Social Philosophy and Social Science. Social and Scientific Background. Vico, Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws—Introduction, First Principles, The Laws of Nature and Society, Elements of Physical Causation in Human Society, Climate and Sobriety, Slavery and Climate, Domestic Slavery and Climate, Political Slavery and Climate, Religion in Relation to Government and Climate, Laws and the Nature of the Soil, Commerce. Summary and Criticism. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

X August Comte 236

Social and Scientific Progress, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, August Comte, The Positive Philosophy—The Progress of the Human Mind, The Two-fold Aim of Positive Philosophy, The Heirarchy of the Positive Sciences, Social Physics,—Necessity and Opportuneness of Sociology, Characteristics of the Positive Method—Absolute and Relative Concepts, Static and Dynamic Concepts, Means of Investigation. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

XI Darwin and Evolution 266

Scientific Background,—Quantitative Analysis, Motives for Inductive Research. Adam Smith—The Wealth of Nations. Thomas R. Malthus—The Principle of Population. Charles Darwin—The Origin of Species and the Descent of Man. Applications of the Theory—Walter Bagehot, John Fiske, Benjamin Kidd. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

XII Herbert Spencer 307

Background Environmental and Personal, Herbert Spencer, Spencer's Social Philosophy—Social Statics. First Principles,—The Unknowable, The Knowable—Evolution, The Interpretation of Evolution, The Study of Sociology—The Need and Possibility of Social Science, The Nature of Social Science, Difficulties of Social Science, Discipline Necessary to the Study of Sociology. The Principles of Sociology—The Data of Sociology—Primitive Ideas,—The Ghost Theory of the Origin of Religion, Inductions of Sociology. Epitome and Explanation. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

XIII Lester F. Ward 355

Background Personal and Social, Lester F. Ward, Dynamic Sociology—The Law of Aggregation—Primary Aggregation, or Cosmogeny, Secondary Aggregation or Biogeny, Psychogeny, and Anthropogeny, Tertiary Aggregation or Sociogeny. Principles of Aggregation. The Social Forces—Feeling or Desire—The Dynamic Agent, The Directive Factor—Intellect or Purpose, The Guiding Function of Intellect or Mind-force—Economy of Intellectual Processes, Rapidity of Intellectual Achievement, The Indirect vs. the Direct Method, The Superiority of the Artificial over the Natural, Teleological Progress vs. Natural Progress, The Social

CHAPTER PAGE

Process—Conation, The Ends of Human Conation. Pure and Applied Sociology. Appreciation. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

XIV GABRIEL TARDE 400

Background Practical and Theoretical, Gabriel Tarde, The Theory—The Repetition of Phenomena, The Law of Imitation,—Invention the Innovating Process, Imitation the Socializing Process—Logical Laws, Extra-Logical Laws. The Opposition of Phenomena,—Opposition and Conflict, Opposition and Rhythm, The Adaptation of Phenomena. Appreciation. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

XV GUMPLOWICZ AND RATZENHOFER 432

National and Racial Background, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Gustav Ratzenhofer, The Theory—Fundamental Points of Agreement, Points of Difference. Gumplowicz Conflict Theory—General Laws, Elements of the Social Process, Deductions. Ratzenhofer's Theory of Interests—Essence of the Social Process, Deductions, Problems of Sociology. Bibliography. Topics for Critical Study

"RESERVE SHELF" FOR COOPERATING LIBRARIES 467
SELECTED SUPPLEMENTAL LIST 469

INDEX 473

DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL THEORY

DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL THEORY

CHAPTER I

PLATO

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

SINCE social philosophy is always a mirror of the time and reflects the life of society, it seems wise to set forth some of the chief facts of Grecian history which influenced Plato in the writing of *The Republic* and *The Laws*.

Authentic history of the Hellenic peoples begins about 700 B.C. At that time they consisted of scattered autonomous communities due largely to the topography of the Greek peninsula. Political integration through voluntary coalescence or conquest resulted in the formation of the city states. While no universal type of government existed, in general the old patriarchal type depicted by Homer had been replaced by aristocratic or oligarchic rule. Further consolidation of groups and the rise of powerful cities together with their adjacent territories, such as Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Corinth and in the colonial territory of Sicily, Syracuse, resulted in another change in governmental type.

The selfish, cruel, and arbitrary misrule of the oligarchs, which often produced dissensions among themselves, together with the rise of the educated and the successful mercantile and commercial classes who aspired to a share in the management of political affairs, created an atmosphere of popular discontent. The situation offered excellent opportunity for ambitious citizens to champion the cause of reform and to grasp control. With the exception of Sparta, practically all the Greek cities by 650 had passed under the rule of a tyrant.

Far from solving the problem of government, the rule of the tyrants proved still more odious. Despotic and often degenerate rulers, who

had acquired their supreme authority illegally, found it necessary to resort to harsh methods to retain their power. Political rivals were ruthlessly suppressed. The nobles were excluded from public affairs and often were banished. The rights of citizens were ignored. Thus the unextinguishable Greek love of liberty and the hatred of despots was rekindled. Tyrannicide became a virtue. By the end of the century this form of government was beginning to disappear. The Dorian cities, for the most part, reëstablished their aristocracies while in the Ionian cities the democratic form was being evolved.

Athenian civilization was by this time developing a degree of self-consciousness. Athens had successfully combined the twelve Attic provinces into a powerful city state, and was ruled by a group of nobles constituting an aristocracy. Draco had codified the laws and Solon had instituted economic, constitutional and moral reforms which laid the foundation of her future greatness. Reaction against reform quickly followed and taking advantage of the opportunity Pisistratus, the ambitious nephew of Solon, seized the reins of government and in 560 established himself as tyrant of Athens. He in turn was succeeded by his two sons, Hippias and Hipparchus, even more unscrupulous than himself, who were finally overthrown in 510. In the class struggle which followed, the aristocratic forces were beaten, and the new constitution of Clisthenes conferred citizenship upon all the free inhabitants of Attica. Thus democracy was established.

The opening of the fifth century ushered in events which were destined to put the new democracy to a severe test. Aristocratic Sparta, always jealous of her democratic rival, made an unsuccessful attempt to restore the tyrants. Athens' greatest menace, however, lay in the ambition of the Persian Empire, which, having conquered the Greek cities of the Eastern Aegean, now directed attention toward the European Greeks. The first expedition of Darius in 492 was an utter failure. The land forces were defeated by the barbarian Thracians and the fleet wrecked by a violent storm off Mt. Athos. The second expedition in 490 was still more disastrous. The huge army of 120,000 men was hurled back at Marathon by the Greek army of 10,000 with terrific slaughter. The third expedition in 480, temporarily successful in the famous battle of Thermopylae and in the destruction of Athens, was utterly defeated in the naval battle of Salamis and in the land victory at Plataea.

The successful termination of the Persian wars added much to the prestige of Athens among the Grecian States. The city was speedily

rebuilt including the enlargement and fortification of the Piraeus and its connection with Athens by the Long Walls. The Delian League was formed consisting of all the free cities of Ionia and Aeolis with the island cities of the Aegean, for offensive and defensive purposes, which at once became the basis of the Athenian Empire.

About the year 460 Pericles arose to the head of affairs in Athens. New difficulties with Sparta were settled by the "Thirty Years' Truce" commonly known as "The Peace of Pericles," and a new era dawned for Athens, probably the brightest in her history.

In what is usually known as "The Age of Pericles," 445 to 431, the Greeks achieved perhaps the most perfect intellectual, moral, political and esthetic civilization yet attained. It required millennia to develop it and after its overthrow it has required two thousand years to approximate it again. It was a period of peace throughout the Mediterranean world not again repeated till the reign of Augustus four centuries later. It resulted in the architectural adornment of the Acropolis which survives to the present day in the world's most magnificent ruins; in a galaxy of great men; in the elevation of the people to a position of power; in the extension of culture; in the development of philosophy and science; and in the building of a world military and naval power.

But in the success of the Persian wars and in the building of the Athenian Empire the seeds of political disintegration had been sown and in the wars which followed bore their fruit in political decay. National jealousies due to military ambitions and mercantile rivalries culminated in the combination of Corinth, at the head of the Dorian Alliance, with Sparta, and the Peloponnesian war 431 to 404 was the result. It proved the undoing of Athens.

The bitter struggles of this war lasted for twenty-seven years. Attica was ravaged successively in the first and second years. In 430, the second year, Athens was the victim of a plague which carried away one-fourth of her inhabitants. The following year the plague returned and the great Pericles was smitten. For years the war was conducted with the most relentless cruelty on both sides, neither gaining a decided advantage. Weary of war, negotiations for peace were opened in 421, and after much conference of embassies the peace of Nicias was concluded providing for a truce of fifty years which neither party to the agreement kept. In 418 Sparta re-established her supremacy among her ambitious and conflicting allies in the Peloponnesus.

In 416 Athens committed an act of piracy against the island of Melos, a Spartan sympathizer, and soon after conducted the disastrous

expedition against Sicily. Years of intrigue followed, and finally in 405, when Plato was twenty-three years of age, Lysander, vice admiral of the Spartan expedition, captured the Athenian fleet and the following spring the city fell into his hands. An oligarchy under the thirty tyrants was established.

In 399 Socrates was put to death, and in 387 the "disgraceful" peace of Antalcidas was concluded between the Greeks and Persians.

Thus the "glory that was Greece" had passed away. Shorn of her proud position among the nations through loss of her empire, her fortifications, her fleet, her revenues, she found it difficult to maintain any semblance of independence.

Throughout the entire period of Greek political history the city state had constituted the social and political unit. Traditions of common blood survived which expressed themselves in pride of race and formed the basis of citizenship. Geographically the city state was composed of the town or towns and the adjacent country which together comprised the political unit. But the real bond of social organization was neither blood nor territory. It was the civic relation. To the Greek mind the city or state, convertible terms, was a community—an association of men—an ethical unity. It was this concept which dominated the social theory of Plato and Aristotle. Civic life was the normal life, and it was the relations which men sustained to each other and to the collective whole that constituted the problems of social philosophy.

Some characteristics of the Athenian city state should be noted. It was composed of a population variously estimated at from 300,000 to 400,000, approximately half of which resided within the city proper. Occupationally there was wide diversion. Agriculturalists, artisans, industrial laborers, merchants, bankers, soldiers, professional men and statesmen represent the division of labor, with agriculturalists and artisans predominating.

Politically the population has been estimated as comprising (1) 40,000 citizens, who with their wives and children approximated 160,000, some 7,000 citizens being engaged in some form of public service either civil or military; (2) resident aliens, together with their families, about 90,000, and (3) slaves, 80,000, some 20,000 of whom were employed in the public silver mines at Laurium.

Slavery was an important institution, but aside from the profits derived from the silver mines operated by state-owned slaves and which constituted a relatively small proportion of the total public revenue it can hardly be said that slavery formed any real basis of the Athenian

political system. While it penetrated every phase of the social life and supported the luxury of the leisure class, nevertheless, the dignity in which the labor of the free citizen was held, and also the high evaluation of skill in production, shows it not to have been the foundation of the economic life. Furthermore, the civilization of Athens was a man's civilization. Except for the hetaerae, a conspicuous but not numerous class, women were excluded from public places and from participation in the affairs of state. They were secluded in the home and engaged chiefly in domestic occupations and in rearing children for the state. It was the men who enjoyed the freedom of the market place, the stoa, the theater, the colonnade, the forum, the gymnasium. Here they gathered and discussed public questions or philosophy which resulted in the formation of public opinion so potent in the development of free institutions and in the control of public policies.

To serious-minded men of the times like Plato the social order offered opportunity for reflection. Politically every phase of organization had been exhibited from tyranny to democracy. Statesmen and demagogues guided alternately the affairs of state. In the formation of the Delian League, when diverse nations were united in one state, new qualities of constructive citizenship were demanded. It was the great national opportunity to establish democracy on a gigantic scale, but the enterprise was wrecked by unscrupulous politicians who spent the revenues of the league upon Athens herself and an oppressive empire was the outcome.

Again, by means of the national contacts created through coöperation or conflict among the Grecian city states and throughout the larger area of the Eastern Mediterranean and still further aided by the extension of trade and commerce that reached still more distant shores, there was created a new cosmopolitanism. There was discovered a similarity between the processes of both Greek and barbarian minds that made possible a new interpretation of human brotherhood. This conception hardly reached beyond the philosophers. In general it merely offered larger means for political or commercial exploitation.[1]

Another effect of Grecian civilization was that it created and drew together a group of intellectuals. The Sophists played a large part in the higher intellectual life of the time. They were the chief educators. While there was no system of higher education, ample opportunity was afforded men of leisure for discussion of new ideas introduced through travelers, tradesmen, and educators who gathered at the capital. Even at a much later period St. Paul remarked that "all the Athenians and

the strangers sojourning there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear some new thing."[1]

Social and political disintegration, however, in no way diminished the ardor of the philosopher. There is no indication that, throughout the period of national decay with the loss of the dignity, the gravity, and the devotion to the public need, of the old Greek life, there was ever any exhaustion of intellectual vigor.

There is evidence also of ethical and religious transition. The mythology of the ancients was being rejected with consequent loss of worship of the household gods. Natural and human causation was coming to replace the old religious theory of morality. Theanthropic ideas were being evolved. Teachers of new faiths could secure enthusiastic hearing.

All these political, social and ethical changes were raising definite questions. What is justice? What is the true basis of social and political life? How can the highest attainments of human personality be achieved? How can the glory of Athens be restored?

The Republic and *The Laws* are Plato's answer.[2]

PLATO

Authentic sources for a biographical sketch of Plato are exceedingly meager. The most probable date of his birth is 427 B.C. and his birthplace either Athens or, as most writers indicate, the Greek island of Aegina in the Saronic Gulf. His father, Ariston, and his mother, Perictione, were both of aristocratic families. In the dialogues of Charmides he claims Critias as his maternal uncle, who was in turn descended from the great Solon. From Diogenes Laertius we learn that he was originally named for his grandfather Aristocles. Later he became known as Plato on account of his broad chest or perhaps brows. In his youth he was a trained athlete, contending in the Isthmian games; was disciplined in military service as a rigid requirement of all Greek youths; and wrote both lyric and epic poetry, some of which is preserved in the anthology. This description of his early training may be regarded as plausible in view of what seems to be its reflection in *The Republic,* in his recommendations for the education of the youth in music and gymnastics.

The nobility of his birth together with his brilliancy of intellect and breadth of culture opened up to him a public career in the world of

[1] Acts 17:21.

[2] *Cf.* Barker, *Greek Political Theory,* Ch. II; Botsford and Sihler, *Hellenic Civilization:* Grote, *History of Greece;* Bury, *History of Greece.*

Greek affairs. At about the age of twenty he met and became an ardent disciple of Socrates. The condemnation and tragic death of the great teacher in 399 together with his disgust at the rule of the Thirty Tyrants profoundly affected his views and he abandoned politics and poetry in order to embark upon a career in philosophy. After the death of Socrates it appears that, in company with Euclides and perhaps others, he chose voluntary exile in Megara where some of his dialogues probably were written. The years following he traveled extensively. From reliable sources we learn that he visited Cyrene, Egypt, Sicily and lower Italy. Less reliable accounts describe more distant journeys to Asia, Palestine, Babylon and Persia. Definite accounts are given of his visit to Sicily in 387 where he came into contact with Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, whose wrath he incurred because of his persistency in advocating certain views contained in *The Republic* condemning injustice and denouncing tyranny. As a result he was sold into slavery but was soon ransomed by a friend.

In 386 he returned to Athens and founded the Academy where, to the end of his life, he taught students in philosophy. Among his students who afterwards achieved fame may be mentioned Xenocrates, Aristotle, Lycurgus the attic orator, Isocrates, and probably Demosthenes.

Due to Pythagorean influence his approach to his subject was mathematical, which contrasts sharply with the biological approach of the later peripatetic school. His curriculum, however, must have included a broad range of subjects. In the *Critias* he gives an account "of the geological history of Attica and its economic consequences which is almost on a level with the most modern discussions of the kind" [3] while in the laws he points out the relation between geographic environment and the character of civilization with an insight seldom equaled by modern writers.[4] Unfortunately all the lectures given in the Academy which must have contained his completed system of philosophy have been lost.

There is much reason to think that Plato believed in the practicability of an ideal state where philosophers should become Kings or Kings philosophers.[5] The opportunity to make a practical test of his theories seemed to have arrived when, upon the death of Dionysius I in 367 and

[3] Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, p. 223.

[4] *Cf. The Laws*, Jowett translation, 708-9. (The numbers in this citation, and in all succeeding references to *The Republic* and *The Laws* refer to the sections into which Jowett has divided the text.)

[5] *Cf. The Republic*, 473.

the accession of his son Dionysius II, Plato received an invitation to join his court at Syracuse. Accompanying it was an urgent letter from Dion, his convert to philosophy on the occasion of his prior visit, urging that "the hour had now struck for the training of the Philosopher-King." [6] Plato accepted reluctantly because dubious of success, but felt the necessity of putting his ideals into practice in order to save philosophy from the reproach of being mere speculation. The enterprise was doomed to failure. Dionysius did not prove to be an apt scholar. Intrigue and dissension at court added to the difficulties. Within four months quarrels between the tyrant and Dion led to the latter's banishment and, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, Plato returned after a few months to Athens. Five years later he returned to Syracuse by special request of Dionysius in order to assist in public affairs and in composing private difficulties with Dion. This mission likewise proved futile, resulting in a breach between Dionysius and Plato, who, with some difficulty, escaped back to Greece. This ended the period of experimentation, though he continued his interest in the affairs of Syracuse for at least a decade as revealed in the 3d, 4th, and 7th *Epistles*.

With the exception of these interruptions Plato devoted forty years to instruction in the Academy. He died in Athens, according to some while writing, according to others at a marriage feast, in the year 347 at the age of eighty-two. By his last will he endowed the Academy with his property, guaranteeing its continuance as one of the most important educational institutions of the time.[7]

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

THE REPUBLIC

The search for social philosophy as distinct from economic or political philosophy among writers who antedate our modern specialism in these fields is beset with difficulties. The word "political" is commonly used to designate the conspicuous aspects of social organization, of collective life. It does not imply the narrower connotation of present usage. This explains in part the necessity for the reëxamination of political writings of the past in order to discover their implicit social philosophy. In this connection Barker aptly remarks:

[6] Barker, *Greek Political Theory, Plato and His Predecessors*, p. 113.
[7] *Cf.* Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-18; Grote, *Plato and Other Companions of Plato*, Vol. I, Ch. III.

"*The Republic,* which was composed in the maturity of Plato's life, somewhere about his fortieth year, and therefore better than any other dialogue, represents the fulness of his thought, has come down to us with a double title, *The State* or *Concerning Justice.* In spite of these two titles, it must not be assumed that it is a treatise either on political science or on jurisprudence. It is both, and it is yet more than both. It is an attempt at a complete philosophy of man. Primarily it is concerned with man in action, and it is therefore occupied with the problems of moral and political life. But man is a whole; his action cannot be understood apart from his thinking; and therefore *The Republic* is also a philosophy of man in thought, and of the laws of his thinking. Viewed in this way, as a complete philosophy of man, *The Republic* forms a single and organic whole." [8]

Nettleship also comments in the same vein as follows: "To Plato one of the leading facts about human life is that it can only be lived well in some form of organized community, of which the Greeks considered the civic community to be the best form. Therefore the question, What is the best life? is to him inseparable from the question, What is the best order or organization of human society? The subject of *The Republic* is therefore a very wide one; and a modern critic, finding such a variety of matter in it, is inclined to think that Plato has confused quite distinct questions. This is not so; he gives us in *The Republic* an ideal picture of the rise and fall of the human soul, its rise to the highest stage of development and its fall to its lowest depths; and in doing so he hastened to take account of everything in the human soul, of its whole nature. Modern associations lead us to expect that the book should be either distinctly ethical or distinctly political, that it should either consider man in his relations as a citizen or consider him simply as a moral agent. Because the Greek philosophers did not separate these two questions it is frequently said that they confused them; whereas it would be truer to say that they looked at human life more simply and more completely than we do. But of course there are questions which we have to differentiate as ethical or political and which the Greeks did not thus differentiate. The reason is that their actual life was less differentiated than ours; that law, custom, and religion were not in practice the distinct things they are now." [9]

It would seem quite as appropriate, therefore, for the sociologist as for the political scientist and for the moral philosopher to emphasize

[8] *Op. cit.,* p. 145.
[9] *Lectures on the Republic of Plato,* pp. 5-6.

those particular aspects of Plato's thought which lie distinctly within his field of interest.

The Form of Presentation

The Republic is cast distinctively in the Socratic mold. Plato was returning from the Piraeus where he had gone to celebrate a religious festival. As he started to return to the city he was hailed by a group of friends who prevailed upon him and his companions to remain for the equestrian relay torch race in the evening, an additional feature of the celebration. Upon their arrival at the home of Polemarchus they find other friends already gathered and seated in a circle. After the usual formalities of greeting, the conversation or dialogue begins and flows on uninterruptedly to the end of the volume.[10] This method of instruction was adopted by Socrates, whose chief purpose was not to impart knowledge but to awaken thought. It was followed by Plato both as teacher and writer. In addition to the pedagogical value of the method it enabled Plato to criticize the social life and institutions of his time through the method of inquiry rather than by attack and to acquire the reputation of the critical student and philosopher instead of that of the didactic reformer.

The method of the dialogues is purely philosophic. It starts from assumptions drawn, to be sure, from contemporary life and experience, and is carried on to logical conclusions. The material was all within the writer's brain. It involved no gathering of facts, no study of data. The society which he created was a hypothetical society, the construct of the mind.

In order to render the arguments the more plausible there is frequent use of analogy both from nature and from art. The dog supplied most of his analogies from the animal world and from the breeding of animals he evolved his theories of eugenics. In the field of art, his analogies were drawn chiefly from the artist, the physician, the teacher and the politician.

The Argument

The dialogue opens upon the theme of justice, a subject worthy the consideration of this distinguished company. Various popular views as to the nature of justice or of that in which it consists, are considered, viz., that of Cephalus, "Speak the truth and pay your debts"[11]; of

[10] *Cf. The Republic,* tr. by Jowett, pp. 327-8.
[11] *Ibid.,* p. 331.

Polemarchus, "The art which gives good and evil to friends and enemies" [12]; of Thrasymachus, "Might is right, justice is the interest of the stronger" [13]; and of Glaucon, "That which is ordained by law." [14]

From all these definitions Plato dissents. Although they differ in point of view they are alike in that they all regard justice as an accomplishment; something conventional, external, legal. Plato revolts at their artificiality. He perceives that justice is something internal; something within the nature or soul of man. It does not depend on chance convention, nor legal enactment. It is a habit of thought, a method of living, an expression of will. As such it is difficult to define. It is better described. While it is a quality of the soul its expression is the social order.

Since justice, then, is a quality of man's inner life, and since the inner life can be studied only as it manifests itself in objective form, it is necessary to consider man's behavior both individual and collective. Moreover, since society is larger than the individual and justice is here wrought "in larger letters," it is best to study it first in this form, for states, i.e., social structures, are not made of oak and rock but out of human natures that compose them.[15]

In order to accomplish this purpose Plato proposes the idea of creating a state hypothetically. He says, "Suppose we imagine the State in the process of creation, and then we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also." [16] In the study of human society, therefore, Plato pursues the purely philosophic method. He considers the origin and development of society, not in its historic, but in its logical order. "The true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention." [17]

The state or organized society "arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of the State be imagined?" [18] In their most elementary aspects these wants are physical; food, shelter, clothing. The condition under which these are best produced is the division of labor, because "we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations." Thus, then, "all things are produced more plentifully and easily, and of a better quality when one

[12] *The Republic*, 332.
[13] *Ibid.*, 338.
[14] *Ibid.*, 359.
[15] *Cf. ibid.*, 544.
[16] *Ibid.*, 369.
[17] *Ibid.*, 369.
[18] *Ibid.*, 369.

man does one thing which is natural to him and is done at the right time and leaves other things.[19] Success through proper adjustment leads to expansion of industry. New wants are created and must be supplied. Artisans, husbandmen, herdsmen, importers, exporters, merchants, bankers, sailors and wage-laborers will be required.[20] When these are all "gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a state." [21]

Justice is here exhibited "in the dealings of these citizens with one another." [22] It consists in the contribution to the social whole of that which the individual is by nature best fitted to supply, and in the proper correlation of these abilities into a collective unity. "In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described." [23]

But development will not stop here. "For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life . . . now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want." [24] Luxuries in food, dress, homes, and furnishings are accompanied by a refinement of occupations. There will be added hunters, artists, musicians, actors, dancers, tutors, barbers and hair dressers, cooks and confectioners, servants, etc. In this expansion lies the possibility of the introduction of injustice and the development of "inflamed constitutions or states" at "fever-heat." By exceeding the limits of necessity states will find it necessary to expand and enlarge their borders. "And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough. . . . Then a slice of our neighbors' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth. And so we shall go to war. Then without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, this much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public. . . . And our state must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army which will have to go out and

[19] *The Republic*, 370.
[20] *Cf. ibid.*, 371.
[21] *Ibid.*, 369.
[22] *Ibid.*, 372.
[23] *Ibid.*, 372.
[24] *Ibid.*, 373.

fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above." [25]

Now since each man may practise only one art, that for which he is by nature fitted, and since "war is an art," the specialization of function must also be applied here: "It will be our duty, if we can, to select natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city." [26] It should be noted that while Plato perceives the possibility of national aggression as a cause of war, he does not regard it as a virtue and passes at once to a discussion of defense as a moral necessity.

Qualities commensurate with their task must be the basis of selection. They should be "quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him." Also "he must be brave if he is to fight well." Above all "his soul is to be full of spirit . . . but are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and with everybody else?" Another element then is required, gentleness toward friends. These qualities seemingly mutually exclusive are actually found in the watch dog and likewise among men. Now as ferocity arises out of "spirit" so gentleness arises out of "reason" or "philosophy." [27]

One further differentiation of function is necessary. We now have the economic organization with its diverse activities; we have also the specialized guardian group. But how is order to be maintained, "Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects?" The guardians are divided into two classes. Those who are especially qualified for fighting, who are to be called "auxiliaries," and those of a more philosophic temper who are to be the "rulers." This class is selected because of their wisdom and efficiency and their special concern for the state.[28]

The organization and classification of citizens in a perfect state is now complete. As regards the relative value of the several classes and the esteem in which they are to be held, he finds the analogy in the use of metals. "Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power to command, in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honor; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he

[25] *The Republic*, 373-4.
[26] *Ibid.*, 374.
[27] *Ibid.*, 374.
[28] *Cf. ibid.*, 412-14.

has made of brass and iron, and the species will generally be preserved in the children." [29]

The classification is made flexible, so that each man may find his proper level, by the provision that should a silver son be born of golden parents or the reverse, they will be transposed to their proper place. Thus human possibilities of development are not stifled and justice is maintained. This "transposition of rank" Jowett regards as "one of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, because un-Greek and also very different from anything which existed at all in his age of the world." [30]

This threefold classification of citizens corresponds to the logical stages of development in the genesis of society, namely, the economic, the military, and the governmental. Furthermore it corresponds with human nature on the basis of the Pythagorean psychology of the three classes, lovers of Wisdom, lovers of Honor, lovers of Wealth, or as Plato puts it, in the analysis of the three parts of the soul: Wisdom, Spirit, and Appetite. Appetite motives the evolution of the economic order by which physical wants are supplied through the creation of wealth, Spirit expresses itself through a sort of chivalry—an inspiration to battle for justice and right, while Wisdom or Reason creates the bond of union and solidarity through the development of social control. [31]

Plato's state, therefore, is the logical coördination of the three classes of "farmers," "soldiers," and "rulers," the inter-dependence of the respective groups constituting the essence of the social order.

The social order then is the logical structure through which the qualities of the soul of man find their true expression. Justice is perfect adjustment. Injustice is "a strife which arises" between the various elements of the soul "a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole. . . . What is all this confusion and delusion but injustice and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?" [32]

It is within this discussion of justice in its collective aspects that the concept of individual justice emerges and becomes clear. Justice is a relation. In its ultimate analysis it resides within the individuals of which society is composed, and it is exhibited from either of two aspects. In the one, justice arises from the ability of the individual to function harmoniously in relation to other members of his group on the basis of his preëminent endowment or peculiar temper. In the other,

[29] *The Republic*, 415.
[30] Introduction to *The Republic, The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. I, p. lii.
[31] *Cf. ibid.*, 437-445.
[32] *Ibid.*, 444.

justice is manifested to the extent to which he is able to balance in a harmonious whole the elements of appetite, courage, and wisdom within his own mind.

Barker comments on Plato's theory of justice; "Platonic justice . . . is not a legal matter, nor is it concerned with any external scheme of legal rights and duties. . . . It is not a matter of law, or again of individual ethics, nor is it a confusion between the two; it is a conception of social morality, and a definition of the code of social ethics which no less than law, and perhaps even more than law, underlies the play of social relations. It deals with the ways in which a whole society may attain goodness and thereby happiness. . . . Its formula is that the essence of social morality lies in the fulfillment of 'my station and its duties'; and this is a formula which modern thinkers can still employ. Behind this formula, and behind the whole conception of social morality, there lies the conception of society as a moral whole or organism, living a moral life of which every individual is an organ and in which every individual has a function. . . . He starts from the conception of an ethical society based on the moral duty of discharge of specific function, and he conceives of justice as the spirit by which men are animated in the fulfillment of that duty." [33]

Within this larger field of social organization in its economic, military and governmental aspects there are two subjects of discussion in which Plato's social philosophy is elaborated: his system of education and his doctrine of communism, the latter subdivided into its economic and family aspects. The discussions are applied mainly, however, to the two upper groups.

Theory of Education

Since justice is the function of the social order it is imperative that society shall provide for the training of the individual in order that he may perform well the differentiated activity upon which the success of the social whole depends. There is an obvious lack of completeness in the application of this principle. It may be assumed that it applies with equal force to the economic group but the argument is applied only to the training of guardians. This may be due in part to the political exigencies of the situation in which the immediate concern was the rebuilding and maintenance of a successful state. In his scheme of education for the specific group concerned, Plato was definitely biased in favor of the Spartan system.

[33] *Op. cit.*, p. 179.

Having been selected on the basis of their physical and mental qualities, what training may be provided in order to enhance their efficiency? The answer is: "The traditional sort . . . gymnastics for the body and music for the soul." [34] Music is to be taught first because youth "is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken." Music is the generic term which included not only music proper but literature, story telling, poetry, drama, and art.

The discussion is begun in Book II and elaborated in later chapters. One principle of education stands out clearly. Its function is to develop the latent possibilities of the mind and body through example and imitation, rather than the storing of the mind with facts. Proper influences must surround the youth. He objects to the fact "that we begin by telling children stories . . . which though not wholly destitute of truth are in the main fictitious. . . . We just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up. . . . Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction." [35] First of all, theology must be expurgated. Narratives involving unbecoming behavior as falsehood, trickery and treachery must be rigidly excluded. "God is not the author of all things, but of good only. . . . Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths . . . let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods." [36] All stories of falsehood, of bribery, of deception; even the lamentations of great men which reveals their femininity, excessive laughter which reveals a frivolous mind and of unjust men who are happy must be eliminated. Only that which inculcates the principles of truth, honor, loyalty and high idealism is to be retained. Such is to be the education of "boys and men who are meant to be free and who should fear slavery more than death." [37] The same principle is carried out with reference to music and art. The function of music is not entertainment but inspiration of "courageous and harmonious life." [38] Again "the same control is to be extended to other artists, and they are also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite

[34] *The Republic*, 376.
[35] *Ibid.*, 377.
[36] *Ibid.*, 380-81.
[37] *Ibid.*, 387.
[38] *Ibid.*, 399.

forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts. . . . We would not have our guardians grow up among images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear like a health-giving breeze from a purer region and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason." [39]

On the constructive side he urges moderation, temperance and self-control in all things. Pleasure is disciplined by reason and is to be derived not from sensuous satisfactions but from the consciousness of duties well performed.

Physical education, the concomitant of mental training, is summarized under the term gymnastics. Like music it should continue through life. It is the complement of music. Exclusive devotion to "music" results in "softness and effeminacy" while gymnastics alone will tend to "hardness and ferocity." The proper balance produces the harmonious soul which is both "temperate and valiant."

The first requirement is to abstain from intoxication. "For of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is. . . . That a guardian should require a guardian to take care of him is ridiculous indeed." [40] Ordinary athletic training is inadequate and even dangerous; "it is but a sleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health." Warrior athletics must create alertness. The training table is necessary. The citizen warrior "amid the many changes of water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign, they must not be liable to break down in health." Fish is discarded, roast meat is recommended, sweet sauces are not to be mentioned. Specific tabus are placed upon "Syracusan dinners," "Sicilian cookery," "Corinthian courtesans," and "Athenian confectionery." [41] Plato has little use for physicians except to prescribe the rules of health. With regard to weak and defective constitutions he would prefer to have the forces of natural selection do

[39] *The Republic*, 401.
[40] *Ibid.*, 403.
[41] *Cf. ibid.*, 404.

their work.[42] As to specific details for athletic training he merely adds "Where would be the use in going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or about their hunting or coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we shall have no difficulty in discovering them."[43]

In Book VII and also in *The Laws* Plato further elaborates the system of education. His purpose however remains constant—the training for the highest type of citizenship. "True education, whatever that may be, will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another and to those who are under their protection."[44]

"The emphasis thus laid on education is the logical result of the Platonic conception of justice. If justice is the principle of social ethics which gives coherence to a community, and if it consists in the proper discharge of specific function by every member of the community, the community must, for the sake of its own coherence, imbue its members with its own principle; it must for the sake of its own excellence, train its members to excellence in the discharge of their functions. Not only in the conception of Plato but also in that of the Greeks at large, education is regarded as a social process, by which the units of a society become instinct with social consciousness and learn to fulfil all social demands. . . . Plato is at one with Aristotle, and both are true to Greek tradition, in upholding the priority and the primacy of the educational function of the state. . . . *The Republic* . . . is concerned not with questions of political structure, but with questions of educational method; and indeed the only system of government which Plato suggests —the rule of philosopher-kings—is really the issue and consequence of his educational theory."[45]

The Theory of Communism

In order to secure justice—the state of the greatest happiness—Plato finds it necessary not only to construct a new system of education, but to remodel the economic and social structure as well. But "Not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens."[46] Also "if our citizens are

[42] *Cf. The Republic*, 410.
[43] *Ibid.*, 412.
[44] *Ibid.*, 416.
[45] Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-2.
[46] *The Republic*, 416.

well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters, which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women, and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says." [47]

Community of Property

Plato regards the extremes of wealth and poverty as a social menace. "One is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent." [48] If the ruling class of guardians and rulers representing the elements of spirit and wisdom are to perform their social functions properly, they must be freed from the domination of these economic forces of appetite. A communistic régime alone can furnish the appropriate environment.

"Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or store, closed against any one who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more, and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have, therefore, no need of the dross which is current among men and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become house keepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our state be ordered, and that these shall be the regu-

[47] *The Republic*, 423.
[48] *Ibid.*, 422.

lations appointed by us for our guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?" [49]

Like the forms of gymnastic training Plato regards his economic communism as so obvious as to need no elaboration. Some observations, however, should be made in view of later communistic doctrines.

First, the communism here advocated does not involve the sacrifice of the individual. It is merely a scheme by which the individual is unhampered in the exercise of his specific abilities. He sacrifices that he may achieve, and this in Plato's thought is not sacrifice at all. It is rather a part of his education in order that he may be better fitted for his task.

Second, it is a scheme to divorce economics and politics. The union of economic and political power has resulted usually in the abuse of political power for economic advantage and the consequent corruption of the state.

Third, Plato's communism is far removed from the modern doctrine of economic communism. It does not disturb the economic structure of society. It is not suggested by a proletarian struggle and is to be applied only to the guardian group where it is intended merely to free them for the pursuits of wisdom.

Community of Wives and Children

The logic of justice demands that each *individual* shall fulfil his duty to the state completely according to his natural endowments. A discussion of woman's status cannot then be evaded. Plato has to be urged to develop this subject which he does somewhat reluctantly because of its complexity and because the principles laid down lead inevitably to conclusions at variance with accepted ideas.[50]

The first principle is that women shall be subject to the same conditions as men. They must be selected, educated, trained and assigned to the tasks for which they are fitted. The seclusion of women in the Grecian household must be broken up. Public service is no longer to be the exclusive function of the male.

A careful analysis reveals the fact that the only difference between men and women is "one of strength and weakness." They must then have the same education as men in music and gymnastics. Those who have the qualities of guardians will be assigned to that group. "Then

[49] *The Republic,* 415-17.
[50] *Cf.* Book V.

let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defense of their country; only in the distribution of labors, the lighter are to be assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects their duties are to be the same." [51]

Two problems now arise. *First,* the Eugenic problem of improving the racial quality of the stock, and, *Second,* the Moral problem of the elimination of those divisive tendencies that arise through private ownership of property and of families. The solution can be found only in communism. "The wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent." [52] "Their legislator, having selected the men, will now select the women and give them to them;—they must be as far as possible of like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own; and they will be together and will be brought up together and will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other." [53] "And this like all the rest must proceed after an orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid. . . . Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred." [54] This can be accomplished through the arrangement of "certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets; the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average of population. There are many things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small. . . . I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honors and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible." [55] Children born through these proper matings will then be brought up by the state, nurtured by mothers, "taking the

[51] *The Republic,* 457.
[52] *Ibid.,* 457.
[53] *Ibid.,* 458.
[54] *Ibid.,* 458.
[55] *Ibid.,* 460.

greatest possible care that no mother recognizes her own child," and by other wet nurses and attendants especially fitted for the task. The offspring of unconsecrated matings, as well as any defectives, will be regarded as "offspring of darkness and strange lust" and will be disposed of ("Decency will be respected") or at least not reared for the state. Abortion is recommended to obviate this necessity.[56]

This communistic arrangement solves the eugenic problem and "will require to be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure." It further operates to eliminate the "private feeling, that disorganizes the state. . . . The community of property and the community of families, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about 'mine' and 'not mine,' each man dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains; but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore they all tend toward a common end." [57]

Like his economic communism, Plato's domestic communism differs radically from modern proposals. Far from a theory of "free love" within the guardian group, it is one of the strictest regulations, in which for the sake of the future quality of the race and for the highest ethical interests of society, those best fitted for parenthood because of their age and their physical and mental qualities, are mated upon scientific principles and under the strict control of the state. He recognized the danger of misunderstanding and misrepresentation in the presentation of so radical a scheme, but it did not deter him from its logical development. He may be wrong, as Aristotle discovers,[58] but his integrity of purpose and his ethical idealism cannot be questioned.

THE LAWS

The Laws constitute Plato's last written work, completed when he was about eighty years of age and, according to tradition, published posthumously probably within a year of his death, or about 347 B.C. We are interested in it, only as it throws additional light upon his social theory. It is less philosophic than *The Republic,* being tempered with the wisdom of experience. He had learned much from his experiments

[56] *Cf. The Republic,* 460-61.
[57] *Ibid.,* 464.
[58] *Cf. The Politics,* Book II.

in Syracuse. The ideal he had formed was difficult of realization. He still clings tenaciously, however, to his idealism. Concessions are made not because he has changed his views but because practical necessity requires it until men's minds and society shall arrive at a greater state of perfection. If we cannot now achieve the best, we must be content with the second best as a means to an end.

"The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that 'Friends have all things in common.' Whether there is anywhere now, or ever will be, this communion of women and children, and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, . . . I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better, and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and, to seek with all our might for one which is like this. . . . The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest immortality and the only one which takes the second place." [59]

The modifications of his doctrine of communism in *The Republic* are then concessions to human weakness. They are not the best, but the next best. "Let the citizens at once distribute their land and houses, and not till the land in common, since a community of goods is beyond their proposed origin, and nature, and education." [60] But in this allotment of houses and lands to individuals the state will have control. Competition is regulated for the common good. "The legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty and wealth. Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved, and no ruler, nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. This the legislator gives as a measure and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple, or as much as four times the amount of this. But if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him or he has made them in business or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is in excess of the measure, if he give back the surplus to the state, and to the gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation." [61] Thus even though Plato concedes the individualization of production he still regards it as a social function and limits it both as to quantity and to use. Consumption is still socialized since "paying

[59] *The Laws*, 739.
[60] *Ibid.*, 740.
[61] *Ibid.*, 744.

a part of the produce," common food and clothing is provided and men and women and their families sit at "common tables." [62]

In regard to women, the ideas of *The Republic* are sustained and elaborated in respect to public activities, involving common education and training, and common responsibilities. With respect to marriage there is the absence of the detailed arrangements in *The Republic.* Marriage is monogamous. This may be due in part to the fact that there is not here the separation between the classes of artisans and guardians. It seems likely that Plato would have sanctioned this form in the economic group in *The Republic* had he discussed it. It should be remembered, also, that he is discussing the "second best" form of society. Like private property in this state marriage is always for the public good and is rigidly controlled by the state. Provision is made for "better acquaintance" before marriage in order "to avoid mistakes." [63] Eugenic considerations are emphasized; [64] and the public importance of marriage is upheld. "Every man shall follow, not after the marriage which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most beneficial to the state." [65] Social advantages should be considered above the purely economic. "We should try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's disposition to be more important than equality in excessive fortune when they marry." [66]

"These regulations, if we duly consider them, will never be exactly carried into execution under present circumstances, nor as long as women and children and houses and all other things are the private property of individuals; but if we can attain the second best form of polity, we shall be very well off." [67]

In further explanation of the more positive and practical character of *The Laws* as contrasted with *The Republic* it should be noted that Plato, frequently throughout the work, seems to exhibit glimpses of the scientific method so conspicuously absent in the former work. While society still remains the construct of the mind, the mind in turn is controlled less by logic and more by the influence of experience. There is one famous passage which exhibits this change to a high degree. He is speaking of the art of government; "Cities find colonization in some respects easier if the colonists are of one race, which like a swarm of

[62] *The Laws,* 806.
[63] *Ibid.,* 771.
[64] *Ibid.,* 772, 775.
[65] *Ibid.,* 773.
[66] *Ibid.,* 773.
[67] *Ibid.,* 807

bees is from a single country, either when friends leave friends, owing to some pressure of population or other similar necessity, or when a portion of a state is driven by factions to emigrate. And there have been whole cities which have taken flight, when utterly conquered by a superior power in war. This, however, which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, in another point of view creates a difficulty. There is an element of friendship in the community of race, and language, and laws, and in common temples and rites of worship; but colonies which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against any laws or any form of constitution differing from that which they had at home; although the badness of their own laws may have been the cause of the factions which prevailed among them, yet from the force of habit they would fain preserve the very customs which were their ruin, and the leader of the colony, who is their legislator, finds them troublesome and rebellious. On the other hand the conflux of several populations might be more disposed to listen to new laws; but then, to make them combine and pull together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult task and the work of years. I was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of all sorts legislate in all sorts of ways. The violence of war, the hard necessity of poverty, are constantly overturning governments and changing laws. And the power of disease has often caused innovations in the state, when there have been pestilences, or when there has been a succession of bad seasons continuing during many years. Any one who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which I was speaking, that no mortal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is almost everything." [68]

Of this Giddings says: "In no later writing that I know do we find in so few words so many cardinal generalizations as these lines contain upon the nature and behavior of human society." [69] Nowhere else in all Plato's writings does he exhibit the same degree of insight into the influence of environment not only in shaping social behavior but also in the formulation of the concepts of the human mind. It is the one conspicuous example of the Philosopher turned scientist.

The thought of this entire chapter is summarized admirably by Giddings as follows: "Social philosophy grappled in its youth with its most difficult questions, those, namely, of personal causation and of the action of society upon the individual character. This was not because systematic inquiry into the nature of society was a legacy from anthropomorphic ages. On the contrary, it was because it arose in that Grecian

[68] *The Laws*, 708-9.
[69] *Studies in The Theory of Human Society*, p. 96.

world where, for the first time, man had become in the true sense of the word a citizen, and had experimentally demonstrated that, through a free and plastic social organization, he could in a measure control his own economic and moral destiny. In Egypt and in Babylonia political integration, hastened and hardened by empire-making militarism, had brought all the eastern lands under a remorseless despotism. Peoples once free and happy had been so crushed by exploitation that hope itself had almost died within them. Despairing of redress at the hands of any earthly power, and distrustful of themselves, they could only create and embrace, according to their temperaments, the religions of resignation, or those of apocalyptic vision. In the Aegean Grecian world geography and race had conspired to prevent a too rigid centralization of power. The city states were still free and proud. Man still believed in himself and respected his fellow men. Rejoicing in political as in artistic creation, loyal to the state which his own thought had fashioned, he believed that he could make it perfect, and thereby perfect himself. Therefore it is that the first comprehensive work on the nature and possibilities of human society which has come down to us from the past was the utopian *Republic* of Plato.

The imperishable contribution which this work makes to our reasoned knowledge of human society is found not in its communistic plan of life, but rather in its analysis and its correlation of moral and social forces; above all, in its actual solution of the problem of social reaction upon individual character. Assuming that man as a personal cause can in fact mold the commonwealth to his will, assuming also that the final end of endeavor is the attainment of a good life—which should consist substantially of those kinds and degrees of pleasurable activity that reason can approve of—*The Republic* demonstrates that the 'good life' so conceived, after all depends upon a certain objective condition which reason and the human will may create, and which is called 'justice.' Moreover, reason and will cannot create justice directly. They can establish it only through the fine adjustments of a social order. Thus, in the thought of Plato, the 'good life' is a function of 'justice' and to maintain justice is the function of social organization." [70]

[70] *Op. cit.*, pp. 101-2.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. What confirmation or disproof for Plato's theory of the diversity of human abilities is found in the modern psychological hypothesis of different "Mental Levels" in the population? *Cf.* Yoakum and Yerkes, *Army Mental Tests,* Chapters II and V.
2. How does Plato's Theory of War correspond with that of Edw. Van Dyke Robinson's *"War and Economics in History and Theory," Polit. Sci. Quar.,* Vol. 15, Dec. 1900, pp. 581-628, Reprinted in Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress,* pp. 133-173.
3. Compare the system of education of guardians given in this chapter with his larger development of the subject in Book VII of *The Republic.*
4. How does Plato's concept of the purpose and content of education compare or contrast with that of Lester F. Ward? *Cf. Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. II, Ch. XIV.
5. What are Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's communism? Are the arguments sound? *Cf. The Politics,* Book II, 1-6.
6. Discuss the criticism of W. A. Dunning that "In The Laws he (Plato) formally abandons his idealism and seeks to set forth a system that would be workable among imperfect men." *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval,* p. 37.
7. What specific influence did Plato's work have upon Sir Thomas Moore, Rousseau, and Comte? *Cf.* E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory,* pp. 383-92.
8. Compare Plato's concept of Justice with that of Spencer, who thinks of it as "that limitation of liberty which equalizes it among men." F. H. Giddings, *Studies in The Theory of Human Society,* p. 110. *Cf.* Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics,* pp. 33-34.
9. How far and in what respects does Plato's theory of "social utility" as an explanation of society correspond with Lester F. Ward's theory of "collective telesis"? *Cf. Pure Sociology,* Ch. XX.

CHAPTER II

ARISTOTLE

HISTORIC BACKGROUND

ARISTOTLE was a contemporary of Plato for the last thirty-six years of Plato's life and survived him by twenty-six years. The survey of social and political events presented in the former chapter needs only to be supplemented to cover the period from the Peloponnesian war to approximately 320 B.C. in order to provide the background of Aristotle's social theory.

For a generation following the Peloponnesian war Sparta enjoyed supremacy among the Grecian states, but in the administration of the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas she committed acts of perfidy in the interest of selfish aggrandizement which were destined to react disastrously upon her own fortunes, as well as those of the whole of Greece.

The dissolution of the Boeotian League and the later invasion of Thebes evoked what Xenophon regarded as "Divine Retribution" in the destruction of the Spartan army at the battle of Leuctra by Epaminondas through the invention of the phalanx. A short period of Theban supremacy followed, but in breaking the power of Sparta she had exhausted herself. In the battle of Mantinea, 362, Epaminondas was slain. While the battle was a victory for the Thebans, the loss of their great leader resulted in negotiations for peace with Sparta.

Another act of Spartan perfidy, disastrous to the liberty of Hellas, was the dismemberment of the Olynthian Confederacy of Macedonian and Grecian cities in the Chalcidian region which might easily have served as a buffer nation between the Greeks and the new and ambitious Macedonian Empire.

By 360 the Greek cities were so far isolated and exhausted as a result of their own internecine strife as to be able to offer no united resistance to the semi-barbarian monarchy now rising in the North and threatening what was left of Grecian independence. It was a period likewise of social and political disintegration in which even the oratory of Demosthenes could not arouse the ancient Greek spirit.

The year 359 marked the beginning of the ascendency of this hardy

mountaineer people of mixed race, of Aryan speech, and of Greek culture. Filled with a zeal for conquest, which he probably absorbed while a hostage in Thebes during the period of Theban supremacy, and by the use of the Macedonian phalanx, a modification of the Theban phalanx, Philip began a career, one of the most brilliant in history. The dismembered Olynthian Confederacy offered little resistance and Thrace was speedily conquered. The gold mines of Thrace filled his treasury. The invasion of Greece followed and in the Battle of Chaeronea the combined forces of Athens and Thebes were defeated and the subjugation of Greece followed. At the Congress of Corinth in 338 the Greek cities were merged into a Macedonian Federation, and Greek independence, except for its revival in the brief period of the Achaean League, passed into history.

After the Congress of Corinth, Philip organized an expedition to invade Asia but the exploit was interrupted by his assassination in 336. The ascension of Alexander upon the assassination of the illustrious Philip marked the beginning of the creation of World empire. After two years spent in unifying his empire Alexander crossed the Hellespont and began his victorious march through Asia in the spring of 334. A mere list of his achievements follows: The battle of Granicus and the conquest of Asia Minor; the battle of Issus and the capture of the family of Darius; the capture of Tyre and the subjugation of Palestine; the conquest of Egypt; the battle of Arbela and the overthrow of Persia; subjugation of Asia from the Caspian to the Hindu Kush; the conquest of India; rediscovery of the sea route from the Indus to the Euphrates.

Selecting Babylon as his capital, Alexander's ambitious plans contemplated the Hellenizing of the known world. This vast scheme was disrupted suddenly, however, by the death of the conquerer, due to the ravages of fever upon a constitution weakened by the terrific strain of the campaign and the insane excesses of his private life. He died in Babylon in 323 at the age of 32. Since the disintegration of his empire lies beyond the period of Aristotle, it is not reviewed here.

As a student in the Academy, Aristotle was thoroughly familiar with the idealism of Plato and shared the aspirations of the great philosopher. He was equally conversant with the affairs of society about him. He saw the confusion of Greece become the opportunity of Macedonia. He was familiar with moral and political decay, the bribery and treachery of the ruling classes. He witnessed the failure alike of the democracy of Athens and the oligarchy of Sparta. He

was impressed by the power of monarchy in the development and control of world empire. He saw collected under one political sovereignty the most diverse nationalities and observed their common human characters.

Sensitive to all these influences, his great mind could not rest content with the subtleties of logic and metaphysics. It must seek out the mystery of human life as it expressed itself in society and the state.

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle was born in the year 384 B.C., in the Greek city of Stagira on the coast of Thrace. His father Nicomachus, a physician, was a direct descendant of Aesculapius. As the physician of Amyntas II, there developed a friendship between Nicomachus and the Macedonian king which survived in their respective sons Aristotle and Philip and which had much to do with the fortunes of the great philosopher. His mother Phaestis was of illustrious Chalcidian origin. It is probable that a portion of his childhood was spent in the surroundings of the Macedonian Court where he acquired tastes which distinguished him throughout his life as a gentleman of culture. Both of his parents died before his seventeenth year but left him possessed of ample fortune with which to pursue his intellectual tastes which he exhibited from early youth. At the death of his parents he was left in charge of a friend of his father, Proxenus of Atarneus who at that time resided in Stagira.

His physical characteristics contrasted strangely with the greatness of his mind. It is said that he was short of stature, with eyes remarkably small and with limbs disproportionately slender; that he lisped and stammered in his speech; that he was particularly anxious to compensate for these deficiencies by the use of ostentatious finery and by the elegance of his dress. His love of display, however, in no way detracted from his earnest pursuit of knowledge which was his life passion. In the year 367, at the age of seventeen, he was attracted to Athens by the fame of the Academy. The physical contrast between the broad-shouldered philosopher of sixty and the delicate youth of seventeen can scarcely be greater, yet because of their similarity in intellectual tastes there was begun a friendship between them which grew and ripened for twenty years. Plato soon recognized the mental worth of his pupil whom he called the "brains of his school" and who required "the rein rather than the spur." Although profoundly influenced by the great teacher, Aristotle developed views of a more scientific and prac-

tical character which differed sharply from the philosophic and idealistic temper of Plato and which made it impossible for him to succeed Plato as head of the Academy.

Immediately after the death of Plato in 347 Aristotle went to Atarneus as the guest of Hermeias, a former fellow pupil, who was then the ruling tyrant. Here he remained for three years as Hermeias' counselor and adviser. In 344 Atarneus fell into the hands of Artaxerxes and Hermeias was put to death. Aristotle escaped with Pythias, adopted daughter of the prince, to Mytilene in the isle of Lesbos. The sad misfortunes of the princess and their flight together resulted in the usual romance and they were married, Aristotle being thirty-seven years of age, the time which he afterward designated as the proper age at which men should enter the state of matrimony.[1] Pythias died within a few years leaving an infant daughter. The affection which characterized their married life is exhibited in the provision of Aristotle's will that her body should be reinterred beside his own and also in the charge of impiety later made against him because he had commemorated her with such ceremonies as are reserved only for the gods.

During his prior residence at Athens Aristotle had continued his friendship with Philip of Macedon, one year younger than himself and who had ascended the throne at the age of twenty-three. When Alexander was born in 356 Philip wrote to Aristotle who was then still a pupil in the Academy, expressing the hope that his son might be educated by his learned friend. After a short stay in Lesbos, Aristotle was called to the court of Pella to become the tutor of the young Alexander, who was then fourteen years of age. He spent eight years in this office, honored at court, and having much opportunity through leisure and travel to make observations and to collect material for his future work.

Upon the accession of Alexander to the throne in 336, Aristotle returned to his beloved Athens. Xenocrates was at that time president of the Academy and since Aristotle admired neither him nor his teaching he opened the Lyceum, a gymnasium situated in a suburb surrounded by trees and gardens. Here he taught for more than twelve years, or until his death. During this entire period he kept in touch with his former pupil, Alexander, who was at that time engaged in his Eastern campaigns. From him he received from time to time plant and animal specimens for his collections but more im-

[1] *Cf. The Politics,* B. VII, 16:9, Tr.. by Jowett.

portant still, contributions of money by which he was able to collect the most valuable library of his day.

Upon the disintegration of the Macedonian Empire, consequent upon the death of Alexander in Babylon in 323, the Grecian states renewed their efforts to regain their independence. Aristotle was suspected of having Macedonian sympathies. Not being able to prove political charges against him his enemies attacked his private life and indicted him for impiety. He escaped from Athens before his trial, taking refuge in Chalcis in Euboea where he died the same year, 322, of a chronic disease of the stomach, at the age of sixty-two.

There is no record of Aristotle's engaging in any public service with the exception of his brief advisorship to the tyrant Hermeias. His life was spent in acquiring and imparting knowledge. His voluminous writings, most of which have been preserved, cover a wide range. They may be divided roughly into I. Logic, II. Metaphysics, III. Science, and IV. Politics, the last group containing his social philosophy and ethics with which we are chiefly concerned.

THE POLITICS

Aristotle, like Plato, left no separate treatise on Social Philosophy. The reason in both cases is the same. The state is society in its most conspicuous form—it is "that association of men which is the highest of all associations and includes all." [2] In *The Politics,* Aristotle treats of many things which are far beyond the limits of political science, even as most liberally defined. He had clearly a theory of man's social life as a whole and hence *The Politics* contains a social as well as a political philosophy. Ellwood says: "The 'Politica' may indeed be characterized as a system of social philosophy worked out from the point of view of the state—a point of view which both Comte and Spencer notably have taken, and which most sociologists are apt to take sooner or later since the state is the association which is the natural unit of all social thought. The general attitude of Aristotle, therefore, may be said to be that of a sociologist in the proper sense of the term." [3] Walford, in the introductory note in his translation of *The Politics* makes a similar explanation. He says: "Politics, or the political science, was understood by Aristotle and indeed by all the ancient philosophers, not in the narrow and restricted sense to which modern ideas have confined it but as a science investigating the subject of human good and

[2] Loos, *The Political Philosophy of Aristotle,* p. 3.
[3] *Aristotle as a Sociologist, "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,"* Mar., 1902, p. 64-5.

the nature of man, not merely as an individual but as a member of the family and of the state."

We need not rely upon commentators, however, for the explanation of the meaning of "politics," for Aristotle himself has explained it in *The Ethics* (Ch. X, 9, also quoted by Walford), where he says: "Since . . . all former authors have passed over without examination the subject of legislation, it would be better perhaps for us to examine it ourselves, and in fact the whole subject of politics in order that *the philosophy of human nature may,* as far as in our power, be completed."

We are justified therefore in making the effort to discover this social philosophy, not in an isolated and detached form but within the general field of social organization which by Plato and Aristotle is called politics.

In contrast with Plato's method of viewing things in the whole, Aristotle, we should observe, employs the more scientific method of resolving every subject into its constituent elements. "We must therefore look at the elements of which a state is composed. . . . He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them." [4]

ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SOCIETY

The phenomena which we are to investigate are society and its organization and we proceed by his method to the analysis of their "elements" together with their "origin and growth." In its origin society does not rest upon the element of intelligence as in Plato's assumption but upon the instinctive nature of man. "In the first place, there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; for example, of male and female, that the race may continue; and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves. And there must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and he who can work with his body is a subject and by nature a slave. . . . Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the family first arises."[5]

In the *Ethics* he broadens the scope of these "natural desires,"

[4] *Politics,* I, 1:1.
[5] *Ibid.,* I, 1:2-5.

among human beings, to include somewhat more than mere sex attraction. "Between husband and wife friendship is thought to exist by nature; for man is by nature a being inclined to live in pairs rather than in societies, inasmuch as a family is prior in point of time and more necessary than a state, and procreation is more common to him, together with animals. To other animals, therefore, community proceeds thus far only; but human beings associate, not only for the sake of procreation but for the affairs of life." [6]

"The family is the association established by nature for the supply of man's everyday wants. . . . But when several families are united and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, then comes into existence the village and the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family composed of the children and grandchildren. . . . When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the early forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them and the completed nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. . . . . Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity or below it; he is the

'Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one'

whom Homer denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone." [7]

This same explanation of the relation of man's organic nature to society is reiterated under his later discussion of the "purpose" of the state and the forms of government by which "human society" is regulated. "We have already said, . . . that man is by nature a political animal. And, therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together all the same, and are in fact brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life mankind meet together and maintain the political community, so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good." [8]

[6] B., VIII, 12.
[7] *Politics*, I, 2:5-9.
[8] *Ibid.*, III, 6:3-4.

In these statements we have Aristotle's first great contribution to social theory—the natural origin and the organic nature of society. Human purpose may be the means by which the forces of nature are molded and controlled in the interest of human advantage, nevertheless it must operate within the domain of natural law. The original and ultimate social forces lie within the natural order and not in the human intelligence and will.

From this general thesis are derived certain corollaries of specific interpretation. Not only society itself but its political organization and its social institutions are in the first instance the products of nature, and must be explained by this same principle of interpretation.

THE NATURAL BASIS OF GOVERNMENT

Government, or the political aspect of social control, arises out of human nature. The bearing of this concept upon Plato's theory of perceived utility and of the later doctrines of the Social Contract school is obvious.

We have noted that the second relationship out of which the family arises is that of master and slave. This constitutional difference is the foundation of authority. The historical evolution of government is traced to this source. "And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. . . . Wherefore men say that the gods have a king. . . . For they imagine, not only the forms of the gods, but their ways of life to be like their own." [9]

No modern student of the history of social institutions has depicted more clearly the origin and nature of the political organization of tribal society. Government in its origin is not thought out on a utilitarian basis but like social organization in general it is a growth and therefore a natural institution.

In the development of government there is further cause for considering it as an emanation from human nature. "Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of

[9] *Politics*, I, 2:6-8.

speech. . . . And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state. . . . The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god; he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all . . . if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, and the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society." [10]

Government, then, originating in the family as a natural and organic relationship, is continued because of the needs growing out of man's ethical requirements as a member of organized society and which constitute likewise an element of his nature.

Aristotle's contention that the state is prior, logically if not historically, to the individual might be passed over as an obsolete metaphysical problem in which the modern student has lost interest, were it not for the fact that evolutionary studies reveal a differentiation of the family, whether of the polyandrian, polygamous, or monogamic type, from the antecedent group or horde of less definite family organization, and to the still more primal fact of proto-human gregariousness or association out of which human characters as such were evolved, and which constitute the organic background of man's social inheritance. From this point of view the discussion of priority possesses a sociological significance which students of society and politics may not properly ignore.

Passing now from the discussion of the origin and nature of government to the consideration of its several forms we find that Aristotle still adheres rigidly to the natural theory of interpretation. The various types of government in the state are simply the enlargement of forms which originate in the household. "Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state, we must speak of the management of the household. The parts of the household are the

[10] *Politics*, I, 2:10-16.

persons who compose it, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its least elements; and the first and least parts of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children." [11] There is another element of the family, namely property, which is considered here only in relation to the problem of household government.

"Of household management we have seen that there are three parts—one is the rule of masters over slaves, . . . another of a father, and the third, of a husband. A husband and father rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature. But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. . . . The relation of the male and female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he receives both love and the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power," [12] Property, whether animate (slaves) or inanimate (economic goods) is governed arbitrarily by the will of the ruler in his own exclusive interest.

It is clear then, that government, whether constitutional, royal or despotic, depending on the nature of the governed, is a control which originates in the nature of things; for just as we discover the nature of the state by the study of its origin in the family so likewise we learn of the nature of political government by observing its beginnings in the organization of the family.

In further defense of his general thesis it is necessary to justify slavery on the one hand, and private property and the individual possession of wives and children on the other as constituting the "order of nature."

SLAVERY

The very essence of order is arrangement of parts on some principle of gradation. This principle pervades all nature and is characteristic even of inanimate things as "the dominant note in music." It is exhibited in the superiority, and therefore in the control of the "soul over

[11] *Politics*, I, 3:1.
[12] *Ibid.*, I, 12:1-3.

the body," of "mind and the rational element over the passionate," and of "men over animals." "Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body or between men and animals, the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master." [13]

There is no difficulty, then, in answering the question "Is slavery a violation of nature?" "For that some should rule, and others be ruled is a thing, not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth some are marked out for subjection, others for rule. . . . And doubtless if men differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. . . . It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right." [14]

Because experience does not always conform to this natural order and that we sometimes find superior men enslaved by their inferiors, further explanation is required. This perversion of nature grows out of the fact that "the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention, according to which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right "many jurists impeach." The defense rests on the following argument. "Virtue when furnished with means, may be deemed to have the greatest power of doing violence: and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power is thought to imply virtue." This is hardly satisfactory. The question is, does virtue in this sense imply justice? "For what if the cause of the war be unjust? No one would ever say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold." [15]

This shows that "the rule of a master is not a conventional rule." Unless his authority is based upon natural superiority it is without rational sanction.

Pride of race, however, appears to have been sufficient to put a

[13] *Politics*, I, 5:7-8.
[14] *Ibid.*, I, 5:1-2 and 10.
[15] *Ibid.*, I, 6:1-5.

serious strain upon logic. The inherent racial and intellectual superiority of the Greek was assumed without the necessity of argument. "Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call themselves slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first, for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere." [16]

In this argument Aristotle presents the first scientific treatment of slavery. Its importance consists not primarily in its justification but in its accounting for slavery on the sociological principle that human institutions arise out of, and are implicit in, human nature.

INDIVIDUALISM VS. COMMUNISM

Private ownership of property and of families is assumed without specific argument. It is inferred necessarily from their origin and nature. The foundation of the family lies in the basic fact of sex attraction but it involves relations of larger social and ethical character. The existence and the continuance of the family implies property. It cannot persist without subsistence and services, that is, goods and slaves. "Property is a part of the household and therefore the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries." [17]

Book I, 8-13 is devoted to a dissertation on the art of money-making in which certain motives and methods are criticised because they violate the true principles of finance in that they fail to serve the ends of good living. He regards "usury" or the "birth of money from money" and the cornering of commodities, especially the "monopoly of provisions," as particularly reprehensible, and cites instances of high finance which he regards as injurious both to the individual and to the state. This discussion lies within the field of economics, and we pass it by. There is one phase of the subject, however, which requires consideration, namely, his theory of private property. As applied both to the family and to wealth it has a high degree of social significance. Aristotle would probably not have discussed communism at all, so foreign was it to his thinking, had it not been necessary to combat it in the writings of Plato—in *The Republic* and in *The Laws*.

He attacks Plato first upon his theory of domestic communism.

[16] *Politics*, I, 6:6.
[17] *Ibid.*, B. I, 4:1.

"There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution does not appear to be established by his arguments." [18]

Chief among Aristotle's arguments are the following:

(1) The unity advocated in *The Republic* is destructive of the diversity essential to the existence of the state. To Socrates' contention "that the greater unity of the state the better" he replies: "Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state?—since the nature of a state is to be a plurality. . . . So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. . . . In a state the elements out of which the unity is to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore, the principle of compensation (or reciprocal proportion) is the salvation of states." [19]

(2) What is everybody's business is nobody's business. "For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everybody thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfil. . . . Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually, but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike." [20]

(3) Dissensions will be increased rather than diminished and offenses will be more heinous. "Other evils against which it is not easy for the authors of such a community to guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as well as involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all of which are unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more likely to occur if the relationship is unknown, and when they have occurred, the customary expiations of them cannot be made." [21]

(4) Family communism is applied to the wrong group. "This community of wives and children seems better suited to the husbandmen

[18] *Politics*, II, 2:1.
[19] *Ibid.*, II, 2:2-3.
[20] *Ibid.*, II, 3-4.
[21] *Ibid.*, II, 4:1.

than to the guardians, for if they have wives and children in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel. In a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of that which good laws ought to have, and the intention of Socrates in making these regulations about women and children would defeat itself. . . . Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection—that a thing is your own and that you love it—neither can exist in such a state as this." [22]

He next attacks the theory of economic communism, although he does not speak with the same degree of assurance.

There are three possibilities in regard to common ownership: (1) "The soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common stock"; (2) "the soil may be common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce divided among individuals for their private use"; and (3) "the soil and the produce may be alike common." Each form has its difficulties. If they till the ground "the question of ownership will give a world of trouble." If the products are divided "those who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor little and consume much." Common property is always a cause of disputes as in partnerships where men "fall out" and "quarrel about any trifle which turns up." [23]

He is inclined to be conservative, and to regard the evolutionary method of bringing about needed reforms in the economic order as superior to the revolutionary method. "The present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of both systems." [24]

Property in general should be private, but he concedes the point that there are common uses to which it should be put. The particular advantages of private property are: (1) That when men have a "distinct interest . . . they will make more progress because everyone will be attending to his own business." (2) "Immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own" and (3) it stifles liberality, "for liberality consists in the use which is made of property."

The losses to society from a system of communism would far outweigh the gains. "Indeed, we see that there is much more quarreling among those who have all things in common, though there are not many

[22] *Politics*, II, 4:4-9.
[23] *Ibid.*, II, 5:2-4.
[24] *Ibid.*, II, 5:5.

of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private property." [25] He therefore criticizes the whole scheme of *The Republic* in this regard, as badly planned in regard to the different classes and as presenting insurmountable difficulties.[26]

Aristotle holds that "The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, *The Laws*," [27] and hence we need not go into details. We will content ourselves with the following facetious if not sarcastic comment: "The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected. . . . In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities." [28]

MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION

In extending his criticism of *The Laws*, Aristotle remarks: "It is said (in *The Laws*) that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two points,—the people and the country. But neighboring countries also must not be forgotten by him, if the state for which he legislates is to have a true political life." [29]

In this statement he reveals an attitude of mind that is thoroughly inductive and scientific and foreshadows the work of Montesquieu and Buckle in their interpretation of society as determined by the action of the physical environment. In Book VII he develops this theory with a degree of clearness not met with again till modern times.

"First among the materials required by the statesman is population: he will consider what should be the number and character of the citizens, and then what should be the size and character of the country. Most persons think that a state in order to be happy ought to be large; but even if they are right, they have no idea what is a large and what a small state. For they judge of the size of the city by the number of the inhabitants; whereas they ought to regard, not their number, but their power. . . . And even if we reckon greatness by numbers, we ought not to include everybody, for there must always be in cities a multitude of slaves and sojourners and foreigners; but we should include those only who are members of the state, and who form an essential part of it." [30]

[25] *Politics*, II, 5:12.
[26] *Cf. ibid.*, II, 5:13-28.
[27] *Ibid.*, II, 6:1.
[28] *Ibid.*, II, 6:6-7.
[29] *Ibid.*, II, 6:7.
[30] *Ibid.*, VII, 4:4-6.

There is an essentially modern tone to the suggestion that size and heterogeneity of population are elements in the determination of political and social character, and that they affect vitally the problem of self-government.

Two factors of importance are considered in respect to territory: (1) "Everyone would agree in praising the state which is most entirely self-sufficing; and that must be the state which is all-producing, for to have all things and to want nothing is sufficiency. In size and extent it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure." [31] (2) "As to the position of the city, if we could have what we wish, it should be well situated in regard both to sea and land." [32] The advantages to be secured by proper location are greater safety and convenience of commerce. These advantages would probably be offset by the consequent "introduction of strangers" and the increase of population, "both of which in an exaggerated degree are inimical to "good order" and "good government." [33]

Climatic factors are considered next with special reference to their effect upon the "character" of the people. "Those who live in a cold climate and in northern Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they keep their freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the best governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world." [34]

Aristotle goes still further in his analysis of the physical factors which affect human happiness. First, health is of prime importance and instead of its being a gift from the gods it is conditioned upon the proper location of the city with respect to pure air and water. "Cities which lie towards the east, and are blown upon by winds coming from the east, are the healthiest; next in healthfulness are those which are sheltered from the north wind, for they have a milder winter. . . . There should be a natural abundance of springs and fountains in the town, or, if there is a deficiency of them, great reservoirs may be established for the collection of rain-water. . . . For the elements which

[31] *Politics*, VII, 5:1-2.
[32] *Ibid.*, VII, 5:3.
[33] *Cf. Ibid.*, VII, 6:1-2.
[34] *Ibid.*, VII, 7:2-3.

we use most and oftenest for the support of the body contribute most to health, and among these are water and air." [35]

Second, housing and city planning are not to be overlooked in this connection. "The arrangement of private houses is considered to be more agreeable and generally more convenient, if the streets are regularly laid out after the modern fashion . . . but for security in war the antiquated mode of building, which made it difficult for strangers to get out of a town and for assailants to find their way in, is preferable. A city should therefore adopt both plans of building. . . . The whole town should not be laid out in straight lines, but only certain quarters and regions; thus security and beauty will be combined." [36]

In few modern writings is there exhibited a clearer perception of the working of cause and effect in human society and of the natural forces which govern human destinies.

EDUCATION

Aristotle's breadth of grasp and the originality of his conceptions in regard to social forces and processes is exhibited further in his theory of education. Human evolution on the basis of natural causation is going on continuously, yet its social direction which is the function of human intelligence is of equal importance.

"It follows then from what has been said that some things the legislator must find ready to his hand in a state, others he must provide. And therefore we can only say: May our state be constituted in such a manner as to be blessed with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we acknowledge her power): whereas virtue and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge and purpose. A city can be virtuous, only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the government; let us then inquire how a man becomes virtuous. . . . There are three things which make men good and virtuous: these are nature, habit, reason." [37]

Rightly understood these three things are qualities of man's original endowment but each may be "molded by the hand of the legislator," that is they are subject to training or control. Hence his emphasis on education. Beginning with a eugenic discussion of the biological qualities of "nature," which in comparison with the writings of Francis

[35] *Politics*, VII, 11:2-4.
[36] *Ibid.*, VII, 11:6-7.
[37] *Ibid.*, VII, 13:8-10.

Galton and Havelock Ellis may be regarded as ultra-radical, he advocates the training of habits and of reason through a broad system of public instruction under the direction and control of the state.

"In the first place, every one must be born a man and not some other animal," that is, he must have a human heredity and "he must have a certain character, both of body and soul." [38]

"Since the legislator should begin by considering how the frames of the children whom he is rearing may be as good as possible, his first care will be about marriage—at what age should his citizens marry; and who are fit to marry." [39]

He notes the effects of immaturity of parents upon their offspring, of the disparity of age of parents both upon children and upon domestic happiness, of injurious occupations and the dispiriting influence of misfortunes upon the bodies and disposition of children. He then discusses the qualifications of parenthood, fixes the ages at which men and women should enter marriage, advises the period of "north winds" as the proper season for procreation, and urges care in regard to prenatal influences.[40]

If in relation to these subjects his biology is unsound it is because he had to depend upon the "physicians" and "naturalists" of his day for his knowledge of the subject just as the present student of society must do. As knowledge advances conclusions must be revised. The method, however, is sound.

On the negative side his eugenic program is direct as it is severe. In order to keep the stock pure "let there be a law that no deformed child shall live," and to provide against excess of population "when couples have children in excess, and the state of feeling is averse to the exposure of offspring, let abortion be produced before sense and life have begun." [41]

The first concern of education, then, is that the children shall be well born. But since nature is capable of being altered by custom or habit, the second duty of the "Directors of Education" is "to have an eye to their bringing up," that is, to enhance the native qualities by proper nurture. This is a twofold task and relates to both body and mind. Special attention should be paid to diet, exercise, baths, and play. For the first five years "no demand should be made upon the child for study or labor, lest its growth be impaired." Until seven years

[38] *Politics*, VII, 13:11.
[39] *Ibid.*, VII, 16:1.
[40] *Cf. ibid.*, VII, 16.
[41] *Ibid.*, VII, 16:15.

of age children should be educated at home, but their education should consist in the formation of good habits and a proper outlook upon life, being protected from that which is illiberal and vicious.

In the third place, education should train the reason, a quality with which man alone is endowed. Since habit modifies nature, and reason modifies both, this is of fundamental importance. Two problems are considered, namely, its public control and its content.

The first is so obvious as to require no discussion. "Since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and that it should be public and not private,—not as at present, when everyone looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. . . . That education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of state is not to be denied." [42]

In regard to content, the case is not so simple. There is room here for differences of opinion. The two main questions being whether education is more concerned "with intellectual or moral virtue," or whether it is primarily cultural or practical. In regard to actual content of education Aristotle adds little to the curriculum of Plato. "The customary branches of education are in number four; they are (1) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, (3) music, to which some add (4) drawing. Of these "reading and writing and drawing are regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a variety of ways, and gymnastic exercises are thought to infuse courage. Concerning music a doubt may be raised—in our own day most men cultivate it for the sake of pleasure, but originally it was included in education, because nature herself, as has been often said, requires that we should be able, not only to work well, but to use leisure well. . . . It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which we must study with a view to the enjoyment of leisure, and these are to be valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are useful in business are to be deemed necessary, and exist for the sake of other things." [43]

Reading and writing are of practical value "in money-making, in the management of a household, in the acquisition of knowledge, and in political life." Drawing is useful "for a more correct judgment of the work of artists," but it also has a practical value in preventing mistakes

[42] *Politics*, VIII, 1:3 to 2:1.
[43] *Ibid.*, VIII, 3:1-7.

in purchases or sales. Gymnastic exercises in moderation give health, strength and courage, but in excess they injure the body and stunt growth. It is the function of musical training to instruct, to entertain and usefully to employ leisure, but it has the higher function of influencing the disposition, of awakening noble sentiments and heroic moods. It possesses a moral value which constitutes for him its chief justification as a legitimate part of the curriculum of public instruction.[44]

Here then is presented a scheme of education which for breadth of grasp, vigor of conception, and completeness of arrangement is scarcely surpassed by the most modern educational programs. It aims not merely at the impartation of useful knowledge, but at the development of the highest type of responsible citizenship. Its purpose is the highest attainment of human personality and the greatest achievement of human liberty consistent with the good of the individual and of the well-being and security of the state.

In concluding this survey of Aristotle's social philosophy we present Ellwood's comments upon his method and upon his place in the history of social thought.

"The chief value of the study of Aristotle to the modern sociologist lies in the matter of method. Aristotle's method was on the whole realistic and inductive, and yet in the spirit of his treatment he was philosophical, without bias or trace of 'one-sided' views. He started with the facts in human society as they presented themselves to him, and sought for their explanation in the nature of man, without any *metaphysical* assumption as to the relation of man to his physical environment. In thus explaining human society in terms of man rather than in terms of the physical universe, Aristotle was, I believe, truly scientific in his method. He sought furthermore to reason from purely empirical data to general principles, correlating his conclusions with all known facts. . . .

"Aristotle must be put at the beginning, not at the end of social philosophy. Just because he was the first truly scientific social thinker, his theories must not be taken as final nor considered as the embodiment of the full truth. Nor must they be hastily condemned because they in some places jar upon our modern feelings or fail to fit in with modern conditions. Their true worth can be perceived only when they are viewed in their historical perspective. . . . The calmness of Aristotle's reasoning and the sanity of his theories, as compared with those of many

[44] *Cf. Politics,* VIII, 3:7 to 5:25.

modern writers, will be found a wholesome corrective for much of the 'scientific' speculation of the present. . . . Taking Aristotle as a starting point and noticing the development of social thought since his day would clarify the atmosphere of social speculation wonderfully; while some of the old Greek concepts of man and society might still be found to be well worth exploiting." [45]

LIKENESSES AND CONTRASTS IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

Both Plato and Aristotle were intellectual geniuses of the first rank. Both possessed those natural endowments which impelled them to the pursuit of knowledge and in turn qualified them to become great teachers. Equally concerned in the problems of philosophy they both perceived that human nature and human society were the most profound subjects of philosophic contemplation. Both shared alike the sincerest interest in the public welfare and both spent their lives in unstinted devotion to the public good.

Nevertheless there were contrasts in their natures and in their methods as remarkable as were these similarities.

Plato was philosophic and deductive in his reasoning modified only slightly, in his latest work, by the scientific spirit. Aristotle was essentially scientific and inductive but not entirely freed from the philosophic habit of mind.

Plato was visionary and synthetic. He was impressed by cosmic unity. He saw things in the large and thus constructed his system by the processes of logic unhampered by the facts of experience or the historical order. Aristotle on the contrary was matter of fact and analytic. He was impressed by cosmic diversity. He resolved everything into its elements and created a system out of experience disciplined by historic processes and facts.

Plato began with hypotheses which were the natural product of contemporary society and reached subjective conclusions by strictly logical processes. Aristotle began in the same way but his method was objective. He subjected his hypotheses to the test of concrete facts and of historic knowledge.

Plato conceived of society as utilitarian, growing out of the perception of human needs. It is a construct of the mind and is, in a sense, artificial. Man builds his society like he builds his house. Aristotle regarded society as a work of nature, the product of man's sociable in-

[45] *Op. cit.*, pp. 72-4.

stincts. It is not a work of art but a growth. Society evolves from natural forces like an animal or a plant.

With Plato society had its origin in the nature of the mind which perceives advantage in social adjustment. This foreshadows the later doctrines of the social contract. With Aristotle society originated in those natural impulses which create the family, the tribe, the village and the state. This leads to the modern organic concept of social origins.

Plato sat in the comfortable home of his friend Polemarchus in the Piraeus and constructed his city from the materials contained in his mind and in the minds of his companions, appealing to reason to support his theories.

Aristotle collected one hundred fifty or more constitutions of Hellenic and barbarian states, and deduced therefrom a thesis which he confirmed by a comparative study of existing Greek and non-Greek communities.

Plato emphasized chiefly the psychic factors of civilization while Aristotle stressed the physical and biologic factors.

Notwithstanding these characteristic differences, some of which may have been somewhat overstressed for the sake of bringing them into bold relief, Plato and Aristotle unite finally in presenting to us each in his own way in *The Republic* and in *The Politics* the most complete philosophy of human life and society to be found outside the sociological writings of the present day.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. Compare Aristotle's theory of the origin of society with that of Plato as presented in the previous chapter. *Cf.* H. E. Barnes, *Sociology before Comte, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXIII, Sept. 1917, pp. 179-81.
2. Discuss the relation of the individual to society in *The Republic* and in *The Politics* and compare these with C. H. Cooley's theory in *Human Nature and the Social Order,* Ch. I.
3. What evidence is there in this chapter or in a more complete study of *The Politics* to justify Dunning in the statement that Aristotle is not purely inductive? *Cf.* W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval,* p. 51.
4. Is Aristotle correct in his criticism that Plato advocates a unity which, if realized, would destroy the state?
5. Contrast the views of Plato and Aristotle in regard to the equality or inferiority of women as compared with men.
6. Compare Aristotle's explanation of the effect of geographic and climatic factors on civilization with that of Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws,* Vol. I, Books XIV-XVIII. Also Buckle, *History of Civilization in England,* Ch. II.
7. Is Montesquieu correct in his criticism of Aristotle's views on slavery? Are his views more in harmony with modern concepts? *Cf. The Spirit of the Laws,* Vol. I, Book XV (especially Ch. VII).
8. Discuss the chief characteristics of Aristotle's program of education emphasized by F. H. Giddings in *Democracy and Empire,* Ch. XIV.

CHAPTER III

LATE GREEK AND EARLY ROMAN WRITERS

HISTORIC BACKGROUND

THE disintegration of the Macedonian Empire began at once upon the death of Alexander, in 323 B.C. Perdiccas, whom the conqueror chose upon his death-bed to become his successor, proved incapable of the task. Several empires arose from the ruins but none was able to cope either with the forces of internal strife or with the rapidly rising power of the new empire of the West. The Greeks, always in a state of chronic revolt against Macedonian control, rebelled upon the news of Alexander's death and carried on for two years the unsuccessful Ionian War. The final attempt to restore Grecian independence resulted in the organization of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues in 281 and 280 respectively. The former comprised a federation of the cities of Achaea and the Peloponnesus. The latter was little more than a league of the half civilized tribes of the mountainous interior for military purposes. For nearly a century and a half some semblance of political independence was maintained, but with the destruction of Corinth, the most important city of Greece since the fall of Athens, the Leagues were destroyed and Greece became a Roman province. Thus ended the long and spectacular drama of ancient Grecian civilization.

The scene now shifts to the Italian peninsula. For several centuries there had been growing up through the consolidation of various racial groups inhabiting Latium, the region south of the Tiber, a virile and powerful state which was destined to eclipse the Persian and Macedonian empires and to rival Greece itself in its influence upon the course of civilization.

From the legendary founding of Rome in 753 B.C. there appears to have been a progressive development of government in the hands of kings, at first little more than powerful tribal chieftains, who because of increasing tyranny were expelled in 509, only one year later than the expulsion of the tyrants from Athens.

The period of the Republic from 509 to 31 was one of expansion and national integration. The first century and a half was consumed

in border warfare with surrounding nations but through the successful Romanization of Southern Etruria by 396, the expulsion of the Gauls who sacked Rome in 390, the overthrow of the Etruscan power, the success of the Samnite wars and the conquering of Tarentum, Rome by 272 had become complete mistress of Italy south of the Arnos and the Rubicon, and a thirst for further conquest had been created.

Her most formidable rival was the Carthaginian Empire embracing the south shore of the Mediterranean from the greater Syrtis to the Pillars of Hercules, and including Southern Spain, Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily, with the exception of Syracuse.

In 264 Rome obtained a foothold in Sicily and in 256 made a brilliant but unsuccessful attempt to capture Syracuse. After two disastrous naval attempts the Romans finally destroyed the Carthaginian fleet and challenged successfully Phoenician supremacy on the Mediterranean which had been held for centuries. A treaty of peace was signed in 241 by which Carthage agreed to pay heavy indemnities.

Rome now realized the necessity of the control of the sea. Sardinia and Corsica were conquered and made Roman provinces, and Illyrian pirates were driven from the Adriatic. Meanwhile the Gauls were subdued in Northern Italy and the Roman boundaries were extended to the Alps.

The Carthaginians now decided to recoup their losses by further conquests in Spain. Hannibal acceded to the command in 221 and in two years pushed the Carthaginian boundaries to the Ebro. In 219 he attacked the city of Saguntum on the East coast, a city under the Roman protectorate, and thus precipitated the second Punic war. Crossing the Alps in the fall of 218 he advanced upon Italy, defeating the Roman armies at Ticinus, Trebbia and Cannae. Capua, having seceded, offered Hannibal quarters where he awaited reinforcements from Spain. Meanwhile the Romans laid siege to Syracuse, an ally of Carthage, and in 212 the city was destroyed. Hasdrubal, in an attempt to reinforce his brother Hannibal, was defeated at Metaurus; Scipio drove the Carthaginians out of Spain and led an army into Africa. Hannibal was recalled from Italy to protect Carthage and at Zama met his first and final defeat. Carthage was again compelled to sue for peace.

The victorious Romans next turned their attention to the punishment of Philip V of Macedon for his friendly alliance with Hannibal. Philip was defeated in Thessaly and required to free all Greek cities under his dominion. The war was then carried into Syria and by the defeat of Antiochus the Great, the larger part of Asia Minor passed in

190 under the sway of Rome. An uprising in Macedonia under Perses against Rome in 168 resulted in the utter and final destruction of the Persian empire in the famous battle of Pydna. In order to maintain the subjugation of the recalcitrant Grecian cities a thousand citizens were carried to Rome as hostages where they were held for seventeen years. Upon their release and return to Greece vehement hostility against Roman rule resulted in rebellion. Rome at once sent an army into Greece and the city of Corinth was laid in ruins. The same year, 146, witnessed the downfall of Carthage. For years Rome had planned her destruction. In 150 the Roman army had landed at Utica, but for four years the Carthaginians had withstood the siege. At last the city was taken by storm and utterly devastated and the Semitic empire became a thing of the past.

The last century of the Republic witnessed the further conquest of Spain, Syria and Palestine by Pompey, and Caesar's conquest of Gaul, Britain and Egypt. At the death of Julius Caesar in the year 44 the power of Rome encircled the Mediterranean. But disintegration like that of Alexander's empire impended. Rival aspirants threatened to disrupt the state, but the final triumph of Octavius, afterward honored by the Senate with the title of Augustus, in his victory in the battle of Actium secured the reins of government and gave to the crumbling Republic a new lease of life which lasted as an empire for five centuries.

Social and political life during the period thus briefly sketched reveal conditions which were reflected in the meager social interpretations important in the early history of both Greece and Rome.

The city state with its local autonomy was completely crushed through the creation of a powerful military despotism. The Greeks learned too late the value of coöperation. The constitutional systems created by the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues were powerless before the growing imperial power. While Rome began as a monarchistic city state and achieved greatness as a Republic the militaristic spirit always inimical to democratic institutions dominated the latter part of the Republican period and finally achieved the Empire.

For two centuries after the fall of the Tarquins and the beginning of the Roman Republic in 509, the class struggle between the Patricians and the Plebeians was significant in the development of social and political institutions. It was a struggle for social equality. It ended in social and racial amalgamation and in the equalization of citizenship. From this point dates the aggressive career of the Roman state.

Another important fact was the further discoveries in regard to

racial unity. The conquests of Alexander and of Caesar created new civilizations through the fusion of races and cultures of the greatest diversity on an international scale. The barriers between Greek and barbarian were broken down when Athenian civilization was merged with Asiatic and Egyptian. Further foundations were laid for world citizenship when Rome added the nations of Western Europe to the international complex. The great doctrine of the universal brotherhood of man with all its social consequences was forced upon the consideration of reflecting minds. At least universal citizenship on the basis of universal law was an accomplished fact which required analysis and interpretation.

And yet it can hardly be said that the times were productive of social philosophy. It was a period rather of empire building, and imperial forces are ruthless and are little influenced by the teachings of philosophy. Ethics was divorced from politics and public policies emanated from the court of Alexander or the Roman Senate. Little is to be expected therefore in the way of comprehensive social philosophy. Only a few fragments may be gleaned from this period which may be regarded as important in the development of social theory.

The teachings of the Stoics and the Epicureans, of Polybius, of Cicero and of Seneca, have been selected somewhat arbitrarily to illustrate the social thinking of the age.

LATE GREEK WRITERS

THE STOICS

Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, was born in Citium on the island of Cyprus about 340 B.C. His father, Mnaseas, of Phoenician origin, was a merchant of Cyprus. Zeno for a time engaged in business, but suffered reverses of fortune through shipwreck, after which he went to Athens, where he came into contact with Crates, the Cynic, about 320. Ten years were devoted to study. Becoming dissatisfied with the narrow views of the Cynics he became a pupil of Stylpo and later of the Academicians, Xenocrates and Polemo. At about 310 he founded his school, delivering his lectures from the Stoa, from which his school derived its name. Here he taught for approximately forty years, gathering about him a group of scholars, who accepted and extended his views. He lived a life of singular moderation, and although he is said to have never enjoyed robust health he arrived at old age untouched by disease. Regarding a slight injury to a finger as a hint

of destiny he ended his life by suicide in accordance with his philosophy about the year 260.

Social Philosophy

We are concerned only with those doctrines which affect social theory. Of chief importance was the doctrine of cosmopolitanism. It was the outgrowth of a philosophy of nature on the one hand and of political developments on the other. The conception of the world was a materialistic pantheism. Nature is the sole reality and its manifestations reveal immutable processes of causation. There is then a soul of things, the Logos, or rational principle, everywhere present and producing a unity in nature. This active principle is regarded as universal reason or destiny. Expressed in religious terms it is Providence or Zeus. This monistic conception regards the diversity of phenomena as merely emanations from one great unity, Nature, and since the essence of this unity is Reason, everything may be reduced to an intelligible scheme.

Human life attains the ideal in the degree to which it conforms to this uniformity of natural law. Human reason, therefore, is the means of securing this uniformity. The goal of philosophy can be attained only by the suppression of emotional elements and by indifference to material considerations. Furthermore it is through conformity to this universal reason, imminent in nature, that all races exhibit a spiritual likeness which creates the concept of universal brotherhood. Zeno was probably the more capable of grasping this broader concept and of minimizing the distinction between Greek and barbarian because of his own half-Greek origin. Furthermore Zeller remarks: "It was far easier for philosophy to overcome national dislikes after the genial Macedonian conqueror had united the various nationalities comprised within his monarchy, not only under a central government, but also in a common culture. Hence the Stoic citizenship of the world may be appealed to, to prove the assertion that philosophic schools reflect the existing facts of history." [1]

The Stoic philosophy provided also a theory of social origin that possessed both Aristotelian and Platonic elements. Likenesses and sympathies which result in collective conduct find their origin in like adaptation of differing men to common objective factors of environment. The result is conformity to type. But this type mind is a

[1] *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, p. 237.

differentiation from universal reason. It is by virtue of this reason that man feels a desire for society, and seeks to identify himself as a part with the whole. He is therefore impelled to merge his interests with those of the group. It is this common consciousness of unity that creates and maintains society.

A most important corollary of Stoic philosophy was the doctrine of passive non-resistance or self-composure. As a product of nature human destiny was fixed. As the result of an inner harmony of soul, happiness could not be affected by external conditions. Poverty or riches, social or political conditions were matters of indifference. Ascetic endurance of pain, of social injustice, of political oppression, constituted true virtue. It was only by this type of philosophy that the citizen could free himself from the depressing effects of a decadent civilization and retain that mental composure which is essential to happiness.

Stoic philosophy was a product of, and therefore not a guide to, Greek civilization. In Rome in the teachings of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius it bore some fruit. It was upon Christianity which absorbed its doctrines of asceticism and human brotherhood that its greatest influence was exerted.

EPICUREANISM

Epicurus was born at Gargettos on the island of Samos, the same year or the year following the birth of his great contemporary Zeno. His father, Neocles, was an Athenian. His early education seems to have been neglected, at least he made the claim to have been self-taught. Though his knowledge of philosophy was superficial, at the time he appeared as a public teacher he shows some familiarity with the writings of Democritus and of Plato. At about the age of eighteen he visited Athens and probably came under the influence of Xenocrates. For a time he traveled in Ionia and Asia Minor and later opened a school at Mytilene in the island of Lesbos. In 306 he returned to Athens and purchased an estate and in his own gardens conducted his school. About him there soon gathered a coterie of devoted friends, attracted alike by the charm of his personality and the strangeness of his doctrines. A peculiarity of his school was that it attracted a group of women, some of whom his enemies charged with being hetaerae. For thirty-six years Epicurus conducted his school and, though more bitterly attacked than any teacher of his time, he impressed upon his students and in turn upon

their followers a stamp which remained unchanged through the centuries. His personal life appears to have been above reproach. Spurning the Stoic recommendation of suicide as the philosophic escape from suffering he endured the pain of his last illness with great fortitude and died a natural death in 270 at the age of seventy.

Social Philosophy

That the same environment should produce such opposite results seems rather remarkable, but in some respects the divergence is more apparent than real. The natural reaction to cosmopolitanism was individualism. Like Stoicism, Epicureanism had two main roots, one in the personal bent of its author and the other in his reaction to the political and social environment. Very early in his career through reflection upon the teachings of Democritus, Epicurus became skeptical in regard to the superstitious practices of the times. He perceived that the greatest obstacle to human happiness was the fear of the gods and the hereafter. It is not the part of wisdom to throw away or to sacrifice life which can be enjoyed only once, for an uncertain future. This does not imply, as his critics assumed, that one should therefore indulge in acts of profligacy or forbidden pleasures. On the contrary, while happiness is the real end and aim of life it is secured through such pleasures as reason approves. Excesses of all kinds should be avoided on account of their painful effects. Simple and natural joys give poise to the mind. It is not by crushing the senses, as the Stoics argued, that contentment is to be secured, but by their discipline and regulation. The Stoic goal was sought by a different route.

This general view colored the attitude of Epicurus toward all experience. He despised education and culture that was not utilitarian. Unless it contributed directly to human happiness it was "learned rubbish." The study of science is valuable, not for its own sake, but for the light it throws upon the processes of nature by which a rational interpretation of the world is obtained and the mind freed from the shackles of superstition. It is ignorance of nature that permits the interposition of supernatural interference and the hypothesis of future existence. It is the business of science to divest the mind of the vague hopes and disquieting fears which distract it and which render it incapable of present enjoyment. Were it not for the fear of the gods and of death the study of science would be superfluous.

With regard to ethics and virtue we have the same utilitarian concept. Virtue for its own sake has no attraction. It is the pleasure that

is derived from the practice of virtue that gives virtue its importance. It is the purpose of ethics to make life tranquil and peaceful. The center of his ethical theory, therefore, is the individual, and he opposes to the pursuit of pleasure only such moral restraints as expediency and prudence demand. Immoral behavior is eschewed only because it disturbs the tranquillity of mind in which happiness consists. It is not surprising that such a utilitarian concept of ethics should have been misunderstood or misrepresented by his critics, and by some of his pretended followers. Rogers summarizes this point well: "Pleasure and virtue are synonymous with Epicurus; it is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and well and justly; it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly." [2]

Epicurean social philosophy was the direct antithesis of the Stoic. Society exists for individuals, and is created by them. Social and legal relations rest wholly upon individual self-interest. Thus the teachings of Aristotle and the Stoics was reversed. Society does not create and mold the individual but individuals create and mold society. Men consciously enter into social relations in order to escape the evils of a non-social or pre-social existence. In this sense the utilitarianism of Plato is reflected and a foundation is laid for the doctrine of the social contract. Society is a convention for individual advantage and the citizen will be interested only so far as that advantage is secured. The political significance of this doctrine is emphasized by Dunning: "The practical teaching of Epicureanism was that of submission to any form of political authority that was attended by peace and order. To the devotees of this school it was a matter of total indifference whether the quiet which he demanded was due to smoothly working constitutional government or to efficient despotism. Hence the Macedonian garrison was to him as good a political sovereign as any other. The suitability of such a philosophy to the life of Hellas after Alexander is self-evident." [3]

In summarizing the likenesses and differences of the Stoics and Epicureans Zeller makes the following pertinent comment: "But whilst recommending a living for society, both systems take no real interest in social life. The recognition of a natural society amongst mankind, of certain positive relations to state and family, above all, a clear enunciation of citizenship of the world characterized the Stoics. The pursuit of friendship and the gentle humanity of their ethics characterized the Epicureans: together with these peculiarities one common feature

[2] *Students' History of Philosophy*, p. 135.
[3] *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval*, p. 103.

cannot be ignored. Both have renounced the political character of the old propriety of conduct and diverting their attention from public life seek to find a basis for universal morality in the simple relations of man to man." [4]

EARLY ROMAN WRITERS

The Roman mind was descriptive rather than philosophic. It was concerned with matters of legal and practical character and was little interested in creating philosophical systems. By conquest and assimilation the Romans acquired a superior knowledge of ethnic facts and forces but the use made of such information was to advance political and legal systems rather than to construct legal and social philosophy. While Roman writers contributed little to social theory, there is much of descriptive analysis concerning nations and races that is of value to the social student. Good examples of this type are Caesar's *Gallic Wars,* and Tacitus' *Germania.* (In order to test the scope of social information contained in the *Germania,* the author at one time classified the paragraphs on the basis of Giddings' *Inductive Sociology* and found material for all the main categories of classification, Social Population, Social Mind, Social Organization, and Social Welfare, and for most of the minor subdivisions.)

Such fragments of social philosophy as are to be found among Roman writers are in the main reflections from the later Greek writers or the modifications of theories under Roman conditions.

POLYBIUS

Polybius was born in Megalopolis in Arcadia about the beginning of the second century B.C. His father, Lycortas, was the leading statesman of the Achaean League. Polybius himself became prominent in public affairs, serving as a commander of cavalry and engaging in diplomatic affairs. After the Greek defeat at Pydna he was carried to Rome among the thousand hostages and was assigned to the home of the victorious general, Aemilius Paulus. He was retained in Rome for seventeen years during which time he enjoyed the confidence of many noted Romans, even accompanying Scipio, the younger, on some of his military expeditions. During his involuntary exile he developed great admiration for the Roman system of government and became reconciled to the fate of his own country in view of the achievements of the "new

[4] *Op. cit.,* p. 506.

favorites of fortune." It was during this period also that he began his great forty-volume history of Rome, completing a large part of the work. Of great physical force and mental vigor, he died at the age of eighty-two as a result of a fall from his horse.

Social Philosophy

Often referred to as the last of the Greek writers, Polybius is here classified under the Roman, because he wrote as a historian of Rome and because he was the first interpreter of the new Graeco-Roman civilization in which the Hellenic was being absorbed. Three elements in his teaching seem sufficiently important to justify including him in our survey.

First is his emphasis on causation. Beginning with the concept of "Fortune" or the "inscrutable will of Deity" as the dynamic force in history he arrives finally at the conclusion that it is unnecessary to posit an extra-natural power for the explanation of events. Their causes lie in the natural world and it is only necessary to discover them in order to render an extraneous explanation superfluous. Everything is the result of cause whether in history or in contemporary experience and its discovery is the business of the historian. He thus injects a new critical element into history and stimulates the motive of research. History with Polybius becomes pragmatic. In his search for causes of political and social institutions in soil, climate and situation we might almost say that with him began the new science of historiography. In this method he follows Aristotle and forecasts the work of Bodin, Montesquieu and Buckle.

In the second place we may note his doctrine of recurring political cycles, a doctrine contained in germ at least in the teachings of Plato and the later Stoics, but elaborated and given currency in his writings. He begins with a pre-social state in which social organization does not exist. The population is sparse and only the gregarious instinct drives men into coöperation. The strongest acquire domination and kingly rule is established. This in turn becomes oligarchy and is overthrown by popular revolt and democracy arises. When democracy deteriorates it becomes mob rule or ochlocracy with resulting violence and anarchy. Complete disintegration is averted by the rise of a new despot and a new cycle begins. His theory of the pre-social state is developed later in the "State of Nature" doctrine of the social contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, and his doctrine of recurring political cycles survives still in the popular phrase "History repeats itself."

In the third place, and as a corollary of the cyclical theory, he deduced the doctrine of "checks and balances" influential in later political theory. While the three forms of constitution, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, contain respectively the elements of their own disintegration, it is possible by the exercise of reason to counteract these influences. Historic instances are found in Sparta, and more particularly in Rome. The Roman government contained all three forms in harmonious adjustment, the consuls, the senate and the popular assembly. A proper balance of the powers vested in these three political functions guarantee the perpetuation of the state and prevent normal disintegration. Later political events shook his confidence in the superiority of even the Roman mixed constitution to prevent decay and strengthened his original doctrine of anacyclosis.

CICERO

Marcus Tullius Cicero was born at Arpinum, seventy miles southeast of Rome, January 3, 106 B.C. His father, a wealthy knight of Sabine origin, of the same name, provided him with a liberal education. At different times he studied Greek literature, poetry, philosophy, law, logic and rhetoric. He traveled extensively in Greece and Asia Minor. About the year 79 he married an heiress, Terentia by name, from whom he was later divorced. Several years later he remarried. By the age of thirty he was recognized as the greatest poet, orator, lawyer and statesman Rome had thus far produced. He held various public offices as Quaestor in Sicily in the year 75, Aedile in 69, Praetor Urbanus in 67, and the Consulship in 63. He defeated the famous conspiracy of Catiline, for which he was accorded supreme honor. Following his consulship he was tendered the governorship of a province, which he declined and retired to a position in the senate. In 60 he opposed the coalition of the triumvirs, Caesar, Croesus and Pompey, as a menace to the Republic and was banished in 58. He was recalled by a bill of restoration in 57 and returned to Rome with great honor. The years 57 to 44 he devoted to writing and to the practice of law, pleading several notable cases in the courts. Upon the assassination of Caesar, which he approved, he delivered his philippics against Mark Antony and denounced the second triumvirate consisting of Octavius, Antony and Lepidus as a coalition dangerous to the state. This resulted in his proscription. Friends advised him to flee for his life but he protested: "Let me die in my fatherland which I have so often saved." Never-

theless he was hurried toward the coast but was overtaken by the forces of Antony near his Formian Villa and assassinated December 7, 43.

Social Philosophy

There is little originality in Cicero's philosophy. It is rather a summation of the theory of his time. There are a few theoretical observations, however, which reflect distinct Roman reactions and which throw light upon the progress of social and political ideas.

Cicero imitated Plato and Aristotle in constructing a commonwealth. Like Plato he employs a form of dialogue in which Scipio plays the rôle of philosopher, but unlike Plato he constructs the state from material furnished by the Roman Republic. He says "I shall also more easily execute my task if I thus exhibit to you our political constitution in its infancy, progress and maturity, now so firm and fully established, than if, after the example of Socrates in the books of Plato, I were to delineate a mere imaginary republic." [5]

The Republic was followed, in further imitation of Plato, by his treatise on *The Laws*, designed as a supplement to *The Republic*. The former work deals with general principles, the latter with their specific applications.

First of all we may call attention to his theory of the origin and nature of society. In this he follows Aristotle rather than Plato. "A commonwealth is a constitution of the entire people—The people, however, is not every association of men however congregated, but the association of the entire number bound together by the compact of justice and the communication of utility (community of interest). The first cause of this association is not so much the weakness of man as the spirit of association which naturally belongs to him—for the human race is not a race of isolated individuals wandering and solitary, but it is so constituted for society that even in the affluence of all things, and without any need of reciprocal assistance, it spontaneously seeks society.

It is necessary to presuppose the original germs of sociality since we cannot discover any primal convention or compact, which gave rise to constitutional patriotism any more than the other virtues." [6]

The initial cause of society then resides in the "presupposition" of the social instincts of man, rather than in his perception of utility. That the commonwealth is a natural growth and not an initial compact is ably set forth in his description of the development of the Roman State. He

[5] Barham, *Political Works of Cicero*, VI, p. 204.
[6] *The Republic*, Book I, Barham, Vol. I, p. 172.

says: "Our Roman constitution, on the contrary, did not spring from the genius of one individual, but of many, and it was established, not in the life time of a man but in the course of ages and centuries. For there never yet existed a genius so vast and comprehensive as to allow nothing to escape its attention, and all the geniuses in the world united in a single mind could never within the limits of a single life exert a foresight sufficiently extensive to embrace and harmonize all, without the aid of experience and practice." [7]

We have here a clear perception of social organization as the product of man's instinctive social nature reacting in a particular physical environment, disciplined by experience and knowledge and requiring the time element for its completion.

He attacks further the theory of utility as the basis of justice in the state. Justice does not arise out of human experience varying with circumstances as men strive to realize their interests.

"For of all the questions on which our philosophers argue, there is none which it is more important thoroughly to understand than this that man is born for justice and that law and equity are not a mere establishment of opinion, but an institution of nature. This truth will become still more apparent if we investigate the nature of human association and society.

There is no one thing more like to another, more homogeneous and analogous, than man is to man, and if the corruption of customs and the variation of opinions had not induced an imbecility of minds and turned them aside from the course of nature, no one would more nearly resemble himself than all men would resemble all men. Therefore, whatever definition we give of man it must include the whole human race. And this is a good argument that no portion of mankind can be heterogeneous or dissimilar from the rest; because if this were the case one definition could not include all men.

In fact, reason, which alone gives us so many advantages over beasts by means of which we conjecture, argue, refute, discourse, and accomplish and conclude our designs, is assuredly common to all men; for the faculty of acquiring knowledge is similar in all human minds though the knowledge itself may be endlessly diversified." [8]

"It follows then in our line of argument that nature made us just that we might participate our goods with each other and supply each other's wants. You observe in this discussion whenever I speak of

[7] *The Republic*, Book I, Barham, p. 204.
[8] *The Laws*, Book I, Barham, p. 45.

nature, I mean nature in its genuine purity and not in the corrupt state which is displayed by the depravity of evil custom, which is so great that the natural and innate flame of virtue is often almost extinguished and stifled by the antagonist vices, which are accumulated around it." [9]

Political and social morality is absolute and derives its force from a principle of nature that lies behind all manifestations. The Stoic concept of nature is thus revived with emphasis. True reason accords with this principle which is "constant and permanent." Justice is something independent of the character and consciousness of men. It is for this reason that the various states coördinated in the Roman political system exhibited common characters. Only where conformity to this principle of innate justice is found does the *res publica* exist. Injustice under whatever form of government destroys the very existence of the state.

The logic of Cicero's theory of human nature bears directly upon all the relations of organized society. We are familiar with Aristotle's philosophy of human inequality. Men differ in native endowments and even slavery was justified as a law of nature.[10] Political events since Aristotle's day made way for a different concept. Cicero therefore sets up and defends the doctrine of the natural equality of men. This equality exhibited among all nations is one of the most common facts of observation. Men differ in achievement but not in capacity. Common standards of morals are found among the most diverse peoples. Where discrepancies do exist it is not due to inherent differences in moral nature, but to perversions. All men are capable of guidance and to the attainment of common virtues.

There is thus swept away not only the distinction between contemporary nationalities but between the civilized man and the savage, and between the master and slave. He commends kindness to slaves and suggests their equality at least with hired labor.

In this theory of natural equality there is laid the basis of two important doctrines, the idea of human brotherhood which held such a prominent place in the teachings of early Christianity, and the more modern doctrine of liberty, fraternity, and equality so important in the period of the French Revolution.

SENECA

Lucius Annaeus Seneca was born at Cordoba, Spain, 4 or 3 B.C., of Spanish-Roman ancestry. His father, Annaeus Seneca, was a wealthy

[9] *The Laws,* Book I, Barham, p. 48.
[10] *Cf.* Ch. 2.

and influential citizen of literary tastes who devoted much time to the study of rhetoric. The younger Seneca was educated in Rome, being interested chiefly in philosophy. He soon became prominent as an orator and public pleader, achieving many "forensic triumphs." He traveled extensively in Greece. In the year 41 A.D. he was banished to Corsica for alleged intimacy with the daughter of Germanicus but was recalled in 49 through the influence of Agrippina and appointed as tutor of her youthful son, Nero. During this period he did most of his writing, which included letters, essays, orations, epigrams, and tragedies. Upon the accession of Nero to the throne in 54, Seneca remained as his preceptor. For five years the great moralist exerted a controlling influence at court. After Nero's defection and the assassination of Burrus in 62 Seneca resigned his position, but his petition was refused. Without the emperor's consent he withdrew. In 65 he was accused of complicity in the conspiracy of Piso, and Nero ordered him to commit suicide, which he did by opening his veins.

Social Philosophy

Seneca's period falls outside that described in the historical survey at the beginning of this chapter, but his thought, little influenced by the change from the Republic to the Empire, belongs to the period under review. His concepts of nature and justice are practically identical with those of Cicero. He adopts Cicero's view of slavery but elaborates it. All men are descended from a common source and hence nobility is common to all. Men become slaves through the exigencies of fortune. Bondage pertains only to their bodies while their minds remain free. The later legal theories of equality find ample confirmation in the writings of Cicero.

In one important essential Seneca differs from Cicero, namely, in his theory of social origin. In his theory of the Golden Age, borrowed no doubt from Hesiod's scheme of the Five Ages,[11] he gave currency to an idea which in modified forms has survived through eighteen centuries.

Carlyle summarizes the theory admirably as follows: "Behind the conventional institutions of society there lay a condition in which these institutions had no place. Before the existing age there was an age when men lived under other conditions, in other circumstances, an age which was called the golden. In this primitive age men lived in happiness and in the enjoyment of each other's society. They were incorrupt in

[11] *Cf.* Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 187.

nature, innocent, though not wise. They were lofty of soul, newly sprung from the gods, but they were not perfect or completely developed in mind or soul. They were innocent but their innocence was rather the result of ignorance than of virtue; they had the material out of which virtue could grow rather than virtue itself, for this properly only belongs to the soul trained and taught and practiced; men are born to virtue but not in possession of it. It is important to notice these points in Seneca's theory, for they serve to differentiate his position from that of some later theorists of the state of nature. In this primitive state men lived together in peace and happiness, having all things in common; there was no private property. We may infer that there could have been no slavery and there was no coercive government. . . . Order there was and that of the best kind, for men followed nature without fail and the best and wisest men were their rulers. They guided and directed men for their good and were gladly obeyed as they commanded wisely and justly. The heaviest punishment they could threaten was expulsion from their territories." [12] One observation upon this theory will serve to emphasize its importance for future interpretations.

The institutions of society do not owe their origin to the natural conditions of human progress as with Aristotle, or to perceived utility as with Plato, but to the corruption of human nature. Their miseries begin as soon as men degenerate from this state of innocence and negative virtue. Avarice and greed disrupt the primitive communism and thirst for power destroys the simplicity of the benevolent rulership of the wise. A condition which ought easily to be maintained, because men are rational above all other beings and should live according to nature, is made impossible "by that universal madness which possesses mankind." Hence the necessity of social and political organization in order to curb these evil propensities. Seneca's conception of primitive human society corresponds very closely with the ancient Hebrew tradition of man's original innocence and fall,[13] and with the further development of this view by the Christian Fathers.

[12] *Mediæval Political Theory in the West*, p. 23.
[13] *Cf. Genesis*, Chs. 2 and 3.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. How does the Stoic theory of Causation differ from that of Polybius? How do both theories differ from the concepts of modern science? *Cf.* Karl Pearson, *Grammar of Science,* Introduction.
2. What were the historic and philosophic influences which account for the wide divergence of the contemporaneous views of Plato and Aristotle, of Stoics and Epicureans? *Cf.* previous chapters.
3. What are the similarities and contrasts in the Stoic and Epicurean doctrine of passive non-resistance? How do these correspond with modern theories?
4. Contrast Cicero's ideas of Justice with those of Plato. *Cf.* Ch. I.
5. What light is thrown upon Cicero's theory of the natural equality of races from modern anthropological research. *Cf.* Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man.*
6. What is the essential difference in the theoretical basis of brotherhood as set forth by the Stoics and by Cicero, and that presented in the Christian Scriptures?
7. Compare Seneca's doctrine of the Golden Age as the original state of nature, with that of Hobbes in the *Leviathan* and of Locke in the *Civil Government.*
8. How do you account for the fragmentary character of the social philosophy presented by the group of writers considered in this chapter as compared with the comprehensive scheme of Plato and Aristotle?

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIANITY

HISTORIC BACKGROUND—ROME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA

THE purely political incidents of the transition from the Roman Republic to the Empire under Augustus and the immediate successors cannot here be recounted in detail. Description is confined to such facts as form a setting for the introduction of Christianity which from this time forward is fraught with the most profound significance in the history of social philosophy.

The century of strife which ended with the battle of Actium left the Republic in a condition of exhaustion and disintegration. Moral idealism, respect for law, traditions of citizenship, ideas of justice, were not lacking but there was no essential unity, no organizing principle. The opportunity of the strong man was at hand. Avoiding the title of king, a designation repugnant to surviving republican ideas, Octavius acquired the title of Princeps and Imperator. Invested with the powers of Consul, Tribune and Censor, he revised the personnel of the Senate and proposed nominations for elections and measures for action in the public assemblies. While thus preserving the form of the Republic the Monarchy abolished five centuries before was reëstablished.

Certain characteristics of the century following the ascendency of Augustus in 31 B.C. are significant.

It was a period of relative peace throughout the civilized world. No great conquests were undertaken. The political energies were spent in the main in Romanizing the provinces. The territory of the empire at the period of its greatest extension under Trajan, 98 to 117 A.D. embraced the entire area surrounding the Mediterranean including Britain and all Western Europe somewhat beyond the Rhine and Danube, all of Asia Minor, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Egypt and the entire African region north of the Sahara. It contained a population variously estimated at from one hundred to one hundred fifty millions.

In many respects it may be regarded as comparable to the age of Pericles in Greece. One of the public enterprises of great magnitude

consisted in the construction of military highways connecting many parts of the empire. During the recent World War, Italy, France and England (in Palestine) found road building greatly facilitated by the use of the old roadbeds constructed by the Romans of this period.

It was likewise the age of Roman Architecture. The city of Rome was transformed from a city of brick into a city of marble. Throughout the empire cities were resplendent with costly temples, theaters, amphitheaters, and markets, besides statues of Roman heroes. Augustus was a patron of literature as well as of art. The poets of this period, Virgil, Horace, and Ovid, and the historian Livy, furnish the Latin student in our modern colleges and universities with his texts. Above all it was a time of wealth accumulation and concentration resulting in the production of a wealthy class whose ostentatious luxury in dress, table, houses and furnishings, rivaled that of the courts of earlier monarchs and served to increase the envy and unrest among the poor who constituted the great mass of the population.

A few deductions from the conditions of the time that bear upon the question of social philosophy may be made:

Never possessing any great genius for philosophy this period was particularly barren because political speculation was treason and economic and social discussion would have endangered the prerogatives of the rich and powerful. The absence of popular uprisings or revolts betokens an extreme apathy born of despair. The birth rate everywhere declined to an alarming degree, among the ruling classes from luxury and profligacy, among the poor because of oppression and uncertainty. The dejected state of mind is further evidenced by the rapid spread of a new religion entirely foreign to the Roman mind as such but congenial to a people who were ready to find comfort in a doctrine of passive resistance to present ills in the hope of future felicity.

It is interesting to note here that it was about the middle of the third decade of the reign of Augustus, in a remote province of the empire, that Jesus was born. At the moment no greater significance attached to his birth than to that of any other child but subsequent developments reveal it to have been one of the most momentous events in all history. We must therefore gather up a few historic facts that illumine these developments.

JUDAISM

A Semitic people known as the Hebrews emerge in history as a primitive people, tribally organized, struggling for possession of Canaan,

sometime before the middle of the second millennium B.C. Passing through a long period of loose confederation under the Judges resembling in many particulars the feudal period in Egypt, Rome and Britain, they arrived at Monarchy about 1050 under Saul. The Kingdom reached its greatest political triumphs under David about 1025-993. In 953 the Kingdom was divided by revolution into the kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Israel was overwhelmed by Assyria in 772 and most of the population transported. Judah maintained a precarious existence down to 586, when it was conquered by Nebuchadnezzar and its population suffered the fate of its northern rival, being carried into Babylonian captivity. Although the Jews after 70 years were permitted to return and to rebuild Jerusalem and to enjoy certain freedom in religion, the territory remained a province under the monarchies successively of Babylon, Persia, Macedonia and Rome.

The details of this interesting history are fully set forth in the Hebrew Bible, general familiarity with which renders any detail here unnecessary.

It is customary to characterize certain peoples by their dominant contributions to civilization. In the same sense that Greece gave to the world philosophy, and Rome organization, the Hebrews contributed religion. At least we may say that their history and their philosophy is so interwoven with their religion and so much the outgrowth of it that it constitutes the chief element of interpretation. The Old and the New Testament together with the Apocrypha and the Talmud constitute the most extensive and complete religious history and literature created by any people.

At the outset the Jewish conception of Jehovah was that of a tribal God fighting for them and avenging their enemies. In all essential elements he differed in nothing from those of other primitive races. It was the genius of this people, however, during their long and eventful history to transform this original concept into the most exalted ethical monotheism which the world has yet produced.

Three ideas which gained ascendency and which are important in the development of social thinking prior to the advent of Christianity are the theocratic concept of God, the doctrine of the "Chosen People," and the Messianic Hope.

The Semitic idea of God brought to its greatest perfection in Judaism was theocratic. It was naïve and practical. Throughout the entire process of elevating Jehovah from the position of the tribal God of the Hebrews to that of Supreme God of the universe, he retains his per-

sonal character of creator and ruler. He exists somewhere outside the world but in absolute control of forces and events. History therefore is a narrative of God's dealings with men. Social institutions such as the family, the state, and even religion itself have their origin and form in the Divine Will. They are communicated to men through divine revelation. This concept formed the natural basis for the development of the doctrine of "the peculiar people."

The destruction of the Jewish Kingdom and the captivity in Babylon was a sad blow to political aspirations but it resulted in the creation of a national self-consciousness not hitherto achieved. Deprived of national independence, forcibly restrained from participation in political affairs, subject to an alien power, they not only wept when they remembered Zion [1] but they thought and wrote. They made diligent inquiry into their own origin and history and revived the theory of their peculiar mission. From oral tradition, fragments of written history and the use of Babylonian sources they constructed a unique narrative which portrayed their descent from Abraham and their selection as a chosen people, under the leadership of the One God of all the Earth. The Pentateuch supplemented by other writings soon took the form of a sacred book. Thus the feeling of group superiority, common to all peoples, a product of group survival, acquired peculiar strength and produced spiritual unity among the scattered elements of the race wherever the literature extended and preserved the character of nationalism without a nation.

Continued political subjection fostered a further state of mind congenial to the hope of restoration of the former glory of Israel. The yearning for national deliverance, common to all conquered peoples, took particular hold of the Jewish mind because of the feeling of national separateness. Hebrew prophecy from the days of Ezekiel is filled with dreams of Utopia. Israel is one day to be redeemed. Jehovah will restore the throne of David and a new world empire with its Capital at Jerusalem will be established. Perhaps no point of time may be designated at which this hope took specific Messianic form, since it represents a movement rather than a discovery. It seems certain, however, that by the time of the conquest of Palestine by Pompey in 63 the concept was thoroughly established. Apocryphal writings from this time on are built largely on this assumption. Once formed it was easy to read back the idea into the Law and the Prophets. The Scriptures were reëxamined and were found to abound in confirmation. By the end of the century

[1] *Psalm* 137:1.

and the dawn of the Christian era the doctrine of the Messianic Hope was one of the most dominant tenets of the Jewish faith.

THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL

In another part of the world an intellectual movement had grown up with significant bearings upon the origin and development of Christianity.

The City of Alexandria was founded in Egypt in 332 B.C. by the Macedonian conqueror. It sprang into almost immediate importance as one of the great commercial centers of the East. Its population, recruited largely by immigration, was of the most cosmopolitan character. Besides native Egyptians it consisted chiefly of immigrant Greeks and of Jews both Palestinian and those of native birth whose ancestors had never returned to Jerusalem.

Under the enlightened patronage of the early Ptolemies the city soon became celebrated for its intellectual achievements. In her political decline Athens still retained preëminence in speculative philosophy, but scientific interests were shifted to Alexandria. With her botanical and zoölogical gardens, her observatory and anatomical buildings and especially her magnificent library and museum, Alexandria is often referred to as the first great University. Students and scholars were attracted from many lands and were subsidized by the government. Mathematics, astronomy, the physical sciences, literature and art flourished.

This brilliant scientific era, however, was short-lived. It lasted scarcely more than a century and was suddenly brought to a close in the middle of the second century B.C. chiefly through the centralizing power of Rome, but the intellectual energy generated during this period could not be dissipated altogether. Science was at a standstill and philosophy was suffering from the blight of skepticism. Religion furnished the necessary outlet. After the departure of large numbers of Greek intellectuals the predominant group was that of the Hellenized Jews. At one time they comprised more than half of the city's population. They spoke the Greek language which made necessary the translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek.[2]

It was here then that the Semitic ideas of religion came into conflict with Aryan theanthropic concepts and with the Egyptian Serapeum. Roman and Babylonian influences were prominent also. Jupiter, Zeus,

[2] For the story of the freedom of the Jews in Egypt and the Septuagint translation under Ptolemy Philadelphus, see Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, Book XII, Ch. II.

Ammon, Bel-Marduk, Osiris and Jehovah were being fused into a common Deity-concept. A perception was growing that they were all One God under different names. The subject proved a fruitful one for speculation. Out of the confusion, because of the predominance of Jewish ideas and the overmastering qualities of Greek thought, one great problem emerged, viz., the reconciliation of Greek philosophy with Hebrew religion, of Plato with Moses, of the Logos with God. The perfection of this synthesis in the work of Philo constituted one of the most important doctrinal bases of Christianity and became a determining factor in the theology of the early church.

JESUS OF NAZARETH

It is the purpose here to set forth, without reference to religious or theological interpretation of Jesus, such facts as seem to be authenticated concerning his life purely as a historic character.

He was born of Jewish parents in Galilee, probably at Bethlehem or Nazareth, about the 28th year of the reign of Augustus, or about 4 B.C. of the Christian calendar. His father, Joseph, a carpenter of Nazareth, was of royal lineage according to the genealogies of *Matthew*[3] and *Luke*.[4] Of his mother, Mary, nothing seems to be known. His boyhood is obscure. He evidently was reared in Nazareth and it is probable that he acquired the common education of the Synagogue, that he worked at his father's trade, and that he made occasional visits with his parents to Jerusalem. About the age of thirty he was attracted by the preaching of John the Baptist, and was baptized by him in the River Jordan. Upon the death of the prophet shortly afterward, Jesus emerged from obscurity and took up his work, wandering about Galilee preaching the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven. He made Capernaum the center of his itinerary but taught in numerous villages, in the open country, and on the shores of the lake. He was a man of intense personal force and strength of character, but of delicate physique. For a time he drew great crowds because of his magnetic personality and of his prophetic message. He accepted the current theory of sickness and insanity and practised the art of suggestive healing.

He was known as one "who went about doing good." He was neither philosopher nor theologian. He probably was unacquainted with the philosophy of Greece or of Alexandria. He respected the Jewish law and worship, giving to both a higher ethical interpretation, but he

[3] Ch. 1:1-17.
[4] Ch. 3:23-28.

violated the traditions when they conflicted with his impulses of mercy. He condemned wickedness and hypocrisy but possessed no morbid sense of sin. Hence he was always kind to the erring and did not hesitate to associate with "outcasts" who desired to mend their ways. Gradually he came into conflict with the self-righteous religionists who counteracted his influence and diminished his following but he gathered about him a group of loyal disciples whom he inspired with love and courage and who became the nucleus of the new religious society which he founded. His personal life was blameless but he was charged with subverting the religion of the Fathers. After about three years he went to Jerusalem where he came into conflict with intrenched orthodoxy and with imperial Roman authority. He was arrested, tried, convicted as a malefactor and conspirator, and executed by crucifixion in the year 30 at the age of about thirty-three.

If the social teachings of Jesus alone constituted our search the problem would be relatively simple and much of the present narrative could have been omitted. But it is the teachings of Christianity and its influence upon social thinking that must be evaluated. This is a more complicated problem. We must note some further factors in the production of historic Christianity before we discuss its social philosophy.

PHILO

About 20 B.C. a man was born in the city of Alexandria who was destined to wield a profound influence upon Christian thought. That man was Philo Judaeus. He was of pure Jewish ancestry descended from the sacerdotal tribe of Levi. His family was in affluent circumstances and afforded him the widest opportunity for education not only in the wisdom and literature of his own race but also in Greek philosophy and letters. Very early he became an ardent disciple of Plato and the Stoics and was thoroughly familiar with Alexandrian agnosticism. Despite his broad intellectual training and extensive knowledge he remained an orthodox Jew of the Pharisaic school and devoted his life to religious philosophy. In this field he became the most celebrated among his contemporary countrymen. Many of his writings have been preserved. His entire life was spent in Alexandria except for two visits, one to Jerusalem, and one to Rome as head of an embassy to Caligula in the interest of religious toleration. He died in Alexandria about 50 A.D.

As a matter of chronology, Philo was a contemporary of Jesus, but was without knowledge either of the person of the Nazarene or of the

problems created by him. There is no trace of the Messianic Hope in the work of Philo. He concerned himself with the problem of the Logos and its reconciliation with Hebrew concepts of God. He was the most eminent representative of the Alexandrian School. His dilemma, which seemed to involve irreconcilable elements, may be summarized:

He accepted the Law of Moses as a Divine revelation. The Scriptures were the "oracles," the "divine word." The prophets were the passive instruments of divine communication of the will of God to man. No foreshadowings of modern criticism are to be found in Philo. Moses was the Lawgiver and the greatest of all the Prophets. His writings constitute the immutable, unchangeable and eternal word of God. He even ascribed the same character to the Septuagint as to the Hebrew version.

He is equally clear in his conception of the Logos. "The Logos is the thought of God, dwelling subjectively in the infinite mind, planted out and made objective in the Universe. The cosmos is a tissue of rational force which images the beauty, the power, the goodness of its primeval fountain. The reason of man is this same rational force entering into consciousness and held by each in proportion to the truth and variety of his thoughts; and to follow it is the law of right living." [5]

"These two positions maintained by Philo, without any sense of contradiction between them, were in reality incompatible. Moses did not teach the Platonic doctrine of ideas, nor could the deep utterances of a spiritual philosophy be found in the literal meaning of the stories in *Genesis*. Philo accordingly summoned to his aid, as the solvent of all difficulties, the system of allegorical interpretation. We should wholly misapprehend the nature of this system if we supposed that it consisted either in a mere whimsical search for hidden meanings or in an intentional falsification of the plain sense of Scripture in order to commend it to philosophic minds. However grotesque many of its results may appear to us and however grossly its whole method departs from the canons of scientific exegesis, Philo employed it with all seriousness, and believed that he was faithfully drawing out the original meaning of the writers to be expounded. . . . It seems, accordingly, in Philo's time to have been characteristic of a school of expositors, to have attained to the regularity of a system, . . . and to have been governed by a settled code of laws or canons." [6]

Through this method, then, Philo identified the Logos of the Greeks

[5] Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, Vol. II, p. 273.
[6] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 18-20.

with the God of the Hebrews and laid a foundation for its application to Christian interpretation. He, however, did not go beyond this identification. On this point Schmidt comments as follows: "It has been much discussed whether Philo's Logos is a personality or not. None of the attributes of personality seems to be wanting. Yet a personification is often very intense without implying the belief in a personal entity. If the complexity of the conception points in one direction, the fondness for allegorizing points in another. At any rate, it is certain that Philo could not have conceived of his Logos as incarnated in a historic human personality." [7]

SAUL OF TARSUS

Prior to the beginning of his ministry and while Jesus was still living in obscurity in Nazareth, in the city of Jerusalem a young man of Hebrew parentage, of Greek language, and of Roman citizenship, was studying Jewish theology at the feet of Gamaliel, a doctor of the law and one of the most learned Rabbis of the day. Saul and Paul seem to have been his Jewish and Greek name respectively. He was born about the year 1 A.D., in the Hellenized city of Tarsus, the capital of Cilicia in Asia Minor, a seat of one of the numerous schools of philosophy similar to that of Alexandria though less prominent. His parents were of the tribe of Benjamin and he was brought up in the strictest sect of the Jewish religion, a Pharisee.[8] He was no doubt educated in the Synagogue and the schools of Tarsus. Nothing is known definitely of his early life except that he learned the trade of tent-maker. Inferences drawn from his writings indicate that he was a Greek scholar and possessed a wide knowledge of Greek literature and philosophy; that he was a religious enthusiast, being more zealous for the traditions of the Fathers than many of his equals among his own countrymen [9]; and that he was possessed with enormous energy and great brilliancy of intellect.

He was in Tarsus during Jesus' active ministry and had never seen him; perhaps had scarcely heard of him. He returned to Jerusalem in the early days of Christian propaganda some years perhaps after the death of Jesus. His first impressions of the new faith were obtained from alarmed orthodoxy and he threw himself violently into the effort to exterminate it.[10] Suddenly in the midst of the havoc he was creating,

[7] *The Prophet of Nazareth*, p. 168.
[8] *Acts*, 23:6 and 26:5.
[9] *Gal.* 1:14.
[10] *Acts*, Ch. 8-9.

he had a vision, new, startling, revolutionary. All the elements for the great discovery were present in his mind. A synthesis was all that was required. Jesus of Nazareth was the anointed, the Son of God, the fulfilment of the Messianic Hope of Israel.

From this moment Paul became a most ardent preacher of the faith he had persecuted, carrying on his arduous labors in Damascus, Jerusalem, Antioch, Athens, Corinth, Ephesus and Rome. His writings survive in some of the epistles of the New Testament. Though not one of the original twelve he was regarded as the Chief of the Apostles and by many modern writers as the real founder of historic Christianity. Certainly aside from Jesus himself he is the greatest figure. He probably suffered martyrdom in Rome under Nero about the year 67.

The effect of St. Paul's teaching upon early Christian thinking cannot be overestimated. His eschatology was overwhelming. He confirmed the growing belief in the Messiahship of Jesus by explaining satisfactorily the disaster of the crucifixion. It was a divine sacrifice, attested and vindicated by the resurrection which in no way diminished his Messiahship. It rather established his sacrificial office.

The effect of this interpretation was to shift the emphasis from motive to belief and to lay the foundation for the development of Christianity as a creed. "Both by his experience and his antecedents Paul could hardly have made anything but eschatological messianism the coördinating scheme of a system that centered in a belief that Jesus was the Christ." [11] The Christianity of Jesus was a life of love and service; that of Paul a theology.

Another contribution to Christianity, made by the "apostle to the Gentiles," was universality. It was Paul who widened the dimensions of the Kingdom. One of the earliest problems confronting the Apostolic Church was whether or not Gentiles were eligible to admission.[12] Paul broke with the narrow conception that the Messianic Kingdom was open to Jews alone, that is, for "the lost sheep of the house of Israel." [13] He demolished the barrier of race and opened wide the door of Christian fellowship. But for him it is evident that Christianity would have remained, for centuries at least, what it was in the beginning, a modified form of the Jewish religion. The significance of this achievement lies in the bearing it had upon the doctrine of universal brotherhood. "As Christianity spread upward among the people, its way was made easier

[11] Mathews, *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, p. 174.
[12] *Eph.* 2:11-22, *Gal.* 2.
[13] *Matt.* 10:6.

by the prevalence of Stoic concepts; the oneness of humanity which had been conceived as centering in the Stoic cosmopolis, received a much more definite and attractive realization in the promise of the Christian heaven." [14]

THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS

The basic difference between the teachings of Jesus and of Orthodox Christianity should now be noted. The former centers about the message, the latter about the messenger. The historic creeds are silent upon the question of what Jesus thought and did. They were concerned with whom he was. Theological presuppositions may therefore be eliminated. Doctrines of messiahship, of the atonement, of sacraments, of the Trinity, were no part of his teaching. His was a moral and not a theological revolution. It was a conscious reaction against a religious interpretation that centered in beliefs, in forms, in ceremonies.

The great theme of his message was the Brotherhood of men under the divine Fatherhood of God, and the spirit and order which these relationships imply. It was expressed in the familiar term "The Kingdom of Heaven" or "The Kingdom of God," but the idea is devoid of political significance. "By the Kingdom of God Jesus meant *an ideal* (though progressively approximated) *social order in which the relation of men to God is that of sons, and* (therefore) *to each other that of brothers.*[15]

But Jesus never defined "The Kingdom of Heaven" except in terms of moral relations. It was an unfolding process and not a finished product. It was to be realized progressively as men in their ideals, in their individual behavior and in their social relations approximated the conditions idealized in the word "heaven." To unveil this process, to define its motive and spirit, to discover and to reveal the principles which would tend to its accomplishment was the task to which he devoted his life and to which he was a willing martyr. He proclaimed the coming of this "Kingdom" in its fullness as the hope of humanity. It was good news to the poor, to the suffering, and to the oppressed.

In the accomplishment of this purpose, Jesus persistently refused to resort to specific utopia or to limit its processes. It was the righteousness and not the form of the new social order that he proclaimed. He believed that if men "sought first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness" [16] right human relations would evolve naturally and human wel-

[14] Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediaeval,* p. 154.
[15] Mathews, *The Social Teachings of Jesus,* p. 54.
[16] *Matt.* 6:33; *Luke* 12:31.

fare would be enhanced. Not through the belief in a doctrine, but by doing the will of the Father was the Kingdom to be established. Furthermore, it was not to righteous acts of conformity to the will of God but to right disposition that he pinned his hope of social regeneration. First make the tree good and its fruits will be good. Purify the fountain and the stream will be pure. When the eye is single the body will be full of light.[17] "It was by heroically throwing himself upon this inner source and sanction of the truth that Jesus gained his marvelous confidence, and was led to an open breach with the current ethico-religious ideal as it expressed itself in overt acts." [18]

This purpose and method makes futile all attempts to identify Jesus with any sect, party, or program. He refused to be drawn into political controversy, he laid down no specific law of the family, he admitted no distinction of class or of race, he advocated no economic order, he established no ecclesiastical organization, he founded no ethical system. To have done so, i.e., to have sanctioned any specific scheme for organizing society, would have destroyed the universality of his message and would have had the effect of localizing his influence and of limiting his Kingdom.

All his teachings, therefore, concerning the conditions of contemporary social life are fragmentary and consist in the application of his general principle. He condemned wickedness, low ideals, and hypocrisy. He filled the law with a new spirit. Even his silence in regard to many burning social questions, which so many writers have remarked, is thus explained. He was not intent upon creating the channels through which all human activity must flow. He was discussing the nature of its flow.

This concept was too great for his disciples. It implied a moral revolution which required ages for its accomplishment, and which meant the reconstruction of the entire social order. There is little wonder that the political authorities and religious leaders, who probably saw the practical significance of Jesus' message more clearly than his disciples who viewed it from a purely religious angle, were alarmed, and, unprepared to meet its demands, attempted to suppress the message by destroying the messenger.

Regarded from the point of view of social philosophy the teachings of Jesus are important in what they imply rather than in what they express. It was quite outside his intention to discuss the origin or evolution of human society, or to describe the forms of social organiza-

[17] *Matt.* 12:33; 6:22.
[18] Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

tion created to minister to human needs. These he took for granted. In this field he made no contribution. He was a prophet and a moral idealist. The source of ethical motivation he also assumed. It was extra-mundane but he clothed the theocratic God of the Hebrews with the mantle of Fatherhood and deduced from this relationship the doctrine of Brotherhood—a concept fundamentally different from that achieved by the Greek or the Roman mind. Perhaps it would approximate the truth to say that the essence of his social philosophy is in his idea of an ethical Brotherhood of mankind and in the possibility of a reconstructed human society on the basis of the Golden Rule.

THE GENESIS AND SOCIAL DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY

As we have seen, the peace of Augustus had released the energies of men for political, religious, and philosophic contemplation. Commerce and travel throughout the Empire facilitated the intercommunication of ideas. Chronologically, there has been perhaps no time in history when religious, political, and philosophic ideas converged and mingled as that at the dawn of the Christian era. Geographically, it was not an accident that Palestine, a veritable highway of the nations, should have received all these influences. Historically, the result of contact and convergence was the new movement which Jesus inaugurated and out of which grew Christianity which has dominated the thinking of men for 2000 years.

The personality of Jesus was so unique and striking that it is not surprising that from the beginning interest should center upon him rather than upon his message. This he consciously endeavored to prevent, but with limited success. Before the Books of the New Testament had been written there had developed a reverent speculation as to his person and nature that was destined to relegate his teaching to a secondary position.

Obviously, one of the very first doctrines which Jesus encountered because of his Jewish origin and his connection with Judaism was the Messianic Hope. His ministry had not proceeded far before this issue arose. There had been men before who had proclaimed themselves to be the Messiah as Theudas and Judas of Galilee [19] but their claims had been discredited. They were killed and their following scattered. Was Jesus another claimant? Did he announce himself as the fulfilment of this Jewish expectation? The present trend of criticism seems to be that he made no such claim; that many of his statements clearly deny it;

[19] *Acts*, 5:36-7.

that such statements as are susceptible of interpretation as messianic claims were either favorable interpretations made by his disciples because of their expectations, were meanings read back into his words after the doctrine had been accepted, or were interpolations.

In view of the radical differences among New Testament exegetes no sure interpretation of his teachings on this subject can be made. It is certain, however, that in a short time after his death and despite that event, through their belief in his resurrection, and after Paul had courageously championed this doctrine and surrounded the person of Jesus with mystical significance, the disciples identified him as the Messiah and this belief became one of the fundamental dogmas of Christianity.

Furthermore, the universal significance which Paul fastened upon the new faith in harmony with the teachings of Jesus, but in conflict with Jewish disciples who would have made it a Jewish sect, resulted in its rapid spread to non-Jewish communities. By the time the first books of the New Testament were written the Christian constituency was so dominantly Greek-speaking that the writers employed the Greek language as a medium of communication, though Jesus himself had spoken only West Aramaic. In this wider sphere the Gospel encountered Hellenistic concepts, reconciled as we have seen by Philo, and the Alexandrian school, with Jewish theology. Surrounded by this influence it was inevitable that a further synthesis should be made. We quote again from Schmidt:

"This step was taken, so far as we know, by the author of the Gospel according to John. It is not to be denied that Christian thinkers had before his time been influenced by Philo. This can scarcely be affirmed of Paul. There is nothing specifically Philonic in his doctrine of the preëxistence of the soul in general, or that of the Messiah in particular, in the designation of the Messiah as 'the heavenly man' or in the description of the Messiah as the mediator; and the idea of the Messiah emptying himself and becoming man, if cherished by Paul, was certainly never dreamed of by Philo. But the Christology of the Deutero-Pauline epistles to the Colossians and the Ephesians uses a phraseology that seems to be reminiscent of Philo's language. The Epistle to the Hebrews reveals so great a similarity in method, conceptions and style that a familiarity with Philo seems unquestionable. All the more remarkable is the fact that there Jesus is never identified as Logos. . . . The Fourth Evangelist was intimately acquainted with Philonic speculation. The Alexandrian philosopher furnished him not only with ideas but also

with his characteristic phraseology. Without Philo his gospel could never have been written. This is true not only of the Prologue but of the whole work. But although his conception of the Logos is essentially that of Philo, it has been modified by two important facts: his Christian experience and his Gnostic speculation. The former gave him the conviction that the personality of Jesus of Nazareth revealed the eternal nature of the Logos; the latter furnished him with the ideas of an emanation, and appearance in the flesh, and a redemption through Gnosis, or insight, an insight which was characteristically mediated, through ethical sympathy and loyal love, rather than through intellectual penetration. The result was that, in the Christological development based upon this gospel the personality of the eternal Logos, the identity of the Logos and the man Jesus, the procession of the son and the Holy Ghost, the incarnation, and the necessity to salvation of knowing the Father and the Son and their mutual relations, fixed themselves in Christian thought." [20]

The genius of the Hebrew for religion and of the Greek for philosophy scarcely surpasses that of the Roman for organization. Out of the elements so far described the Christology of the ecumenic creeds was evolved. The moral revolution which Jesus began required no organization. Its influence permeated society like leaven. A creed, as a system of beliefs, implies sanction and evolves organization for its maintenance and defense. If the Christianity of Jesus had developed under a democratic form of government it is safe to predict that its influence in the world would have presented a far different picture, but as Christianity of the creeds, developing under the influence of the Roman Empire, certain inevitable results followed. The institutionalizing process appears dominant almost from the start. By the end of the first century it had become an organized ecclesiasticism which not only prescribed beliefs but contended with the Empire for recognition of its ecclesiastical prerogatives.

At first the Empire was inclined to view Christianity with complacency, simply as one more religious cult. But when it became apparent that a formidable ecclesiastical hierarchy was developing, that adherents to the faith were multiplying with great rapidity, and that its creed was aggressively intolerant of all other creeds and even hostile to Roman society itself, the emperors sought to extirpate it. Official hostility was aroused, not because of the peculiar tenets of Christianity, for Rome was tolerant of all creeds, but because of the social consequences

[20] Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-70.

of its exclusiveness. From the reign of Trajan, 98 to 117, to the edicts of toleration of Galerius in 311 and of Constantine in 313, Christianity was an illegal religion. Persecution was carried on intermittently with various degrees of severity.

As a result two outstanding facts should be noted: First, the rapid spread of Christianity in Rome. Persecution failed of its purpose. The frantic efforts of Diocletian to exterminate the seeds of the faith served only to scatter and invigorate them. By the time of Constantine the Christians constituted a considerable portion of the population and their faith constituted one of the most unifying forces in the distracted empire. Second, persecution had made conspicuous the necessity of reconciling the theological dissensions within the church itself. These dissensions, as we have already pointed out, centered not upon spirit and conduct where Jesus placed it, but upon correctness of beliefs. Arian, Sabellian and Trinitarian doctrines of the person of Christ had developed. They threatened internal disruption. After various attempts at reconciliation had failed the first great ecumenical council was convened in 325 at Nicea. The Nicene Creed was the result. It was a triumph for Trinitarianism. It contained the exact and authoritative definition of Christian theology and marks the entrance of Orthodox Christianity into the western world.

Another fact of profound significance was the acceptance of Christianity by Constantine and its consequent adoption as the State religion of Rome. This momentous event changed the entire course of world history. Christianity emerged from a persecuted sect and was transformed into a dominant world religion. Under the sanction of and in coördination with the secular power, it acquired the ability to enforce its decrees.

The effect of this consummation upon social thinking is forcibly stated by Bury: "About ten years after the Edict of Toleration, Constantine the Great adopted Christianity. This momentous decision inaugurated a millennium in which reason was enchained, thought was enslaved, and knowledge made no progress.

"During the two centuries in which they had been a forbidden sect the Christians had claimed toleration on the ground that religious belief is voluntary and not a thing which can be enforced. When their faith became the dominant creed and had the power of the state behind it, they abandoned this view. They embarked on the hopeful enterprise of bringing about a complete uniformity in men's opinions on the mysteries of the Universe and began a more or less definite policy of coercing

thought. This policy was adopted by Emperors and Governments partly on political grounds; religious divisions, bitter as they were, seemed dangerous to the unity of the state, but the fundamental principle lay in the doctrine that salvation is to be found exclusively in the Christian Church. The profound conviction that those who did not believe in its doctrines would be damned eternally, and that God punishes theological error as if it were the most heinous of crimes, led naturally to persecution. It was a duty to impose on men the only true doctrine seeing that their own Eternal interests were at stake and to hinder errors from spreading. Heretics were more than ordinary criminals and the pains that men could inflict on them were as nothing to the tortures awaiting them in hell; to rid the earth of men who, however virtuous, were, through their religious errors, enemies of the Almighty, was a plain duty. Their virtues were no excuse. The intolerance arising from such views could not but differ in kind and intensity from anything the world had yet witnessed." [21]

It is not assumed that throughout this formative period when Christianity was acquiring its theological content, developing its ecclesiastical form and assuming its religio-political character, that the influence of Jesus was entirely obliterated. On the contrary, despite these conspicuous aspects of Christian history, the moral earnestness and ethical idealism of Jesus produced profound results.

Through collecting and canonizing the books of the New Testament the Church preserved the tradition of the meek and lowly Nazarene. His character continued to shine forth and ennoble many lives in the midst of the fierce contentions which raged over the character of his person. His spirit dominated the Church in its moral protest against slavery, gladiatorial combats, family corruption, and oppression of the poor.

SUMMARY

Only a brief summary seems necessary. Practically all the teachings of Christianity that are important for social theory are those of Jesus which it has preserved. Most of these are scarcely recognizable in the form and content which they came to possess. For the ethnic brotherhood which the Greeks and Romans had discovered, Jesus substituted the idea of ethical brotherhood but the Church in its dissensions did not exemplify either. Paul emphasized likemindedness as a condition of social unity [22]; but the method of securing this unity by the Church was

[21] *Freedom of Thought*, pp. 51-3.
[22] *Ro.* 12:16, 15:5; I *Cor.* 1:10; *Phil.* 2:2.

reduced to compulsory creedal conformity. "The social doctrines of Jesus were embodied in the highly idealistic and plastic exhortations to love, service and recognition of human brotherhood, and were not reduced or intended to be reduced, to any rigid scheme of dogmas or ritual, and were on that account all the more valuable and adjustable to changing conditions. It was inevitable, however, that, when the attempt was made to put these lofty ideals into operation on a large scale and to perfect an ecclesiastical organization, they would be compressed into the narrow bounds of dogmatic interpretation and ritualistic expression from which they have not yet escaped, and which through a greater part of the history of Christendom have been perverted from a means to an end into an end in themselves." [23]

In taking over practically unmodified the Jewish theocratic concept of God who had revealed himself in the Holy Scriptures, and the resulting Cosmography, the Church established the basis for its reactionary attitude toward progressive thought. The Bible supplied man with a history of his origin and his institutions. Not only was there no need for scientific research or social philosophy, but its very pursuit was impious and its conclusions, in so far as they differed, blasphemous.

It was inevitable, however, that within the Church the social doctrines would require formulation and that orthodoxy should be defined. This task fell to the lot of men whose intellectual abilities were outstanding and whose ecclesiastical positions enabled them to speak with authority, a group to which appropriately has been applied the designation "Christian Fathers." Limits of space permit only a summary of their work and this is most admirably presented by Barnes:

"The Christian Fathers, as a source of religious dogma and authority hardly second to the Scriptures, are most important in the History of Social Philosophy. While their doctrines cover some six centuries, nevertheless their thoughts possess sufficient coherence to allow the patristic period to be discussed as a whole. The fundamental doctrines of the Fathers upon the origin, nature and end of society may be summarized under the following propositions: (1) Mankind is by nature social; society thus being a natural product in agreement with the ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. (2) Seneca's 'Golden' state of nature with an absence of coercive government was identified with the state of man before the 'Fall.' (3) Civil government was rendered necessary by that 'Fall' as a remedy for the crimes and vices of mankind. (4) While

[23] Barnes, *Sociology Before Comte, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXIII, Sept., 1917, p. 188.

government was thus rendered necessary by the 'Fall,' nevertheless it was a divine institution devised to curb further evil, and hence the rulers derived their power from God, were the agents of God, and rebellion was a sin. (5) Whatever practical value social institutions might have in rendering more endurable this earthly life, their service was only fleeting and, at best, immeasurably less important than preparation for the institutions of the heavenly Kingdom. Thus social reform and progress was regarded as relatively unimportant, and it was held that one might better endure social inconveniences than to jeopardize his salvation by dissipating his energy in attempting to improve earthly conditions. Their theory that the poor were a part of the divine order provided as a means to advance the spiritual welfare of alms-givers dominated the methods of charity and relief until the English Poor Law of 1834.

"The eschatological conception, with its disregard of earthly values and institutions, found its highest development in Augustine's *City of God* (written 413-26). Here the doctrine was set forth with great vigor and the only criterion set up for measuring the excellence of human institutions was the aid or hindrance which they offered to the attainment of heavenly salvation." [24]

[24] *Op. cit.*, pp. 189-90.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. To what extent did the social-political evolution of the Hebrews parallel that of other peoples? *Cf.* Henry Schaefer, *The Social Legislation of the Primitive Semites,* Chs. I-IV; T. G. Soares, *The Social Institutions and Ideals of the Bible,* Chs. I, VI, X; G. A. Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins,* Ch. II.
2. Discuss the "Tribal ethics" of the Hebrews as revealed in *Joshua,* Ch. 10, *I Samuel,* Ch. 15, The Book of *Jonah,* and *Psalms,* 137:9. *Cf.* D. G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples,* pp. 227-30.
3. What was the nature and importance of the ethical-social teaching of the Hebrew prophets? How are these teachings connected with Hebrew origin and history? *Cf.* E. S. Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought,* Ch. IV; also, C. F. Kent, *The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus.*
4. Compare the Hebrew moral code with earlier codes, especially that of Hammurabi and the Laws of Manu. *Cf.* E. S. Bogardus, *op. cit.,* Ch. III.
5. What evidences of an evolution in moral ideas are to be found in the teachings of Jesus as contained in *Matthew,* Ch. 5? For an entirely different conception of the moral teachings of Jesus, *cf.* F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic and Morals,* Ch. X.
6. Discuss more fully the mingling of scientific, philosophic and religious thought in the school of Alexandria. *Cf.* H. G. Wells, *The Outlines of History,* Vol. I, Ch. XXV.
7. What particular elements in the social outlook of Jesus were reflected in his teachings? *Cf.* T. C. Hall, *Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics,* Ch. I.
8. What difficulties are encountered in an effort to secure a biography of Jesus or a statement of his ethical teachings that is free from theological presuppositions? *Cf.* Hutchinson, Introduction to Renan's Life of Jesus, also H. C. King, *The Ethics of Jesus,* Introduction, also F. C. Conybeare, *op. cit.,* Ch. I and IX.
9. In view of the varied elements of thought combined in Historical Christianity do you agree with Jastrow Morris, that "The history of Christianity is to a large extent a history of philosophic thought

applied to religious problems"? *The Study of Religion,* p. 235, also Ch. VII.

10. What influences were exerted by the Late Greek and Early Roman writers upon Christian social Philosophy?
11. Contrast the theological form and content in which Christianity came to be expressed with its social expression as proposed by S. N. Patten. *Cf. The Social Basis of Religion,* Ch. I.

CHAPTER V

SCHOLASTIC SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY—ST. THOMAS AND DANTE

HISTORIC BACKGROUND

CIVILIZATION, as we have seen, thus far has been the product of two great historic elements—the *Classical,* by which is meant that whole body of ideas, culture, and institutions which Greece and Rome created and transmitted, and the *Hebrew,* which embraces the original religious philosophy transformed and institutionalized in orthodox Christianity. Medieval and Modern civilization is the further outgrowth of these same elements modified by the *Teutonic* factor, first embodied in barbarism and later in the tendencies toward freedom and democracy developed in Western Europe.

Social and political history in the millennium following the reign of Constantine presents a complex of these factors so intricately interwoven throughout the entire period that it is difficult to disentangle them in order to reveal their separate significance. In the main, however, they may be grouped into two separate trends embodied in the evolution of State and Church. With the full realization that each was modified profoundly by the other, we shall proceed nevertheless to outline the chief characteristics of their separate developments.

THE STATE

The coup d'état of Constantine in allying Christianity with the Empire proved only a temporary expedient. The vacillating policies of his successors toward Christianity made it a source of internal dissension rather than of unity.

By 375 A.D., Rome began to feel the impact of the restless barbarians upon all her boundaries. The Germans were raiding the Rhine region, the Saxon pirates were ravaging the coasts of Gaul and Britain, the Moors were threatening her African possessions, and the Huns were driving a wedge into central Europe and forcing the Goths and Vandals southward. In 395 the Empire was severed through political intrigue

into the Eastern and Western divisions. The Empire of the East maintained a turbulent existence for a thousand years until finally overthrown by the Turks in 1453. It is the Empire of the West, however, with which we are concerned. In 403 and 409 respectively the Romans resisted successfully the invasions of the Visigoths and the Vandals but in 410, Alaric returned and sacked the city of Rome. The withdrawal of the Roman legions for the protection of Rome left Britain and Gaul defenseless. The Angles and Saxons took possession of Britain and other Teutonic hordes, including the Vandals and Burgundians, overspread Gaul. The Vandals pushed on into Africa by way of Gibraltar, conquered the Roman provinces and set up the Kingdom of the Vandals with its capital at Carthage. The Visigoths after pillaging Italy established themselves in Spain. By this time the Huns were moving further westward and threatening to overwhelm both Romans and Barbarians. Temporarily submerging their separate interests in the face of a common enemy and because they found a common interest in preserving Christianity, they united their forces and in 451 in the Battle of Chalons hurled back the intrepid Attila and settled the question of Teutonic domination of Western civilization. Four years later the Vandals having gained supremacy in the Western Mediterranean sailed up the Tiber and again sacked Rome. Despoiled of her provinces and unable to maintain her political independence at home, the Roman Senate made overtures toward consolidation with the Eastern Empire which were accepted and in 476 after 1229 years of independent existence the Roman Empire of the West came to an end. The Herulian bandit, Odoacer, who overthrew the last Roman Emperor, was in turn displaced in 493 by the Ostrogoths under Theodoric. In 553 the Eastern Emperor, Justinian, recovered Italy for the Empire and established the exarchate of Ravenna but in 568 the Lombards conquered the northern part of Italy and ruled till 774 when they were destroyed by Charlemagne. These same three centuries saw in the West the rise and development of the Teutonic kingdoms of the Visigoths, Burgundians, Vandals, Franks and Anglo-Saxons, and at the same time their conversion to Christianity. In the East we note the parallel growth of Mohammedanism and the Conquest of the Saracens. In 732 the issue between the Moslems and the Christians was settled on the plains of Tours when Charles Martel completely vanquished the Moors and once more saved Western Europe to Christianity. Through this success the Kingdom of the Franks now came into prominence. In 752, Pippin, son of Charles, usurped the Merovingian crown. He was succeeded in

768 by his two sons, Charles or Charlemagne acquiring the entire kingdom within three years through the death of his brother Carloman.

With the accession of Charlemagne begins that remarkable period which embraces the rise and development of the Holy Roman Empire. Through his military genius and organizing ability Charlemagne brought again under one political sovereignty most of the territory comprised within the original boundaries of the Roman Empire of the West. His first triumph was in Italy. Summoned by the Pope to the defense of Rome he drove the Lombards from Italy and acquired the Lombard crown. Next he led a successful crusade against the Moslems in Spain and freed the northern half of the peninsula from Saracen rule. Repeated Saxon revolts across the Rhine were put down. By the end of the century his sovereignty was recognized throughout the German provinces. Meanwhile friction of both political and religious character had arisen between Rome and Constantinople. Seizing the opportunity, occasioned by the usurping of the Byzantine throne by the brilliant but unscrupulous Empress Irene, to declare the throne vacant, Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne Emperor of the Romans on Christmas Day 800 A.D. Thus after a lapse of 324 years the Empire of the West was reëstablished.[1]

Charlemagne must not be regarded as a warrior merely. His most noteworthy work was that which he effected as a reformer and statesman. He founded schools, reformed the laws, collected libraries and extended to the Church a patronage worthy of a Constantine. In a word, "his untiring energy displayed and felt in every corner of his wide empire laid the foundation of all that is noble and beautiful and useful in the history of the Middle Ages." [2]

The subsequent history is well epitomized by Dunning: "Charlemagne's empire fell to pieces within less than half a century of his death. The territory that he had ruled was divided into independent kingdoms, but throughout the anarchy of this process the idea of an emperor survived and of an emperor whose authority would be formally complete only after the coronation of the Pope of Rome. The persistence of this idea was promoted not only by papal policy which sought the support of superior power against the Italian princes, but also by the ambition of every ruler, who having succeeded to some share of Charlemagne's dominion, could hope to claim the whole. In 962,

[1] *Cf.* Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, Ch. IV; also, Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval*, p. 141 ff.

[2] Alzog, quoted by Myers, *Mediæval and Modern History*, pp. 115-16.

Otto I, the German King, a monarch whose character and achievements justly won for him the epithet of 'Great,' added Italy to his possessions and received or extorted from the Pope recognition as Emperor. With the coronation of Otto begins definitely the history of the Holy Roman Empire.

From the purely secular point of view this history is concerned with the long struggle of German kings to maintain the imperial unity of Germany and Italy. The various phases of the struggle turn chiefly on three facts: first, the thoroughly feudalized character of the royal power in both Germany and Italy; second, the racial antagonism between the Teutonic and the Latin populations; and third, the enormous development of ecclesiastical and especially of papal power. The feudal conception of royal power hopelessly hampered the efficiency of the monarch's action; the dislike of the Italians for everything German, which to them was synonymous with barbarian, was a constant stimulus to seditions and revolt, and the tortuous policy of popes, who ruthlessly employed their power to insure that the emperor should be their ally but not their master, raised up in both Germany and Italy obstacles which ultimately proved fatal to the development of a really imperial system. For a century after the Great Otto, the German monarchs preserved a fairly strong hold on Italy and asserted their ancient control over the Roman See. But then arose Hildebrand and the era of the great struggle was at hand which ended a century and a half later in the extinction of the imperial authority, if not the imperial name, in all the region south of the Alps." [3]

THE CHURCH

We must now trace in brief the ecclesiastical development which parallels and is interwoven with that of the Empire. It has been noted that Christianity very early developed an ecclesiastical organization shaped constitutionally and administratively on the imperial model. Gradually there developed a hierarchy of deacons, presbyters, bishops, archbishops and patriarchs and a territorial division into the five patriarchates of Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. It is probable that the patriarchs at first representing the several districts possessed coördinate powers. Several influences operated to upset this balance. To the natural tendency toward differential leadership and the

[3] Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval*, pp. 142-4; also *cf.* Tout, *The Empire and the Papacy*, Ch. II.

desire to maintain unity and uniformity in the faith, there was added the tradition of priority of the Bishop of Rome as the successor of St. Peter, the founder of the Church in Rome and its first bishop to whom had been committed the keys of the kingdom.[4] The prestige of the Eternal City itself as the political and geographic center of the Empire naturally invested its bishops with peculiar dignity. When Constantine made Christianity the state religion of Rome and the Bishop of Rome became his ecclesiastical adviser in all matters pertaining to the Church throughout the Empire the priority of the Bishop of Rome was assured.

The decline in imperial prestige through the removal of the capital to Byzantium did not lessen ecclesiastical prestige. On the contrary the head of the Church now became the chief personage in Rome. Historically the matter was finally settled by the ecclesiastical Council of Sardica in 347 in which the Bishop of Rome was given appellate jurisdiction over all other bishops and by the decree of Valentian III in 445 constituting "the Bishop of Rome the legal court of appeal for ecclesiastical causes from all parts of the dominion." [5]

Thus it happened that the Church with its centralized organization and its unified hierarchical system, with its Catholic doctrine proclaiming the essential equality of men and the essential unity of mankind, remained stable and through the turmoil of the barbarian invasions and the fall of Rome "inherited the empire."

From 325 to 476 the Church had been an adjunct of the Empire but with the transfer of political sovereignty to the East the popes were emancipated and began an era of ecclesiastical rule, which was not only free from political domination, but one which gradually came to include political functions. A succession of able pontiffs, among whom Innocent I, Leo I and Gregory I are notable, added much to the dignity and prestige of the Church. Twice during the last days of the Empire had Leo I, because of the dignity of his holy office, saved the Imperial City from the fury of the barbarians, when the imperial armies had failed. As progressively the political affairs of Rome and of all Italy came under the protection of the popes it was necessary that the Church should exercise political powers. Through the period of the ascendency of the Ostrogoths and later the Lombards in Italy its power grew as the bulwark of the people against foreign tyranny and oppression and

[4] *Matt.* 16:19.
[5] Dunning, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

through the period of political dissolution that followed it preserved the traditions of the shattered Empire.

Several developments contributed to increase the power and prestige of the papacy in the West. The Goths and Vandals who were first among the barbarians to be converted to Christianity had come under Eastern influence and were Arians and therefore heretics. The first task was to reconvert them to the orthodox creed. This accomplished, attention was directed toward the Franks, Anglo-Saxons and the Germans. Their progressive conversion constitutes one of the marvelous achievements of the early Christian missionaries. While the victory was one in name rather than in fact and may have been a matter of tribal or national adoption rather than an individual conviction, nevertheless it created a loyalty to the Church which later the popes were able to turn to advantage in their clash with recalcitrant monarchs.

Owing to the triumphant conquests by the Saracens, in the seventh century, the patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria were lost to the Christian world and a bound was set to the spread of Christianity in Asia. However great the misfortune for Christianity as a whole, it left the Roman prelates without Eastern rivals except for Constantinople and made it inevitable that in the end the boundaries of Christendom should become coextensive with those of the Roman See.

The prestige acquired by Constantinople through the reclamation of Italy by Justinian and the establishment of the exarchate of Ravenna was always deeply resented by the popes of Rome. When, therefore, Leo the Isaurian, the Eastern Emperor, in 716 issued his iconoclastic decree against the use of images in the churches and endeavored to force the proscription upon the churches of the West a breach was created between Constantinople and Rome which never was repaired and which finally ended in the complete separation in 1054 of the Greek Orthodox Church of the East from the Roman Catholic Church of the West.

From the beginning of "the war of the Iconoclasts" the Exarch of Ravenna sided with Rome. Taking advantage of the weakness occasioned by this internal strife the Lombards destroyed the exarchate and made repeated attempts to annex the city of Rome. Meanwhile Charles Martel, the redoubtable Catholic chief had just defeated the Moslem hordes at Tours and at his death, Pippin, his son, had invoked and received the sanction of the Pope in his usurpation of the Merovingian crown. In this direction the Pope now turned for assistance. Pippin descended upon the Lombards, drove them from the ecclesiastical estates, conquered the territory formerly occupied by the Exarchs and

bestowed the whole upon the Pope. "Thus the Papacy became formally, what it had been in fact, the holder of political power." [6]

At the death of Pippin in 768 the Lombards again threatened the papal estates and Charlemagne came to the rescue. Completely overthrowing the Lombards he assumed the Lombard crown and added Northern Italy to the Frankish empire. Italy now enjoyed twenty years of relative peace but in 798 sedition in Rome drove the Pope, Leo III, from the city. He fled to Westphalia, where Charlemagne was busy suppressing a revolt of the Saxons. Charlemagne restored him to his pontificate in Rome under military escort and after subduing the Saxons, himself repaired to Rome.

It was now apparent that "the spiritual head of Christendom could not dispense with the temporal head; without the Roman Empire there could not be a Roman, nor by necessary consequence a Catholic and Apostolic Church, for men could not separate in fact what was indissoluble in thought. Christianity seemed to stand or fall along with the great Christian state; they were but two names for the same thing. Moved by these ideas and pressed by these needs the Pope took a step, which some among his predecessors are said already to have contemplated, and toward which the events of the last fifty years had pointed." [7] There was no uncertainty as to the candidate for this high political office. Charlemagne was the undisputed sovereign of Western Europe and his services to the Church were of the most conspicuous character. He was the man of destiny.

Accordingly, while he knelt at mass in the basilica of St. Peter's on Christmas Day 800 A.D., the Pope placed a crown upon his head and saluted him as Charles Augustus, Emperor of Rome. The significance of this portentous event lay, not in the conferring of political power upon Charlemagne, for this he had already won by the sword, but in two most important elements of future papal supremacy: First it flung defiance at the Eastern empire and guaranteed the supremacy of the bishops of Rome; second, it obliged the Emperor to accept his title as a gift from the Pope, thus raising an issue between Teutonic politics and Latin Christianity, the results of which constitute according to Dunning "the history and the theory of the Holy Roman Empire." [8]

One further factor in the exaltation of the Papacy must be added.

[6] Dunning, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
[7] Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 46-7.
[8] *Cf. op. cit.*, p. 142.

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It has to do with the personal character of the popes as a result of their method of appointment. "From the days of the old Empire the choice of a new bishop had frequently been the occasion of popular tumults and bloodshed. The transition to mediæval conditions brought the office under the control of the powerful noble families who divided the city among themselves. With the growth of political influence in the Papacy, the contests among the families for possession of the dignity became more intense and bitter. While all Western Europe looked with reverence upon the Pope, he was himself, in many cases, the mere puppet of some unscrupulous Roman noble. During the tenth century the personal character of the popes reached a very low level from this cause and an inevitable reaction was manifest upon the authority of the Papacy. This source of weakness was in a measure removed by the reform of 1059 when, by act of the second Lateran Council, the chief power in the election of a pope was vested in the cardinals—a definite body, presumably characterized by the most eminent sacerdotal virtues. This reform was but one of a series that included the enforcement of celibacy among the clergy and the stringent proceedings against simony which precipitated the struggle over investitures. The Hildebrand epoch had arrived—the epoch in which great popes from Gregory VII to Innocent III brought the dignity and power of their office from both the secular and the spiritual point of view, to the utmost limit of exaltation." [9]

EXTRA-POLITICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL AGENCIES

Within the range of these most conspicuous aspects of the social life and organization of the period just described there were numerous developments that contributed to the thought of the time which must not be overlooked.

Feudalism was the product of social and political forces which operated in Western Europe in the ninth and tenth centuries. Tribal organization had disintegrated through conquest and migration. Strong men had come into control of large land areas which they subdivided to tenants. Small owners found it necessary, as had been the case earlier in Italy, to bring their holdings into feudal relations with great estates for the protection they were thus able to secure. The system grew up gradually and irregularly but finally came to assume the form of an autocratic institution.

[9] Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-1.

The social bond of feudalism was originally the reciprocal one of authority and allegiance, but allegiance gradually became enforced. Great feudal lords grew powerful and through subjugation of other lords, arrived at the dignity of kings. The Church grew rich and powerful through the acquisition of feudal estates. In this atmosphere ideas of irresponsible sovereignty were fostered. War was the chief activity and the law of feudalism. The lords were under the constant temptation, to which they consistently yielded, to extend their dominions, or if subjected, to revolt. The formation of stable national governments was practically impossible.

Internecine struggles weakened their power and tended to their overthrow. Both in theory and in practice, the Empire and the Church vied with each other to establish universal peace in which human welfare could be enhanced, but with only indifferent success. Robinson remarks that with the opening of the Crusades in 1096 the popes undertook to effect a general pacification by diverting the prevailing warlike spirit against the Turks.[10]

Chivalry, the "Flower of Feudalism" was due largely to the reaction of Christian idealism within the feudal system. If it could not suppress, it could in a measure Christianize, the profession of arms. Chivalry, like Feudalism, was not founded as a system. It grew spontaneously from the conditions of the time. It was in essence the idealization of allegiance and obedience. Toward his Christian faith, his feudal lord, his lady love, his personal honor, the knight must exhibit abject loyalty at whatever personal sacrifice. Thus fidelity became a virtue and a prominent factor in establishing social control.

The *Crusades* present a weird picture of religious fanaticism which centered about the rescue of the Holy Sepulchre from the infidel Turk. For two centuries wave after wave of disorganized crusaders surged Eastward through Europe and toward Asia with varying fortunes; the motives of the participants were numerous and varied. The enterprise offered to the knight an ideal opportunity to display his valor; to the devout Christian, certainty of future felicity; to the wicked, absolution from their sins; to aspiring nobles and merchants the hope of material reward; to the Empire an opportunity for conquest; and to the Church an extension of dominion and power. With details of success and failure we are not concerned here. Certain effects, however, are important.

Two political effects may be noted; first, while the Crusades ended

[10] *History of Western Europe*, p. 118.

in 1244 with the Turks in undisputed possession of Jerusalem, their Westward conquests were checked and the Fall of Constantinople postponed for three centuries; second, feudal aristocracy received a severe setback. Thousands of estates of the nobles who did not return escheated to the crown, while the increase of commerce and the growth of cities, due to commercial revival with the East, served to create a new order of citizen who was destined later to figure in the struggle for individual freedom and in the overthrow of the old régime.

The power of the Papacy was enhanced on the one hand through the leadership it exercised over the armies and resources of Christendom utilized in the various campaigns, and on the other, through the wealth acquired by purchase and gift of vast estates on the part of the devout in return for prayers and benedictions.

Most important of all, perhaps, was the impetus given to culture and learning. As we have seen, for 1000 years the Church had dominated the thinking of men and the West had been cut off from the thought currents of the East. The barbarians of the West had never been in contact with these influences. These avenues were now opened. Thousands of men came into contact with civilizations more advanced than their own and with ideas of which they had never dreamed. They returned with thoughts and with books which were destined to pave the way for the enlightenment soon to follow.

Monasticism began in Egypt in the fourth century. It was a product of asceticism which roots back at least to Plato. By the sixth century it spread rapidly in Europe and was Westernized by St. Benedict in 526 into a system. Throughout the period under review in this chapter, the Monastery and the Monks played a most important rôle. They represented the non-political factors of the Church. Aside from their purely religious function of missionary enterprise, keeping alive the spiritual life of the Church, checking the worldly evils of the time and administering charity, their chief value was in the fact that they were the repositories of learning. They conducted schools, copied and preserved classical manuscripts and kept alive traditions of scholarship. They received much of the literature brought back by the Crusaders and made it available for future use. It was largely from these influences that scholasticism arose.

Charlemagne, in 789, issued an order establishing schools in connection with the monasteries throughout his dominions. It was in these schools, about 900, that there grew up a type of learning known as *scholasticism,* which Rogers explains as follows: "It is, in the first

place, a philosophy of dogmatic religion, assuming a certain subject-matter as absolute and unquestioned. The Church could not consistently allow the search for truth, since she herself already possessed the truth by an infallible revelation; the limits within which thought could move were necessarily strictly defined. There was no neutral field of secular knowledge; in all spheres alike, history and science as well as matters of religion in the stricter sense, the Church conceived herself to be possessed already of final truth. But meanwhile a certain work was left for the intellect which was not obviously dangerous. This was the work of showing how the doctrinal content, whose truth was taken for granted on authority, was also self-consistent and rational. Granted that the dogma was given as an established fact, it yet might seem a pious task to show that these doctrines, when given, are acceptable to the reason, and capable of being justified to it. There was indeed danger in this, as the Church was later to discover, the danger that the rational justification should become a requirement, and the dogma be measured by its standard, and derive authority from it. But meanwhile to oppose the tendency would have been to oppose all intellectual life whatever, and this not even the Church would have been powerful enough to do successfully.

"The most prominent characteristic of scholasticism then was its function as a systematizer and rationalizer of religious dogma." [11]

This system continued to develop for more than four centuries and culminated in the work of Thomas Aquinas, whose philosophy we shall consider presently.

The *medieval universities* which grew and thrived from the 12th to the 15th centuries were not the product of monasticism or scholasticism, but rather the result of the awakening of intellect which these institutions stimulated; gradually their curricula were extended to include, besides theology, historical and scientific interests, which paved the way for the freedom of research essential to the modern type of thinking.

THE CONFLICT OF THE TWO POWERS

Throughout the entire period of the simultaneous development of the Empire and the Papacy there was more or less conflict over questions of priority. In the earlier period when the Roman Emperor was the recognized head of both Church and State it was tacitly assumed that the Church had a legitimate sphere of authority over moral de-

[11] *A Student's History of Philosophy*, pp. 203-4.

linquencies. In the later period when the Church began to claim a spiritual supremacy even over political rulers it was conceded that there was a genuine political function to be performed by the State.

In the absence of any clear or generally accepted division of function it was inevitable that conflicts should arise which would involve the question of ultimate authority.

Passing over the earlier stages of this conflict, for lack of space, we shall review it only in its most dramatic form in the struggle between Emperor Henry IV of Germany and Hildebrand as Pope Gregory VII.

As we have noted, the scandal of the Papacy as a result of political appointments was removed to a large extent through the creation of the college of Cardinals in 1059, but the practice of simony continued in the appointment of bishops. In administering the feudal system the bishops who presided over the feudal estates of the Church were appointees of the kings or overlords and thus combined both civil and religious functions. Since the revenues were often quite as attractive as the "holy office" it was inevitable that unscrupulous men should seek and secure appointment. The result was demoralizing. Accordingly Gregory decided upon far-reaching ecclesiastical reforms. Having previously asserted the complete supremacy of the Pope over the Church and his responsibility for civil government whenever matters of righteousness were involved, he reissued a decree in 1075 which ineffectively had been made by his immediate predecessors forbidding the investiture of ecclesiastics by secular princes, and took measures for the immediate enforcement of the order.

Henry IV, the young and ambitious successor, after a century, to the throne of the great Otto, ignored the Pope's decree and taking counsel from excommunicated princes, he continued to fill bishoprics in both Germany and Italy with men suitable to his own interests. The issue was now clearly drawn. When, therefore, Henry was summoned in 1076 to appear before the Papal Court to answer charges of insubordination, he convened a council of German bishops at Worms and deposed the Pope. Gregory retaliated at once by issuing a decree excommunicating the King and absolving his subjects from allegiance. The superstitious awe in which the Pope was held proved superior to political loyalty. The bishops were intimidated and aspiring vassals seized the opportunity to revolt. In his extremity the King sought the Pope at Canossa and in utter humility begged for forgiveness and reinstatement. After three days, waiting barefoot in the snow and clad in the guise of a pilgrim, the Pope received the penitent and humiliated King

and revoked the decree of excommunication. Returning to Germany, Henry found new difficulties. A new ruler had been elected in his stead. Four years of struggle between the rival kings ensued. The Pope refused to take sides at first but finally reissued his order of excommunication against Henry. The effect was precisely opposite to that produced by the former order. Henry's friends, both among the bishops and among his vassals resented deeply the interference of the Pope and rallied to his support. His political rival was overthrown and the bishops once more declared the papal throne vacant. Gathering an army the King now invaded Italy, and after prolonged conflict, exiled Gregory to Salerno, where he soon afterward died, and an antipope occupied the papal seat.[12]

This victory was only temporary. It served merely to prolong the struggle. Henry suffered reverses before his death in 1106 which brought the Papacy again into the ascendency. The fierce contention lasted throughout the 12th and 13th centuries between the Papal See and the Hohenstaufen emperors.

One of the most important facts of social importance during this period was the growth of towns which were destined to play an important part in the decay of feudalism and also in reshaping the future of politics. This was particularly true in Italy, where for the most part the government of the towns which were struggling for political independence, fell into the hands of their respective bishops, and thereby strengthened the position of the Papacy. The Lombard League of independent cities became a powerful organization. During the same period the issues of a controversy among the rival houses of Welf and Weiblingen in Swabia extended beyond the Alps and in Italy became the struggle between the Guelphs and Ghibellines, the Guelph faction being the party of the Pope and the Ghibelline that of the Empire. From a struggle over principles which lasted for a century it finally degenerated into a meaningless factional feud between parties which struggled for the control of the Italian cities, and added to the chaos of the 14th and 15th centuries.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TWO POWERS

Perhaps the reader will feel that an undue proportion of space thus far and particularly in this chapter has been devoted to historic factors. If so, he is reminded once more that social philosophy is "a mirror of

[12] *Cf.* Robinson's *History of Western Europe,* Ch. XII-XIII.

the times" and is meaningless apart from the facts of experience which it seeks to interpret. It is not true or false with reference to a finished system but rather with reference to concrete phases of contemporaneous social life. It reflects epochs and stages in the development of social thinking and it is the description of these stages that constitutes a history of the development of social theory. While, therefore, men struggled and fought and history narrates the events, other men thought and wrote and their contributions interpret the intellectual conflicts and define the motives that explain objective facts.

We have selected somewhat arbitrarily for consideration, not as the exclusive, but perhaps as the most conspicuous interpreters of this period, Thomas Aquinas and Dante as spokesmen for the social theory evolved. Furthermore it should be borne in mind that it was not permitted, even if it had occurred to any one as desirable, to interpret human society as such. The struggle was one for social control within a limited field occupied by political and ecclesiastical organizations and so overmastering were these interests that all others were for the time obscured. This fragmentary though conspicuous aspect of social life fixed the boundaries of social interpretation.

THOMAS AQUINAS

Thomas Aquinas was born in the family castle in the territory of Naples about the year 1224. His father, Landolf, Count of Aquino, was connected with the early Hohenstaufen House. His ancestors had distinguished themselves in the campaigns of Charlemagne. His mother, Theodora, was descended from a noble Norman family. At the age of five Thomas was placed in the school of Monte Cassino, the most notable Benedictine Monastery of the time, and of which his uncle Sinnebald was abbot. Here he spent seven years. It was the hope and expectation of his family that some day he should become the abbot of the great monastery for which his ancestors had so often jeopardized their lives and fortunes.

At the destruction of the Abbey by Emperor Frederick on account of his conflict with the Pope, Thomas was sent to the University of Naples where he spent six years. Here he came into contact not only with the Greek culture of the University but with the order of St. Dominic, which sought to meet religious and political heresy with eloquence and learning rather than with the passive saintliness of the Franciscans. Thomas assumed the habit of this new order in 1242 against the wishes and protests of his family. Refusing to yield to

their importunity, he was captured by his brothers and held a prisoner in his own home for two years. Neither persuasion, threats, nor the enticements of a beautiful young woman availed to shake him from his monastic vows. Finally having been convinced of the futility of the opposition and converted to his views his sisters connived with Dominican friars for his escape to Naples. Thomas had already acquired a good education at Monte Cassino and at the university, but the Dominicans in preparation for the great combat in the arena of human reason could be satisfied with nothing less than the highest training for so brilliant an intellect. Accordingly Thomas was sent by way of Rome and Paris to Cologne to become a pupil of Albertus Magnus, the greatest schoolman of his age. Here he acquired successively the degrees of Bachelor, Master and Doctor of Theology. In a short time he became a lecturer on theology and the greatest preacher of the times, carrying on his work in Cologne, Paris, Naples and Rome.

He was a close adviser of the reigning pontiffs and was consulted constantly upon both political and ecclesiastical affairs. At the same time he was a prolific writer, his *Summa Theologica* being the greatest masterpiece of medieval theology and the culmination of scholastic thinking. In 1274 at the age of 50 he was summoned by the Pope, Urban IV, to the Council of Lyons to deliver a disputation against the Greek Church. On his journey he became ill and was taken to the Cistercian Monastery near Terracina, where he died.

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS

In the gigantic task of reconciling all accumulated knowledge with Christian Theology to which he devoted himself, it was necessary for Thomas to construct a complete philosophy of life and society—the first since the Greeks. His sources included the theories of Aristotle, the Stoics, Cicero, St. Augustine, the Roman jurists and the theology of the Church. Of his numerous writings, his *Summa Theologica, De Regimine,* and *Introduction to Aristotle's Politics,* are most important in the development of his social and political philosophy. In English the best single analysis of his work is that of Littlejohn, *The Political Theory of the Schoolmen and Grotius,* Part II, and is the chief source used in this analysis.[13]

The scope and character of his work is set forth in his doctrine of law; (1) *Eternal law* embodies much of the Stoic concept of the Logos.

[13] *Cf.* also Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval.* Ch. VIII; also, Vaughan, *St. Thomas of Aquinas, Life and Labors.*

It is Divine reason guiding and controlling the Universe and while never completely comprehended, is known to man by the inner sanction of truth; (2) *Natural law* is the progressive rationalization of the Eternal law. All sentient beings are subject to the Eternal law and are passively molded to it through the process of nature, while it is the awareness of the process which enables man to make conscious adjustments and to acquire active participation; (3) *Human law* is the purposive application of Natural law to specific human needs and constitutes the basis of the human social order. Its conformity to Natural and Eternal law is the means through which it derives rational sanction and authority; (4) *Divine law* supplements the inadequacies of human reason in regard to the ultimate end of human existence, viz., eternal salvation and is miraculously revealed in the Holy Scriptures and preserved by the Church.

There is here outlined a logical and progressive order of social analysis. Under the gradual unfolding of the Divine purpose in Eternal law there is the natural history aspect of society in which social institutions have their natural origin; the organization of society into political form chiefly through conscious effort; and the final conformity of society and government to the revealed will of God. The scheme further exhibits Thomas' theory of the hierarchy of authority. Political organization is required to regulate a natural social order in the interest of human welfare, while the State in turn can accomplish its ultimate purpose only under the guidance and control of spiritual powers.

Thomas agrees with Cicero that the origin of society is due to human spontaneity and that it arises out of the community of interests.[14] This is clear from the facts of man's relative helplessness as compared with animals, his social instincts which impel him to associate, and his power of speech which renders association effective, through communication. He accepts Aristotle's dictum that man is a political animal, he adds to it the word "social." Man is formed for society and is truly human only in association. He disagrees quite naturally, therefore, with Seneca in the assumption "that social organization is due to the 'Fall.' "[15] Even in a "state of innocence" unlike other animals which are supplied with means to satisfy their wants, man would require organized coöperative association as a means not only of preserving but of enlarging his life. Society, then, rests on the basis of Natural law. Its original nature is derived from the instincts of gregariousness, of mating, of ac-

[14] *Cf. supra.*, Ch. III, p. 66.
[15] *Cf. supra., ibid.*, p. 70.

quisitiveness, of self-defense. It is therefore, as Aristotle concluded, "a work of nature."

While the origin of Society is found in Natural law, its progress toward its goal requires as a second element, the imposition of Human law. Political organization of the State is necessary. In matter and material society is simply social, but in form and organization it is political. Instinctive human impulses require for their guidance and restraint a conscious directive agency, i.e., government. The Divine law explicitly sanctions this arrangement. "The powers that be are ordained of God." [16] This alone for Thomas was sufficient sanction for political institutions, but in typical scholastic fashion, he finds that it agrees also with human reason. Government depends upon a principle of authority and power. Differentiation of function on the basis of intelligence and foresight is natural in the social organism and wise leadership is evolved. This accounts not only for a ruling group but for the various classes of citizens within the State. Thomas follows Aristotle in regard to the position of women, who on account of their weaker natures and the predominance of feeling and desire, should leave the affairs of State to the more intelligent and rational activities of men. To the Aristotelian theory of Slavery [17] he adds the Augustinian—a moral justification as a result of sin.

With keen analytic penetration, Thomas perceives Human law as developed in the State to be a psycho-physical product. He discusses the geographic size, fertility, natural beauty and location of national territories, and also the ethnic facts of homogeneity, size, occupations and spirit of the population as elements that determine the character of governments and thus foreshadows the work of Bodin, Montesquieu and Buckle. These ideas, however, are carried little beyond those of Aristotle and are so deeply imbedded in a mass of theological interpretation as to have excited little comment.

It is with the end or purpose of the State and not with its nature and forms that Thomas is concerned chiefly. It is a natural product but its place in the Eternal design is that which gives it importance. The State has a twofold function.

First, *temporal* in respect to the physical well-being and preservation of the race. It should be noted that Thomas' concept of the political state differs from the more subjective concept of the Greeks. Political conditions in the 13th century exhibited a multitude of conflicting

[16] *Romans* 13:1.
[17] *Cf. supra.*, Ch. II, pp. 40-42.

states and nationalities, which required a more objective and localized application. It concerned states rather than the State.

Second, *spiritual,* an ethical task in promoting the spiritual well-being of men and to which every other consideration is relatively of minor importance. It is impossible for natural law and human reason to guide the supernatural destinies of man. They are not adequate to the task of securing eternal happiness. It is necessary, therefore, that the Divine law or Revealed law should be superimposed. At this point Thomas departs from Aristotle, his great teacher in the domain of the natural, and appeals to the doctrines of Christian Theology for the completion of his book. It is here, also, that he enters the arena of the contemporary conflict between the two powers.

On the basis of the premises adduced, Thomas argues with irresistible logic the absolute and final supremacy of the Church over all things temporal and spiritual. The parallel development of Church and State does not create spheres of correlative power. Human life is an organic whole. Political society arose as we have seen, as the product of Human law,—an organized form of human society, which in turn is based on Natural law. But political society is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. As a means for securing Eternal happiness for mankind it possesses certain functions. It is sanctioned by Divine law. Kings rule by Divine right when they serve the Divine purpose of the State, but, the means of eternal happiness is not in possession of the State. It is mediated alone through the Church.

"The distinction of temporal and spiritual power lies in this, that in temporal government the use of reason is authorized, for human laws are an emanation of reason, whereas in the Kingdom of the spiritual reason has no place. It does not decide whether truth and reason shall rule, but has only to obey, and at best it is only permitted to prove this in a subjective way, that is, to justify what exists as far as it is possible. Reason is limited by the supernatural so that in the Church the spiritual government is absolute and not amenable to human reason. The Church is built on faith and Divine reason. The State and Church occupy the same relation as the natural and supernatural, the State being subordinate to the Church in all cases where the end of the Church and its authority comes in question. Their relations are founded (a) upon their respective ends, and (b) upon the respective means they use to attain these ends. The Church has a higher aim and uses higher means than the State. The Church must be free and independent in her spiritual

work and must not be hindered in any way by the State, but rather helped; for the earthly government can help citizens to be subjects of the Church by protecting with its power and legislation the laws of the Church and her doctrines, and by punishing enemies and apostates, executing the sentence of the Church with the secular arm. . . . The Divine law is necessary to guide man to his heavenly end. This Divine law is represented by the Church and the Church has her unity in the Pope." [18]

Questions of priority in this historic controversy, therefore, are settled by Thomas with the same degree of finality as that attributed to the Divine law. A secular ruler who becomes an apostate, or whose rule jeopardizes the spiritual interests of the State may be deposed by the Pope and his subjects absolved from allegiance to him. Should the heresy of a prince involve injury to the Christian faith the Pontiff may go to the limit of excommunication and the imposition of the death penalty.

An important corollary to the philosophy of Thomas with respect to the supreme authority of the Church is its bearing on the problem of world peace through which alone the spiritual well-being of mankind can be secured. Contemporary history exhibited the inability of secular rulers to accomplish this end. Wars of conquest and aggression were inevitable as long as political rulers were not restrained by a unified superior power. Such power the Church afforded and hence the unity of mankind, "which is called peace," can become a fact through the absolute domination of the supreme Pontiff of the universal and catholic Church.

In the writings of Thomas we have the pro-papal doctrine brought to its logical perfection. As to the correctness of his premises we must await the verdict of subsequent history. Modern political and social students are turning with renewed zeal to his writings and are discovering a wealth of material to reward their search.

Excellent examples of modern studies are doctors' theses by A. M. Smith, *The Grounds of Non-Catholic Freedom in the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas,* Chicago University, 1905, and H. I. Smith, *Classification of Desires in St. Thomas and in Modern Sociology,* Catholic University of America, 1915. The latter is an illuminating study, comparing desires as a source of human action as found in the writings of St. Thomas with those of Ward and Small.

[18] Littlejohn, *The Political Theory of the Schoolmen and Grotius,* p. 166.

DANTE ALIGHIERI

Dante was born in Florence in May, 1265. His father was a local notary, of a respectable Guelph family which boasted of ancient Roman descent. His mother was probably of plebeian origin. Her surname is not even known. Details of his boyhood are lacking but he acquired a liberal education, spending some time under the tutorship of Brunetto Latini, who was celebrated alike for his ability as a teacher of philosophy and rhetoric and for his gross vices. Most of Dante's biographers deal with experiences and conditions which bear upon his developing genius as the author of the *Divine Comedy* and which lie outside our specific interest. He grew to manhood amid scenes of political violence. The struggle between the Guelphs and Ghibellines was at its height, each party alternately possessing the city. Possessed with ardent patriotism Dante joined in this struggle and fought on the side of the Guelphs at the battle of Campaldino in 1289. For ten years he seems to have been employed largely upon diplomatic missions and other public service. On June 15, 1300, he was elected one of the three priors of Florence. To this "ill-omened" election and to his imprudence in office Dante attributes all his subsequent miseries. In the interest of the continued independence of Florence, he resisted the Pope's interference in the settlement of the feud between the Whites and the Blacks, factions within the Guelph party, and also the intervention of the French King, Charles of Valois. His efforts were fruitless. Charles entered Florence in 1302, overthrew the party of Dante, the Whites, and placed the Blacks in control. The property of the Whites was confiscated and plundered. Dante with four others was "condemned for fraud, corrupt practices in office, peculation, rebellion against the Pope and his representative, Charles of Valois, and against the peace of the State of Florence and the Guelph party." [19] These, of course, were purely political charges. Dante was absent from the city, probably on an embassy to Rome, and failing to answer an immediate summons was fined 5000 gold florins and banished for two years. Later the same year the penalty was increased to death by burning if he ever returned to Florence.

Such was the fate, through the bitterness of factional feuds, of one of Italy's greatest statesmen, poets, liberal and broad-minded citizens. Dante's experiences in exile did not diminish his love for Florence nor

[19] Dinsmore, *Life of Dante*, p. 140.

his desire for her future welfare. For nineteen years he wandered from city to city and from country to country. He lived for a while in Padua and spent some time in Verona. There is a tradition of a visit to the Universities of Paris and Oxford. His last days were spent in Ravenna, where he died in 1321.

There is much controversy over his relation to the Ghibelline party. That he broke with the Black Guelphs and that the White Guelphs with whom he was banished from Florence were afterward merged with the Ghibellines, and that he found asylum with Ghibelline princes is certain. Furthermore, his one great political treatise *De Monarchia,* the certain date of which is unknown, is the one outstanding defense of the imperial power as against the pretensions of the Church and as such, may with much force be regarded as the creed of the party of the Emperor.[20]

DE MONARCHIA

Unlike Thomas Aquinas, Dante presents no general scheme of social analysis. His whole social horizon was bounded by the religio-political struggle which was the cause of his own suffering and of the ills of society. He was sensitive as to his failure in public office and was conscious of having contributed little to the public good. Nevertheless, he believed himself competent "to set forth truths by others unattempted—truths ill understood yet profitable—for the benefit of the world." [21] These "truths" are presented in his *De Monarchia,* which Dunning regards as the most complete and perfect system that we have of imperialistic philosophy.[22]

Dante was not a Schoolman though the form and subtlety of his logic reveals a familiarity with their methods. He was widely read in the Metaphysics and Politics of Aristotle, Roman and Jewish history, the Civil and Canon Law, and the Hebrew Scriptures, but he drew upon these sources chiefly for proofs of his own political ideas.

It should be noted at the outset that there is a fundamental difference in the point of view of Dante and St. Thomas. St. Thomas, as we have seen, recognized the natural sphere of temporal government but argued for the complete supremacy of the Church. Dante does not reverse this claim. His whole contention is for correlative power.

[20] *Cf.* Dinsmore, *Life of Dante;* Church, *Dante;* Browning, *Dante, His Life and Writings;* Bunbury, *Life and Times of Dante Alighieri.*

[21] *De Monarchia,* B. I, Ch. 1. References to *De Monarchia* are from the translation by R. W. Church.

[22] *Op. cit.,* p. 230.

He asserts the duality of human nature. Man has a body and a soul. He has, therefore, two ends; that "prefigured in the earthly Paradise" and "that of the blessedness of life eternal." It follows that those two ends require different means for their accomplishment. Man needs two guides: "The Supreme Pontiff to lead mankind to eternal life, according to the things revealed to us" and "The Emperor to guide mankind to happiness in this world, in accordance with the teachings of philosophy." [23] He nowhere asserts the priority of the Empire except in its own legitimate sphere. He even concedes in the last sentence of his book that the prince may be subject to the pontiff in certain spiritual matters that he "may be stronger to lighten the world over which he has been placed by Him alone who is the ruler of all things, spiritual as well as temporal."

De Monarchia is divided into three books in which he presents in question form his three great arguments, viz.: (1) World Empire is a necessity; the Romans rule by Right; and the Authority of Government is direct from God.

Book I.—Whether a temporal monarch is necessary for the well-being of the World?

His general principle is "that the proper work of the human race, taken as a whole, is to set in action the whole capacity of that understanding which is capable of development; first, in the way of speculation, and then, by its extension, in the way of action," and "the condition requisite for the accomplishment of this purpose is universal peace," [24] which in turn is attainable, as Aristotle shows, whether in the family, the village or the commonwealth, by Kingly rule. This is further supported by "infallible truth; every Kingdom divided against itself shall be brought to desolation." [25] Since humanity is a whole the principle is applicable to the whole human race and universal monarchy is required.[26] Local division of authority means controversy among princes, hence their subordination to a super-prince, as a supreme judge is essential.[27] Again, justice rests on power and will. A supreme Monarch alone possesses the power, and removed from envy, by his exalted position, likewise the will.[28] Liberty is the greatest gift "bestowed by God on mankind" but men are freest under peace and

[23] *De Monarchia*, B. III, Ch. 6.
[24] *Ibid.*, B. I, Ch. 4.
[25] *Ibid.*, Ch. 5.
[26] *Ibid.*, Ch. 7-8.
[27] *Ibid.*, Ch. 10.
[28] *Ibid.*, Ch. 11.

good laws and this is best secured by one imperial rule.[29] In establishing a world rule, however, local authorities are not to be dispensed with. He says: "But it must be carefully observed that when we say that mankind may be ruled by one Supreme prince, we do not mean that the most trifling judgments for each particular town are to proceed immediately from him. For nations and kingdoms and states have, each of them, certain pecularities which must be regulated by different laws. But our meaning is that it is in those matters which are common to all men that men should be ruled by one monarch and be governed by a rule common to them all, with a view to their peace." [30]

"To all these reasons alleged above, a memorable experience adds its confirmation; it was under the Divine Augustus, who was sole ruler, under whom a perfect monarchy existed" and when "The human race was happy in the tranquillity of universal peace" that the Son of God made his advent into the world,—an age to which Paul referred as "the fullness of the times." [31]

Book II.—Whether the Roman people assumed to itself by right the dignity of Empire?

In this second division of the work Dante devotes himself to what seems to be an unnecessary as well as an extremely precarious task, but he believed that it was not only necessary to demonstrate the utility of world empire, but also to prove that those who had achieved it did so by divine right. The age to him was degenerate. The "golden age" was in the past; the hope of the future lay in its reëstablishment.

His first principle here is that "Right is the will of God." What, therefore, God wills in human society exists by Divine Right. Furthermore, "honor is the reward of goodness." From this he deduces the conclusion that since the Romans achieved this supreme honor it was because they were the noblest and best fitted to rule and hence they ruled not by usurpation but by right.[32] Additional historic proofs are adduced to support this claim. He accepts without question the "testimony of illustrious authors" to the miraculous intervention of God in behalf of the Romans and cites numerous instances.[33] "The Roman people in bringing the world into subjection aimed at the public weal and since right is justified by its aims they acquired their empire by

[29] *De Monarchia*, B. I, Ch. 12.
[30] *Ibid.*, Ch. 14.
[31] *Ibid.*, Ch. 16.
[32] *Ibid.*, B. II, Ch. 2-3.
[33] *Ibid.*, Ch. 4.

right."[34] Again "nature is divine intelligence." Some men by nature are born to rule, as Aristotle shows, and the same law of nature holds in respect to races. In acquiring empire the Romans demonstrated that they were ordained by nature to rule and thus divine intelligence is vindicated.[35] Four chapters are next devoted to the defense of the medieval concept of the "wager of battle" as the ultimate test of justice, the conclusion from which is, that since the Romans prevailed when all other nations were striving for empire, they achieved their rule by right, i.e., by the will of God.

To the argument from reason, as in the first book, he adds the testimony of the Christian faith and the doctrine of The Atonement. By choosing to be born in the Roman Empire, Jesus gave it his sanction, and again, he could expiate the sins of all mankind only by suffering under a ruler who had jurisdiction over the whole human race. "Let them cease, then, to insult the Roman Empire, who pretend that they are the sons of the Church; when they see that Christ, the bridegroom of the Church, sanctioned the Roman Empire at the beginning and at the end of His warfare on earth."[36]

Book III.—Whether the Authority of the Monarch comes from God or from the Vicar of God?

It was only by an almost incredible stretch of his vivid imagination that Dante conceived of the Empire of his Day—The Roman Empire, to have had any real existence and whose right he vindicated. Yet such was his faith.

He disposes unceremoniously and with vituperation of his antagonists "who have extinguished the light of reason, who are of their father, the devil," of the Decretalists whose arguments were based upon the Canon Law[37] and certain others, "who boast, themselves, to be white sheep in the flock of the Lord, but who have the plumage of crows." His is an honest contention with "The Chief Pontiff, Vicar of our Lord Jesus Christ and the successor of Peter, to whom we owe, not indeed all that we owe to Christ, but all that we owe to Peter, (who) contradicts this truth, urged it may be by zeal for the keys, and others whom I believe to be only led by zeal for our mother, the Church." He guards himself scrupulously against any imputation of impiety. "With these men, therefore, strong in the reverence which a dutiful

[34] *De Monarchia*, B. II, Ch. 5.
[35] *Ibid.*, Ch. 7.
[36] *Ibid.*, Ch. 12-13.
[37] *Cf.* Dunning, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

son owes to his mother, dutiful to Christ, dutiful to the Church, dutiful to the chief Shepherd; dutiful to all who profess the religion of Christ—I begin in this book the contest for the maintenance of the truth." [38]

In chapters 4-9 he takes up the scriptural arguments for the priority of the spiritual over the temporal found in the relation of the Sun and Moon, of Judah and Levi, of Samuel and Saul, of the offering of the Wise Men, of the commission to bind and loose, and of the two swords, and refutes them seriatim by the methods of "Aristotelian formal logic . . . with analysis that is often acute and ingenious but also often puerile." [39]

He next answers the arguments from Roman history by the same method. Constantine's "donation" of the seat of Empire at Rome to the Church establishes no authority, "For the dignity of the Empire was what Constantine could not alienate, nor the Church receive, for the Emperor to divide the Empire is impossible since the very function of empire is to preserve unity under one will, as argued in Book I, and the Church was disqualified to receive temporal power by the plain command of Scripture in *Matt.* 10:9.[40] To the argument that Charlemagne received his power of Empire from the Pope, he replies that "a usurpation of right does not make right." If the argument is insisted upon, however, it is dangerous, for with equal propriety one could argue the dependence of the Church on the Empire—a claim which Dante does not care to make—"for the Emperor Otto restored the Pope, Leo, and deposed Benedict, leading him to exile to Saxony." [41]

A convincing argument from history he supplies with great force: "The Empire was in existence and was possessed of its power before the Church arose," therefore, "the Church is not the cause of the Empire, and therefore, not of its authority." To the confirmation of this fact by the birth and death of Jesus, is added the testimony of Paul in his appeal to Caesar, *Acts* 25:11.[42]

Further arguments from reason are summarized in one general proposition: "If the Church had power to bestow authority on the Roman Prince, she would have it from God or from herself, or from some Emperor, or from the universal consent of mankind, or at least of the majority of mankind. There is no other crevice by which this

[38] *De Monarchia,* B. III, Ch. 1-3.
[39] Dunning, *op. cit.,* p. 234.
[40] *De Monarchia,* B. III, Ch. 10.
[41] *Ibid.,* Ch. 2.
[42] *Cf. Ibid.,* Ch. 13.

power could flow down to the Church. But she has it not from any of these sources; therefore she has it not at all." [43]

Dante's final conclusion is that there are two species of authority essential to human welfare, the Church and the Empire, and that both derive their power directly and independently from God.

Two criticisms of *De Monarchia* are appended:

"Dante's political views were a dream; though a dream based upon what had been, and an anticipation of what was, in part at least, to come. It was a dream in the middle ages, in divided and republican Italy, the Italy of cities, of a real and national government, based on justice and law. It was the dream of a real *State*. He imagined that the Roman Empire had been one great State; he persuaded himself that Christendom might be such. He was wrong in both instances, but in this case as in many others, he had already caught the spirit and ideas of a far distant future; and the political organization of modern time so familiar to us, that we cease to think of its exceeding wonder, is the practical confirmation, though in form very different from what he imagined, of the depth and farsightedness of those expectations, which are in outward form so chimerical." [44]

"The theory here set forth is idealized Ghibellinism. Powerful and eloquent as the treatise is it bears all the characteristic medieval defects of reasoning; ingenious arguments are based upon fanciful premises; little discrimination is shown in the valuation of authorities, and no appreciation of what constitutes evidence.

"It is now six hundred years since Dante conceived and defended his political theories and time has applied its acid test. His contention that both Church and State would be purer and more efficient if the temporal power be separated from the spiritual has been amply vindicated; but his dream of universal peace under a divinely ordained monarch having world-wide authority has revealed itself to be unsubstantial. Italy has come to unity, not through the weight of a single power imposed upon her from above, but through a spirit of nationality created by the many and the foundations of her peace rest upon the law-abiding habits of a free people trained in self-government and not on the sword of a conqueror. . . . Thinking in the familiar terms of his century Dante thought of this supreme arbiter as a divinely ordained monarch. We, to-day, thinking in terms of our democratic traditions, conceive of the sovereign power as an international court, whose de-

[43] *De Monarchia*, B. III, Ch. 14.
[44] Church, *Dante*, pp. 86-7.

crees are to be sustained by international force; but with the war-weary poet we agree 'that universal peace is the best of those things which God had ordained for our beatitude,' and the bitter experience of six centuries has taught us that this blessedness is not to be obtained by such chimeras as 'the balance of power' or 'invincible alliances,' but that it can come only through a sovereign power that is above all nations." [45]

[45] Dinsmore, *Life of Dante*, pp. 163-4.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. Trace the factors of history which led to the revival of social philosophy in the middle ages. Does this establish the contention that social philosophy reflects the life of the times?
2. What was the influence of Aristotle upon Thomas and Dante? What were the chief influences in bringing this about? What influence did humanism exert? *Cf.* Robinson, *History of Western Europe,* pp. 271-3; also 329-37.
3. To what extent are the philosophic and scientific elements blended in the work of Thomas? Of Dante?
4. How far do the four orders of law in the analysis of Thomas conform to the modern concepts of philosophy, science, politics, and religion? Trace the origin of these concepts in the writers reviewed so far.
5. How does the scholastic theory of law differ from those of Greek philosophy and Roman jurisprudence? *Cf.* W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval,* pp. 192-7.
6. Compare Thomas's theory of the origin of Society with those of Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, and Seneca. *Cf.* J. M. Littlejohn, *The Political Theories of the Schoolmen and Grotius.*
7. What support did Thomas afford in his theory of law for the doctrine of "divine right of kings"? *Cf.* W. A. Dunning, *op. cit.,* pp. 176-81.
8. What basis is laid in Dante's doctrines of the "two powers" for the theory of the Protestant reformers in regard to the separation of Church and State? *Cf.* W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Luther to Montesquieu,* Ch. I.
9. Contrast clearly the divergent methods proposed by Thomas and Dante for ending the strife between the two powers.
10. What significant contribution to social theory at this period was made by the Arabian historian and statesman, Ibn Khaldun? *Cf.* H. E. Barnes, *Sociology Before Comte, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 23, Sept., 1917, pp. 197-8; also, for further description Flint, *History of Philosophy of History in France,* pp. 158 ff.

What essential differences are found between this and Thomas and Dante?

11. What roots are found in this period and following for the development of utopian social thought? *Cf.* E. S. Bogardus, *History of Social Thought,* Ch. X.

CHAPTER VI

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

HISTORIC DEVELOPMENTS

NO more striking evidence of the backward look of social philosophy probably can be found than that presented during the 14th and 15th centuries. St. Thomas and Dante furnished no guide for the future. Acute as their observations were they affected but little, if at all, the future trend of events. While the struggle continued for a time in both Church and State to establish a universal authority in theory at least, conditions were developing which pointed in the opposite direction. A few of these may be summarized briefly.

Conspicuous among these changes was the growth of national states. Absolute national monarchy as an ideal was replacing the world imperialistic philosophy of the past. The power of feudalism, so important in the medieval period, was everywhere being broken by the rise of strong rulers, who if they could not obliterate this ancient system, were still able to organize the institutions of government upon a national basis.

The Hundred Years' War finally separated France and England and ultimately increased the power of both as national states. Each in turn gained ascendency over the great feudal families; the former being unified under Louis XI, and the latter, after the War of the Roses, under Henry VII. The Kingdom of Spain came into separate national existence through the alliance of Castile and Aragon under Ferdinand and Isabella, and Maximilian was endeavoring, though with less obvious success, to unify the conflicting interests of the feudal states of Germany. It was an era of strong men, when personal ability to achieve, embodied in a dominating will, was more impressive than a theory of an Imperial government or a Universal church.

Another element of social change was the rise of towns throughout Western Europe. As commerce and industry grew and a middle class developed and multiplied, there clustered about the feudal castles groups of dwellings occupied by petty merchants, traders, and artisans. These increased in size and importance until many of them

were sufficiently powerful to demand free charters from the lords, and on the economic side constituted an important factor in the overthrow of feudalism. This movement was a part of the general evolution of society which created the individual. It evolved new classes of citizens. It provided monarchs with new and powerful allies in their struggle with the landed nobility. It furnished largely the source of a hired professional soldiery, so important in the early monarchial period, and from it emerged a new leisure class in which art and letters were an active concern. In short we observe here the rise to social and political self-consciousness of that portion of the population now rapidly increasing, which for centuries had been without significance and against whose oppression and sufferings no effective voice of protest had been raised. In Germany with the collapse of imperial authority, the towns acquired practical independence, while in Italy, under widely different conditions, they assumed the proportion of free city states such as Florence, Milan, Naples, Venice and a host of others of lesser importance.

A third condition developed within the Papacy. The conflict between Boniface and Philip the Fair of France over the taxation of Church property, resulted disastrously for the Pope and upon his death in 1305 Philip secured the appointment of the Archbishop of Bordeaux as Pope Clement V and transferred the seat of the Papacy to France, where it remained at Avignon for seventy-two years, a period known as the "Babylonian captivity." In 1377, Pope Gregory XI returned to Rome, where he died the following year. The Roman populace compelled the cardinals, most of whom were French, to elect Urban VI. When Urban refused to return to France, the cardinals withdrew from Rome, and declaring that they had been intimidated in the election of Urban chose Clement VII, who went at once to Avignon. Urban selected a new college of cardinals and remained at Rome. This was the beginning of the great Schism which lasted for another forty years. There were now two reigning Popes. Each claimed to be the rightful vicar of Christ and defended his claims by attempting to depose the other. Early in the conflict the University of Paris advocated a Council of Christendom to settle the difficulty on the theory that such a Council, as for instance, Nicea in 325, was superior to the Pope. At length in 1409 such a Council was convened at Pisa and Alexander V was chosen Pope. Neither of the reigning Popes recognized the decree of the Council and for eight years more there were three heads of the Church instead of two. A second great Council was convened in Constance in

1414 and after three years' deliberation finally ended the Schism by the election of Martin V, who reëstablished the pontificate in the Vatican.

As a result of this century of internal strife the dignity of the Church was seriously impaired and ample justification was afforded for the protests of Wycliffe and Huss.[1]

A fourth factor was the Renaissance in Italy. In 1453 Constantinople fell into the hands of the Turks and many Greek intellectuals found asylum in Italy. The intense political and commercial rivalries among the city-states had awakened intellect and increased secular interests. Greek culture, therefore, found a congenial atmosphere and produced revolutionary results. While the revival of learning affected profoundly the whole future of civilization and opened the modern era of science, discovery, invention, industry, and finally democracy in both religion and government, all historians of the time agree that this most brilliant period of intellectual awakening was accompanied in, Italy especially, by inexplicable moral contradictions. Villari says: "Everywhere liberty was disappearing, tyrants springing up; family ties grew weaker and weaker, the domestic hearth was profaned; no man trusted any longer the good faith of the Italians." [2] Roger remarks: "A civilization sprang up which, as opposed to the Religious civilization of the Middle Ages, was thoroughly pagan in its spirit—pagan not only in its love of beauty and literature, and its delight in living, but also—as a reaction against the asceticism of the Church—in its vices, and its frank sensualism and egoism. The whole scale of values was shifted." [3] Cust paints a still more sinister picture. He says: "At the beginning of the sixteenth century Italy was rotten to the core. In the close competition of great wickedness the Vicar of Christ easily carried off the palm, and the court of Alexander VI was probably the wickedest meeting place of men that has ever existed upon earth. No virtue, Christian or Pagan, was there to be found; little art that was not sensuous or sensual. It seemed as if Bacchus and Venus and Priapus had come to their own again, and yet Rome had not ceased to call herself Christian." [4]

Finally, conditions in Florence which furnished Machiavelli with his

[1] See Robinson's *History of Western Europe,* Ch. XXI; also Machiavelli's *History of Florence,* translated by Detmold, Vol. I, B. I.

[2] *Niccolo Machiavelli and His Times,* Vol. I, p. 5.

[3] *A Student's History of Philosophy,* p. 244.

[4] *Introduction to Machiavelli* in *Tudor Translations,* edited by Henley, Vol. I, p. xvii.

immediate social outlook should be considered. Florence was easily the most democratic, cultured, and corrupt of the Italian Republics. It presents a confused chaos of events, which even the brilliance of Machiavelli could scarcely disentangle.[5] "Lorenzo the Magnificent, leading a life of scandalous immorality, keeping up continual and general *espionage,* interfering in the most private affairs, forbidding marriage between persons of condition that were not to his taste, and bestowing the most important offices on the lowest men, he dazzled all men by the splendor of his rule so that a writer observes that though Lorenzo was a tyrant 'it would be impossible to imagine a better and more pleasing tyrant.' "[6]

Machiavelli presents a much more attractive view of Lorenzo and declares that all Florence lamented his death and that soon afterward "there began to spring up those evil seeds of trouble which ruined and continued to cause the ruin of Italy as there was no one capable of destroying them."[7]

Conspiracies followed quickly upon the death of Lorenzo in 1492 and upon the approach of Charles VIII of France, who invaded Italy in 1494, the people revolted, sacked the palaces of the Medici and banished them from the city. For a time the burning eloquence of the Dominican monk, Savonarola was sufficient to check the profligacy of the city and he became the dominating figure in the formation of the Republic. A bonfire was made of the "Vanities," including immoral books and pictures. His ascendency, however, was short-lived. Reforms could not sink deeply and violent reaction quickly followed. In 1498 Franciscan jealousies and popular clamor was supplemented by the bitter hostility of the unscrupulous Pope Alexander VI, and Savonarola was arrested, convicted as a heretic, executed and his body burned in the public square. The Republic continued a turbulent existence for eighteen years. In 1512 the Medici were again restored to control and the liberty of Florence came to an end. Political intrigues and assassinations continued until Florence was reduced to the position of a grand duchy of Tuscany.

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

Niccolo Machiavelli was born in Florence on May 3, 1469. The Machiavelli family was of ancient Tuscan origin, held landed estates in Val de Pica, and was of the Guelph party. His mother, Bartelomea

[5] *Cf.* Machiavelli's *History of Florence.*
[6] Villari, *Niccolo Machiavelli and His Times,* Vol. I, pp. 59-60.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 420.

Nelli, was equally well connected. Niccolo's father, Bernardo, was a citizen of Florence, held the office of Jurisconsult, and possessed a small estate at San Casciano. Of his boyhood and education we have no details whatever. That he grew to manhood in the Florence of Lorenzo the Magnificent, that he read Latin fluently, that he was a true product of the times, that he saw the Medici driven from the city and Savonarola martyred, are evident facts in his preparation for a public career. In 1498, at the age of twenty-nine he emerged from obscurity to play an important rôle in Florentine politics. He was appointed to the office of Secretary to the Ten Liberty and Peace, a position which he held till the fall of the Republic. His public service was without reproach. He was employed almost constantly upon diplomatic embassies, not only throughout the Florentine domains but to Rome and even to the court of Louis XII, and of Maximilian. He spent a year and a half in the camp of Caesar Borgia in Romagna and observed the practices of military statescraft. He secured through the Nine of Ordnance and Militia the reorganization of the Florentine army on the militia basis and the elimination of mercenary troops and thus created the modern military system.

With the return of the Medici in 1512, he lost his office, though he would have been glad to have served the new masters, but he had political enemies. The following year a group of conspirators plotted the overthrow of the tyrants. Machiavelli was suspected of complicity, was arrested and tortured on the rack. He was not convicted but remained in prison. Set at liberty through a proclamation of amnesty by Cardinal de Medici, then Pope Leo X, he repaired, disgusted and disheartened, to his family estate.

His private life is best described in a letter which he wrote to a friend on December 10, 1513: "I am at my farm and since my last misfortunes, have not been in Florence twenty days. I rise with the sun and go into a wood of mine that is being cut, where I remain two hours inspecting the work of the previous day and conversing with the woodcutters who have always some trouble on hand among themselves or with their neighbors. When I leave the wood, I proceed to a well, and thence to the place which I use for snaring birds, with a book under my arm—Dante, or Petrarch or one of the minor poets like Tibullus or Ovid. I read the story of their passions and let their loves remind me of my own, which is a pleasant pastime for a while. Next I take the road, enter the inn door, talk with the passersby, inquire the news of the neighborhood, listen to a variety of matters and make note

of the different tastes and humors of men. This brings me to dinner time when I join my family and eat the poor produce of my farm. After dinner I go back to the inn, where I generally find the host and a butcher, a miller, and a pair of bakers. With these companions I play the fool all day at cards or backgammon; a thousand squabbles, a thousand insults and abusive dialogues take place while we haggle over a farthing and shout loud enough to be heard from San Casciano. But when evening falls, I go home and enter my writing-room. On the threshold I put off my country habit, filthy with mud and mire, and array myself in royal courtly garments; thus worthily attired I make my entrance into the ancient courts of the men of old where they receive me with love and where I feed upon that food which only is my own and for which I was born. I feel no shame in conversing with them and asking them the reason for their actions. They, moved by their humanity, make answer; for four hours space I feel no annoyance, forget all care, poverty cannot frighten nor death appall me. I am carried away to their society. And since Dante says 'that there is no science unless we retain what we have learned,' I have set down what I have gained from their discourse and composed a treatise De Principatibus, in which I enter as deeply as I can into the science of the subject with reasonings on the nature of principality, its several species and how they are acquired, how maintained, how lost. If you ever liked any of my scribblings this ought to suit your taste. To a prince and especially a new prince, it ought to prove acceptable. Therefore, I am dedicating it to the Magnificence of Giuliano." [8]

Of this period of his life Cust says: "His position was miserable. Temporarily crippled by torture, out of favor with the government, shunned by his friends, in deep poverty, burdened with debt, with a wife and four children, his material circumstances were ill enough. But, worse still, he was idle. He had deserved well of the Republic, and had never despaired of it and this was his reward. He seemed to himself a broken man. He had no great natural dignity, no great moral strength. He profoundly loved and admired Dante, but he could not for one moment imitate him. He sought satisfaction in sensuality of life and writing, but found no comfort, great things were stirring in the world and he had neither part nor lot in them." [9]

However, after six years Cardinal de Medici consulted him on

[8] Simon, *Age of Despots,* 244-6, Requoted from Morley, *Machiavelli,* Romanes Lectures, pp. 13-14.

[9] Cust, *op. cit.,* p. xiv.

governmental affairs and commissioned him to write the history of Florence on an annual stipend of 100 florins. In 1526 we find him again employed in military reconstruction, and in the fortification of Florence. He died in Florence June 22, 1527.

THE PRINCE

Henry Morley classes Machiavelli with Aristo and Tasso as one of the three great writers produced by Italy in the 16th century.[10] Among his voluminous writings *The Prince* is the chief source of his social philosophy. The *Discourses on Livy* and the *Art of War* are of value chiefly for the elaboration of the doctrines set forth in *The Prince* though with some difference in point of view.

Neill says that it might be repeated as truly of Machiavelli as it was said of the poet Gray, "that no other man had walked down the aisle of fame with so small a book under his arm." [11] And Cust remarks that "there is no great book in the world of smaller compass than *The Prince* of Machiavelli. There is no book more lucidly, directly, nor plainly written. There is no book that has aroused more vehement, venomous and even truculent controversy from the moment of its publication until to-day. And it is asserted with great probability that *The Prince* has had a more direct action upon real life than any other book in the world and a larger share in breaking the chains and lighting the dark places of the Middle Ages." [12]

It seems necessary therefore and at the same time sufficient to analyze the contents of this little volume.

OUTLINE AND DISCUSSION

The book contains twenty-six brief chapters condensed into about one hundred octavo pages. The material divides itself logically into six distinct parts.[13]

[10] Introduction to *The Prince,* Universal Library, p. 5.
[11] Article, *Machiavelli, Library of the World's Best Literature,* Vol. 24, p. 9484.
[12] *Op. cit.,* p. xxxv.
[13] Quotations are from the translation by Detmold, *Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli.* For other translations see Morley's Universal Library, Vol. 6; also, Edward Dacres in the Tudor translations. A most quaint and interesting work is that of Ellis Farnsworth, M.A., Vicar of Rostern in Cheshire, *The Works of Nicholas Machiavel, Secretary to State to the Republic of Florence, Newly Translated from the Originals, Illustrated with Notes, Anecdotes, Dissertations, and the Life of Machiavel, never before published, and Several New Plans in the Art of War.* Two Volumes, London, 1742.

I. *The Dedication.* It is recommended modestly to the magnificent Lorenzo, son of Piero de Medici as an unembellished historical analysis of the elements of successful rule, with the hope that it may be of value in enabling His Magnificence "to attain that greatness which fortune and his great qualities promise," and incidentally that he may not overlook the "malice of fortune" to which the author has been subjected.[14]

II. *The Nature of Principalities with Respect to their Government.*—This part comprises chapters one to eleven.

In striking contrast to prior subjective interpretations, Machiavelli derives his theory of government from objective facts. The form of principalities and their method of acquisition determine the nature of their rule. Of tyrannies there are two kinds, hereditary and newly acquired. The former are preserved with least difficulty because of tradition. If the prince does not make himself odious he can control with ease. Should he be supplanted by conquest he can usually recover his kingdom upon the first reverses of the usurper.[15] The latter are more difficult to hold. If "accustomed to liberty and the government of their own laws" they will be in a state of chronic revolt against their conqueror and he must either "ruin them" or permit them self-government.[16]

New principalities are often the result of a combination of superior ability and favorable opportunity as in the case of Moses, Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus. Such princes "acquire their principalities with difficulty but preserve them with ease provided they depend upon 'force' and not upon 'entreaties.'" "Thence it was that all prophets who came with arms in hand were successful whilst those who were not armed were ruined. . . . This was the experience of Brother Girolamo Savonarola, who failed in his attempt to establish a new order of things as soon as the multitude ceased to believe in him; for he had not the means to keep his believers firm in their faith."[17]

In the case of new principalities that are acquired merely by good fortune through purchase or as a gift from some powerful monarch, difficulties usually arise upon the assumption of office. Generally such

[14] The reader will note an apparent discrepancy in regard to the dedication. In the letter cited on page 130, we find the name is Giuliano. The change was due to the summoning of Giuliano to Rome by his brother Pope Leo X, where he was shortly afterward assassinated, and the assumption of the reigns of government by his nephew, Lorenzo.

[15] *Cf. The Prince,* Ch. 2.

[16] *Cf. ibid.,* Ch. 5.

[17] *Ibid.,* Ch. 6.

men "have neither the skill nor the power to maintain that high rank." "He who does not lay the foundation of his power beforehand may be able by great ability and courage to do so afterwards; but it will be done with great trouble to the builder and with danger to the edifice." [18]

Where a principality is obtained by "wicked and nefarious means" Machiavelli observes that "such means may enable a man to achieve empire, but not glory." In this case the prince should do all his wickedness at once and then settle down to peaceful rule. He cites examples of this type but is careful to remark: "Without entering otherwise into the merits of these cases I judge they will suffice to anyone who may find himself obliged to imitate them." [19]

In regard to civil principalities—those not acquired by treason or violence, but by the favor of the people—it does not necessarily follow that "he that relies upon the people build upon quicksand." This is true only in case he relies upon their continued voluntary support. "A wise prince, therefore, will steadily pursue such a course that the citizens of his state will always and under all circumstances feel the need of his authority and will therefore always prove faithful to him." [20]

Ecclesiastical principalities are gained because of good fortune or valor but are kept without either because of the dignity of the Church—the conduct of the prince may be what it will. "For they are raised up and sustained by the Divine Power and it would be a bold and presumptuous office for any man to discuss them." Nevertheless if it should be inquired how the Church came to be so powerful in temporal matters, the historical answer is that designing princes so contrived that what they did for the one was turned to the good account of the other.

III. *Military Organization as a means of National Defense.*—This part embraces three chapters,—twelve to fourteen.

There are two foundations of national safety,—good laws and good arms. Laws are good, not on the basis of their conformity to a theoretical standard of excellence, but because they preserve and increase the well-being of a given state. Arms are good if they are effective instruments of public defense.

One of the outstanding weaknesses of the military system of the Italian republics was its dependence upon a hired soldiery. Against

[18] *The Prince*, Ch. 7.
[19] *Ibid.*, Ch. 8.
[20] *Ibid.*, Ch. 9.

this system Machiavelli inveighs with remorseless logic. "Mercenary and auxiliary troops are both useless and dangerous, and if any one attempts to found his state upon mercenaries it will never be stable or secure; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, faithless and braggarts among friends, but amongst enemies cowards, and have neither fear of God nor good faith with men. . . . There is no difficulty in demonstrating the truth of this; for the present ruin of Italy can be attributed to nothing else but to the fact that she has for many years depended upon mercenary armies. Their commanders are either competent, or they are not; if they are, then you cannot trust them because their chief aim will always be their own aggrandizement, either by imposing upon you, who are their employer, or by oppressing others beyond your intentions; and if they are incompetent, then they will certainly hasten your ruin." [21]

Auxiliary troops supplied by a powerful ally are equally unreliable. "Troops of this kind may be useful and good in themselves but they are always dangerous for him who calls them to his aid; for if defeated he remains undone, and if victorious then he is in their power like a prisoner." "In short, with mercenaries the danger lies in their cowardice and bad faith; whilst with auxiliaries their valor constitutes their danger. A wise prince, therefore, should ever avoid employing either of them and should rely exclusively upon his own troops and should prefer defeat with them rather than victory with the troops of others, with whom no real victory can ever be won." [22]

"A prince then should have no other thought or object so much at heart and make no other thing so much his especial study as the art of war and the organization and discipline of his army . . . princes who thought more of indulgence in pleasure than of arms have thereby lost their states." "A wise prince . . . should never be idle in times of peace but should industriously lay up stores, of which to avail himself in times of adversity, so that when Fortune abandons him, he may be prepared to resist its blow." [23]

It may be superfluous to observe, by way of comment, that Machiavelli's philosophy of "preparedness," a product of Italy's national emergency of his day was never more ably nor more forcibly stated by our own renowned Roosevelt in the stormy days of international emergency preceding our entrance into the World War.

[21] *The Prince,* Ch. 12.
[22] *Ibid.,* Ch. 13.
[23] *Ibid.,* Ch. 14.

IV. *The Character of a Successful Prince.*—This division of the work includes chapters fifteen to eighteen.

The author approaches this subject with the same candor and *sang-froid* that is exhibited in the earlier discussions. Nothing matters but the salvation of Florence. Patriotism is a passion. "Reasons of State" are his justification for the conduct of the prince. Nor is he unaware of the risk incurred in departing from the customary treatment of the subject, "but as my aim is to write something that may be useful to him for whom it is intended, it seemed to me proper to pursue the real truth of the matter rather than to indulge in mere speculation on the same; for many have imagined republics and principalities such as have never been known to exist in reality. For the manner in which men live is so different from the way in which they ought to live that he who leaves the common course for that which he ought to follow will find that it leads him to ruin rather than to safety. For a man who, in all respects, will carry out only his professions of good, will be apt to be ruined among so many who are evil. A prince therefore who desires to maintain himself must learn to be not always good, but to be so or not as necessity may require. Leaving aside then the imaginary things concerning princes and confining ourselves only to the realities, I say that all men . . . are noted for some quality that brings them either praise or censure." [24]

After enumerating a long list of virtues and their alternate vices he continues: "I am well aware that it would be most praiseworthy for a prince to possess all of the above named qualities that are esteemed good; but as he cannot have them all, nor entirely observe them . . . he should at least be prudent enough to know how to avoid the infamy of those vices which rob him of his state; . . . for all things considered, it will be found that some things that seem like virtue will lead you to ruin if you follow them; whilst others, that apparently are vices, will, if followed, result in your safety and well-being." [25] Examples follow:

1—"It is well for a prince to be deemed liberal; and yet liberality indulged in so that you will no longer be feared will prove injurious. For liberality worthily exercised, as it should be, will not be recognized, and may bring upon you the reproach of the very opposite. For if you desire the reputation of being liberal, you must not stop at any degree of sumptuousness; so that a prince will in this way generally consume

[24] *The Prince*, Ch. 15.
[25] *Ibid.*, Ch. 15.

his entire substance, and may in the end, if he wishes to keep up his reputation for liberality, be obliged to subject his people to extraordinary burdens, and resort to taxation and employ all sorts of measures that will enable him to procure money. This will soon make him odious with his people; and when he becomes poor he will be condemned by everybody so that having by his prodigality injured many and benefited few, he will be the first to suffer every inconvenience and be exposed to every danger and when he becomes conscious of this and attempts to retrench, he will at once expose himself to the imputation of being a miser."

On the other hand if he does not fear the charge of being parsimonious and "by his prudence and economy he makes his revenues suffice him, and that he is able to provide for his defense in case of war and engage in enterprises without burdening his people, he will be considered liberal. . . . There is, therefore, more wisdom in submitting to be called parsimonious, which may bring you blame without hatred, than by aiming to be called liberal, to incur unavoidably the reputation of rapacity, which will bring upon you infamy as well as hatred." [26] This is the familiar argument in modern politics by which "the administration" is charged with extravagance and a consequent high tax rate, which not infrequently leads to the overthrow of "the party in power."

2—"Every prince ought to desire the reputation of being merciful, and not cruel; at the same time he should be careful not to misuse that mercy. . . . A prince, therefore, should not mind the ill repute of cruelty, when he can thereby keep his subjects united and loyal, for a few displays of severity will be more merciful than to allow by an excess of clemency, disorders to occur, which are apt to result in rapine and murder; for these injure a whole community whilst the executions ordered by the prince fall only upon a few individuals." "This, then, gives rise to the question 'whether it be better to be loved than feared' or 'to be feared than beloved.' It will naturally be answered that it would be desirable to be both the one and the other; but as it is difficult to be both at the same time, it is much more safe to be feared than to be loved when you have to choose between the two."

Let us inject here a hypothetical question. Suppose actual emergencies arise—a criminal assault is made with a deadly weapon with intent to kill—Germany invades Belgium—and you have for the time being to choose between "love" and "fear". Machiavelli's answer is unequivocal.

[26] *The Prince*, Ch. 16.

"A prince, however, should make himself feared in such a manner that if he has not won the affections of his people, he shall at least not incur their hatred, for the being feared and not hated can go very well together if the prince abstains from taking the substance of his subjects and leaves them their women. And if you should be obliged to inflict capital punishment upon any one then be sure to do so only when there is a manifest cause and proper justification for it; and above all things abstain from taking people's property, for men will sooner forget the death of their fathers than the loss of their patrimony." [27]

Here we have stated in naked honesty the traditional doctrine of force as a means of social control; in the discipline of children by punishment, intimidation as a means of criminal repression and the imprisonment of conscious objectors in the interest of public morale.

3—"It must be evident to everyone that it is more praiseworthy for a prince always to maintain good faith and practice integrity rather than craft and deceit. And yet the experience of our own times has shown that those princes have achieved great things who made small account of good-faith and who understood by cunning to circumvent the intelligence of others; and that in the end they got the better of those whose actions were dictated by loyalty and good faith. You must know, therefore, that there are two ways of carrying on a contest; the one by law, and the other by force. The first is practised by men and the other by animals; and as the first is often insufficient it becomes necessary to resort to the second.

"It being necessary then for a prince to know well how to employ the nature of the beasts, he should be able to assume both that of the fox and that of the lion; for whilst the latter cannot escape the traps laid for him, the former cannot defend himself against the wolves. A prince should be a fox to know the traps and snares; and a lion to be able to frighten the wolves; for those who simply hold to the nature of the lion do not understood their business.

"A sagacious prince then cannot and should not fulfill his pledges when their observance is contrary to his interest, and when the causes that induced him to pledge his faith no longer exist. If men were all good, then indeed this precept would be bad, but as men are naturally bad, and will not observe their faith towards you, you must in the same way not observe yours to them; and no prince ever yet lacked legitimate reasons with which to color his want of good faith. Innumerable

[27] *The Prince*, Ch. 17.

modern examples could be given of this; and it could easily be shown how many treaties of peace and how many engagements have been made null and void by the faithlessness of princes; and he who has best known how to play the fox has ever been the most successful. . . . A prince should seem to be merciful, faithful, humane, religious and upright, and should even be so in reality . . . (but) he should have a versatile mind, capable of changing readily, according as the winds and changes of fortune bid him; and as has been said above, not to swerve from the good if possible, but to know how to resort to evil if necessity demands it.

"A prince then should look mainly to the successful maintenance of his state. The means which he employs for this will always be accounted honorable and he will be praised by everybody." [28]

It is upon this chapter, more than any other portion of his writings that Machiavelli's sinister reputation depends. And yet Morley may be correct when he observes that "we are shocked by his maxims in proportion to our forgetfulness of history." [29] Three times in this one chapter he repudiates the practice of deception as a general principle of political morality,—it is simply a bad method which reason of state may require under existing conditions. The history of treaties and of international diplomacy among modern nations can hardly be cited in refutation of the accuracy of his description.

V. *Effective Means of National Security.*—Six chapters are included in this division, nineteen to twenty-five.

The general problem, here, is how a prince may avoid the hard necessity of employing unscrupulous means in maintaining the State.

First of all he himself should avoid being hated and condemned. "Thus will he maintain himself in such esteem that no one will think of deceiving him or betraying him. . . . For there are two things a prince has to fear; the one, attempts against him by his own subjects; and the other, attacks from without by powerful foreigners. Against the latter he will be able to defend himself by good armies and good allies, and whoever has the one will not lack the other. And so long as his external affairs are kept quiet his internal security will not be disturbed unless it should be by conspiracy."

Among existing nations, France has best solved the problem of internal safety through the creation of a parliament. "For the Founder of that Kingdom knew the ambitions and insolence of the nobles and

[28] *The Prince*, Ch. 18.
[29] Romanes Lectures, *Machiavelli*, p. 38.

judged it necessary to put a bit into their mouths with which to curb them. He knew at the same time the hatred of the mass of the people toward the nobles based upon their fears. Wishing to secure both, and yet unwilling to make this the special care of the Kings so as to relieve him of the responsibility to the nobles of seeming to favor the people, and to the people of favoring the nobles he instituted the Parliament to act as a judge, which might without reference to the King, keep down the great and favor the weak. Nor could there be a wiser system or one that affords more security to the King and his realm." [30]

As to the problem of external safety he reaffirms his faith in a national militia and the strength that is found in a united people.[31]

Furthermore with the modern principle of expression rather than repression as a means of character-building, Machiavelli is in full accord. "Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as the undertaking of great enterprises and the setting of a noble example in his own person." His historic illustration here is Ferdinand of Spain: "And thus he was always planning great enterprises, which kept the minds of his subjects in a state of suspense and admiration and occupied with their results. And these different enterprises followed so quickly one upon the other that he never gave men a chance deliberately to make any attempt against himself."

Another suggestion has an essentially modern ring: "The choice of his ministers is of no slight importance to a prince; they are either good or not as the prince is sagacious or otherwise; and upon the character of the persons with whom a prince surrounds himself depends the first impression of his own ability. If his ministers and counsellors are competent and faithful, he will be reputed wise because he had known how to discern their capacity and how to secure their fidelity; but if they prove otherwise, then the opinion formed of the prince will not be favorable because of his want of judgment in their first selection." [32] Nevertheless, he should be wary of counsel and avoid flattery. "Those who imagine that a prince who has the reputation of sagacity is not indebted for it to his own natural gifts, but to the good counsels of those who surround him, certainly deceive themselves. For it may be taken as a general infallible rule that a prince who is not naturally wise cannot be well advised, unless he should perchance place himself

[30] *The Prince*, Ch. 19.
[31] *Cf. ibid.*, Ch. 20.
[32] *Ibid.*, Ch. 22.

entirely in the hands of one man, who should guide him in all things, and who would have to be a man of uncommon ability. In such a case a prince might be well directed but it would probably not last long because his counsellor would in a short time deprive him of his state." [33]

Finally, Machiavelli observes that Fortune and Divine Power are arbiters of human destiny to the extent of half or even a little more, but the rest is left to human will. The prince, therefore, is not wise who ignores these factors. "The prince who relies entirely upon fortune will be ruined according as fortune varies," while "the prince who conforms his conduct to the spirit of the times will be fortunate; and in the same way he will be unfortunate if in his actions he disregards the spirit of the times." [34]

VI. *Exhortation to Deliver Italy from Foreign Barbarians.*—This division includes only the final chapter.

With passionate appeal the author now beseeches Lorenzo to redeem Italy. The fortunes of Italy were desperate but this only furnished the greater opportunity. Provided with a national army, inspired by the justice of a righteous cause, schooled in the knowledge of how great men in history have saved their states, "favored by God and the Church" success will be assured.

"You must not then allow this opportunity to pass so that Italy after waiting so long may at last see her deliverer appear. Nor can I possibly express with what affection he would be received in all those provinces that have suffered so long from this inundation of foreign foes!—with what thirst for vengeance, with what persistent faith, with what devotion and with what tears. What doors would be closed to him? Who would refuse him obedience? What envy would dare oppose him? What Italian would refuse him homage? This barbarous dominion of the foreigner offends the nostrils of everybody.

"Let your illustrious house, then, assume this task with that courage and hopefulness which every just enterprise inspires; so that under your banner our country may recover to ancient fame, and under your auspices may be verified the words of Petrarca:

> 'Virtue shall arm 'gainst rage, and in short fight
> Prove the Roman valour's not extinguished quite.' " [35]

[33] *The Prince,* Ch. 23.
[34] *Ibid.,* Ch. 25.
[35] *Ibid.,* Ch. 26.

ESTIMATES AND CRITICISMS

Macaulay, in his essay on Machiavelli, says: "There is no reason whatever to think that those amongst whom he lived saw anything shocking or incongruous in his writings. Abundant proofs remain of the high estimation in which both his works and his person were held by the most respectable among his contemporaries. Clement VII patronized the publication of those very books which the Council of Trent in the following generation pronounced unfit for the perusal of Christians. Some members of the Democratic party censured the Secretary for dedicating *The Prince* to a person who bore the unpopular name of Medici. But to those immortal doctrines which have since called forth such reprehensions no exception appears to have been taken. The cry against them was first raised beyond the Alps and seems to have been heard with amazement in Italy." [36]

We continue the story from Morley: "In the long and fierce struggle from the fifteenth century onwards, among rival faiths and between contending forces in civil government, Machiavelli was hated and attacked from every side. In the great rising up of new types of life in the Church, and of life in the State, his name stood for something that partisans of old and new alike professed to abhor. The Church first tolerated, if it did not patronize, his writings; but soon, under the double stress of the Reformation in Germany on one hand and the Pagan Renaissance in Italy on the other, it placed him in that index of forbidden books which now first, 1557, in dread of the new art of printing, crept into formal existence. He speedily came to be denounced as schismatical, heretical, perverse, the impious foe of faith and truth. He was burnt in effigy. His book was denounced as written with the very fingers of Satan himself. The vituperation of the 16th century had never been surpassed either among learned or unlearned men and the dead Machiavelli came in for his full share of unmeasured words. As Voltaire has said of Dante that his fame is secure because nobody reads him, so in an inverse sense, the bad name of Machiavelli grew worse because men reproached, confuted and cursed but never read. Catholics attacked him as the enemy of the Holy See, and Protestants attacked him because he looked to a restoration of the spirit of Ancient Rome, instead of a restoration of the faith and discipline of the primitive Church. While both of them railed at him,

[36] *Critical, Historical and Miscellaneous Essays and Poems,* Vol. I, p. 196.

Catholic and Protestant each reviled the other as Machiavellist. In France national prejudice against the famous Italian Queen-mother hit Machiavelli too, for his book was declared to be the oracle of Catherine de Medici, to whose father it was dedicated; it was held responsible for the Bartholomew massacre and the Huguenot wars. In Spain opposite ground was taken, and he who elsewhere was blamed as the advocate of persecution was abominated here as the enemy of wars of religion, and the advocate of that monstrous thing, civil toleration. In England, Royalists called him an atheist, and roundheads called him a Jesuit. A recent German writer has noted 395 references to him in our Elizabethan literature, all fixing him with the craft, malice and hypocrisy of the Evil One. Everybody knows how Hudibras finds in his Christian name the origin of our domestic title for the devil though scholars have long taught us to refer it to Nyke, the water-goblin of Norse Mythology. . . . Whenever a bad name floated into currency it was flung at Machiavelli and his own was counted the worst that could be flung at a bad man." [37]

The reaction against this odium and hate has carried favorable criticism to equally exaggerated extremes. Macaulay says: "It may seem ridiculous to say that we are acquainted with few writings which exhibit so much elevation of sentiment, so pure and warm a zeal for the public good, or so just a view of the duties and rights of citizens as those of Machiavelli. Yet so it is." [38] Morley tells us that "Thomas Cromwell, the powerful Minister of Henry VIII, told Cardinal Pole that he had better fling aside dreamers like Plato, and read a new book by an ingenious Italian which treated the arts of government practically." He speaks further of Bacon who was "profoundly attracted by the genius of Machiavelli" and who said: "we are much beholden to Machiavelli and others that wrote what men do, and not what they ought to do." [39] Morley gives his own estimate as follows: "He has the highest of all the virtues that prose writing can possess—he is simple, unaffected, direct, vivid and rational. He possesses the truest of all forms of irony, which consists in literal statement, and of which you are not sure whether it is irony or naïveté. He disentangles his thought from the fact so skillfully and cleanly that it looks almost obvious. Nobody has ever surpassed him of throwing pregnant vigor into a single concentrated word. On some pages it has been well said that

[37] Romanes Lectures, *Machiavelli*, pp. 6-8.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 195.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

they are written with the point of a stiletto. He uses few of our loud easy words of praise and blame; he is not often sorry or glad; he does not smile and he does not scold; he is seldom indignant and he is never surprised. He has not even the mastering human infirmity of trying to persuade. His business is that of the clinical lecturer, explaining the nature of the malady, the proper treatment, the chances of recovery. He strips away the flowing garments of convention and commonplace; closes his will against sympathy and feeling; ignores pity as an irrelevance just as the operating surgeon does." [40]

Machiavelli's dust now reposes in Florence beside that of Michael Angelo and Galileo in the Church of Santa Croce. A medallion on the monument erected to commemorate his worth is inscribed with the words: "So great a name no praise can match." The Italian Government, recognizing his great merit, has placed his bust in the Pincio Gardens in Rome, and in 1869 placed upon the modest house in which he lived and died in the Via Guicciardini a tablet bearing the inscription:

To Nicholas Machiavelli

The intrepid and prophetic precursor of National Unity
The first Institutor and Master of Her Own
In place of Adventitious Arms
United and Armed Italy placed this tablet
On his fourth centenary 3rd May, 1869 [41]

In view of the wide disparity between these diatribes and encomiums upon the character and work of Machiavelli, it would appear, since we cannot impugn the motives nor deny the sincerity of either faction, that the discrepancy lies in misconceptions on the part of the one or the other, or perhaps both. To the writer the explanation of the dilemma seems to be obvious; those who have criticized him adversely have assumed without sufficient warrant that *The Prince* sets forth his general social and political philosophy whereas it is the analysis of the behavior of men in the specific conspirital society in Florence in 1513, and is not subject to unlimited application, while those who have worshiped at his shrine have probably overestimated the value of his interpretations in the perspective of history.

On almost every page of *The Prince* the author has repudiated the universal application of the principles under discussion. It is there-

[40] Romanes Lectures, *Machiavelli*, pp. 20-21.
[41] Detmold, *Op. cit.*, p. xli.

fore incorrect to say that Machiavelli believed in the separation of politics from morals and religion; that he recommended the breaking of faith as a virtue; that he sought to inspire the ambitions of a prince.

A few quotations from the *Thoughts of a Statesman*[42] are offered in confirmation of these assertions.

Chapter I. Religion.

"All enterprises to be undertaken should be for the honor of God and the general good of the country."

"The fear of God facilitates every enterprise undertaken by governments."

"Wherever there is religion, there every good may be presupposed; and where it is lacking, there all evil may be presupposed."

"As the observance of Divine Worship is the cause of the greatness of states, so the disregard of Divine Worship is the cause of their ruin."

"In well constituted governments the citizens fear more to break their oaths than the laws; because they esteem the power of God more than that of men."

"If in all the governments of the Christian Republic religion were maintained as it was instituted by its Divine Founder, the State and the Christian Republics would be much more united and happy than they are now."

"The disregard of all devotion and of all religion brings with it many troubles and infinite disorders."

Chapter II. Peace and War.

"A good and wise prince should love peace and avoid war."

"Arms should be reserved for the last extremity, when all other means prove insufficient."

[42] "This collection of maxims, extracted from the works of Machiavelli, was made by an eminent Italian jurist and man of letters, who selected and arranged them to show the injustice of the charges against the writings of Machiavelli, resulting from an unfair prejudice and imperfect understanding of his sentiments. The little book was printed in Rome, with the entire approval of the Papal censors, in the year 1771. Subsequently, a corrected edition was printed at Lausanne in Switzerland, enriched with a polished dedicatory letter, pretending to have been written by Machiavelli himself to his son. The letter was so exactly in the style of Machiavelli that it deceived the public, and even those best acquainted with his writings. To give it still more a varnish of authenticity, a little note was added to the letter intended to make it appear that it had been found among the papers of Francesco del Nero."—Prefatory note, Detmold, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 435.

"A prince who has any feelings of humanity cannot altogether rejoice at a victory that spreads sorrow amongst all his subjects."

"The increase of power and state brings with it increase of enmity and envy, the invariable sources of war and disaster."

"That government alone is durable which rests upon the free will of the governed."

"He, who blinded by ambition rises to a place from which he cannot rise any higher, necessarily prepares for a most disastrous fall."

"Even in war but little glory is derived from any fraud that involves the breaking of a given pledge and of agreements made."

"An ally should prefer his pledged faith to advantages or to perils."

Chapter V. Laws.

"Whoever is not restrained by the laws commits the same error as an unrestrained mob."

"As the preservation of good morals needs good laws, so the laws to maintain themselves need good morals."

"It is the laws that make men good."

"In a well constituted government the laws are made for the public good, and not to satisfy the ambitions of a few."

"No law should ever stain the pledged faith of public engagements."

Chapter VI. The Ideal Prince.

"To be humane, affable, show no signs of cruelty, pride, sensuality, nor any other vice that taints men's lives, will bring a prince honors, victories, and renown."

"Everyone knows how laudable it is in a prince to keep his pledges, to live with integrity and not with craft and deceit."

"The public faith pledged by a prince to his subjects should be inviolably preserved."

These statements represent the ideal and subjective elements of his political faith. They are what men ought to do and be. The philosophy of *The Prince* and of the *Discourses* is offered in view of what men do and are. We have seen that Italy was corrupt. Politics was divorced from morals but so was religion. Conspiracy, treachery, deceit, characterized public and private action. Macaulay says: "A time was at hand when all the seven vials of the Apocalyse were to be poured forth and shaken out over those pleasant countries, a time of slaughter, famine, beggary, infamy, slavery, despair." [43]

[43] *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

The Prince, then, contains a philosophy of emergency and of crisis —that the end justifies the means—a doctrine in theory always repudiated but in practice always followed. Mankind has always a weakness, if it is a weakness, of making virtue of necessity. Inexorable conditions, not theories, if we observe the lessons of history, shape public policies. "Consequently, to the conduct of the prince and to the policy of the state, profounder standards than those of ordinary morals apply. Self-preservation through adequate power and ceaseless growth is the supreme law. The social order may not rightfully be permitted, for moral reasons to disintegrate, as the Queen of Siam was left to drown because it would have been sacrilege to lay hands upon her sacred person.[44] When Italy shall have been redeemed from the foreign invader and her unity and peace restored, then one may advocate safely the ethics of peace.

Nothing in literature so completely shocks us into the realization that our political and social theories are hypothetical and idealistic. Despite our denial that it is ever right to do evil that good may come, it would require volumes to record instances in which individual and public morality has justified exceptions to the rule. The surgeon inflicts pain, and puts the life of the patient in jeopardy, in the interest of future health. We sanction homicide in self-defense. Capital punishment is still defended by many as justifiable in the interest of public safety. War suspends the Decalogue, reverses the Christian attitude toward enemies, plunges society into moral chaos and condemns millions of men to cruel death and yet it is justified to "save the union," "to make the world safe for Democracy," or "to end war." We even glorify this hideous "demon of destruction" and call its victims heroes. And greater than all, orthodox Christianity has affirmed that the martyrdom of the Son of God was the means employed by Divine Justice to the end that the world might be saved.

Machiavelli's fault was that he accepted this doctrine without apology, that he described it without equivocation. Unfettered by conventional standards and basing his considerations upon observation and experience he was thus able to construct in *The Prince* a psychology of human behavior which for acuteness of penetration and accuracy of description remains unsurpassed in the literature of social philosophy.

Conspiritual society is a type of society; it is not the only type and it is not the best type. It "arises in populations that, like the Italian cities at their worst estate, have suffered disintegration of a preëxisting

[44] Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* pp. 105-6.

social order. Unscrupulous adventurers come forward and create relations of personal allegiance by means of bribery, patronage and preferment. Intrigue and conspiracy are the social bonds. The social type is the conspirital." [45]

"With amazing precision, Nicolo Machiavelli analyzed the psychology of this relation as it had never been analyzed before. The leader obtains obedience through his power to browbeat lesser men, to inspire and to awe. He is feared and revered not so much for his physical strength alone as for his nerve, his resourcefulness and craft; because he is the fearless man in the midst of men who fear. Collectively they could make an end of him but that is the last thing they would wish to do, for deeper and more overmastering than their fear of him is their fear of a hostile world environing them and forever threatening their existence and they have discovered that their man of iron is able to make that outer world fear him, as they also fear. Loyally and without question obeying him they are safe. They conquer and make their way. They build the state and extend its domain. The alternative is servitude or extermination. Therefore the supreme duty of *The Prince* is to maintain his authority. The supreme duty of the state, whether principality or republic, is to maintain its dominion and its vital quality of growth." [46]

To charge the great Italian with the invention of the philosophy of opportunism, to coin out of his name a synonym for treachery and deception; to impugn his motives because he sought to get behind fancy pictures to the truth of things seems rather a concession to popular prejudice based upon ignorance of his real purpose and motive than a sincere desire to render a balanced judgment.

It was his misfortune that he lived in Italy in the 16th century and that his genius was applied to the interpretation of an unattractive epoch of social history. But this should not blind us to the merit of accurate description. It is a habit of the untutored mind to identify interpretation with defense. Had he lived in Athens in the age of Pericles he might have written *The Politics,* or in France in the 18th century he might have written *The Spirit of the Laws or The Social Contract.* He never could have written *De Monarchia* or *The Summa Theologica.* Had Machiavelli ever intended that *The Prince* should be regarded as presenting an ideal picture of public morality, then it would have merited all the censure it has evoked. But such was not

[45] Giddings, *Historical and Descriptive Sociology,* p. 13.
[46] Giddings, *Studies in The Theory of Human Society,* p. 105.

his intention. There is no evidence that he rejected moral force as the ultimate element of government. Furthermore it is beneath the dignity of the critics to assume that he intended to practice upon Lorenzo a malicious fraud by recommending a course that would lead him to destruction, or that *The Prince* was merely a piece of grave irony intended to warn nations against the arts of ambitious men.[47]

It was Machiavelli's peculiar merit that he withdrew social and political interpretation from the domain of hypothetical speculation and started it upon a course of inductive observation. His chief contribution to social philosophy, therefore, lies in his method rather than in his material. His "relentless empiricism" gave direction to the trend of social thinking which resulted ultimately in inductive researches in the fields of social analysis and social control.

Morley closes his brilliant essay with the following pertinent observation: "It is true to say that Machiavelli represents certain living forces in our actual world; that Science with its survival of the fittest, unconsciously lends him illegitimate aid; that he is not a vanishing type, but a constant and contemporary influence. This is because energy, force, will, violence still keep alive in the world their resistance to the control of justice and conscience, humanity and right. In so far as he represents one side in that eternal struggle and suggests one set of considerations about it; he retains a place in the literature of modern political systems and of European morals." [48]

We conclude, then, with the observation that Machiavelli's idealistic philosophy reflects the ethical idealism of the moral leaders of the ages. It merits unstinted praise. It is the goal toward which evolving civilization moves. His philosophy of expediency, no less true to history and experience, still richly deserves the censure it receives. It is the survival of a disappearing phase of the struggle from savagery to civilization which the race is undergoing; from a society based upon natural impulses to one which ultimately shall rest upon genuinely ethical foundations.

His moral idealism is the philosophy of a society for ethical culture. His ethical opportunism is that of a committee of public safety.

[47] Macaulay, *op. cit.*, p. 195.
[48] *Op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. What inference is to be drawn in regard to the popular prejudice against Machiavelli from the fact that practically all translators of his writings find much in them to commend?
2. What similarities are to be found between Machiavelli's observations in *The Prince* and Aristotle's reflections upon the causes of the preservation and destruction of tyrannies? *Cf.* Aristotle, *Politics,* Book V, Ch. 10-12.
3. In what sense does Machiavelli merit the title of "the Galileo of Social Science"? *Cf.* E. S. Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought,* pp. 173-5.
4. Discuss H. G. Wells' estimate of Machiavelli and especially the moral issue raised by Ernest Barker in the footnote. *Outlines of History,* Vol. II, pp. 194-8, also quotation from F. H. Giddings in this chapter.
5. Compare with Wells' estimate the sincere effort of C. E. Detmold to understand and to interpret without prejudice the writings of Machiavelli. *Cf.* Translator's Preface, in *The Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli,* Vol. I.
6. What was Machiavelli's real attitude toward Religion? *Cf. Thought of a Statesman, supra.* p. 144; also Advertisement to the French Translation of the *Discourses on Livy;* Ellis Farnsworth, *The Works of Nicholas Machiavel,* Vol. II, pp. V-VIII; also W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval,* pp. 297-303.
7. What evidence is there to justify the claim of Amelot de la Houssaye that "Machiavel, who has everywhere been represented as a promoter of tyranny, was a greater enemy to it than perhaps any man of his time"? *Cf.* Ellis Farnsworth, *op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 502.
8. Discuss the probabilities as to the purposes Machiavelli had in mind in writing *The Prince. Cf.* Ellis Farnsworth, *Anecdotes of the Life of Nicholas Machiavel, op. cit.,* Vol. I, pp. 473-95.
9. If as is claimed repeatedly Machiavelli obtained his political maxims and his ideas of "reasons of state" from history, should the reading of history be approved and Machiavelli condemned? *Cf.* Ellis Farnsworth, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 484.

10. Cite instances from modern history, especially the history of modern diplomacy, which seem to indicate that there is a difference between the standards of private and public morality.
11. Is the enigma which Machiavelli presents solved by the assumption of moral dualism, i.e., that he possessed, in common with mankind in general a theoretical or subjective morality and a practical or objective morality?
12. How far is it correct to say that Machiavelli's chief contribution to social theory lies in his method rather than in his material? *Cf.* W. A. Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-6.
13. For a delightful modern paraphrase of *The Prince, Cf.* Henry Champernowne, *The Boss.*

CHAPTER VII

THE REFORMATION AND BODIN

MARTIN LUTHER AND THE REFORMATION

HISTORIC BACKGROUND

FOUR years after Machiavelli finished writing *The Prince,* that is in 1517, Luther nailed his Ninety-five Theses to the church door in Wittenberg and the Protestant revolt was launched. With the strictly religious aspects of the Reformation we are not here concerned, but since both its causes and its consequences have a wider reach, it is necessary to consider them.

The immediate occasion of Luther's attack was the sale of indulgences which became a notorious scandal in Mainz where, in 1517, Tetzel, a papal legate, had entered into a mercenary agreement to divide the proceeds with the Archbishop, the alleged purpose of the sales being the erection of St. Peter's Church in Rome. Of this Wace and Buckheim remark, "If such was really the case, it might be truly said that Leo X undermined the Chair of St. Peter for the sake of the Church of St. Peter." [1]

The ultimate causes lay much deeper and are to be found in the status of religion and science and in the economic, political and social conditions in the early part of the 16th century.

Without entering upon description the religious situation may be inferred from the fact that Humanists, Scholars, Knights and even Cardinals denounced the immorality and hypocrisy of the clergy of all ranks, and the abuses within the Church in regard to its revenues and its sumptuousness, and also its ceremonies,—its fasts, masses, pilgrimages, miracles and relics. Ulrich von Hutten's *Letters of an Obscure Man* and Erasmus' *Praise of Folly* were peculiarly effective philippics hurled at the foibles and follies of the times. Luther was only one of a large group composed of such men as Calvin, Melancthon, Cranmer, Knox and Zwingli, who, inspired by men like Wyckliffe,

[1] Luther's *Primary Works,* p. xlvii-viii.

Huss, and Savonarola were seeking not only for moral but for doctrinal reforms within the Church, based upon the Scriptures.[2]

The religious agitation was intensified by the jibes of Hutten and others that the Roman Court maintained its magnificence by emptying German pockets and that the Germans were stupid and easily hoodwinked.

The Commercial Revolution of the 16th century through the opening of new trade routes to India and America, the development of world markets, and the increased output of silver from the German, Austrian and Mexican mines, made possible the productive use of capital which had hitherto been employed chiefly in military operations, and which resulted in its rapid increase. Great trading companies flourished and a new class of wealthy merchants arose to vie in luxury not only with the great landed proprietors but even with princes and kings. Many parallels are to be found between this and the Industrial Revolution three centuries later.

The lot of the peasant, however, was scarcely improved and in many respects was made worse. As values shifted from land to commerce, the Knight could compete in luxury with merchant princes only by increasing his revenues by higher dues and by services exacted from the peasants. Commerce increased wealth and luxury but was accompanied by no corresponding increase in production. The resulting rise in prices, increase in rents and taxes, and the incessant demand for tithes and fees on the part of the Church, furnish the basis for the numerous peasant revolts of the century. As early as 1438 a prophet of German reform had declared, "It is a shame which cries to heaven, this oppression of tithes, dues, penalties, excommunications and tolls of the peasant, on whose labor all men depend for their existence." [3]

The social unrest due to economic causes affected all classes. Princes and nobles coveted the possessions of the Church, which comprised approximately one-third of the territory of the Germanies, and favored "secularization." The merchants sided with the princes and nobles through whom they secured immunity from "regulation" by sharing profits, and the peasants were ready to join any revolt that might secure relief from any portion of their intolerable burdens.[4]

[2] *Cf.* Hayes' *Political and Social History of Modern Europe,* Vol. I, p. 127-131; Vedder, *The Reformation in Germany,* Ch. II; Robinson, *History of Western Europe,* p. 337.

[3] Hayes, *op. cit.,* p. 127.

[4] *Cf.* Schapiro, *Social Reform and the Reformation,* Ch. I-III.

Political conditions were bound up with the economic. The rising spirit of nationalism naturally encountered its most serious obstacles in the surviving cosmopolitanism of the Church. The feudal organization of the Church had suffered little in the political breakdown of that institution. Besides her enormous wealth, the Church still possessed a high degree of prestige in temporal affairs. Both these factors were hindrances to the prestige of strong political states like Germany, England, France, Spain and Portugal which were being carved out of the ancient Empire. A condition essential to the completion of the national sovereignty, therefore, was to divert the ecclesiastical revenues which approximated and sometimes exceeded those of the State, into the national treasury and to attach the prestige of the Church to the autonomous political state.

Furthermore, the regency of tradition and authority in the realm of religion was being threatened by the development of science. The modern method of research was instituted by the critical spirit of the Humanists who added the knowledge of Greek, mathematics, astronomy, physics and medicine to that of art, literature and philosophy. The invention of printing diffused knowledge and quickened the social mind. The use of gunpowder in warfare equalized the power of noble and peasant. The telescope and the compass charted both the heavens and the seas and the geography of the physical and spiritual world was being revolutionized. Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and other scientists created new ways of viewing the world and Bacon and Descartes developed new methods of using the mind.

Nor was the Church unaware of its own internal weakness and of the hostile atmosphere which surrounded it. A distinguished cardinal had warned one of the Popes in the 15th century of the impending dangers, especially in the Germanies. He said: "These disorders excite the hatred of the people against all ecclesiastical order; if it is not corrected it is to be feared that the laity, following the example of the Hussites, will attack the clergy as they now openly menace us with doing. For they will say that the clergy is incorrigible and is willing to apply no remedy to its disorders. They will attack us when they no longer have any hope of our correction. Men's minds are waiting for what shall be done; it seems as if shortly something tragic will be brought forth. The venom which they have against us is becoming evident; soon they will believe they are making a sacrifice agreeable to God by maltreating or despoiling the ecclesiastics as people odious to God and man and immersed to the utmost in evil. The little reverence still

remaining for the sacred order will be destroyed. Responsibility for all these disorders will be charged upon the Roman Curia, which will be regarded as the cause of all these evils because it has neglected to apply the necessary remedy." [5]

The reforms which thoughtful men everywhere were demanding were delayed until that which began as a demand for the reformation of the clergy and the altering of ecclesiastical organization, and particularly the revision of questionable practices by which nations were taxed for the support of the Vatican, ended in the division of the Church and the abolition of the authority of the Pope over a large portion of Western Christendom.

LUTHER AND THE REFORMATION

Martin Luther was born in Eisleben, a small town in Prussian Saxony, November 10, 1483. His father, John, and his mother, Margret, were peasants. When Martin was six months old the family removed to Mansfeld, where his father leased some smelting furnaces and engaged in the business of mining. As a child he was surrounded by the poverty and hardships of the working class. He attended the village school in Mansfeld. At the age of fourteen he was sent for a year to Magdeburg, then to St. George's School in Eisenach and at the age of eighteen he entered the celebrated University of Erfurt, founded by Clement VII in 1379. Prior to his university career his work as a student had not been brilliant, but he now gave more serious attention to his studies, obtaining his Bachelor's degree in 1502 and his Master's in 1505. Up to this time he was not noted for piety, though he was not irreligious. Upon a sudden impulse he entered the Erfurt Convent contrary to the wishes and hopes of his father, who desired him to become a lawyer. He appears not to have entered the convent because of his love of theology but through a deep conviction of sin and a desire to save his soul, and though he pursued his studies with great diligence he failed to find peace in the current theology of "justification by works." In his later writings he refers to his monastic experience as a period of struggle, of remorse, of despair, which nearly drove him to suicide. He was ordained to the priesthood in 1507. The next year he became Professor of Philosophy in the new university at Wittenberg, and soon after, he began to preach. In 1511 he was sent on a business mission to the Papal Court. He went in

[5] Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

the spirit of a pilgrim and visited all the sacred shrines and relics. He was shocked at the moral corruption and priestly infidelity of the Holy City and while ascending the *Scala Santa* he arose exclaiming, "The just shall live by faith" and walked slowly down.[6] He returned to Wittenberg in 1512 and was sent to Erfurt to secure his Doctorate. He returned to Wittenberg as Professor of Theology and continued to preach with greater freedom and authority. The prophetic note in his teaching was justification by faith in contrast and opposition to the Scholastic Theology. In 1516 he began his attack upon indulgences which culminated in the *Theses* the following year. The Pope at first regarded the controversy with Tetzel as a monkish quarrel of no great significance but when the revenues from the sale of indulgences rapidly declined he became alarmed and summoned Luther to Rome, July, 1518. To comply meant certain condemnation for heresy, and death. Luther construed the order as an affront to the University of Wittenberg and called upon Elector Frederic and Emperor Maximilian to defend him. As a result the order was rescinded and he was ordered before the German Cardinal at Augsburg. The result was unsatisfactory. Cardinal Cajetan ordered Luther to recant his heresies. Luther refused and wrote an appeal to a General Council. Luther had the ear of the German people and the political situation was too critical for the Pope to act precipitately. A papal legate, Miltitz, was sent to Germany to investigate but accomplished nothing. Meanwhile, Luther accepted the challenge of John Eck, an eminent German Catholic apologist, to debate the primacy of the Roman Pontiff at Leipzig in 1519. This debate defined the controversy sharply. Luther was compelled to admit that some of his teachings were similar to those of Wyckliffe and Huss and further to assert that the Pope and even a General Council had erred. Up to this time he had hoped for a reformation within the Church. He now abandoned the Church and became an avowed revolutionist. He broke completely with Erasmus, the great Humanist, who stood for evolutionary methods of reform, but was ardently supported by Hutten, the Elector of Saxony, and most of the German princes.

It was at this period that Luther wrote the three great Reformation Treatises: *The Liberty of a Christian Man, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation,* and *On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church.*[7]

[6] For a good account of this experience see Vedder, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12, and footnote bottom p. 12.

[7] These three documents are translated and published by Wace and Buckheim, Luther's *Primary Works.*

In these writings, Luther fearlessly proclaimed the freedom of the individual conscience in all religious matters, denounced the luxury and license of the Roman Curia, and denied the supremacy of the Church and the Pope.

When these pamphlets reached Rome, the Pope issued a Papal bull, denouncing Luther as a heretic and demanding that he and his followers recant within sixty days on pain of excommunication and the interdict. Eck was charged with the publication of the Bull in Germany. He had no easy task. While this move on the part of the Pope was expected, it irritated the German princes. It threatened national sovereignty. Princes and Universities most friendly to the Pope published it reluctantly while many ignored it. Luther and his students burned it publicly at Wittenberg.[8]

Meanwhile the death of Maximilian brought to the throne of the Germanies his grandson, the youthful King of Spain, Charles V. He was a loyal Catholic and as Emperor was bound to defend the Church, but his attitude toward the Pope was affected by political considerations. The state of feeling in Germany rendered any attempt at coercion dangerous. The Pope had sent to his Coronation an envoy in the person of Aleander, the Director of the Vatican Library and a shrewd diplomat, but of indifferent morals, to force the issue in the case of Luther. Aleander was received among the Germans with great hostility but he succeeded in impressing upon the Emperor the necessity for action. The Bull had excommunicated Luther and the business of the secular ruler was to enforce the order. The Elector and the Princes, however, served notice upon the Emperor that if Luther were condemned by him, unheard in his own defense, it would be a cause for armed resistance. The outcome was the summoning of Luther before the Diet of Worms in April, 1521. Luther expected the fate of Savonarola but refused the importunity of his friends to defy the Emperor and seek the protection of von Sickingen, a Knight of great military and political importance backed by the Elector Frederic. It was at this juncture that he wrote his famous letter to Spalatin declaring that "he would come to Worms if there were as many devils as tiles on the house roofs to prevent him." [9] He appeared before the Diet on April 17 and 18 and without an opportunity of debating the issues involved was ordered to repudiate his writings and recant his heresies. He pointedly and obstinately refused. The Emperor proposed that Luther,

[8] *Cf.* Vedder, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
[9] Lindsay, *A History of the Reformation*, p. 274.

immediately upon the expiration of his safe conduct, should be placed under the ban of the Empire. The Estates protested and sought to effect a compromise but without effect, "except to reveal the intensity of feeling and the menace of political revolt." Nothing now remained but to publish the ban, but the Emperor delayed. Luther and most of his supporters left the city. Suddenly Worms was startled by the report that Luther had been kidnapped, but whether by friend or foe no one knew. He had been taken by the order of Elector Frederic and placed in the Castle of Wartburg, but in a few days a rumor spread that he had been murdered—stabbed to death in a silver mine while returning to Wittenberg. The excitement that followed served further to advertise his popularity and strengthen his defense.

Finally on May 26 the imperial edict against Luther was signed by the Emperor. Aleander was jubilant and the Pope celebrated the news with festivities. Luther would be burned and his followers exterminated. The Emperor's Secretary, however, wrote in a prophetic letter to a Spanish correspondent: "Here you have as some imagine, the end of this tragedy; but I am persuaded it is not the end, but the beginning of it. For I see that the minds of the Germans are greatly exasperated against the Roman See, and they do not seem to attach great importance to the Emperor's edicts; for since their publication Luther's books are sold with impunity at every step and corner of the streets and market-places. From this you will easily guess what will happen when the Emperor leaves." [10]

The ban proved utterly futile. Outside of Germany it had some effect but it did not prevent the spread of Protestant literature, while within, it was wholly disregarded. The uproar at the rumor of Luther's death indicated the German temper. It became evident that his martyrdom would prove disastrous and no further effort was made to carry out the edict.

Within a year Luther returned to Wittenberg to check the fanaticism of his followers. His publications flooded Germany. In January, 1522, a reform Pope Adrian VI succeeded Leo X. Charles V returned to Spain soon after the Diet of Worms but was too busy with political matters to concern himself with ecclesiastical affairs in Germany. By 1524 the Reformation had become thoroughly established in Northern and Central Germany, while the Catholic party was able to create a federation of Austria and Bavaria through the methods of reconciliation. In 1530, Melancthon formulated the Lutheran doctrines in what

[10] Lindsay, *op. cit.*, p. 298-9.

is known as the Augsburg Confession. The Emperor once more declared his intention to exterminate the heresy and from 1546 to 1555 a desultory civil war resulted. The conflict finally was ended by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 which established religious toleration in the Lutheran States.

Two incidents in the personal life of Luther should be mentioned in view of their formative significance. He stood for the essential democracy of Christians as against a hierarchy and he had denounced the celibacy of the priesthood. On October 9, 1524, he threw aside his monk's cowl, and on June 13, 1525, he married Catherine von Bara and established a home life characterized by sincere affection and renowned hospitality. He died in the town of his birth after an illness of a few hours, February 18, 1546.

The spread of Lutheranism into Scandinavia and Denmark cannot be described here. As in Germany it may be traced to similar social, political and economic causes. The movement assumed a somewhat different form in France, Switzerland, The Netherlands, England and Scotland under the general term Calvinism or Presbyterianism through the leadership of Calvin, 1509-64, Zwingli, 1484-1531, and Knox, 1505-1572. In England it became Anglicanism under Henry VIII.

JOHN CALVIN

John Calvin, "The Lawgiver of the Reformation," was born in Noyon, Province of Picardy, of French middle-class parents, 1509. He was educated for the priesthood but at the age of twenty embraced the Protestant views. Persecution under King Francis I drove him from France and he sought refuge in the Swiss city of Basel, where he studied the views of Luther, Zwingli and others, and published in 1536 *The Institutes of the Christian Religion,* the most logical and complete system of Protestant theology which the Reformation produced.

In Book IV, Chapter XV, of the *Institutes,* Calvin discusses *Civil Government.* Its function is described as follows: "Civil government is designed as long as we live in this world, to preserve the pure doctrine of religion, to defend the Constitution of the Church, to regulate our lives in a manner requisite for the society of men, to form our manners to civil justice, to promote our concord with each other, and to establish general peace and tranquillity.[11] "It is equally as

[11] *Institutes,* B. IV, Ch. xv., par. ii.

necessary to mankind as bread and water, light and air and far more excellent . . . that every person may enjoy his property without molestation; that men may transact their business together without fraud or injustice; in short that there may be a public form of religion among Christians, and that humanity may be maintained among men; . . . I do not allow men to make laws respecting religion and the worship of God . . . though I approve of civil government, which provides that the true religion which is contained in the law of God, be not violated and polluted by public blasphemies, with impunity." [12]

Secular government is necessary to human well-being and its maintenance and defense involves the right of capital punishment,[13] of carrying on war,[14] of taxation for legitimate revenues,[15] and to maintain civil laws and courts of justice.[16] The argument is concluded with a dissertation on the duty of passive submission to constituted authority, "The first duty of subjects toward their magistrates is to entertain the most honorable sentiments of their functions, which they know to be a jurisdiction delegated to them from God and on that account to esteem and reverence them as God's ministers and vicegerents." [17] The logic of his premises admits of no deviation from this rule. "Obedience is required not only of those princes who discharge their duty to us with becoming integrity and fidelity, but of all who possess the sovereignty, even though they perform none of the duties of their function. . . . A man of the worst character, and most undeserving of all honor, who holds the sovereign power, really possesses that eminent and Divine authority, which the Lord has given by his word to the ministers of his justice and judgment; and therefore he ought to be regarded by his subjects as far as pertains to public obedience, with the same reverence and esteem which they would show to the best of Kings, if such a one were granted to them." [18] Only one reservation is made, viz., that this passive submission "do not seduce us from obedience to him, to whose will the desires of all kings ought to be subject, to whose decrees all demands ought to yield, to whose majesty all their sceptres ought to submit." [19]

It should be noted that Luther had taken substantially this same

[12] *Institutes,* B. IV, Ch. XV., par. iii.
[13] *Ibid.,* par. x.
[14] *Ibid.,* par. xi and xii.
[15] *Ibid.,* par. xiii.
[16] *Ibid.,* par. xiv-xxi.
[17] *Ibid.,* par. xxii.
[18] *Ibid.,* par. xxv.
[19] *Ibid.,* par. xxxii.

position, but with less positiveness, in his work entitled *Of Secular Authority: How Far is Obedience Due to It;* published in 1523.

EFFECT OF LUTHER AND CALVIN UPON SOCIAL THINKING

One of the first effects to be noted was the emphasis upon the ethical element so sadly lacking in medieval religion and politics. Dunning says, "The whole attitude of the reformers in this respect made for social betterment, and was responsible for that reunion of morality and religion which has characterized both the Catholic and the Protestant Churches ever since the separation." [20] It served to confirm the idealistic theories of Machiavelli and equally to discredit his doctrines of political emergency.

On the other hand important political significance attached to the doctrine of the reformers through the logical distinction between the religious and secular interests, and revived to some degree the old controversy between the two powers as presented in St. Thomas and Dante. With the emphasis, however, upon the Christian duty of passive nonresistance to political authority the effect was to strengthen the tendency to political absolutism and to make the Church dependent upon the secular arm. There was thus transferred to the State the duty of fixing the limits to which fanatics might go in exercising the freedom advocated by the Reformers. While, therefore, differences in doctrines which had become acute during this period fostered the freedom of intellectual inquiry and paved the way for future developments, entire freedom of conscience was not secured. The martyrdom of Servetus and the religious wars in Protestant countries reveal the struggle through which the society of the age had to pass before it could arrive at the goal of religious toleration.[21]

Lecky sums up the intellectual achievements of the Reformation as follows: "There certainly has never been a movement which, in its ultimate results, has contributed so largely to the emancipation of the human mind from all superstitious terrors as the Reformation. . . . It, above all, diminished the prominence of the clergy; and thus prepared the way for the general secularization of the European intellect, which is such a marked characteristic of modern civilization. . . . It is only by a very slow process that the human mind can emerge from a system of error; and the virtue of dogmas has been so ingrained

[20] *Political Theories, Luther to Montesquieu,* p. 2.
[21] *Cf.* Dunning, *op. cit.,* Ch. I; Marvin, *The Living Past,* pp. 161-6.

in all religious thought, by the teaching of more than twelve centuries, that it required a long and painful discipline to weaken what is not yet destroyed. The nature of truth, the limits of human faculties, the laws of probabilities, and the conditions that are essential to an impartial research, were subjects with which even the most advanced minds were then entirely unfamiliar. There was, indeed, much cultivation of logic considered in its most narrow sense; but there was no such thing as a comprehensive view of the whole field of mental science, of the laws and limits of the reason. There was also no conviction that the reason should be applied to every department of theology with the same unflinching severity as to any other form of speculation. Faith always presented to the mind the idea of an abnormal intellectual condition, of the subversion or suspension of the critical faculties. . . . As long as such a conception existed, a period of religious convulsion was necessarily a period of extreme suffering and terror and there can be little doubt that the reformation was, in consequence, the most painful of all the transitions through which the human intellect has passed." [22]

An exceedingly interesting and important joint product of Luther's method of study, of his antagonism to ecclesiastical jurisdiction and of German family life was his doctrine of marriage. In preparation for the disputation with Eck at Leipzig he had reviewed the historic development of the Church and noted the conditions under which its doctrines had been formed instead of relying upon the scholastic method of logical argument. Without realizing the importance of this revolutionary method of procedure, he nevertheless became the pioneer in applying the modern method of historical criticism to social institutions.[23] This principle of interpretation he applied to the theory of marriage. The dogma of the sacramental character of marriage which had become fixed through a long series of ecclesiastical decrees, he repudiated, and contended for civil marriage.[24] "Since weddings and matrimony are a temporal business it becomes us clerks and servants of the Church to order or rule nothing therein, but to leave to each city and state its own usages and costumes in this regard. . . . Matrimonial questions do not touch the conscience but belong to the temporal power. It is a temporal worldly thing which does not concern the Church." [25] His arguments

[22] *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe,* pp. 56-8.
[23] *Cf.* Lindsay, *op. cit.,* p. 239.
[24] For this history, *cf.* Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions,* Vol. I, Ch. VII.
[25] Howard, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 338.

against the sacrament of marriage are elaborated in the *Babylonian Captivity of the Church,* subtitle, *Of Matrimony.*[26]

Domestic virtue had characterized the Germans since earliest times,[27] and still prevailed as the basis of national life. Celibacy, with its deprivation of normal family life for the large class of priests and nuns and notwithstanding its attendant immorality, was extolled as holier than wedlock, and thus it undermined the foundation of the family.[28] This background probably colored Luther's views. The outcome was the civil contract theory of marriage, the destruction of the monasteries, and the marriage of the clergy throughout the countries embracing the reformed theology.

HISTORIC SUMMARY OF THE PERIOD OF BODIN

The period covered by the life of Jean Bodin, 1530-1596, was the most agitated and in some ways the most eventful in the History of Western Europe. It was a period characterized by bitter, civil, national and religious wars. It was not, however, void of constructive movements in religion, economics and politics. The Protestant Revolt put the ancient Church on the defensive and gave new impetus to reforms the crying need for which had been recognized long before the days of Luther. In 1545 the Council of Trent was convened and terminated its work after a long interruption in 1563. By its decrees many of the existing abuses were corrected, the personnel of the clergy was improved and the doctrines of the Church were redefined. Efforts were made also to improve the worship, to extend the reading of the Bible and to improve education in the monasteries and schools. It further defined heretical doctrines, anathematized all departures from the Canons and Decrees of the Council and took measures to prevent the spread of Protestantism in Catholic countries.[29]

This period witnessed also the rise to tremendous power and influence of the Jesuit Order of the Society of Jesus, organized by Ignatius Loyola about 1534 and sanctioned by a Papal Bull in 1540. The missionary enterprises of Francis Xavier in the East and the Christianizing of Brazil, Mexico and Peru and the Indians of the American Southwest are especially noteworthy. On account of their sworn loyalty to the Pope, however, the Jesuits were particularly ener-

[26] Wace and Buckheim, *op. cit.,* p. 215.
[27] *Cf.* Tacitus Germains for family life and the position of woman among the German tribes.
[28] *Cf.* Seebohm, *The Era of the Protestant Reformation,* p. 223.
[29] *Cf.* Dunning, *op. cit.,* pp. 124-8.

getic in the Protestant persecutions and added much to the intensity and bitterness of that struggle in Western Europe.

We cannot recount here the details of the political struggles of this period in the various countries. Philip II succeeded Charles V in Spain and sought to establish absolutism in government and to exterminate Protestantism through the inquisition. Three queens figure pre-eminently in this epoch. Elizabeth in England, the mainstay of English Protestantism, persecuted both Calvinists and Catholics; Catherine de Medici in France sought to overthrow the power of the Huguenot leaders by the St. Bartholomew's Massacre, and Mary, Queen of Scots, struggled vainly against the Nobles and the Presbyterians under the leadership of John Knox until finally beheaded by Elizabeth, whose protection she had sought in vain.

The political struggles between the rival Guise and Bourbon houses, the Huguenot wars in France, and the Council of Blood under the Spanish Alba in the Netherlands are spectacular incidents of the violence of the times.

Despite the religious fanaticism, so conspicuous during this period, it is safe to say that for the most part, the causes of the numerous wars were political rather than religious. Rival aspirants for political supremacy, often under cover of religious zeal or by appeal to national feeling, fought to gain the ascendency.[30]

Conflict was not confined to the religious and political spheres. The Princes and Nobles profited by the confiscation of ecclesiastical properties to the obvious detriment of the peasants. The growth of commerce and the development of woolen manufactures and mining increased the necessity for capitalistic organization and intensified the antagonism with the trade journeymen, the minors and the communistic societies. The peasant insurrections of 1525 and following, under the leadership of Munzer and others, evidence the widespread economic unrest.[31]

The intellectual strife of the period was likewise productive of great thinkers not only in theology but in those scientific and practical interests which increasingly were dominating men's minds. Here was laid the basis for the doctrines of the physiocrats and the merchantilists so important in economic theory of a later period and the origin of the doctrine of sovereignty which from this time on engaged the thinking

[30] *Cf.* Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-46; also, Robinson, *op. cit.*, Ch. XVIII.
[31] *Cf.* Kautsky, *Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation.*

of political philosophers. Sir Thomas Moore produced his *Utopia* in 1515 and set going, however impracticable his scheme, constructive ideas for the conscious improvement of social conditions.

JEAN BODIN

The most striking figure, standing serene amid the tumult of religious, civil and economic strife, and producing a philosophy, the most dispassionate and concise since Aristotle wrote *The Politics,* was Jean Bodin.

He was born in Angers, France, in 1530. His father was a Frenchman and his mother, according to a tradition current among his contemporaries, a Spanish Jewess, whose family had sought refuge in France as a result of the Jewish persecutions under Ferdinand and Isabella. He studied law and took his degree in jurisprudence at Toulouse, where he later became a professor. Ambitious to secure fame as a lawyer he settled in Paris in 1561 but soon turned to literature. In 1566 he published a work entitled *A Method for the Easy Understanding of History* which contained many innovations in historical interpretation and foreshadowed the epoch making work of Montesquieu. In 1568 he became a member of the Assembly of State of Narbonne and in 1571 counselor to the Duke of Alencon. As the Duke's counselor, as a known advocate of religious toleration and accused of Calvinism he was sought on the eve of St. Bartholomew's massacre but escaped and reappeared in Paris when the tempest was past.

Because of his scholarly attainments and the attractiveness of his personality he won the favor of Henry III and was appointed King's attorney in Laon in 1576. During this year he was elected by the Third Estate to the States General at Blois, where he distinguished himself in the defense of "freedom of conscience, justice, and peace" and published his great work *The Six Books of the Republic,* built largely out of the raw material of his earlier work, *The Method.*

Through opposing successfully the alienation of public lands and royal demesnes Bodin lost the favor of the King and attached himself to the Duke of Anjou whom he accompanied to England in 1581, where he found his work being studied in London and Cambridge. The death of the Duke in 1584 resulted in his return to his family at Laon where he succeeded his father-in-law, Nicholas Frouillard, in the position of procureur general. He died of the plague in 1596.

There appears to have been little in Bodin's private life to interest his biographers. His works reveal some strange contrasts in the working of a mind not completely emancipated from medieval superstition and yet dominated by the scientific spirit. He was blindly credulous in regard to witchcraft and both wrote and labored in its persecution. He was not irreligious; his works reveal a deep religious veneration and a conspicuous lack of prejudice. He was an advocate of religious toleration. Yet it is not known what his personal religious convictions were. He has been charged variously as being a Calvinist, a Catholic, a Mohammedan, a Jew, a Pantheist and an Atheist.

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE REPUBLIC

Stewart, a writer on the progress of philosophy, quoted by Hallam, says: "I know of no political writer of the same period whose extensive and various and discriminating reading appears to me to have contributed more to facilitate and guide the researches of his successors, or whose references to ancient learning have been more frequently transcribed without acknowledgement." [32]

In order to discover his own philosophy of society as well as to point out some of these stimulating suggestions to later writers, we present a brief analysis of Bodin's principal work.

ORIGIN OF SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT

With Aristotle he agrees that society has a natural origin in the family. "The beginnings of all civil societies are derived from a family, which is itself a natural society, and by the father of nature itself first founded in the beginning together with mankind. But when reason, by God himself ingrafted in us, had made man desirous of the company and society of man, and to participate together both in speech and conversation; the same so wrought as that proceeding farther, from the love of them that were domestic and their own, it extended farther, to take pleasure in the propagation and increase of families. So also families by little and little departing from their first beginning, learned by civil society to imitate the natural society of a family." [33]

The family contains the germ of civil society. The family existed before civil society and can exist without it, but civil society cannot exist without the family. "Now when the Master of the Familie goeth

[32] *Introduction to the Literature of Europe,* Vol. II, p. 148.
[33] *The Six Books of a Commonweale,* translated by Richard Knolles, p. 361.

out of his own house where he commandeth, to entreat and traffic with other heads of families, of that concerneth them all in general, he then loseth the title of master, head, and lord, to become a companion, equal and fellowlike with others, leaving his family to enter into a city, and his domestic affairs to entreat of public; and instead of a lord calleth himself a citizen, which is no other in proper terms than *A Free Subject Holding of the Sovereignty of Another Man.*" [34]

While civil society has its origin in the nature of man, the state originates in force and restricts "the free laws of nature," "for before there was either city or citizen, or any form of a Commonweale amongst men, every master of a family was a master in his own house, having the power of life and death over his wife and children, but after that force, violence, ambition, covetousness and desire of revenge had armed one against another, the issues of wars and combats giving victory unto the one side, made the other to become unto them slaves; . . . Then that full and entire liberty by nature given to every man, to live as himself best please, was altogether taken from the vanquished. So the word of Lord and Servant, Prince and Subject before unknown unto the world, were first brought into use. Yea, Reason and the very light of nature leadeth us to believe very force and violence to have given course and beginning unto Commonweale. . . . Wherein it appeareth Demosthenes, Aristotle and Cicero to have mistaken themselves, in following the error of Herodotus, who saith that the first Kings were chosen for their justice and virtue; and have hereof feigned unto us, I wot not, what heroic and golden worlds: and opinion by me by most certain arguments and testimonies elsewhere (i.e., in *The Method*) refelled." [35]

In this one page Bodin revived the old tradition of the "State of Nature" antecedent to organized society and which became so important in the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, anticipated Gumplowicz in his struggle of races as a theory of social origin, refutes the ancient theory of deterioration from a golden age, and suggests a theory of sovereignty which he develops later, which by many is regarded as the beginning of modern political science.

It should be noted, however, that the pre-social state, which he assumes but does not develop, is not a condition of unrestrained individual freedom, for even the family involves an infringement of liberty for wives and children and slaves, and, the citizen of the Commonwealth

[34] *The Six Books of a Commonweale,* pp. 46-7.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 47.

is not the individual but the representative of the constituent family group.

Furthermore in no previous writings do we find so careful an analysis of the voluntary forms of association as companies, colleges, corporations, communes and the like, lying between the family based on natural instinct and the state founded on force, as necessary component elements of social organization.[36]

SLAVERY

Slavery is treated as historic, but not as a natural or useful institution. He surveys all the arguments based upon the different types of slaves, viz., "every slave is either natural, that is to wit, begotten of a woman slave, or made a slave by the law of arms; or by some crime committed, or one which for money departed with his liberty, or hath played away his liberty, or else such an one as hath voluntarily vowed himself to be a perpetual slave unto another man," [37] and particularly Aristotle's theory "that the servitude of slaves is of right natural," and while admitting that there is some show of reason to these arguments he says they can be answered. This he proceeds to do by appeal both to history and to reason. His position is essentially practical and modern. One sample must suffice. It is argued "that servitude could not have continued so long if it had been contrary unto nature," to which he replies, "True it is in things merely natural, which according to their natural propriety follow the immutable ordinance of God; but having given unto man the choice of good and evil, it chanceth oftentimes to the contrary; him to choose the worse, contrary to the law of both God and nature; in whom his corrupt opinion hath so great power, that it passeth in force of a law, of greater power than nature itself." [38] Then follows a history of human sacrifice which he describes as a custom almost as widespread and venerable as slavery, from which he deduces the conclusion "that we must not measure the law of nature by man's actions, be they never so old and inveterate; neither therefore conclude, that the servile estate of slaves is of right natural." [39]

Especially does he denounce the inhumanity and cruelty to slaves and the consequent debasement of masters, and warns against the danger of slave conspiracies and rebellions. "Wherefore seeing it is proved by

[36] *Cf. The Six Books of a Commonweale,* B. III, Ch. VII.
[37] *Ibid.,* p. 32.
[38] *Ibid.,* p. 35.
[39] *Ibid.,* p. 35.

the examples of so many worlds of years, so many inconveniences of rebellions, servile wars, conspiracies, eversions, and changes to have happened unto Commonweales by slaves; so many murders, cruelties and detestable villainies to have been committed upon the persons of slaves by their lords and masters; who can doubt to affirm it to be a thing most pernicious and dangerous to have brought them into a Commonweale; or having cast them off, to receive them again." [40]

Where slavery exists it should be abolished, but by a method that will protect slaves from hardship: "the best way is, by little and little to enfranchise them, having before their enfranchisement taught them some occupation whereby to relieve themselves." [41]

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONS

In his philosophy of social change Bodin presents an original doctrine in striking contrast to the static theories of earlier writers. However theoretically desirable stability and perfection in government may be, it is practically unattainable. The law of growth, maturity and decay which characterizes organic life he regards as alike applicable to the State. The business of the social philosopher is to study these processes, not with the view of obstructing them, but of understanding and controlling them. No State, however well established or flourishing, can remain long in a stable condition "by reason of the changes of worldly things, which are so mutable and uncertain." [42] With clear insight he distinguished two types of transformation: "Now I call that a conversion of a Commonwealth, when as the State thereof is altogether changed; as when a Popular estate is changed into a Monarchy; or an Aristocracy into a Democracy; or contrarywise; for as the change of customs, laws, religion or place, it is but a certain kind of alteration, the State and sovereignty continuing still; which may also to the contrary itself be changed, without any change of religion, or laws, or any other things also, besides them which belong unto sovereignty." [43] Thus Conversion is political revolution and results in a change in the location of sovereignty, while "Alteration" is the evolutionary movement which results from social change within the State.

The causes which render political changes inevitable are "human, or natural, or divine; that is to say, that they come to pass either by

[40] *The Six Books of a Commonweale*, p. 44.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 406.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

the only council and judgment of God, without any other main causes; or by ordinary and natural means of causes and effects, . . . or by the will of man, which the divines confess to be free, at the least concerning civil actions." [44]

The importance of these generalizations for social philosophy is in the sphere of social organization. It is relatively unimportant that he failed to maintain his scientific poise in developing details. For in his effort to forecast national catastrophes from a study of "natural" causes he resorts to the methods of occult science, particularly astrological calculations, entirely out of harmony with the scientific character of his work in general, and reveals the strange inconsistencies of an only partly oriented mind.[45]

PHYSICAL CAUSATION

The most original and revolutionary portion of *The Republic,* elaborated from his earlier work, *The Method,* so far as the development of Social Theory is concerned, is Book I, Chapter V, in which Bodin analyzes the effect of the physical environment upon social life and institutions. While not the first to discover this principle of interpretation,[46] it is not an exaggeration to say that since the publishing of *The Republic,* the reaction of men and of society to the physical environment has been a canon of scientific interpretation. That the work was crude and premature, because of the undeveloped state of cognate physical sciences, and that the writings of Montesquieu and Buckle were necessary to give it currency, in no way diminishes its importance nor detracts from the brilliancy of his achievement.

"Hitherto we have treated of that which concerns the general estate of Commonweales: Let us now show what may be particular to some, through the diversity of peoples' humors, to the end that we may accommodate the public weals to the nature of the place; and the ordinances of man to the laws of nature, whereof many have had small regard: but striving to make nature obedient to their edicts, have oftentimes troubled, yea ruined great estates. And yet those which have written of a Commonweale, have not treated of this question. For even as we see a great variety in all sorts of beasts, and in every kind some notable alteration for the diversity of regions; in like sort

[44] *The Six Books of a Commonweale,* p. 436.
[45] *Cf. ibid.,* B. IV, Ch. 2.
[46] *Cf.* Aristotle, *supra.,* p. 46.

we may say, that there is in a manner as great difference in the nature and disposition of men as there is of countries." [47]

His first observations are based upon the differences of latitude, noting the enervating effect of heat and the stimulating effect of cold. In general "the people of the North have force, with bigness and beauty of body, and little wits: and contrarywise the Southern nations are weak, little, black, and have great wits": except that in the extreme North they are "little, lean and tamed with cold." [48] Seasonal changes in temperature have effects similar to those of latitude, and humidity intensifies the effects of heat.[49] "But if we shall look more narrowly into the disposition of the people of the North, of the South and of them that are betwixt both: we shall find that their natures are like unto young men, old men, and them of middle age, and to the qualities which are attributed unto them. In like sort everyone of those three in the government of the Commonweale useth that which he hath most at command: The Nations of the North, by force; those in the midst by equity and justice; and the Southern parts, by religion." [50] "The people of the South are made and appointed for the search of hidden fancies that they may instruct other nations: Those of the North for labor and manual arts; and those of the middle betwixt the two extremes, to negotiate, traffic, judge, plead, command, establish Commonweales; and to make laws and ordinances for other nations." [51]

He proposes also a longitudinal classification: "If we look well into histories, we shall find that the people of the West do participate much of the nature of the North; and the people of the East with them of the South in the same latitude." [52]

Elevation has effects similar to latitude: "That which I have spoken of the nature of Northern countries, agrees with the mountains, the which are oftentimes more cold than the regions that are far Northward. . . . And contrarywise the inhabitants of valleys are commonly effeminate and delicate; and even the natural fertility of the valleys gives the inhabitants thereof occasion to glut themselves with pleasure." [53]

Location with reference to the sea, violence of winds and the fertility

[47] *The Six Books of a Commonweale*, p. 454.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 548.
[49] *Cf. ibid.*, p. 549.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 559.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 561.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 562.
[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 563-4.

of the soil are factors that determine national character: "As for the inhabitants upon the sea coast, and of great towns of traffic, all writers have observed, that they are more subtile, politic, and cunning than those that lie far from the sea and traffic. . . . There is also a great variety for the difference of places subject to violent winds, which makes people to differ much in manners, although they be in the same latitude and climate: For we see plainly that these people are more grave and staid, when the air is calm and temperate, than those which lie in regions beaten with violent winds." [54]

"The barrenness and fruitfulness of places doth in some sort change the natural inclination of the heavens: . . . men of a fat and fertile soil, are most commonly effeminate and cowards: whereas contrarywise a barren country makes men temperate by necessity, and by consequence, careful, vigilant and industrious. . . . So as the barrenness of the soil doth not only make men more temperate, apt to labor, and of a more subtile spirit; but also it makes towns more populous: for an enemy affects not a barren country, and the inhabitants living in safety do multiply, and are forced to traffic or to labor." [55]

"The transportation of Colonies works a great difference in men, but the nature of the heavens, winds, waters and earth, are of more force." [56]

His psychological generalizations are equally brilliant and daring. "Ancient histories do agree that the people of the North are not malicious, not crafty, as the nations of the South be . . . and contrarywise, the people of the South are cruel and revengeful, by reason of melancholy, which doth inflame the passions of the soul with an exceeding violence, the which is not easily suppressed." [57] "And there are more mad men in the Southern regions, than towards the North. . . . The variety of mad men shows the natural humor of the people: for although there be stores of fools and mad men in all places and of all sorts, yet those of the Southern parts have many terrible visions, they preach and speak many languages without learning them, and are sometimes possessed with evil spirits, having lean bodies more like unto ghosts than those corpulent and sanguine men toward the North, which do nothing but dance, laugh and leap in their fooleries." [58] "Southern people go beyond all other nations in quickness of wit,

[54] *The Six Books of a Commonweale*, p. 564.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 565.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 568.
[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 554-5.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 556.

whereas barbarism and rude behavior proceed from ignorance and want of education. . . . And without any further search we have the proof thereof in this realm where the difference is apparent in regard of the English . . . for that the French lost most commonly in their wars against them but won still in their treaties." [59]

Morals and religion are affected by climate: "We have yet another notable difference betwixt the people of the South and of the North, for that these are more chaste and abstinent, and those of the South much given to lust." [60] This difference he regards as the basis of the divergent forms of the family citing polygamy as characteristic of the South, monogamy in middle countries and even polyandry in England as described in Caesar's *Commentaries*.[61]

"And all religions have in a manner taken their beginning from the people of the South, and from thence have been dispersed over the whole earth. So the more we draw towards the South, the more devout we find men, and the more firm and constant in their religion." [62]

Bodin's admirable summary must conclude this brief survey: "We have said (speaking in general) that the people of the South are of a contrary humor and disposition to them of the North: These are great and strong, they are little and weak; they of the North hot and moist, the others cold and dry; the one hath a big voice and green eyes, the other hath a weak voice and black eyes; the one hath flaxen hair and fair skin, the other hath both hair and skin black; the one feareth cold, and the other heat; the one is joyful and pleasant, the other sad; the one is fearful and peaceable, the other hardy and mutinous; the one is sociable, the other solitary; the one is given to drink, the other sober; the one rude and gross witted, the other advised and ceremonious; the one is prodigal and greedy, the other is courteous and holds fast; the one is a soldier, the other a philosopher; the one fit for arms and labor, the other for knowledge and rest." [63]

IMPORTANCE OF HIS METHOD

Those who judge the value of a contribution from the point of view of the correctness of details in its application will find ample reason for criticizing Bodin's work. His lack of scientific accuracy in the use

[59] *The Six Books of a Commonweale*, pp. 552-3.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 557.
[61] *Cf. ibid.*, p. 557.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 560.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 567.

of historic material and the strained and often fantastic deductions from insufficient data is admitted. Nevertheless, we agree with Dunning that "the most superficial consideration of his writings reveals a wide gap between him and most of his adversaries in spirit and in method. In spirit the difference is that between the philosopher, who finds his conclusion shaping itself automatically out of a wide range of observed facts, and the advocate, who laboriously marshals his array of facts to sustain the conclusion already assumed; in method, the difference is between the uncritical use of history and theological authority, and the critical use of history, guided by the broadest erudition and exceptional philosophic insight with a pronounced skepticism as to all human authority. Bodin is indeed the first writer to set forth a philosophy of history in the modern sense. He was the first, that is, to make an exhaustive and scientific review of the facts of human development the basis of broad generalizations as to the principles and purpose underlying that development." [64]

Hallam concludes his survey of Bodin's work with the following: "It must appear, even from this imperfect analysis, in which much has been curtailed of its fair proportion, and many both curious and judicious observations omitted, that Bodin possessed a highly philosophical mind, united with the most ample stores of history and jurisprudence. No former writer on political philosophy had been either so comprehensive in his scheme or so copious in his knowledge; none, perhaps, more original, more independent and fearless in his inquiries. Two names alone, indeed, could be compared with his, Aristotle and Machiavel. Without, however, pretending that Bodin was equal to the former in acuteness and sagacity, we may say that the experience of two thousand years, and the maxims of reason and justice, suggested or corrected by the Gospel and its ministers, by the philosophers of Greece and Rome, and by the Civil Law, gave him advantages, of which his judgment and industry fully enabled him to avail himself. Machiavel, again, has discussed so few, comparatively, of the important questions in political theory, and has seen many things so partially, according to the narrow experience of Italian Republics, that, with all his superiority of genius, and still more in effective eloquence, we can hardly say that his *Discourses on Livy* are a more useful study than *The Republic* of Bodin." [65]

[64] *Op. cit.*, pp. 82-3.
[65] *Op cit.*, p. 165.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. Discuss more fully the economic and political causes of the Protestant Reformation. *Cf.* J. H. Robinson, *History of Western Europe,* Ch. XXIV; also, Robinson and Breasted, *Outlines of European History,* Part I, pp. 578-99.
2. Define the relative authority of Church and State in Protestant theology. In what respects did this differ (1) from St. Thomas, and (2) from Dante? How near did the Reformers come to making the Church dependent upon secular power?
3. Does Bodin throw any light upon the struggle of the two Powers through his interpretation of the effects of climate on civilizations?
4. Compare the conflict of Luther with Leo X with that between Henry IV and Gregory VII four and a half centuries earlier. What were the differences, religious, political, economic and social, that explain the different outcome?
5. What writers so far have noted the effects of the geographic environment on civilization? Give a brief description of each.
6. Compare Bodin's study of climatic effects with the modern work of Huntington, *Civilization and Climate.* How far may we regard Bodin as the originator of the study of Human Geography? *Cf.* Huntington and Cushing, *Principles of Human Geography;* also, Jean Brunches, *Human Geography,* tr. by Le Compte.
7. Compare Bodin's observations of the effects of climate on religion with those of Oscar Peschel, *The Zone of the Founders of Religion,* in *The Races of Man,*—Republished by Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress,* pp. 271-5; also Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws,* Vol. II, Ch. XXIV.
8. How does Bodin anticipate Buckle in his theory of the effects of "The Aspects of Nature"? *Cf.* Buckle, *History of Civilization in England,* Ch. II; also reprinted in Carver, *op. cit.,* pp. 243-75.
9. Contrast the theory of the Origin of Society in Bodin with that of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and St. Thomas.
10. Trace briefly the development of the Sacramental theory of Marriage and point out Luther's contribution to the rise of the civil contract theory. *Cf.* G. E. Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions,* Ch. VIII-IX.

11. Discuss Bodin's natural history theory of social and political revolutions. What essentially modern concepts are discovered?
12. Trace the forces or currents which produced almost contemporaneously such different characters as Machiavelli, Luther, and Bodin.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORISTS

THE epoch-making work of Bodin suffered an eclipse for nearly two centuries through the domination of the philosophic concept of the Social Contract. Far from being new this doctrine had a wide diffusion among earlier writers, especially among churchmen who had long been familiar with the clash of legal systems. Furthermore, contractual organizations, as for example, business corporations, communistic societies, the Solemn League of the Covenant, The Mayflower Compact, were common during the period and impressed the minds of men with the value of utilitarian forms of voluntary association.

While, in the main, the theory in its earlier forms had reference to governmental compacts and did not involve a historic explanation of social origins, nevertheless it pioneered the way, under the influence of historic developments of a later period, for a system that dominated social and political thinking during the 17th and 18th centuries.

From the list of writers who have discussed the subject, we have selected Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau as typical for our study, first because the social contract constituted the basis of their social and political thinking and second because in their works, more than in those of all others, the theory was given its classical form and its wide currency.

HISTORIC BACKGROUND

The historic period in England of which the theory of the Social Contract furnished the philosophic interpretation, extended from the close of the reign of Elizabeth to the elevation of William and Mary to the throne.

Throughout the period of the early Stuarts, James I and Charles I, there was increasing conflict between absolutism in government and the rising spirit of popular independence.

The struggle between Puritanism and Anglicanism, persecution of the Catholics and the Gunpowder Plot, discord between the King and the people and between the King and Parliament, characterized the

reign of James I. Charles I was even more arbitrary than his father and soon plunged England into war with both France and Spain. Personal levies for funds, contrary to the rights established in the Magna Carta, precipitated a conflict with Parliament that resulted in the Petition of Right, 1628, which was in essence a series of concessions wrested from an unwilling ruler and served further to establish the contractual relations between sovereign and people. The strife was not ended, however, and in 1629 Charles dissolved Parliament and proceeded to rule without its assistance for eleven years, the period known as the personal government of Charles I.[1]

The Scotch Rebellion of 1637 involved the King in new difficulties and resulted in calling the "Long Parliament" in 1640, which proved hostile to the King and the conflict culminated in the civil war between the "Cavaliers" or Royalists and the "Roundheads," chiefly commoners and mostly Puritans. The defeat of the King's forces at Marston Moor and later at Naseby put the parliamentary party in undisputed control and Charles was convicted of treason and beheaded on January 30, 1649. By "The Agreement of the People" England was declared a Commonwealth and a Free State on May 19 of the same year. But Parliamentary government under military control proved unsuccessful, and after dissolving the "Long Parliament" and calling the "Nominal Parliament" to take its place, Oliver Cromwell established the Protectorate in 1653. The Protectorate was short-lived. The brilliant career of Cromwell was cut short by his death in 1658 and after a brief interval the army reassembled the surviving members of the "Long Parliament." Cheyney says: "The period of the Commonwealth had been a time of great deeds, high ideals, and strong feelings, but they had led to no permanent and satisfactory settlement of the form of government. The nation was tired and sick of military rule and of political change. The people wanted to be ruled by civil authority and they wanted a settled government. They longed to return to old established ways and institutions that had existed before the feverish excitement and rapid changes of the civil war and the Commonwealth." [2]

The recall of Charles II to the throne in 1660, upon the basis of the Declaration of Breda, reëstablished the monarchy with constitutional guarantees. But religious dissensions and political turmoil continued. The Habeas Corpus Act in 1679 added another document to the English Constitution. Charles II died in 1685 and was succeeded by his brother,

[1] *Cf.* Cheyney, *A Short History of England,* Ch. XIV.
[2] *Op. cit.,* p. 464.

James II. The tyranny of the new King and his avowed Catholicism aroused violent antagonism and upon the birth of a son in 1688 through whom a Catholic line of Kings would be maintained, revolt crystallized. William of Orange, and his wife Mary, eldest daughter of Charles II, were invited to come to England to preserve its liberties. James fled to France. A convention was called,—a parliament in everything except name,—which declared the throne vacant and elected William and Mary as sovereigns. This procedure, known as the Revolution of 1688, was the final victory of the people organized in Parliament over absolute monarchy. The theory of the Divine Right of Kings was repudiated and the Bill of Rights, the first declaration of the new Parliament, 1689, fixed the conditions under which sovereigns in England should in the future rule.[3]

Conditions in France differed greatly from those in England. The Estates General which had existed from the beginning of the 15th century and which for a time showed signs of paralleling the history of the English Parliament, held its last session in 1614 and thereafter for a century and three quarters, absolutism, which failed in England through Parliamentary control, was fastened securely upon the French nation.

The climax of despotic rule was attained under Louis XIV, 1643 to 1715. No Magna Carta or Bill of Rights existed and the Estates General had never held a check upon the collection and expenditure of public revenues. Consequently the King ruled by "Divine Right" and without responsibility to the people or to their representatives. In the exercise of this despotic freedom, though at first with the advice of a series of able ministers, Louis carried on wars of aggression, extended the French boundaries, controlled the public finance, persecuted the Protestants, oppressed the third estate, patronized literature and art, increased the splendor of his court, and elevated France to a position of prominence and power hitherto unattained in Western civilization.

Brilliant as was this personal achievement, however, as an experiment in government, it was based upon no secure moral foundations, and carried within itself the germs of its own destruction. Profligacy of manners spread downward through all ranks of the population and weakened the social morale. Religious persecution drove thousands of the most enlightened and industrious citizens from France and many

[3] *Cf.* Cheyney, *op. cit.*, Ch. XVI; also, Robinson, *History of Western Europe*, Ch. XXX.

prosperous industries collapsed. The whole burden of military exactions, of taxation and of productive labor fell upon the third estate, which was without representation or redress. Decadence followed ascendency and when Louis XV, 1715-1774, succeeded his great-grandfather he inherited a legacy of overwhelming national debt, a dispirited and depleted army, a court at once the most magnificent, the most scandalous, and the most expensive in Western Europe, and an active social and political discontent which portended future disaster. His reign of forty-nine years was one of uninterrupted calamity and disaster to the nation and when, in turn, his grandson, Louis XVI, came to the throne in 1774 conditions were ripe for revolution, which finally overthrew the old régime and gave to France a written constitution. Although absolutism prevailed it was not without challenge. While the higher law courts or parliaments in the various provinces were in no sense legislative bodies, they had acquired the right to register and to publish the king's decrees and to enter protests which were often published and distributed widely. The King could not, therefore, alter what was regarded as "the fundamental law" without increasing popular discontent. Toward the end of the period the parliaments claimed that laws which they were required to register against their wills were invalid. Moreover, the writings of statesmen and philosophers were taking increasing hold of the French mind. As early as 1625 the great Dutch jurist Grotius had in his *War and Peace* laid the foundation of international law. During the reign of Louis XIV the body of social and political thought was given coherence through the work of Hobbes, *The Leviathan,* 1651, Pufendorf, *On the Law of Nature and Nations,* 1672, and Locke, *Civil Government,* 1689, and in the succeeding reign, Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws,* 1746.

It was likewise an age of outspoken criticism against religious, social, and governmental abuses, the chief spokesman of which was the brilliant and cynical Voltaire.[4]

THOMAS HOBBES

Thomas Hobbes was born prematurely at the news of the wreck of the Spanish Armada, at Malmesbury, England, April 5, 1588. His father was a Wiltshire vicar and his mother of yeoman stock. He went to school at the age of four, and ten years later entered Magdalen Hall, Oxford, taking his degree in 1607. Next he became the tutor

[4] *Cf.* Robinson, *op. cit.,* Ch. XXXI and XXXIV.

of the future Earl of Devonshire and traveled with him extensively in France and Italy. His brilliancy of mind brought him in contact with men of genius, numbering among his friends Lord Bacon, Ben Jonson, Descartes and Galileo. His mind was absorbed by the controversy going on between the Stuarts and the champions of political liberty, out of which grew his life interest and his philosophic doctrines of society and the State. In 1647 he became instructor to the young Prince of Wales, afterward Charles II. He identified himself with the Royalists and with them fled to France at the reverses of the civil war. While in exile he published *The Leviathan,* or *The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil.* His avowed rationalism was bitterly attacked by the clergy of both France and England. Failing of the support of royal favor because he denied the Divine Right of Kings, and fearing for his safety in Paris he returned to England, where he sought the protection of Cromwell, whose absolute government was most congenial to his views. After the restoration he was pensioned at £100 a year by his former pupil, Charles II, but he continued under constant criticism. *The Leviathan* was censored by Parliament in 1666 and burned at Oxford after his death. He died at Hardwicke Hall, December 4, 1679, at the age of ninety-one. "If he could have maintained his vigorous life but for another nine years and become a centenarian, he would have seen the problem (of government) practically solved in a way not dreamt of in his philosophy." [5]

JOHN LOCKE

John Locke was born during the bitter days of struggle between Charles I and his Parliament, at Wrington, Somersetshire, England, August 29, 1632. His father, a country attorney, had served as Captain in the Parliamentary Army. His mother, Agnes Keene, was the daughter of the village plumber. Probably trained at home during his early years, he entered the Westminster School in London in 1646, was made a King's scholar the next year, and entered Christ Church Oxford in 1652, taking his Bachelor's degree in 1656 and his Master's two years later. He was then appointed to a "senior studentship," which enabled him to pursue graduate work indefinitely. He entered the diplomatic service as secretary of the Legation in Berlin in 1664 and later held office under Lord Chancellor Shaftesbury, 1672. The

[5] Henry Morley, Introduction to *The Leviathan,* p. 5.

years 1675 to 1679 he spent in France on account of his health, having suffered for some time from tuberculosis. He returned to England in 1679 and was associated again with Shaftesbury in political affairs. In 1682 Shaftesbury was involved in a plot for the succession of the Duke of Monmouth to the English throne and upon its discovery escaped to Holland where he died the following year. Suspected of complicity, His Majesty revoked Locke's beneficence at Oxford, and he was obliged to leave the country. He then fled to Holland also, where he remained for five years. When James II came to the throne in 1685, William Penn offered to intercede and to endeavor to secure a pardon for Locke, who replied "there is no need for a pardon where there is no crime or fault."

The Revolution of 1688 made it safe again for him in England and he returned on the same ship which brought the Princess Mary, the new queen. He again held public office under the new government, but his health continued to fail and he died at Oates, Essex, October 28, 1704, in his seventy-third year.

Throughout his life he had been an advocate of religious and civil toleration and wrote extensively on this subject. He was influenced by the writings of Hobbes, but the period of the Commonwealth and the Revolution had intervened. When he published his treatises on Civil Government, therefore, in 1689, he championed the theory of limited monarchy and plead for the rights of the people and for responsible government.[6]

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU

Rousseau was born in Geneva, Switzerland, June 28, 1712, in the days of agitation and riots which threatened the old Genevan oligarchy. His father, a watchmaker by trade, was a Frenchman whose family had migrated from Paris in the 16th century. His mother, Susanne Bernard, daughter of a German minister, died in giving him birth. Deserted by his irresponsible father, his early life was one of misadventure. A maternal uncle placed him in school at Bassey under the tutelage of Pastor Lambercier. Dismissed for misdemeanors he apprenticed himself to a solicitor and next to an engraver. Sustained application was uncongenial. Accused of idleness and lying he ran away. Although of Calvinistic stock, a priest became interested in him and sent him to Madame de Warens, whose reputation for piety Rousseau later did

[6] *Cf.* H. R. Fox-Bourne, *Life of John Locke;* also, Locke, *Civil Government,* Introduction by Henry Morley.

not sustain, who exerted great influence over him during his formative period. He was now sixteen. She in turn sent him to a hospice in Turin to complete his conversion to the Catholic faith, which he afterward renounced.

For some time he lingered about Turin. He tried various means of making a living, among them a position as valet from which he was dismissed for theft. From 1729 to 1738 he was back with Madame de Warens, making futile attempts in several occupations. In 1741 he walked up to Paris and tried writing comedy and teaching music, but without success. Two years later he went to Venice as Secretary of the French Ambassador. Being insulted at the lack of an invitation to a State dinner he resigned and returned to Paris. He now began his life with Therese Le Vasseur, a kitchen maid of low mentality, a relation which lasted intermittently to the end of his life and which was finally legalized by a marriage ceremony in 1768.[7] The five children born to them were dropped in succession into oblivion in the box of the foundling asylum.[8]

His literary notoriety began in 1750, when he won a prize offered by the Academy of Dijon on *Has the Progress of the Sciences Contributed to Purify or Corrupt Morals?* This was followed by his opera *Le Divin du Village* and his *Discourse on Inequality* and in 1762 by the *Social Contract* and *Emile,* upon which his reputation as a social and political philosopher rests. The latter work was condemned by Parliament and burned, and an order issued for Rousseau's arrest. Warned by friends he escaped to Geneva and later went to England, 1765, where he was offered asylum by Hume. In 1770 he was back in Paris, mercifully let alone by the police and united with Therese and making a precarious living by copying music. In 1777 he accepted refuge on the estate of his friend Rene de Guardin at Ermenonville near Paris, where he died of apoplexy July 2, 1778, at the age of sixty-six.[9]

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Plato in *The Republic* had laid the foundation for an interpretation of society based upon the perception of utility, but social and political development had taken such course that the concept had been of little

[7] *Cf.* Hudson, *Rousseau,* p. 104.
[8] *Cf.* Morley, *Rousseau,* p. 81; *cf.* also Gran, *Jean Jacques Rousseau,* Ch. XVII.
[9] *Cf.* Morley, *ibid.*

importance. In the struggle between absolutism and popular sovereignty in Western Europe in the 17th century, however, it received new emphasis and in the form of the Social Contract was elaborated into a system.

Unlike theories of growth, of evolution, the idea of contract involves the assumption of an arbitrary beginning. This requires in turn the further assumption of a pre-social condition in which society in the strict sense of the word did not exist and from which men sought to escape by entering into some form of social covenant. The logical development of this hypothesis constitutes the point of departure for each of the writers we have chosen to review.

THE STATE OF NATURE

1. With Hobbes the State of Nature is an intolerable state of war. "Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself." [10]

"From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, endeavor to destroy or subdue one another. . . . Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company, where there is no power able to overawe them all. . .

"So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. . . . The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children and cattle; the second to defend them; the third for trifles, a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by

[10] *Leviathan*, p. 63.

reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their possessions, or their name.

Hereby, it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man against every man. For 'war' consisted not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of 'time' is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is 'Peace.'

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." [11]

Man in civilized society manifests these traits: "When taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house, he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow-citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words?" [12]

Against the argument that such a state of war never existed he cites two instances: "Savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust (sex instinct), have no government at all, and live at this day in

[11] *Leviathan*, p. 64.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 64-5.

that brutish manner, as I said before."[13] "Kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbors; which is a posture of war. . . .

"To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities that relate to man in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no 'mine' and 'thine' distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for as long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason. . . .

"The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature."[14]

2. Locke's State of Nature is a State of Freedom and Equality in contrast to a State of War but far inferior to a state of organized society.

"To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.

"A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is

[14] *Leviathan*, p. 65.

[13] Hobbes' knowledge of the American Indians was based on the current reports of Europeans on the savage resistance of the Indians to the encroachments of the whites. The studies of Indian social life and organization such as that of Lewis H. Morgan had not yet been made.

reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection." [15]

"But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions. . . .

"And that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man's hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressor of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation." [16]

To the question "Where are, or ever were, there any men in such a state of nature?" he gives, without credit, Hobbes' answer from the experience of independent rulers and the Indian in the woods of America, and adds "I, moreover, affirm that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till, by their own consents, they make themselves members of some politic society." [17]

"The state of Nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded (an evident thrust at Hobbes), are as far distant as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance, and preservation; and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction are one from another. Men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of Nature. But force, or a declared design of force upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war; and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, though he be in society and a fellow subject. . . . Want of a common

[15] Locke, *Civil Government*, Second Treatise, sec. 4.
[16] *Ibid.*, sec. 6-7.
[17] *Ibid.*, sec. 14-15.

judge with authority puts all men in a state of Nature; force without right upon a man's person makes a state of war both where there is, and is not, a common judge." [18]

Contrary to Hobbes, he argues the natural right of property. Man has "in himself the foundation of property." [19] "The earth and all that there is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of their being . . . and nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state." [20] "Yet every man has a 'property' in his own 'person.' This nobody has any right to but himself. The 'labor' of his body and the 'work' of his hands, we may say are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with it, and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property . . . at least, where there is enough, and as good left in common for others" [21] "He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself." [22] "Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it." [23] "As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property." [24]

"The measure of property Nature well set, by the extent of man's labor and the conveniency of life. . . . Which measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself without injury to anybody in the first ages of the world." [25]

The State of Nature then, with Locke, is far from a lawless state. It is characterized by social relationships under the dominion of the "law of nature" which resides in "human reason" and is morally binding upon men in the pre-political state. But although the moral obligations are present, they are subject to violation and the natural peaceful character of the state is destroyed. "Were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other, no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and associate into lesser combinations." [26]

[18] *Civil Government*, sec. 19.
[19] *Ibid.*, sec. 44.
[20] *Ibid.*, sec. 26.
[21] *Ibid.*, sec. 26-27.
[22] *Ibid.*, sec. 28.
[23] *Ibid.*, sec. 30.
[24] *Ibid.*, sec. 32.
[25] *Ibid.*, sec. 36.
[26] *Ibid.*, sec. 128.

"Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society." [27]

3. Rousseau, unlike Hobbes and Locke and little influenced by Montesquieu, regards the state of Nature as an ideal condition from which civilized man has deteriorated. This idea is most boldly asserted in the first paragraph in *Emile.*

"Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man. . . . He will have nothing as Nature made it, not even man." [28] Equally striking is the opening sentence in the first chapter of the *Social Contract:* "Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains." [29]

"The philosophers, who have examined the foundations of society, have every one of them, perceived the necessity of tracing it back to a state of nature but not one of them has ever arrived there. . . . All of them, in fine, constantly harping on wants, avidity, oppression, desires and pride, have transferred to the state of nature ideas picked up in the bosom of society. In speaking of savages they described citizens." [30]

Rousseau, with a frankness unusual among philosophers, discards history as untrustworthy and resorts to logical deductions: "Let us begin therefore, by laying aside facts, for they do not affect the question. The researches, in which we may engage on this occasion, are not to be taken for historical truths, but merely as hypothetical and conditional reasonings, fitter to illustrate the nature of things, than to show their true origin, like those systems, which our naturalists daily make of the formation of the World." [31]

Stripping off "all supernatural gifts" and "artificial faculties" he considers man "such as he must have issued from the hands of nature." He says: "I see an animal less strong than some, and less active than others, but upon the whole, the most advantageously organized of any; I see him satisfying the calls of hunger under the first oak, and those of thirst at the rivulet; I see him laying himself down to sleep

[27] *Civil Government,* sec. 127; *cf.* also Lamprecht, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke,* pp. 121-32.

[28] Rousseau, *Emile,* tr. by Payne, p. 1.

[29] Rousseau, *Social Contract,* tr. by Harrington, p. 2. For the elaboration of his views on the State of Nature, however, we must refer to his *Discourse on Inequality,* which should be read as an introduction to the *Social Contract. Cf.* J. Hudson, *Rousseau,* p. 138.

[30] Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality* Harvard Classics, Vol. 34, p. 168.

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 169.

at the foot of the same tree that afforded him his meal; and behold this done, all his wants are completely supplied." [32]

"Men, accustomed from their infancy to the inclemency of the weather, and to the rigor of the different seasons; inured to fatigue, and obliged to defend, naked and without arms, their life and their prey against the other wild inhabitants of the forest, or at least to avoid their fury by flight, acquire a robust and almost unalterable habit of body. . . . Nature treats them exactly in the same manner that Sparta treated the children of her citizens; those who came well formed into the world she renders strong and robust, and destroys all the rest." [33]

Primitive man had the natural infirmities of infancy and old age, but sickness chiefly attends man living in a state of society. He was strong and robust as animals are before domestication. "In proportion as he becomes sociable and a slave to others, he becomes weak, fearful, mean-spirited, and his soft and effeminate way of living at once completes the enervation of his strength and of his courage." [34]

Mentally, nature abandons him to "pure instinct." "His desires never extend beyond his physical wants; he knows no goods but food, a female and rest; he fears no evil but pain and hunger. . . . The knowledge of death and of its terrors, is one of the first acquisitions made by man, in consequence of his deviating from the animal state. . . .

"The progress of the mind, has everywhere kept pace exactly with the wants to which nature had left the inhabitants exposed, or to which circumstances had subjected them." [35]

"But . . . everything seems to remove from savage man the temptation and the means of altering his condition. His imagination paints nothing to him; his heart asks nothing from him. His moderate wants are so easily supplied with what he everywhere finds ready to his hand, and he stands at such a distance from the degree of knowledge requisite to covet more, that he can have neither foresight, nor curiosity. . . . His soul, which nothing disturbs, gives itself up entirely to the consciousness of its actual existence, without any thought of even the nearest futurity." [36]

Morally he was neither good nor bad, because duty, vice or virtue

[32] *Discourse on Inequality*, p. 172.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 172.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 177.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 181.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 181.

are social qualities. His love was normal physical attraction devoid of "factitious sentiment engendered by society." [37]

Having described the original State of Nature, Rousseau proceeds "to bring together the different accidents which may have perfected the human understanding by debasing the species, render a being wicked by rendering him sociable, and from so remote a term bring man at last and the world to a point in which we now see them." [38]

Space forbids elaboration but the most important of these "accidents" are: The growth of personal possessions in land, tools, products of agriculture and the chase, individual appropriation of land being the first and worst, the increase of population and the growth of exclusive families, increased gregariousness, and prepared the way for vice and crime, characteristic of social history; the rise of mining and agriculture introduced slavery; the growth of language improved communication and developed forethought with increased competitive strivings; the formation and coalescence of groups, antagonisms between groups, disparity of rank and condition. The abuse of riches led to usurpation and war.[39]

"Such was, or must have been, had man been left to himself, the origin of society and of the laws, which increased the fetters of the weak, and the strength of the rich; irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, fixed forever the laws of property and inequality; changed an artful usurpation into an irrevocable title; and for the benefit of a few ambitious individuals subjected the rest of mankind to perpetual labor, servitude and misery. . . . Societies once formed in this manner, soon multiplied or spread to such a degree, as to cover the face of the earth; and not to leave a corner in the whole universe, where a man could throw off the yoke, and withdraw his head from under the often ill-conducted sword which he saw perpetually hanging over it." [40]

PROBLEM—THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT

1. Hobbes, as we have seen, held that the State of Nature was a State of War, an intolerable condition from which men must escape or perish. Since this concept was a logical deduction from his theory of human nature, rather than a historic induction, he follows the same method in solving the problem of the origin of peaceful society.

[37] *Cf. Discourse on Inequality,* pp. 191-6.
[38] *Ibid.,* p. 201.
[39] *Cf. ibid.,* Part II, pp. 202-16.
[40] *Ibid.,* p. 217.

"The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of the laws of Nature.

"For the laws of nature, as 'justice,' 'equity,' 'modesty,' 'mercy' and in sum 'doing to others as we would be done to,' of themselves, without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge and the like. And covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." [41]

"It is true that certain living creatures, as ants and bees, live sociably one with another, which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures; and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgments and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit; and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know why mankind cannot do the same." [42]

After citing numerous differences between animal and human societies he concludes: "The agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant only which is artificial; and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit.

"The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, into one will. . . . This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, 'I authorize and give up my

[41] Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Part II, p. 82.
[42] *Ibid.,* p. 83.

right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner, This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a 'commonwealth.' This is the generation of that great 'Leviathan' or rather to speak more reverently, of that 'mortal god' to which we owe under the 'immortal God' our peace and defense." [43]

The transference of power through the surrender of natural rights can take place in two ways, by institution and by acquisition. "A commonwealth is said to be 'instituted,' when a 'multitude' of men do agree, and 'covenant every one with every other one,' that to whatever 'man' or 'assembly of men' shall be given by the major part, the 'right' to 'present' the person of them all, that is to say, to be their 'representative'; every one, as well he that 'voted for it' as he 'that voted against it,' shall 'authorize' all the actions and judgments, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves and be protected against other men." [44]

"A commonwealth 'by acquisition' is that, where the sovereign power is acquired by force; and it is acquired by force when men singly or many together by plurality of voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorize all the actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power.

"And this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from sovereignty by institution only in this, that men who choose their sovereign do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute; but in this case, they subject themselves to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it from fear." [45]

"Dominion," i.e., acquisition, "is acquired in two ways; by generation and by conquest. The right of dominion by generation is that which the parent hath over his children, and is called 'paternal,' and is not so derived from the generation, as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him; but from the child's consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments declared." [46] Thus even though society may originate in the family, Hobbes still thinks there is involved some sort of covenant, at least as soon as children are "old enough to care for themselves."

[43] *Leviathan*, pp. 83-4.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 84.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 95.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

"Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers call 'despotical'. . . . And this dominion is then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life and liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such covenant made, the vanquished is a 'servant' . . . such men, commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds or the prison; and kill, or carry away their master, justly: but one, that being taken, hath corporal liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is trusted by him." [47]

In order to escape the State of Nature, then, men "have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth; so also they have made artificial chains, called 'civil laws.'" Henceforth the rights and duties of the citizen emanate from this source and "the liberty of a subject lieth therefore only in those things which in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath permitted." [48]

Once entered into, the covenant is irrevocable: "For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted to stand to what the major part should ordain; and therefore if he refused to stand thereto, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever." [49]

2. Because Locke's State of Nature was less violent than that of Hobbes men united for advantage rather than from necessity. Social institutions existed before the origin of political society and the moral order rests not upon civil laws but upon the "law of nature" and upon "natural rights." Locke makes a distinction between natural and political society.

(1) "God, having made man such a creature that, in His own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination, to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to con-

[47] *Leviathan*, p. 97.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

tinue and enjoy it. The first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children, to which in time, that between master and servant came to be added. And though all these might, and commonly did, meet together and make up but one family, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family, each of these, or all together, come short of 'political society' as we shall see if we consider the different ends, ties and bonds of each of these." [50]

"Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman, and though it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation, yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to their common offspring, who have a right to be nourished and maintained till they are able to provide for themselves." [51]

"The Society betwixt parents and children," is not based on covenant but on moral obligation but it terminates "with the minority of the child." If it continues beyond that time it may "by an insensible change" become political monarchy.[52]

The society between "master and servant" is "as old as history." It arises in two ways; by the sale of services which "gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater than is contained in the contract between them. But there is another sort of servants which, by a peculiar name we call slaves who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of Nature, subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men, . . . cannot in that state be considered as any part of a civil society." [53]

Taken as a whole, "the master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves," constitutes a natural society. But "what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very far from it both in its constitution, power, and end. The difference will best be seen by studying political society itself." [54]

(2) "Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his consent, which is done by agree-

[50] Locke, *Civil Government,* Second Treatise, sec. 77.
[51] *Ibid.,* sec. 78.
[52] *Cf.* sec. 84 also, secs. 64-76.
[53] *Ibid.,* sec. 85.
[54] *Ibid.,* sec. 86.

ing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peacable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties,[55] and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest: they are left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of Nature." [56] "When any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with the power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority." [57]

"Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of Nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends of which they unite into society to the majority of the community. . . . And thus, that which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of majority, to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world." [58]

"To this I find two objections made: 1. That there are no instances to be found in history of a company of men, independent and equal one against another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a government. 2. It is impossible of right that men would do so, because all men, being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at liberty to begin a new one."

To the first there is this answer: "Government is everywhere antecedent to records, and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation in civil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their safety, ease, and plenty." He thinks all, however, "have manifest footsteps of it." [59]

To the second he answers: "It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such natural subjection that they were born in, to one or to the other, that tied them, without their own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs.

"For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred and profane as those of men withdrawing themselves and their obedience from one jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other

[55] In sec. 87 property is explained as consisting in "life, liberty and estate."
[56] *Civil Government*, sec. 95.
[57] *Ibid.*, sec. 96.
[58] *Ibid.*, sec. 99.
[59] *Ibid.*, sec. 100-101.

places. . . . This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to this day." [60]

The end of political society and government is "the good of mankind": to set up and establish that which a state of Nature lacks for the preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, viz., 1. "An established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong." 2. "An indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law." 3. "A power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution." [61]

Since, in creating the political state, men do not surrender all their authority, as with Hobbes, but only that which is necessary to create it and give it force, the government is the agency of the collective will and may be called to account.[62] "And hence it is evident that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted for the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all." [63]

If, therefore, the government in any of its branches, executive, legislative or judicial exceeds its authority and subverts the purpose of its existence, the people have the right to rebel. "In all states and conditions the true remedy of force without authority is to oppose force to it. The use of force without authority always puts him that uses it into a state of war as the aggressor, and renders him liable to be treated accordingly." [64]

There is an obvious difference, however, "between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government." [65] "The power that every individual gave the society when he entered into it can never revert to the individuals again as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community." [66] "When the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative differing from the other by the change of persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good." [67]

3. Rousseau's problem differs fundamentally from that of Hobbes and Locke. In his state of Nature man was free and non-social and

[60] *Civil Government*, sec. 114-116.
[61] *Ibid.*, sec. 124-6.
[62] *Cf. ibid.*, sec. 135.
[63] *Ibid.*, sec. 90.
[64] *Ibid.*, sec. 155.
[65] *Ibid.*, sec. 211.
[66] *Ibid.*, sec. 243.
[67] *Ibid.*, sec. 220.

he lost this freedom through the artificial restraints imposed by social life and organization. His task then is to discover by what process this transformation from natural freedom to political enslavement can be justified and rendered legitimate. Several possibilities are at once eliminated. Since "man is born free" and the social state is the negation of this freedom, it cannot rest on nature. "The most ancient of all societies and the only natural one is that of the family; yet children remain dependent upon the father only as long as they have need of him for self-preservation . . . if they remain united it is not longer naturally, it is voluntarily, and the family itself is maintained only by agreement." [68]

Might does not make Right. "Strength is physical power; I do not see what moral force could result from its action" [69] and hence the state cannot properly be founded on force. The only other alternative is convention. "I suppose man arrived at a point where obstacles, which prejudice his preservation in a state of Nature, outweigh, by their resistance, the force which each individual can employ to maintain himself in this condition. Then the primitive state can no longer exist; and mankind would perish did it not change its way of life." [70]

In making this change, two apparently contradictory elements must be reconciled, viz., social solidarity and individual liberty. " 'To find a form of association which shall defend and protect with the public force the person and property of each associate, and by means of which each, uniting with all, shall obey however only himself, and remain as free as before.' Such is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract gives the solution." [71]

"Each giving himself to all, gives himself to none; and as there is not an associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as is conceded, an equivalent is gained for all that is lost, and more force to keep what he has.

"If, then, we remove from the social contract all that is not of its essence, it will be reduced to the following terms; 'Each of us gives in common his person and all his force under the supreme direction of the general will; and we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.'

"Immediately, instead of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body,

[68] *Social Contract,* tr. by Harrington, p. 3-4.
[69] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[70] *Ibid.,* p. 19.
[71] *Ibid.,* p. 20.

composed of as many members as the assembly has votes, which receives from this same act its unity, its common being, its life and its will." [72]

In at least one essential particular, Rousseau agrees with Hobbes. His social contract involves the absolute surrender of the individual will to that of the group, and the tyranny of the social rule is no less exacting than that of Hobbes' "Sovereign."

"In order then that the social compact may not be an idle formula, it includes tacitly this engagement, which alone can give force to the others, that whoever shall refuse to obey the general will, shall be compelled to it by the whole body, which signifies nothing if not that he will be forced to be free; for it is this condition which, giving each citizen to the country, guarantees him from all personal dependence, a condition which forms the device and working of the political machine, and alone renders civil engagements legitimate, which without that would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to great abuse." [73]

In another important respect Rousseau's Contract differs radically from both Hobbes and Locke. With Hobbes men alienate their power forever by placing it in a sovereign and thereby sacrifice their right to rebel. With Locke they surrender all the power necessary in a general agreement to constitute a government and may hold that government responsible; they even may destroy it but not the general agreement. With Rousseau they surrender nothing. The compact is an agreement among equals and they remain equal. They do not contract with a sovereign. They *are* collectively the sovereign. "The act which institutes the government is not a contract, but a law; the depositories of executive power are not masters of the people, but its officers. It may establish them and dispense with them as it pleases." [74] "There is no fundamental law in the state which cannot be revoked not even the social compact." [75] Thus the right of revolution is inalienable.

In Rousseau's estimate of the relative advantages of civil society we meet with one of the numerous instances of inconsistency characteristic of his writings. It would be more charitable perhaps to say he had changed his mind. He has modified greatly, if he has not abandoned, his theories of the absolute superiority of the State of Nature set forth in the *Discourses*.

"The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces in a

[72] *Social Contract*, pp. 21-2.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 153-4.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

man a very remarkable change, by substituting in his conduct justice for interest and giving to his actions a moral force which they lacked before. Then only does the voice of duty succeed to physical impulse, and law to appetite, and man who until then had thought only of himself, sees himself forced to act upon other principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his desires. Although he deprives himself in this state of several advantages which he holds from nature, he gains other advantages as great—his faculties exercise and develop, his ideas expand, his sentiments become ennobled, his whole spirit is elevated to such a point that, if the abuse of this new condition did not often degrade him below that from which he came, he ought to bless without ceasing the happy moment which took him from it forever, and which has made of a dull stupid animal, an intelligent being—a man." [76]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau were not the authors of the Theory of the Social Contract, but they gave to it its classic statement and its dominating influence. As a theory it is purely philosophic both in character and in method. It does not start with inductive inquiries but with philosophic assumptions; most of which, in the light of scientific and historical research, are wrong. As a system of logical reasoning it is delightfully consistent. The diverse conclusions arrived at by the three writers are due to the differences in their premises.

1. Hobbes assumed the state of nature to be so insufferably bad that men were forced to make a bad bargain to escape it. Denying the dictum of Aristotle that man is by nature a political (i.e., a sociable) animal, and holding to the pessimistic doctrine of Machiavelli in regard to the depravity of human nature he could find no sufficient basis for the social order except in convention, the chief motive of which is fear. Whether fear of each other or of a conqueror the result is the same. The irrevocable nature of the compact, together with its psychological implications, distinguished Hobbes' from that of the others, and made him the champion of absolutism in government expressed most forcibly in the thesis of Louis XIV, "I am the State." Unsuccessful rebellion is conspiracy. Successful rebellion is revolution and society returns to its original state. This doctrine did much to prepare the way for the French Revolution.

2. Locke's State of Nature, while not advantageous is not so in-

[76] *Social Contract,* pp. 26-7.

tolerable, and men are forced to surrender only so much of their power as is necessary to create security, through the establishment of an impartial authority. While stating more clearly than either of the others that Contract is the only legitimate basis of political society, he nevertheless distinguished clearly between society and government and justified revolution as a means of conforming government to social needs. Locke was therefore the philosopher of the Commonwealth and of the system of control represented in the English Constitution.

3. The "erratic and romantic" Rousseau writing at a period when the philosophic method was already being discredited by a more scientific outlook, nevertheless gave to the theory a still more arbitrary setting. The State of Nature was good. It was society that was bad. Injustice and oppression prevailed. Only through the right understanding of contract could justice be reëstablished. But the "general will" thus created became absolute. Once entered into the individual or the minority had no rights which the majority were bound to respect. He thus substituted the absolute sovereignty of the crowd for that of the personal sovereign created by Hobbes, and his philosophy was that of the "Reign of Terror."

The fact should not be overlooked that the Social Contract reflected social and political conditions as outlined in the beginning of this chapter. England was progressively acquiring a government responsible to the people through the instrumentality of "agreements" with sovereigns. In France the resistance of absolutism to the rising power of the people was only deferring the change and making more certain its ultimate overthrow by violence.

The most important contribution of the Social Contract theory to social philosophy is its emphasis on *Social Control.* In practically all prior writings, since the Greeks it had been assumed that human affairs were directed through external agencies. Christian theologians not only assumed that men were directed in all things by the Divine Will, but made it heresy to question the interpretation. The problem was one of conformity. The function of reason was to discover and to approve this order.

Political philosophers, notwithstanding their contentions in regard to the priority of the State nevertheless based the authority of Empire on Divine Right. The State was an institution which justly imposed its authority because of that right. The "Divine right of kings" was but a corollary of this theory.

Even with Machiavelli, the Prince, as a strong man imposed his authority upon the people by virtue of his iron will.

In the Social Contract the will of the people is sovereign. Ultimate power arises from within. Even with Hobbes the sovereign derives his original power, not from God, mediated or direct, but from the consent of the governed. With Locke and Rousseau, not only the existence of government but its continuance depends upon this source.

Furthermore, the modern scientific movement received from the theory of Social Contract a new and decided impulse. Its scope was at once enlarged. As long as human affairs were assumed to be directed by an inscrutable and irresponsible will, either human or divine, no science of society was possible. When it became evident that the forces which determine human behavior were resident within society itself, then it became the business of science to invade this field and to trace the forces and processes exhibited by social phenomena.

In the light of historic developments in the field of social science it scarcely needs to be remarked that the Social Contract theory has long since lost its prestige. It overlooked other social bonds. Instinctive groupings of animals and men furnish a far more rational theory of social origin. The evolution of political society reveals other beginnings and other forms.

As an explanation of the numerous forms of voluntary association it remains a valuable concept. Trade unions, Red Cross societies, college fraternities, churches, business corporations, are contractual forms of organization, both in origin and in the control of their members. They define the relations of the individual to the group. Within its legitimate sphere the Social Contract holds a valuable place in the realm of social interpretation.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. Read critically, in connection with this chapter, the excellent chapters on Hobbes and Locke, W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Luther to Montesquieu,* and on Rousseau, *Political Theories, Rousseau to Spencer,* and note specifically the material which bears on social theory.
2. Study the development of the Social Contract theory among the writers of the earlier period especially in Hooker, Suarez, Althusius and Grotius. *Cf.* H. E. Barnes, *Sociology Before Comte, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXIII, September, 1917, pp. 202-4.
3. What are the evidences in the writings of the Social Contract theorists which justify the application of the theory to social origins and social organization apart from the specifically political application?
4. Discuss the Social Contract theory as an outgrowth of the social struggle for "individual rights" or individualism. *Cf.* E. S. Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought,* Ch. XI.
5. In what respects do the great documents of the English Constitution represent forms of contract? *Cf.* E. P. Cheyney, *A Short History of England,* pp. 180-3, 414-16, 492-3, and 510-11.
6. In what sense is Hobbes' method "essentially identical" with that of Machiavelli as claimed by W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval,* p. 303.
7. Contrast Hobbes and Locke on the theory and the right of revolution. What historical events occurred between the dates of their respective writings that may account for the differences?
8. Study carefully the thesis of Rousseau in regard to "natural equality" and "social inequality" as presented in this chapter and in W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories, Rousseau to Spencer,* Ch. I.
9. Be able to state clearly the fundamental difference between the Social Contract as a theory of social interpretation and that of previous theories. What specific contribution did this theory make to the development of social science?

CHAPTER IX

MONTESQUIEU

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

IT seems desirable at this point in the development of our subject, to make a brief synthetic review of the theory described, and to note certain of its dominant characteristics.

Our pursuit has been the discovery of social philosophy—how men have sought to explain the phenomenon of human society. We have found that ever since the rise of the philosophic method of thinking it has been applied to the problem of collective human life. We have not found a logical nor consecutive treatment that we could call a system, but we have discovered interpretations which, fragmentary as they often were, still reflected the stage of social evolution and the progress of knowledge.

Plato was surrounded by a society which responded in some measure to ideals and he produced the philosophy of an ideal state. He conceived of the social order as a fabric of the human mind. It was conscious, utilitarian, purposive. He assumed that men knew what they wanted and that society was a coöperative device to obtain it.

Aristotle perceived that society was not quite so simple; that the cause of society was not primarily a *perception of utility* but an *instinct of sociability*. It was therefore not in the brain of man but in his organic nature that an explanation of his social relations must be sought. Society is, then, a *growth* rather than an *edifice*.

The introduction of Christianity, as a moral revolution, gave a new form and meaning to the doctrine of "universal brotherhood" as the social bond. It emphasized the ethical character of society, but dominated by the theocratic concept of the Hebrews, creedalized by the Greeks and institutionalized by the Romans, it not only formulated but enforced a theological interpretation of human life and society that for centuries precluded further rational effort.

The classic struggle between the Church and State, however, revived social speculation and in Thomas and Dante conflicting theories of

social control are supported by logic and history. Reason is once more appealed to to justify the claims of theology and politics.

Machiavelli saw that in both Church and State it was less a doctrine than a strong personality that created an effective social bond and he developed his theory of individual ascendency as the basis of the social order.

The Social Contract theorists reversed this process in their emphasis on social ascendency of the group over the individual, securing it and justifying it on the basis of covenant. They swept aside the old theory that the institution or the organization of society was due to a superimposed will. It was an emanation from the collective human will.

Some generalizations may now be made.

1. Social interpretation so far has taken the form primarily of a philosophy of history, not in the technical sense that has since been applied to that term, but as a reflection of social and political conditions and since Plato and Aristotle has been limited and fragmentary. It has been necessary therefore to present the historic background in much detail, not only as a starting point for social theory but because to a large degree *the interpretation of contemporary history constitutes the social theory.* From this point on, the *intellectual* environment is of greater importance and the strictly *historic,* less.

2. Again, social philosophy has been imbedded largely in political philosophy and is often but a corollary to it. This is due in part to the conspicuous character of political organization. Social processes are more obvious in this sphere and are less differentiated. Nevertheless we have found much social analysis of non-political aspects of society as well as of the political and as we proceed, the shift of emphasis will become more apparent, for the principle of social interpretation must comprehend all phases of social life and must include those common factors of social causation which are the basis of all social organization.

3. The philosophic character of social theory up to this point in contrast with the modern scientific method should be emphasized. The philosophic method assumes premises and reasons to logical conclusions. It is fundamentally deductive. It is true that the premises are the result of observation and arise out of experience but they are not submitted to critical examination. They are taken for granted. The method of science requires equally the use of the trained imagination for the construction of hypotheses but the process consists in resubmitting the hypotheses to the test of facts and to improved methods of criticism.

With the possible exception of Aristotle and Bodin, all the writers reviewed have been predominantly philosophic. We have been impressed with the logic of their arguments with which little fault could be found. The value of their conclusions and of the theories they have deduced, however, has been in direct ratio to the correctness of their premises and many of these, in the light of history and of improved methods of observation, we find to be unsound.

Nevertheless a critical study of social philosophy is of great value as an introduction to a genuine social science. It has formulated problems if it has not solved them and has stimulated interest in the development of methods by which correct description may be obtained.

With Montesquieu we reach the turning point in method. Logical deduction from philosophic assumptions begins to be replaced by inductive investigations of social material. We should not expect a complete break with the speculative methods of the past, for fundamental changes do not come so suddenly, but the change in trend is obvious and we begin the process of evolving inductively a modern descriptive science.[1]

SOCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND

It seems remarkable at first that the same environment should have produced two such widely different types of mind as those of Rousseau and Montesquieu. And yet the period was one in which the currents of thought were diverse enough to call forth a great variety of responses. Important intellectual changes were taking place. Among these the method of interpreting human experience by inductive inquiries into the evolutionary process was beginning to be differentiated from the ideological or speculative method of the past. This tended to produce a segregation of minds on the basis of their dominant characteristics. Rousseau was a product of the movement known as the Enlightenment but in his Social Contract we have a recrudescence of a vanishing type of social philosophy. Montesquieu belonged to the new order, and while his orientation was never complete, he was characterized by the scientific temper. Some of the specific aspects of contemporary thought that gave it new direction may be noted.

The development of natural science through the work of Galileo, Kepler and men of similar type, had reached its highest attainment in Newton and had begun profoundly to influence social thinking. It had

[1] *Cf.* Small, *General Sociology,* Ch. IV.

already created a wholesome skepticism as to the finality of subjective speculations in regard to the social order and had stimulated curiosity in regard to social facts. It had at least raised the question as to the possibility of analyzing and controlling social phenomena by the methods supplied to physical phenomena. The contact of cultures and the new ethnic material acquired through geographic exploration and discovery aroused new interest and awakened criticism of existing social institutions. The movement known as the Enlightenment, though expressing itself with much variation in the different countries, was exerting a powerful influence upon social philosophy.

The Deistic philosophy in England with its emphasis on Natural Religion did much to break down the pessimistic doctrine of man's inherent depravity and to establish a new ethical theory based upon human progress from savagery to civilization. While this controversy in free England remained largely scholastic in character, in France, owing to the greater persistence of medieval institutions, it assumed the form of a battle royal with the intolerant forces of obscurantism. The chief weapon of Voltaire, and of Montesquieu (in his *Persian Letters*) was cutting satire and biting wit. In contrast to the Idealism in England there developed here in the work of the Encyclopedists a materialism by which they sought, through the accumulation of the experimental knowledge which mankind had achieved, to construct a scientific view of the physical world and of the social order. There was thus provided a new basis for the study of social phenomena by the comparative and inductive method.[2]

Certain environmental influences were not without their effect in shaping the thought of the period.

The Industrial Revolution, destined in time to produce more profound effects upon the modern social order than the Commercial Revolution had had upon the medieval, was already influential in creating new social problems which extended beyond the domain of political organization. There was thus created a condition destined to differentiate social science. Economic interests were assuming an importance which called for special consideration on the part of the Physiocrats and the English Classical Economists and was on the way to become a special social science. Likewise "it was as a result of the necessity of providing a synthetic and systematic science of society to criticize the validity of the multitude of schemes presented as a means of reconstructing the dis-

[2] *Cf.* Rogers, *A Student's History of Philosophy,* pp. 386-99.

integrated social order that sociology in its present connotation had its origin." [3]

Among numerous writers who contributed to the new thought of the period two seem directly or indirectly to have prepared the way especially for Montesquieu. The first was Bodin, whose work was reviewed in Chapter VII and which need not further be discussed here. The second was Giambattista Vico, to whom Dunning attaches much importance in his influence upon Montesquieu.[4]

VICO

Vico was born in Naples in 1668, where he passed his life in poverty and obscurity. Like Bodin he was too far in advance of his contemporaries to have been understood and only by later generations has his greatness become appreciated. In his *New Science,* first published in 1725 and revised in 1731, he set forth a conception of society, based upon its organic nature and its historic continuity that contains the essence of modern scientific concepts. Montesquieu possessed a copy of the 1725 edition, which is still preserved at the Château la Brede, and although Croce in his enthusiasm to establish the priority of Vico in the use of the new historic method says "the traces of imitation alleged to have been discovered in the Spirit of Laws are very doubtful and in any case of minor importance" [5] it is certain that Montesquieu caught the spirit of the work and was influenced profoundly by it. It is not a depreciation of Vico to say that whatever may have been his genius and erudition in constructive thinking, Montesquieu possessed the originality of mind and vigor of presentation, coupled with his greater prestige, which gave currency to the method.

A brief synopsis of Vico's original contribution to Social Theory must suffice.[6]

He approached the subject of social analysis from the historical point of view but evolved an original theory of sources.

The recapitulation theory, now extensively used as a biological analogy by which the life history of the species is traced in the developing embryo, he employed in the study of child psychology, assuming that

[3] Barnes, *Sociology Before Comte, American Journal of Sociology,* Sept., 1917, p. 216.
[4] *Cf. Political Theories, Luther to Montesquieu,* p. 389.
[5] *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico,* translated by Collingwood, p. 269.
[6] The best single source in English is the admirable summary by S. H. Swinny, *Giambattista Vico, The Sociological Review,* Vol. VII, No. I, Jan., 1914.

the developing language, ideas and beliefs of the child spontaneously reproduce that of the race.

Etymology he regarded as a most valuable means for the discovery of primitive ideas. "The origin of ideas follows the origin of events" and "the study of the origin of words throws much light upon the order of social beginnings." [7]

Mythology furnishes another valuable source. "Myth . . . is a history of such a kind as could be constructed by the primitive mind." It is not allegory but a sort of "non-logical form of knowledge," which reveals primitive mental processes. Movement could not be disengaged from personality. The myth, therefore, may be quite as valuable for the sociologist as the uncertain and capricious character of historical narration.[8]

In these and similar ways he sought for social origins and the beginning of primitive institutions.

Of his general conception Swinny says: "The first and greatest was that of the social movement as a gradual unfolding, each stage resulting from the preceding, and giving rise to the succeeding in due order and filiation. This is the doctrine which later received the name of historical necessity, a process which does not exist apart from and independent of human ideals, since those ideals themselves arise in the course of the social evolution, and like the whole process spring from the nature of Man and his environment. Thus he swept aside the old theory that the institution of society was due to the wisdom of some great lawgiver, or the new theory of the social contract, which sought the origin of government in the desire of the people to escape the evils of anarchy. As little did he find the origin of religion in the imposture of its first professors—a doctrine that was soon after to be accepted by many who prided themselves on their enlightenment. To Vico, society and religion sprang from the very nature of Man. The first social contacts were not due to foresight. They were not planned for their utility. They resulted from Man's common needs. . . . Men were brutes who only gradually became human, and society owed its origin not to the reflection of the wise, but to the human feeling arising among the brutish. Stated with the confusion which is to be expected in a new thought, this is in its essentials the doctrine that was ultimately to prevail."

"But from this evolutionary theory of society, another consequence

[7] *Cf.* Croce, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
[8] *Cf. ibid.*, Ch. V.

followed. Hitherto sociology has been almost purely statical. It had been concerned with the classification of states of society, or a survey of relations and institutions. At most, it had taken account of the succession of forms of government each considered as a consequence of the preceding, or of the contrast between a state of nature and a state of civilization, the transition to which depended on the volition of the legislator or the people. It was in the conception of the gradual unfolding of civilization that we have the beginning of the social dynamics in the meaning attached to the word by Comte."

"From the common nature of Man Vico drew an inference of even greater importance to social science. However much the special circumstances of each separate nation might obscure it, there was a general course which civilization must run. The nature of Man must give the general direction of the evolution of civilization, which peculiarities of environment or contacts with peoples higher or lower in the scale of development could only modify. . . . A closer examination will show that two separate thoughts are involved. The first is that a common human nature and its environment gives rise to a common civilization which in essentials might arise in many different centres, and follow a similar course in each case. The second is that the torch of civilization may pass from one people to another each in turn the leader of the race, the social descent not necessarily coinciding with the biologic. Vico treated the whole course as though it had been the history of a single people. When Herder followed the progress of Man from the hunting to the pastoral stage and from that to the stage of settled agriculture, when Condorcet attempted to sketch the development of the human mind, when Comte discovered the Law of the Three States, when Geddes, in the footsteps of Le Play, traces the various layers of civilization represented in the course of a river—an ideal river—from source to sea, they all, explicitly or implicitly construct an Ideal History of which the first conception is due to Giambattista Vico." [9]

It should further be remarked that this explanation of social behavior in terms of the reaction of man to his environment constitutes the basis of the evoluntionary interpretation of society from Darwin and Spencer to Giddings and to the modern physiological psychologists. Before this result could be accomplished, however, it was necessary that a demonstration of the principle should be made and the causal relation between human ideas and institutions and the physical environment established.

[9] Swinny, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-6.

This was the task of Montesquieu in *The Spirit of Laws,* a task already begun, though prematurely and imperfectly by Bodin.

MONTESQUIEU

Charles-Louis de Secondat de la Brede and de Montesquieu was born on the family estate in Gascony near Bordeaux, France. The exact date is unknown but he was christened on January 18, 1689. His father Jacques de Secondat of distinguished Gascon origin boasted of two and a half centuries of nobility. His mother was Marie de Penel of English descent. She died when he was seven years of age. At eleven he was placed in the Oratorian Fathers College at Juilly where he remained till he was twenty-two. He then studied Law independently. Because of his family rank and his recognized talents he was a frequenter of the best salons of Bordeaux. In 1713 his father died and he passed under the guardianship of his uncle, Baron de Montesquieu. In 1715 he entered into a loveless marriage with Jeanne Lartigue selected for him by his uncle and who brought him a dowry of a hundred thousand livres. His uncle died a year later making him sole legatee of his large estate on condition that he wear the name Montesquieu which he had already assumed at his marriage. Thus at the age of 27 he became one of the wealthiest and most influential men in the Department. With riches, leisure, social standing and scholarly tastes, he was able to compensate for his dearth of domestic affection through association with the brilliant ladies of his social circle and found life a delightful and instructive experience.

His public career began in 1714 when he became councilor of the Parliament of Guienne, one of the most important of the twelve parliaments of France, and which sat at Bordeaux. At the death of his uncle he inherited the presidency of the Parliament, a life position. Though the position was an honorable one and added to his prestige, he found its responsibilities irksome. His literary interests predominated. In 1715 he had been admitted to the Academy in Bordeaux and in 1721 he published anonymously his *Persian Letters,* the first of which on "A refutation of the doctrine of the eternal damnation of idolaters" he had written before leaving college, in which he satirized with the brilliant audacity of a Voltaire, the social, ecclesiastical, political and literary follies of French society. The work was at once attributed to Montesquieu, and while it shocked the public, as emanating from the president of Parliament, it gained for him a reputation in

literary circles. He now spent much time in the capital. His great ambition was to gain admission to the Academy in Paris, and upon refusal because a non-resident, he returned to Bordeaux, sold his presidency and removed to Paris where he finally, though with some intrigue, reached his coveted goal.[10]

He next spent several years in travel on the continent and in England making observations upon social and political life. He spent a year and a half in England and was impressed deeply by her constitutional government which became his ideal. "Germany, he thought, was made to travel in, Italy to rest in, England to think in, and France to live in."[11] Upon his return to France he spent his time, which he divided between Paris and La Brede, in study and in writing.

In 1734 he published his first historical work: *Considerations upon the Causes of the Grandeur and the Decadence of the Romans.* The title indicates its character. Gibbon describes the decline of the Roman Empire, Montesquieu explains it. No one has excelled his depth of insight into the causal factors of history. This book like *The Letters* was published anonymously but no one was in doubt of its authorship from its first appearance. It was received with great enthusiasm. His theory of the value of scientific interpretation was vindicated.

For six years he had been working on a universal explanation of history, of which the *Considerations* was but an enlarged portion. With enthusiasm he now devoted himself to the completion of this task and after fourteen years more of arduous labor gave to the world, that is in 1746, *The Spirit of Laws.* Helvetius and Laurin had read it in manuscript, and, fearful of the effects of its audacious character upon the reputation of its author, had advised him against its publication, at least without revision. It was well that their advice was unheeded. Within a year and a half, so great was its popularity that it passed through twenty-two editions and was translated into numerous foreign languages.[12]

His strenuous labors had weakened his physical constitution and impaired his sight, but he lived seven years longer in the enjoyment of his reputation and in the continued exercise of his scholarly tastes. He died in Paris on February 10, 1755, at the age of sixty-six.[13]

[10] *Cf. Persian Letters,* Introduction by Davidson, pp. 13-14.
[11] *Ibid.,* p. 15.
[12] For Helvetius' Letters, as well as a refutation of Montesquieu's theories, *Cf.* Condorcet, *A Commentary of Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws.*
[13] *Cf. Memoir,* by Prichard, in *Spirit of Laws.*

THE SPIRIT OF LAWS

INTRODUCTION

A few sentences from the Author's Preface will explain the extent and purpose of the work. "If amidst the infinite number of subjects contained in this book there is anything which, contrary to my expectations, may possibly offend, I can at least assure the public that it was not inserted with an ill intention; for I am not naturally of a captious temper."

"I have first of all considered mankind; and the result of my thoughts has been, that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and manners, they were not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy."

"I have laid down the first principles, and have found that the particular cases follow naturally from them; that the histories of all nations are only consequences of them; and that every particular law is connected with another law, or depends on some other of a more general extent."

"I have not drawn my principles from my prejudices, but from the nature of things."

"When things are examined with never so small a degree of extent, the sallies of imagination must vanish; these generally arise from the mind's collecting all its powers to view only one side of the subject; while it leaves the other unobserved."

"I write not to censure anything established in any country whatsoever. Every nation will find the reasons on which its maxims are founded."

"The most happy of mortals should I think myself could I contribute to make mankind recover from their prejudices. By prejudices I here mean, not that which renders men ignorant of some particular things, but whatever renders them ignorant of themselves."

"If this work meets with success, I shall owe it chiefly to the grandeur and majesty of the subject. However, I do not think I have been totally deficient in genius. When I have seen what so many great men in France, England, and Germany have said before me, I have been lost in admiration; but I have not lost my courage; I have said with Corregio, 'And I also am a painter.'"

Montesquieu was conscious of the originality and even the revolutionary character of his interpretation, but he was convinced of the correctness of his method. He believed he had advanced human knowledge and he wished the serious work of twenty years to be judged

calmly on the basis of its merits. He was anxious, therefore, to disarm prejudice and to escape from the reputation he had acquired as the author of the *Persian Letters.* Hence the interesting character of this introduction.

FIRST PRINCIPLES

"Laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws: the Deity His laws, the material world its laws, the intelligence superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws."

"There is, then, a prime reason; and laws are the relations subsisting between it and different beings, and the relations of these to one another." [14]

In this definition Montesquieu presents a new concept of law.[15] It contrasts radically with the two systems with which we have become familiar, namely, that law is the "dictate of reason" or that it is "the command of a superior." His aim was to eliminate the elements of arbitrariness and the "caprice of fancy" and to establish the law of cause and effect. Nothing exists outside the range of this process and no interpretation on any other basis is either adequate or sound. The importance of this concept for scientific thinking can hardly be overestimated. His entire work was a demonstration of this principle. The fact that he erred often in its application was due, in the main, to three difficulties. First, the inadequacy and inaccuracy of scientific data with which he had to work. Many conclusions and much of the material of science available to him have been revised. Second, the characteristic unskillfulness with which a new tool is used. Many of his generalizations are admittedly crude. Third, he was unable to free himself entirely from the bias of the practical statesman. While his interpretation of social phenomena was inductive, his conclusions were used to determine the type of legislation necessary to secure a definite social result. This issued often in moral valuations rather than in simple scientific descriptions.

These weaknesses, while they invalidate many of his specific conclusions, in no way diminish the importance of his method nor of his results as a whole. They serve rather to indicate the path along which future social science is to proceed.[16]

[14] *Spirit of the Laws,* Vol. I, p. 1.

[15] For its best modern elaboration consult Karl Pearson, *Grammar of Science,* Ch. III.

[16] *Cf.* Dunning, *Political Theories, Luther to Montesquieu,* pp. 394-8.

THE LAWS OF NATURE AND SOCIETY

Montesquieu could not escape the influence of the Social Contract theorists in their emphasis on the state of Nature. He accepts the two-fold classification of the state of Nature and the state of society, but is concerned merely with the nature of laws in each.

He sides with Locke as against Hobbes in the theory of man's original nature and proceeds at once to outline the causes of society. "In this state every man, instead of being sensible of his equality, would fancy himself inferior. There would therefore be no danger of their attacking one another; peace would be the first law of nature."

"Next to a sense of his weakness man would soon find that of his wants. Hence another law of nature would prompt him to seek for nourishment."

"Fear, I have observed, would induce men to shun one another; but the marks of this fear being reciprocal, would soon engage them to associate. Besides, this association would quickly follow from the very pleasure one animal feels at the approach of another of the same species. Again, the attraction arising from the difference of the sexes would enhance this pleasure, and the natural inclination they have for each other would form a third law."

"Besides the sense or instinct which man possesses in common with brutes, he has the advantage of acquired knowledge; and thence arises a second tie, which brutes have not. Mankind have therefore a new motive of uniting; and a fourth law of nature results from the desire of living in society." [17]

The Society created by these native human impulses, peace, hunger, sex and social desire, gives rise to conflicts or a "state of war" and positive human laws develop for their control. The conjunction of human wills gives rise to the civil state, but Montesquieu is not concerned with the nature of this covenant but with the conditions which determine the character of its laws.

"They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit another. They should be in relation to the nature and principle of each government; whether they form it, as may be said of political laws; or whether they support it, as in the case of civil institutions.

"They should be in relation to the climate of each country, to the

[17] *Spirit of Laws*, Vol. I, pp. 4-5.

quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds; they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the relation of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine, they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the extent of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established; in all of which different lights they ought to be considered.

This is what I have undertaken to perform in the following work. These relations I shall examine, since all these together constitute what I call the Spirit of Laws." [18]

It is necessary for us to pass over Books II to XIII, in which Montesquieu investigates the spirit of Laws in governments, as lying primarily outside the field of our particular interest, although there are many genuinely sociological generalizations. It is his observations upon the reaction of man to his environment and the result upon social ideas and institutions that concerns us chiefly, and constitutes his main contributions to social science.

ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL CAUSATION IN HUMAN SOCIETY

Montesquieu differs from Bodin chiefly in that he not only observes the fact of environmental influence but explains the processes by which the effects are produced.

"If it be true that the temper of the mind and the passions of the heart are extremely different in different climates, the laws ought to be in relation both to the variety of those passions and to the variety of those tempers."

"Cold air constringes the extremities of the external fibres of the body; this increases their elasticity, and favors the return of blood from the extreme parts to the heart. It contracts those very fibres; consequently it increases also their force. On the contrary, warm air relaxes and lengthens the extremes of the fibres; of course it diminishes their force and elasticity.

"People are therefore more vigorous in cold climates. Here the action of the heart and the reaction of the extremities of the fibres are better performed, the temperature of the humors is greater, the blood moves more freely toward the heart, and reciprocally the heart has more power. This superiority of strength must produce vigorous effects; for instance, a greater boldness, that is, more courage; a greater sense of

[18] *Spirit of Laws,* Vol. I, p. 7.

superiority, that is, less desire for revenge; a greater opinion of security, that is, more frankness, less suspicion, policy, and cunning. In short, this must be productive of very different tempers. Put a man into a close, warm place, and for the reasons above given he will feel a great faintness. If under this circumstance you propose a bold enterprise to him, I believe you will find him very little disposed towards it; his present weakness will throw him into despondency; he will be afraid of everything, being in a state of total incapacity. The inhabitants of warm countries are, like old men, timorous; the people in cold countries are, like young men, brave." [19]

These observations are supported by further physiological analysis of muscular and nervous reactions, by analogy of the expansive effect of heat upon iron, by the diverse effects of opera in England and Italy, by military enterprise, and finally by a method, new in its application to social interpretation, laboratory experiments with the use of the microscope.[20]

Specific applications of this principle may now be considered for the light it throws upon social customs and institutions.

Climate and Sobriety

"In warm countries the aqueous part of the blood loses itself greatly by perspiration; it must therefore be supplied by a like liquid. Water is there of admirable use; strong liquors would congeal the globules of blood that remain after the transuding of the aqueous humor.

"In the cold countries the aqueous part of the blood is very little evacuated by perspiration. They may therefore make use of spirituous liquors, without which the blood would congeal. They are full of humours; consequently strong liquors, which give a motion to the blood, are proper for those countries.

"The law of Mohamet, which prohibits the drinking of wine, is therefore fitted to the climate of Arabia; and indeed, before Mohamet's time, water was the common drink of the Arabs; the law which forbade the Carthaginians to drink wine was a law of the climate. . . .

"Such a law would be improper for cold countries, where the climate seems to force them to a kind of national intemperance, very different from personal ebriety. Drunkenness predominates throughout the world, in proportion to the coldness and humidity of the climate." [21]

[19] *Spirit of Laws*, Vol. I, pp. 238-9.
[20] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 239-40.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 245-6.

Slavery and Climate

"The state of slavery is in its own nature bad. It is neither useful to the master nor to the slave."

"One would never have imagined that slavery should owe its birth to pity, and that this should have been excited in three different ways.

"The law of nations to prevent prisoners from being put to death has allowed them to be made slaves. The civil law of the Romans has empowered debtors, who were subject to be ill-used by their creditors, to sell themselves. And the law of nature requires that children whom a father in a state of servitude is no longer able to maintain should be reduced to the same state as the father."

"These reasons of the civilians are all false. It is false that killing in war is lawful, unless in a case of absolute necessity. . . . War gives no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing any further harm by securing their persons.

"Neither is it true that a freeman can sell himself. . . . The freedom of every citizen constitutes a part of the public liberty and in a democratic state is even a part of the sovereignty. To sell one's freedom is so repugnant to all reason as can scarcely be supposed in any man.

"The third way is birth, which falls with the two former; for if a man could not sell himself, much less could he sell an unborn infant. If a prisoner of war is not to be reduced to slavery, much less are his children." [22]

Three additional causes he describes but treats with contempt and as undeserving of answer. They are differences of social custom, religion and color.

"I would as soon say that slavery proceeds from the contempt of one nation for another, founded on a difference in customs. Lopez de Gama relates that the Spaniards found near St. Martha several baskets-ful of crabs, snails, grasshoppers, and locusts, which proved to be the ordinary provision of the natives. This the conquerors turned to a heavy charge against the conquered.

"I would as soon say that religion gives its professors a right to enslave those who dissent from it, in order to render its propagation more easy. . . .

"Louis XIII was extremely uneasy at a law by which all the negroes in his colonies were to be made slaves; but it being strongly urged to him as the readiest means for their conversion he acquiesced without further scruple.

[22] *Spirit of Laws*, Vol. I, pp. 253-5.

"Were I to vindicate our right to make slaves of the negroes, these would be my arguments:

"The Europeans, having extirpated the Americans, were obliged to make slaves of the Africans, for clearing such vast tracts of land.

"Sugar would be too dear if the plants which produce it were cultivated by any other than slaves.

"These creatures are all over black, and with such a flat nose that they can scarcely be pitied.

"It is hardly to be believed that God, who is a wise Being, would place a soul in such a black, ugly body.

"It is so natural to look upon color as the criterion of human nature that the Asiatics, among whom eunuchs are employed, always deprive the blacks of their resemblance to us by a more opprobrious distinction.

"The colour of the skin may be determined by that of the hair, which, among the Egyptians, the best philosophers in the world, was of such importance that they put to death all the red-haired men who fell into their hands.

"The negroes prefer a glass necklace to that gold which white nations so highly value. Can there be a greater proof of their wanting common sense?

"It is impossible for us to suppose these creatures to be men, because, allowing them to be men, a suspicion would follow that we ourselves are not Christians.

"Weak minds exaggerate too much the wrong done to Africans. For were the case as they state it, would the European powers, who make so many needless conventions among themselves, have failed to enter into a general one, in behalf of humanity and compassion?" [23]

The editor of the 1894 edition missed the fine satire of Montesquieu in the above quotation. For in a footnote referring to it he says "The above arguments form a striking instance of the prejudice under which a liberal mind can labor."

"It is time to inquire into the true origin of the right of slavery. It ought to be founded on the nature of things; let us see if there be any cases where it can be derived thence."

Two possible origins are grudgingly admitted.

"In all despotic governments people make no difficulty in selling themselves, the political slavery in some measure annihilates the civil liberty. . . . The Muscovites sell themselves very readily: their reason for it is evident; their liberty is not worth keeping.

[23] *Spirit of Laws*, Vol. I, pp. 256-7.

"This is the true and rational origin of that mild law of slavery which obtains in some countries: and mild it ought to be as founded on the free choice a man makes of a master, for his own benefit; which forms a mutual convention between the two parties.

"There is another origin of the right of slavery, and even the most cruel slavery which is to be seen among men.

"There are countries where the excess of heat enervates the body and renders men so slothful and dispirited that nothing but the fear of chastisement can oblige them to perform any laborious duty: slavery is there more reconcilable to reason; and the master being as lazy with respect to his sovereign as his slave is with regard to him, this adds a political to a civil slavery." [24]

Montesquieu differs with Aristotle whom he contends has not proved his theory "that there are natural slaves." If slavery is justified at all it is on environmental grounds. Slavery must be regarded as "unnatural" even if conditions seem occasionally to render it useful. But even this is uncertain for he concludes: "I know not whether this article be dictated by my understanding or by my heart. Possibly there is not that climate upon earth where the most laborious services might not with proper encouragement be performed by freemen. Bad laws having made lazy men, they have been reduced to slavery because of their laziness." [25]

In dealing with the practical problems of slavery and the desirability and methods of its elimination he agrees substantially with Bodin, and adds nothing essentially new.[26]

Domestic Slavery and Climate

With a degree of clearness unexcelled in the literature of social science Montesquieu establishes the relation of climate to the forms of marriage.

"Women, in hot climates, are marriageable at eight, nine, or ten years of age; thus, in those countries, infancy and marriage generally go together. They are old at twenty; their reason therefore never accompanies their beauty. When beauty demands the empire, the want of reason forbids the claim; when reason is obtained, beauty is no more. These women ought then to be in a state of dependence; for reason cannot procure in old age that empire which even youth and beauty

[24] *Spirit of Laws,* Vol. I, pp. 257-8.
[25] *Ibid.,* pp. 259-60.
[26] *Cf. supra.,* Ch. VII, pp. 168-9.

could not give. It is therefore extremely natural that in these places a man, when no law opposes it, should leave one wife to take another, and that polygamy should be introduced.

"In temperate climates, where the charms of women are best preserved, where they arrive later at maturity, and have children at a more advanced season of life, the old age of their husbands in some degree follows theirs; and as they have more reason and knowledge at the time of marriage, if it be only on account of their having continued longer in life, it must naturally introduce a kind of equality between the two sexes; and, in consequence of this, the law of having only one wife."

"Thus the law which permits only one wife is physically conformable to the climate of Europe, and not to that of Asia. This is the reason why Mohammedanism was so easily established in Asia, and with such difficulty extended in Europe; why Christianity is maintained in Europe, and has been destroyed in Asia, and, in fine, why the Mohammedans have made such progress in China, and the Christians so little." [27]

"In the cold climates of Asia there are born, as in Europe, more males than females; and hence, say the Lamas, is derived that reason of the law which amongst them permits a woman to have many husbands.

"I confess that if what history tells us be true, that at Bantam there are ten women to one man, this must be a case particularly favorable to polygamy.

"In all this I only give their reasons, but do not justify their customs." [28]

After having explained the influence of environment in determining the forms of marriage and having made clear the difference between "explanation" and "justification" of the results, he proceeds to give his own opinion of their utility, points out their correlation with political forms, and shows how the civil laws must be constructed in order to secure conformity to an ideal.

"With regard to polygamy in general, independently of the circumstances which may render it tolerable, it is not of the least service to mankind, nor to either of the two sexes."

"In a republic the condition of citizens is moderate, equal, mild and agreeable; everything partakes of the benefit of public liberty. An empire over the woman cannot, amongst them, be so well exerted; and

[27] *Spirit of Laws*, Vol. I, pp. 270-1.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 272-3.

where the climate demands the empire, it is most agreeable to a monarchical government. This is one of the reasons why it has ever been difficult to establish a popular government in the east.

"On the contrary, the slavery of women is perfectly conformable to the genius of a despotic government, which delights in treating all with severity. Thus at all times have we seen in Asia domestic slavery and despotic government walk hand in hand with an equal pace."

"In the case of a multiplicity of wives, the more a family ceases to be united, the more ought the laws to reunite its detached parts in a common centre; and the greater the diversity of interests, the more necessary is it for the laws to bring them back to a common interest."

"When, therefore, the physical power of certain climates violates the natural law of the two sexes, and that of intelligent beings, it belongs to the legislature to make civil laws, with a view to opposing the nature of the climate and re-establishing the primitive laws." [29]

Political Slavery and Climate

"Political servitude does not less depend on the nature of the climate than that which is civil and domestic; and this we shall now demonstrate.

"We have already observed that great heat enervates the strength and courage of men, and that in cold climates they have a certain vigour of body and mind, which renders them patient and intrepid, and qualifies them for arduous enterprises. This remark holds good, not only between different nations, but even in the different parts of the same country. In the north of China people are more courageous than those in the south; and those in the south of Corea have less bravery than those in the north.

"We ought not, then, to be astonished that the effeminacy of the people in hot climates has almost always rendered them slaves; and that the bravery of those in cold climates has enabled them to maintain their liberties. This is an effect which springs from a natural cause."

"These facts being laid down, I reason thus: Asia has properly no temperate zone, as the places situated in a very cold climate immediately touch upon those which are exceedingly hot, that is, Turkey, Persia, India, China, Corea, Japan.

"In Europe, on the contrary, the temperate zone is very extensive, though situated in climates widely different from each other: There being no affinity between the climates of Spain and Italy and those of

[29] *Spirit of Laws,* Vol. I, pp. 273-9.

Norway and Sweden. But as the climate grows insensibly cold upon our advancing from south to north, nearly in proportion to the latitude of each country, it thence follows that each resembles the country adjoining it; that there is no very extraordinary difference between them, and that, as I have just said, the temperate zone is very extensive.

"Hence it comes that in Asia the strong nations are opposed to the weak; the warlike, brave and active peoples touch immediately upon those who are indolent, effeminate, and timorous; the one must, therefore, conquer, and the other be conquered. In Europe, on the contrary, strong nations are opposed to the strong; and those who join each other have nearly the same courage. This is the grand reason for the weakness of Asia, and of the strength of Europe; of the liberty of Europe, and of the slavery of Asia; a cause that I do not recollect ever to have seen remarked. Hence it proceeds that liberty in Asia never increases; whilst in Europe it is enlarged or diminished according to particular circumstances." [30]

Montesquieu notes one important exception to the general rule in regard to countries, with an observation particularly illuminating in view of recent developments. "The Russian nobility have indeed been reduced to slavery by the ambition of one of their princes: but they have always discovered those marks of impatience and discontent which are never to be seen in southern climates. . . . Another of the Northern Kingdoms has lost its laws; but we may trust to the climate that they are not lost in such a manner as never to be recovered." [31]

Religion in Relation to Government and Climate

"When religion is introduced and fixed in a state, it is commonly such as is most suitable to the plan of government there established; for those who receive it, and those who are the cause of its being received, have scarcely any other idea of policy than the state in which they were born.

"When the Christian religion, two centuries ago, became unhappily divided into Catholic and Protestant, the people of the north embraced the Protestant, and those of the south adhered still to the Catholic.

"The reason is plain: the people of the north have, and will forever have, a spirit of liberty and independence which the people of the south have not; and therefore a religion which has no visible head is more agreeable to the independence of the climate than that which has one.

[30] *Spirit of Laws*, Vol. I, pp. 284-7.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

"In the countries themselves where the Protestant religion became established the revolutions were made pursuant to the several plans of political government. Luther having great princes on his side would never have been able to make them relish an ecclesiastical authority that had no exterior pre-eminence; while Calvin, having to do with people who lived under republican governments, or with obscure citizens in Monarchies, might very well avoid establishing dignities and preferments.

"Each of these two religions was believed to be perfect: the Calvinist judging his most conformable to what Christ had said, and the Lutheran to what the Apostles had practised." [32]

LAWS AND THE NATURE OF THE SOIL

Not only climate but the nature of the soil has a definite relation to civilization. Its bearing upon industry and upon population must limit our survey.

"The goodness of the land, in any country, naturally establishes subjection and dependence. The husbandmen, who compose the principal part of the people, are not very jealous of their liberty; they are too busy and too intent on their own private affairs. A country which overflows with wealth is afraid of pillage, afraid of an army. . . .

"Thus monarchy is more frequently found in fruitful countries, and a republican government in those which are not so; and this is sometimes a sufficient compensation for the inconveniences they suffer by the sterility of the land." [33]

"The laws have a great relation to the manner in which the several nations procure their subsistence. There should be a code of laws of a much larger extent for a nation attached to trade and navigation than for people who are content with cultivating the earth. There should be a much greater for the latter than for those who subsist by their flocks and herds. There must be a still greater for these than for such as live by hunting." [34]

Since it is the nature of the country that determines these occupations it is the nature of the country that determines ultimately the nature of the laws. This principle then explains the various types of behavior,

[32] *Spirit of Laws,* Vol. II, pp. 114-15. For an elaboration of the influence of climate on Religion, *cf.* Peschel, *The Races of Man,* Appleton, 1894, pp. 314-18.
[33] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 291.
[34] *Ibid.,* p. 295.

the different manners and customs and the diverse social institutions exhibited among different peoples.

Commerce

"Though commerce be subject to great revolutions, yet it is possible that certain physical causes, as the quality of the soil, or the climate, may fix its nature forever." [35]

"In Europe there is a kind of balance between the southern and northern nations. The first have every convenience of life, and few of its wants; the last have many wants, and few conveniences. To one nature has given much, and demands but little; to the other she has given but little and demands a great deal. The equilibrium is maintained by the laziness of the southern nations, and by the industry and activity which she has given to those in the north."

"The world has found itself, from time to time, in different situations; by which the face of commerce has been altered. The trade of Europe is at present carried on principally from the north to the south; and the difference of climate is the cause that the several nations have great occasion for the merchandise of each other."

"The ancient commerce, so far as it is known to us, was carried on from one part of the Mediterranean to another; and was almost wholly confined to the south. Now the people of the same climate, having nearly the same things of their own, have not the same need for trading amongst themselves as with those of a different climate. The commerce of Europe was therefore formerly less extended than at present." [36]

An extended survey of the history of commerce, including the effects of the geographic discoveries of new continents, is made with the purpose of disclosing its effects upon divergent civilizations.

Population

Few modern students of society have pointed out with greater clearness the relation between physical factors and the growth of population than did Montesquieu in his pioneer efforts.

"The females of brutes have an almost constant fecundity. But in the human species, the manner of thinking, the character, the passions, the humour, the caprice, the idea of preserving beauty, the pain of childbearing, and the fatigue of a too numerous family, obstruct propagation in a thousand different ways." [37]

[35] *Spirit of Laws*, Vol. II, p. 1.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

"Wherever a place is found in which two persons can live commodiously, there they enter into marriage. Nature has a sufficient propensity to it, when unrestrained by the difficulty of subsistence.

"A rising people increase and multiply extremely. This is, because with them it would be a great inconvenience to live in celibacy; and none to have many children. The contrary of which is the case when a nation is formed." (An accurate description of the growth of population in the United States.)

"Pasture-lands are but little peopled, because they find employment only for a few. Corn-land employs a great many men, and vineyards infinitely more.

"It has been frequent complaint in England, that the increase in pasture-land diminished the inhabitants; and it has been observed in France that the prodigious number of vineyards is one of the great causes of the multitude of people." [38]

"Regulations on the numbers of citizens depend greatly on circumstances. There are countries in which nature does all; the legislator then has nothing to do. What need is there of inducing men by laws to propagation when a fruitful climate yields a sufficient number of inhabitants. Sometimes the climate is more favorable than the soil; the people multiply, and are destroyed by famine; this is the case in China." [39]

There are numerous factors such as war, pestilence, famine, the nature of governments, and the effects of certain types of physical environment that lead to depopulation. In order to offset these tendencies various nations have resorted to legislation for the encouraging of marriage and propagation. As examples Montesquieu presents a summary of the methods employed by ancient Rome to accomplish this purpose and cites one instance from contemporary France.[40]

SUMMARY AND CRITICISM

Perhaps no better method of evaluating the work of Montesquieu could be found than to present certain comments on the part of writers whose views we have great reason to respect.

Dunning says: "The field covered by *The Spirit of the Laws* is so

[38] *Spirit of Laws*, Vol. II, pp. 86-9.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 90. For a modern statement of this Malthusian doctrine in regard to China, *Cf.* Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, Ch. IV.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 91-108. (For a more elaborate and scientific treatment of the influence of environment on civilization the reader should consult Buckle *History of Civilization in England;* Huntington, *Civilization and Climate;* and Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment.*)

extensive as to make it a work rather of social science than of politics proper. The lines of Montesquieu's survey are those of the Greek philosophers, comprehending all the institutions of social existence. While his general spirit is strongly suggestive of Aristotle's *Politics,* his point of view is often evidently that of Plato's *Laws.* He puts himself in the position of the legislator, in the sense so common in antiquity—the man of almost superhuman sagacity, like Solon and Lycurgus, intrusted with the formulation of a code to regulate a given society. The problems that would confront such a legislator are the problems which particularly interested Montesquieu. For their solution, however, his method is that of Aristotle, not of Plato, of Bodin, not of Hobbes, or Locke. Like all the thinkers of his time he would look to nature for the criterion of his law. But the teachings of nature would be sought not in deductions from abstract assumptions of pure reason, but in the concrete facts of life both present and past. His explanation of social phenomena, and of the laws which govern them, is derived chiefly from history and observation, and the explanation so derived is in his philosophy the chief element in framing a judgment as to the moral or political value of any legislation." [41]

"The widening of the field in which history and observation were to operate was a fact of the first importance in political and social science, and Montesquieu is entitled to all credit for his recognition of this importance, whatever the errors into which he was led by his enthusiasm for the novelties brought within his reach." [42]

The following estimate is made by Giddings: "In Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* the speculative methods of the social philosophers are frankly abandoned. The work is descriptive and its conclusions stand or fall with the accuracy and sufficiency of concrete facts, from which the conclusions are derived by generalization. That this work, as judged by modern standards, is elementary and crude should not prevent our recognition of the service it rendered in turning attention to inductive method, in awakening interest in purely objective interpretations of social phenomena, and in stimulating by suggestion and example those researches which have accumulated for the use of scholars today an enormous mass of ethnographic and other descriptive sociological material. Montesquieu converted social philosophy into descriptive social science." [43]

[41] *Political Theories, Luther to Montesquieu,* pp. 394-5.
[42] *Ibid.,* p. 431.
[43] *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* pp. 107-8.

An interesting example of the effect of Montesquieu's work upon the traditional and reactionary minds of contemporaries appears in a treatise by the Rev. David Williams, presented to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales in 1789. "The genius of Montesquieu is of an order commanding admiration and respect. It is fertile and inventive, in the art of displaying wonderful treasures of heterogeneous knowledge. His talents, in constructing the principles of a system, are not equal to those he employs, in drawing circumstances, from all imaginable quarters, to favor and support it. The predominant faculty of mind, is imagination; his theory is fabricated from common presuppositions; as is generally the case in the fable of epic poems and plays; but his address in giving it plausibility; the unaffected ease with which extensive knowledge is applied; the pertinence and beauty of the images and allusions; and the charms of his style have raised him above the rank which he would have had a right to occupy with the first poets of any age or country. Montesquieu is among politicians what Sterne may be among divines; he assumes principles and truths; searches the universe for circumstances to corroborate them; warmly interests the heart in their favor; and points and directs his language, with a delicate and irresistible hand. Hence the astonishing popularity of his writings. As grave, solid, and unornamented sermons are neglected, for the brilliant sallies of sentimental essays: the institutes of Justinian; the works of Bodin, Harrington, Grotius, Puffendorf, Bacon, Hobbes, Stuart, and Hume are frequently discarded for the captivating charms of the *Spirit of Laws*. But I would not anticipate observations which may, in future, obviously arise from the subjects before us. I will only add, whatever reasons I may have, to guard youthful candor, in studying Montesquieu, from the effects of his address on doubtful principles—I have no inclination to check the most ardent and exquisite sensibility on the subject of his humanity, or benevolence. His talents will entitle him to admiration, but the goodness of his heart, an unremitting solicitude to meliorate the sufferings, and to promote the happiness of mankind, will secure to his memory the esteem and affection of all ages." [44]

Comte evaluates Montesquieu as follows: "The great strength of this memorable work appears to me to lie in its tendency to regard political phenomena as subject to invariable laws, like all other phenomena. This is manifested at the very outset, in the preliminary chapter, in which, for the first time in the history of the human mind, the general idea of *Law* is directly defined, in relation to all, even to political subjects, in

[44] *Lecture on Political Principles*, pp. 1-3.

the same sense in which it is applied in the simplest positive investigations. The progress of science which had been effected in the labors of Descartes, Galileo, and Kepler, a century before, had rendered the most advanced minds familiar with an incomplete notion of progress. Montesquieu's conception was a generalization of this incomplete notion; and, instead of denying originality to so eminent a service, we may well be amazed that such a conception should be offered, before the positive method had extended beyond the simplest natural phenomena—being scarcely admitted into the department of chemistry, and not yet heard of in the study of living bodies. And in the other view, a man must have been in advance of his time, who could conceive of natural laws as the basis of social speculation and action while all other able men were talking about the absolute and indefinite power of legislators, when armed with due authority to modify at will the social state."

After pointing out certain weaknesses of the work because of its pioneer character, he concludes: "It is by our posterity that Montesquieu will be duly estimated, when the extension of positive philosophy to social speculations will disclose the high value of the precocious attempts which though doomed to failure yield the light by which the general question must be laid down." [45]

Hallam compares Montesquieu and Bodin: "It has been often alleged . . . that Montesquieu owed something, and especially his theory of the influence of climate, to Bodin. But, though he had unquestionably read *The Republic* with that advantage which the most fertile minds derive from others, this ought not to detract in our eyes from his real originality. *The Republic* and the *Spirit of Laws* bear, however, a more close comparison than any other political systems of celebrity. Bodin and Montesquieu are, in this province of political theory, the most philosophical of those who have read so deeply, the most learned of those who have thought so much. Both acute, ingenious, little respecting authority in matters of opinion, but deferring to it in established power, and hence apt to praise the fountain of waters whose bitterness they exposed; both in advance of their age, but one so much that his genius neither kindled a fire in the public mind, nor gained its own due praise, the other more fortunate in being the immediate herald of a generation which he stimulated, and which repaid him by its admiration; both conversant with ancient and medieval history, and with the Roman as well as national law; both just, benevolent, and sensible of the great object of civil society, but displaying this with some variation according

[45] *Positive Philosophy,* tr. by Martineau, pp. 442-4.

to their times; both sometimes seduced by false analogies, but the one rather through respect to an erroneous philosophy, the other through personal thirst of praise and affectation of originality; both aware that the basis of the philosophy of man is to be laid in the records of his past existence; but the one prone to accumulate historical examples without sufficient discrimination, and to overwhelm, instead of convincing the reader by their redundancy, the other aiming at an induction from select experience, but hence appearing sometimes to reason generally from particular premises, or dazzling the student by a proof that does not satisfy his reason." [46]

[46] *Introduction to the Literature of Europe,* Vol. II, pp. 165-6. (For a brief summary of the effect of Montesquieu's Philosophy upon the formation of the American Constitution see Thorpe, F. N., *Article on Montesquieu, Warner Library of the World's Best Literature,* Vol. 26, pp. 10249-55.)

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. In the light of our study so far consider carefully Small's statement "that in all probability the sentimental philanthropic impulse has done more than the scientific impulse to bring sociology into existence." *General Sociology,* Ch. III. Do you draw the same conclusion?
2. What reasons can you give for the fact that Vico's advanced scientific views on social evolution failed to usher in a new era in social science?
3. What is "scientific law" according to Pearson? *Cf. Grammar of Science,* Ch. III. Compare and contrast this with Montesquieu's definition of "Law."
4. Reread Bodin's interpretation of the influences of physical environment on civilization. Also reëxamine Buckle, *History of Civilization in England,* Ch. II, and compare these writers with Montesquieu in regard to material, scope and method.
5. Trace the effects of geography and climate upon the rise, spread, and final abolition of slavery in the United States. *Cf.* E. C. Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions,* Ch. XIV, also *The Influences of Geographic Environment,* pp. 618-22. How does this confirm Montesquieu's position in regard to slavery?
6. Make a further study of the effects of climate upon civilization in the light of modern scientific studies. What additional factors are considered? *Cf.* E. C. Semple, *The Influence of Geographic Environment,* Ch. XVII, also E. Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia* and *Civilization and Climate.*
7. Carry the analysis one step further by studying the effects of weather on human behavior. *Cf.* E. G. Dexter, *Conduct and the Weather,* also Huntington's chapter, *Work and Weather* in *Civilization and Climate.*
8. For a still more highly specialized study of this subject read C. F. Woodruff, *The Effects of Tropical Light on White Men.* See especially his comments on the uses of alcohol in the Tropics, pp. 22-3 and 193. How does this differ from Montesquieu?
9. What criticism does A. J. Todd make of the theory of "Geographic Determinism"? *Cf. Theories of Social Progress,* Ch. IX. Are his objections valid? *Cf.* also Ellwood, *Theories of*

Cultural Evolution, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXIII, May, 1918.

10. Examine L. F. Ward's criticism that this doctrine while valuable was "carried too far." What other elements does he regard as necessary to true and complete interpretation of society? *Cf. Pure Sociology,* pp. 58-62.
11. Read critically W. A. Dunning's chapter on *Montesquieu,* especially sections, 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8. Note his comparisons of Montesquieu with other writers and his evaluations of Montesquieu's theories.
12. Study critically A. A. Goldenweiser's criticisms of environmental determinism in connection with Montesquieu's theories. *Cf. Early Civilization,* Ch. XIV.
13. Additional sources for the study of environmental factors are E. S. Bogardus, *History of Social Thought,* Ch. XV; A. W. Small, *General Sociology,* Ch. XXX; E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology,* Ch. III; F. S. Chapin, *Social Evolution,* Ch. V.

CHAPTER X

AUGUST COMTE

SOCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

ONE hundred years elapsed, including the last half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th century, before the work of Montesquieu reached its full fruition,—a century characterized by revolutionary changes in government, in social conditions, and in human thinking. No adequate review of the period can be undertaken. Only a brief reference can be made to a few outstanding factors that conditioned the epoch-making work of August Comte, the founder of the modern science of sociology.

The French revolution destroyed the old régime and with it the theory of the Divine Right of Kings, but the social upheaval was greater, even, in magnitude. The whole social fabric was shaken to its foundations.

Social and political change, accomplished gradually in England, had been resisted stubbornly in France, but by 1789 there had grown up a sufficient unity and social self-consciousness to create within the social mind the conviction that the survival of feudal traditions and institutions, the product of the method by which the state had been pieced together through conquests and alliances, and which long since had outlived their usefulness, constituted "abuses" which demanded redress. The most serious of these were: the lack of homogeneity in civil rights throughout the realm; the survival of commercial barriers between the provinces; traditional class differences between the nobility and clergy and the third estate; the prerogatives and possessions of the church; the serious inequalities and exemptions of taxation; and above all, the existence of an oppressive and irresponsible government.

The violence of the revolution and the reign of terror through which the old régime collapsed, added to the mental and moral confusion which is always the aftermath of war. The French Revolution is unique, however, in the history of wars, for the extent and for the fundamental character of the changes it produced. It closed one age and opened another. It was inevitable that the period of reconstruction should

involve difficulties of corresponding magnitude. The "people" into whose hands the responsibilities fell were inexperienced in methods of social control, without precedent which might serve as a guide, and without the aid of that prevision which science renders to any task. Uncertainty and confusion prevailed.[1]

The Industrial Revolution, brought about chiefly through the substitution of mechanical for muscular power and with the aid of mechanical invention, was producing changes equally profound in the social life. To an extent scarcely yet fully recognized it lay at the base of the social and political unrest of the time. The introduction of machinery and the factory system with its enormous increase of production, improvement in the means of communication, the development of trade and transportation, the massing of capital and the expansion of credit, the rise of the entrepreneur, and the extension of the wage system, are among the important factors creating the modern industrial system. New problems of social adjustment demanded solutions for which there was neither knowledge nor experience. While the most acute effects were being experienced in England, they were present only in lesser degree in France.

The intellectual background of Comte's thinking includes several definite trends.

The system of modern philosophy begun by Descartes and culminating in the work of Kant and Hume, had laid the foundation for consecutive and logical thinking, and had pointed the way, if it had not accomplished it, for the unification of human knowledge. It had freed the mind from the thraldom of scholasticism and set new tasks for the human intellect. It had established reason and experience as the ultimate tests of the validity of thought.

In the field of science there had been equally great achievements. In astronomy, chemistry, physics and physiology, there had developed experimental methods which had carried knowledge in these fields to an unprecedented level of achievement. Superstitions were being undermined by the light which positive knowledge was beginning to throw upon the nature and processes of physical phenomena. Little unification among the sciences had been perceived or attempted, but the general principle of causation had been established in whatever spheres of phenomena had been brought under investigation and the basis for a synthesis had been laid.

As a result of the intellectual and social ferment incident to the

[1] *Cf.* Robinson, *History of Western Europe,* Ch. XXXIV-V.

political and the industrial revolutions, two important effects were produced in the domain of social science, one of which served as a guide and the other as a stimulus to sociology.

On the theoretical side, both of the new sciences of politics and economics received fresh incentives to reconstruct their theories in view of the changing order, and a host of writers appeared in the various countries of whom Bentham and Austin, and Ricardo and Adam Smith, are the best representatives respectively. Mention also should be made of the new impetus given to the study of the philosophy of history by such men as Guizot and Grote.

On the practical side, there was a new zeal for social reform. Inspired by a desire to ameliorate the miseries due to the revolution, the utopianism of Moore, Harrington and others was abandoned, and reform took on a new socialistic character. Experimental, eager, and persistent in their desire for social improvement, Saint-Simon, Owen, Fourier, and later Engels and Marx sought by fundamental reconstruction of the political and economic life to secure the adjustments which the theorists sought to explain.[2]

From the vantage ground of historic perspective it is easy to observe the convergence of all these scientific and social achievements and there wanted only the work of the master mind which could create a synthesis. This gigantic task of organizing and coördinating the specific elements into a unified system was the work of August Comte.

Among the numerous writers of the time, there were two who probably more than any others gave form and direction to the thought of Comte.

CONDORCET

Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet was born in Picardy, September 14, 1743. He was educated at the college of Navarre, was a resident of Paris, a friend of Turgot and a great admirer of Voltaire, a member of the French Academy, a moderate republican, president of the legislative assembly, an active participant in the affairs of the Revolution and was elected to the national convention in 1792. Proscribed by the Jacobins in 1793 he was secreted in the house of a friend where, in almost hourly expectation of the executioner's ax, he composed his *Historical Sketch of the Progress of the*

[2] For an admirable summary of the economic-socialist doctrines, *cf.* Gide & Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines.* For a survey of the intellectual background of Comte, *cf.* Barnes, *Sociology Before Comte, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXIII, Sept., 1917, pp. 214-43.

Human Mind, but which was not published until after his untimely death the following year.[3]

This remarkable "sketch" traces the development of the human mind through ten successive stages or epochs. The Introduction, in many respects the most original part of the work, is devoted to method and to the analysis of the principles of interpretation. Beginning with "Man United into Hordes," the development is traced "To the Formation of the French Republic." The tenth epoch is the "Future Progress of Mankind."[4]

His point of view is well presented in the following paragraphs:

"Were we to confine our observations to an inquiry into the general facts and unvarying laws which the development of these faculties presents to us, in what is common to the different individuals of the human species, our inquiry would bear the name of metaphysics.

"But if we consider this development in its results, relative to the mass of individuals coexisting at the same time on a given space, and follow it from generation to generation, it then exhibits a picture of the progress of the human intellect. This progress is subject to the same general laws, observable in the individual development of our faculties, being the result of that very development considered at once in a great number of individuals united in society. But the result which every instant presents, depends upon that of the preceding instants, and has an influence on the instants which follow.

"This picture, therefore, is historical; since, subjected as it will be to perpetual variations, it is formed by the successive observations of human societies at the different eras through which they have passed. It will accordingly exhibit the order in which the changes have taken place, explain the influence of every past period upon that which follows it, and thus show, by the modifications which the human species has experienced, in its incessant renovations through the immensity of ages, the course which it has pursued, and the steps which it has advanced towards knowledge and happiness. From these observations on what man has heretofore been, and what he is at present, we shall be led to the means of securing and of accelerating the still further progress, of which from his nature we may indulge the hope.

"Such is the object of the work I have undertaken; the result of which will be to show, from reasoning and from facts, that no bounds

[3] *Cf.* Victor Branfor, *The Founders of Sociology, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. VII. July, 1914, pp. 94-120. Also John Morley, *Critical Miscellanies,* Vol. II, pp. 163-253.

[4] *Cf.* Condorcet, *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind.*

have been fixed to the improvement of the human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth above the control of every power that would impede it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us." [5]

Comte's indebtedness to Condorcet must be inferred from a study of his own work and from his own personal estimate subjoined in lieu of further analysis.

"After Montesquieu, the next great addition to Sociology (which is the term I may be allowed to invent to designate Social Physics) was made by Condorcet, proceeding on the views suggested by his illustrious friend Turgot. Turgot's suggestions with regard to the theory of the perfectibility of human nature were doubtless the basis of Condorcet's speculation exhibited in his *Historical Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind,* in which the scientific conception of the social progression of the race was, for the first time, clearly and directly proposed, with a distinct assertion of its primary importance. The strength of the work lies in its introduction, in which Condorcet exhibits his general idea, and proposes his philosophical project of studying the radical connection of the various social states of mankind. These few immortal pages leave really nothing to be desired in regard to the position of the sociological question at large, which will, in my opinion, rest, through all future time, on this admirable statement." [6]

SAINT-SIMON

Claud Henri Comte de Saint-Simon, often called the founder of French Socialism, was born in Paris, October 17, 1760, of a noble French family which claimed descent from Charlemagne. In his youth he was extravagant and dissipated. He received a military education and entered the army at the age of seventeen. He embarked with the French expeditionary forces and fought in the American Revolution, being present at the surrender of Lord Cornwallis. Returning to France he soon left the military service, studied mathematics and traveled extensively. He took no part in the French Revolution except as a student of its social effects. For a time he speculated in the confiscated estates, fell under the disfavor of Robespierre and was imprisoned for eleven months during the Reign of Terror. His mind now turned toward political and social problems, and he became an ultra liberal. He studied

[5] *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind,* Introduction, pp. 2-4.

[6] Comte, *Positive Philosophy,* tr. by Martineau, p. 444.

science in the Polytechnic School. Accused of immorality he defended himself on the ground of philosophic investigations in the underworld. An unfortunate marriage in 1801 which was speedily dissolved by mutual consent completed his experiments. In 1803 he began his philosophic writings and his weird schemes for social reform which he continued to the end of his life. He died in Paris, May 19, 1825.[7]

Comte was indebted equally as much to Saint-Simon as to Condorcet, though the break in their friendship which occurred in 1824 probably accounts for his lack of acknowledgment.

Two points of view stressed by Saint-Simon are particularly illuminating in relation to the later work of Comte.

First, is his emphasis upon the need of scientific reconstruction as a remedy for the chaos attending the intellectual revolution.

Booth summarizes Saint-Simon's argument: "The great advance that has been made in physical sciences has totally revolutionized our views of man and nature; and the clergy, instead of embodying each new discovery into their systems, and themselves leading the way towards the further acquisition of knowledge, have remained immovable in positions that have become untenable. They have not only in this manner lost their title to be considered the intellectual guides and authorities of men, but they have actually assumed an attitude of hostility to progress. Thus there has arisen the direst anarchy in society. On the one hand, there is a class of men whose authority is supposed by the ignorant to be derived from heaven; upon the other, an increasing body of investigators, whose discoveries are directly opposed to the doctrines of the authorized teachers. Now, what constituted the strength of the spiritual power during the middle ages was the circumstance that scientific knowledge was then in complete harmony with theological belief. The only means of restoring the spiritual authority that has been lost by disunion, and without which social order is impossible, is to re-establish the harmony between theology and science; and this is not to be accomplished, as has been vainly attempted, by arresting the progress of knowledge, but by advancing theology so as to meet the new requirements of science." [8]

Second, the order of the development of knowledge is outlined. "In truth, the sources of our knowledge are imagination and observation. In the childhood of intellect the imagination prevails, but it is gradually corrected according as facts are more and more observed. To

[7] *Cf.* Booth, *Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism,* pp. 2-10.
[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 10-11.

this process is due the elimination of astrology from astronomy, and of alchemy from chemistry. Each science is freed from its purely imaginative elements in the order of its simplicity; that is to say, according as its phenomena are easy or difficult of observation. Now physiology is the most complex of all the sciences, and, therefore, it is not unnatural that it should still be encumbered with much speculation that is solely due to the imagination, and has no foundation in fact. But the time has at length arrived when its deliverance should be wrought; and the classes who indulge in vain speculations concerning man—such as theologians, metaphysicians, and others—should be entirely superseded by men of science, whose knowledge alone has any reliable foundations." [9]

"It follows that the great work that remains for this age to accomplish is to rescue physiology from its conjectural condition, and this not so much out of regard for the science itself, as because of the intellectual revolution that it will produce; for the transition will be then definitely effected from Deism to Physicism, from the system of ideas that ascribes phenomena to the direct action of a divine will instead of to natural operation of an invariable law." [10]

In his *Introduction to Scientific Works* published in 1808 Saint-Simon used for the first time the term "Positive Philosophy" to designate the general science which is a synthesis of the specific sciences. He noted furthermore the varying degrees of precision in the different sciences and particularly the lack of positive achievement in physiology because of "the complexity of the phenomena presented by man." [11]

It should be noted that Saint-Simon conceived of social and moral phenomena as based on physiological causes and conditions, and instead of creating a separate classification for social science regards it as an aspect of the science of physiology, just as Comte later classified psychology as a department of biology.

Saint-Simon's theory of progress is further illustrated by his connecting man with other animals in an organic series differing only in degree, but not in kind, with respect to intellect, and by his appeal to history to show "That civilization is the result of a long series of progressive evolutions, the earliest being due exclusively to the slight physical superiority of man, and each successive step being the necessary result of its immediate predecessor." [12]

The lucidity of Saint-Simon's thinking in regard to social reconstruc-

[9] Booth, *Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism*, p. 12.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 26-7.
[11] *Cf. ibid.*, p. 26.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

tion and his anticipation of Comte's principal theories leads Barnes to observe that: "One who is familiar with Comte's system need not be told that all that remained was for him to expand and to systematize the outlines laid down by Saint-Simon, and the best critics agree that such was the primary contribution of Comte to Sociology." [13]

AUGUST COMTE

Isadore Auguste Marie François Xavier Comte was born at Montpellier, January 19, 1798. His parents were devout Catholics and ardent royalists. His father held the public office of Treasurer of Taxes. At the age of nine he was placed in the Lycée of Montpellier. He finished his course at fourteen, studied Mathematics for two years under Daniel Encontre and at sixteen entered the Polytechnic School in Paris. He was a brilliant student and exhibited great intellectual independence and fearlessness in resisting tyranny, whether political, theological or academic. Largely as the result of an insurrection in the Polytechnic against one of the tutors, in which Comte was implicated, the school was closed by government order and he was sent home and placed under the surveillance of the police, with hope of a future career apparently shattered. By this time he had become a free-thinker and there was no place for him in the national system of education.

The next year however he was in Paris supporting himself by private instruction in Mathematics. Benjamin Franklin at this time was his intellectual idol from whom he derived inspiration and ambition. In 1818 he became a disciple and coadjutor of Saint-Simon, whose ideas and aims became powerful factors in shaping his future career and thought.

Intellectually precocious he is said to have felt at the age of fourteen the need for reconstruction in politics and philosophy. At twenty-two he published a pamphlet entitled *A System of Positive Polity* which contained the essential elements of his future theory. Attracting no attention, but conscious of the value of his ideas, he determined upon a course that would make them effective. He thereupon closeted himself for twenty-four hours and in that time evolved and outlined the *Positive Philosophy* which required more than twenty-four years for its completion.

His marriage in 1825 proved to be one in which Morley says

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 224. See also Barnes' summary of the work of Saint-Simon from M. Alengry,—*Idem.*

"Magnanimity owes no account to prudence" [14] and which all his biographers declare to have been unhappy.

Urged by a friend to put the ownership of his ideas upon record because of their general appropriation, he began in 1826 to expound them in a series of lectures in his own home. Men of scholarship and science were attracted. The work was scarcely begun, only three having been delivered, when he was stricken with a serious cerebral derangement, induced by severe mental strain and domestic misery. He was confined in an asylum for seven months. A period of profound melancholy followed his release during which he attempted suicide by throwing himself into the Seine, but was rescued. Within the year, however, he was sufficiently recovered to resume his work and his lectures. He completed the series and repeated it in 1829 in a public course at the Athenée.

With the reopening of the Polytechnic by Louis Philippe he was appointed professor of Mathematics and afterward examiner of candidates. For sixteen years he gave weekly public lectures on astronomy.

In 1830 the first, and in 1842 the last of his six-volume work on *Positive Philosophy* was published. The remainder of his life was devoted to miscellaneous writings and sporadic and often fanatical attempts at social and religious reforms over which his most sympathetic critics have thrown the mantle of charity because of the unfortunate state of his mind. It is upon his *Positive Philosophy* that his enduring fame as a contributor to social and scientific thinking rests. Of the mode of thought here presented Mill says: "He is the first who has attempted its complete systematization, and the scientific extension of it to all objects of human knowledge. And in doing this he has displayed a quantity and quality of mental power, and achieved an amount of success, which have not only won but retained the high admiration of thinkers as radically and strenuously opposed as it is possible to be, to nearly the whole of his later tendencies, and to many of his earlier opinions.[15]

The six volumes of the *Positive Philosophy* were condensed and liberally translated by Harriet Martineau and published in 1855 two years before the death of the distinguished author—the edition used in this analysis.

Comte died of cancer September 5, 1857.[16]

[14] *Critical Miscellanies,* Vol. III, p. 343.
[15] *August Comte and Positivism,* p. 3.
[16] *Cf.* Morley, *Critical Miscellanies,* Vol. III, pp. 337-84; also Harrison, biographical introduction, Martineau Translation.

THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY

In the analysis of the *Positive Philosophy* it will be best to preserve the order of its development and, so far as possible, the phraseology of the author. His method, scope and aim should be grasped as a whole and their value estimated, not on the basis of the finality of his conclusions but in their bearing upon the future development of social science. His achievement was a necessary and inevitable stage in social thinking and not its final form.

THE PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND

"In order to understand the true value and character of the *Positive Philosophy* (without defining the term, Comte uses the word "positive" as a synonym for "scientific" in its generally accepted sense) we must take a brief general view of the progressive course of the human mind, regarded as a whole; for no concept can be understood otherwise than through its history.

"From the study of the development of human intelligence, in all directions, and through all times, the discovery arises of a great fundamental law. . . . The law is this: That each of our leading conceptions —each branch of our knowledge—passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific or positive."[17] Mill thinks Comte's terminology badly chosen as implying unintended connotations, at least to the English mind. He prefers the Personal or Volitional, the Abstractional or Ontological, and the Phenomenal or Experimental.[18] Ward, regarding the stages from the point of view of the method employed uses the terms Teleological, Ontological, and Positive.[19] Both authors accept the general validity of the classification.

"In the theological state, the human mind, seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and final causes of all effects—in short, Absolute knowledge—supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings.

"In the metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. . . .

[17] *Positive Philosophy*, tr. by Martineau, p. 25.
[18] *Cf. August Comte and Positivism*, p. 10.
[19] *Cf.* Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 86-7.

"In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws—that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance. Reasoning and observation, duly combined, are the means of this knowledge.

"The Theological system arrived at the highest perfection of which it is capable when it substituted the providential action of a single Being for the varied operations of the numerous divinities which had been before imagined. In the same way, in the last stage of the Metaphysical system, men substituted one great entity, Nature, as the cause of all phenomena, instead of the multitude of entities at first supposed. In the same way, again, the ultimate perfection of the Positive system would be, if such perfection could be hoped for, to present all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general fact—such as Gravitation, for instance." [20]

The two main evidences of this law are that "There is no science which, having attained the positive stage, does not bear marks of having passed through the others" and "the progress of the individual mind . . . (as well as) the mind of the race." [21]

Comte observed "that the different kinds of our knowledge have passed through the three stages of progress at different rates, and have not therefore arrived at the same time. . . . Any kind of knowledge reaches the positive stage early in proportion to its generality, simplicity, and independence of other departments. Astronomical science, which is above all made up of facts that are general, simple, and independent of other sciences, arrived first; then terrestrial Physics; then chemistry; and at length, Physiology." [22] Lewes illuminates this idea further: "The more closely we examine the present condition of sciences, the more we shall be struck with the anarchy above indicated. We shall find one science, Physics, in a perfectly positive stage, another, Biology, in the metaphysical stage, a third, Sociology, in the supernatural stage. Nor is this all. The same varieties will be found to coexist in the same individual mind. The same man who in Physics may be said to have arrived at the positive stage, and recognizes no other object of

[20] *Positive Philosophy*, p. 26.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 26-7. (For a criticism of Comte's error in repudiating the entire study of causation, and his failure to distinguish between ultimate causes and the process of causation which is the basis of science, see Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-91.)

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

inquiry than the *laws* of phenomena, will be found still a slave to the metaphysical stage in Biology, and endeavoring to detect the *cause* of life; and so little emancipated from the supernatural stage in Sociology, that if you talk to him of the possibility of a science of history, as a social science, he will laugh at you as a 'theorizer.' The present condition of Science, therefore, exhibits three Methods instead of one: hence the anarchy. To remedy the evil all differences must cease: one Method must preside. August Comte was the first to point out the fact, and to suggest the cure; and it will render his name immortal." [23]

Commenting upon the law of the three stages and with particular reference to the positive method, Ward says: "All that has been gained toward the elevation of society and toward securing the comforts and enjoyments of life has come from this source, not one item having ever been contributed to the material prosperity of the world from either teleological or ontological researches.

The essential accuracy of all this, in both its historical and its dogmatical character, cannot now be doubted, and, both for the fact and for the form of its presentation, the world owes to August Comte a debt of gratitude which its long neglect and tardy acknowledgement of his writings have poorly repaid." [24]

Davis, on the other hand, criticizes his "growth-periods" involving "fixed and definite states" as a violation of the modern "principle of continuity" and therefore as psychologically unsound.[25]

THE TWOFOLD AIM OF POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY

"In mentioning just now the four principal categories of phenomena, astronomical, physical, chemical, and physiological,—there was an omission which will have been noticed. Nothing was said of Social phenomena. Though involved with physiological, Social phenomena demand a distinct classification, both on account of their importance and of their difficulty. They are the most individual, the most complicated, the most dependent on all others; and therefore they must be the latest, —even if they had no special obstacle to encounter. This branch of science has not hitherto entered into the domain of Positive Philosophy. Theological and Metaphysical methods, exploded in other departments, are as yet exclusively applied, both in the way of inquiry and discussion,

[23] *Biographical History of Philosophy*, Vol. II., p. 784.
[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 87.
[25] *Cf. Psychological Interpretations of Society*, p. 16.

in all treatment of Social subjects, though the best minds are heartily weary of eternal disputes about divine right and the sovereignty of the people. This is the great, while it is evidently the only gap which has to be filled, to constitute, solid and entire, the Positive Philosophy. Now that the human mind has grasped celestial and terrestrial physics, —mechanical and chemical; organic physics, both vegetable and animal, —there remains one science, to fill up the series of sciences of observation,—Social Physics. This is what men have now most need of: and this it is the principal aim of the present work to establish.

"It would be absurd to pretend to offer this new science at once in a complete state. Others, less new, are in very unequal conditions of forwardness. But the same character of positivity which is impressed on all the others will be shown to belong to this. This once done, the Philosophical system of the moderns will be in fact complete, as there will be no other phenomenon which does not naturally enter into some one of the five great categories. All our fundamental conceptions having become homogeneous, the Positive state will be fully established. It can never again change its character, though it will be forever in course of development by additions of new knowledge.

"We have stated the special aim of the work. Its secondary and general aim is this: to review what has been effected in the Sciences, in order to show that they are not radically separate, but all branches from the same trunk. If we had confined ourselves to the first and special object of the work, we should have produced merely a study of Social Physics: whereas, in introducing the second and general, we offer a study of Positive philosophy, passing in review all the positive sciences already formed."

"The two aims, though distinct, are inseparable; for, on the one hand, there can be no positive philosophy without a basis of social science, without which it could not be all-comprehensive; and, on the other hand, we could not pursue Social science without having been prepared by the study of phenomena less complicated than those of society, and furnished with a knowledge of laws and anterior facts which have a bearing upon social science." [26]

The fulfillment of these theoretical aims will result in certain achievements of social importance:

1. It will afford "the only rational means of exhibiting the logical laws of the human mind, which have hitherto been sought by unfit methods."

[26] *Positive Philosophy*, pp. 30-31.

2. It will "regenerate Education," by giving it a scientific content essential to the "regeneration of our intellectual system."

3. By this means it will "aid the progress of the respective positive sciences," and most important of all,

4. It "offers the only solid basis for that Social Reorganization which must succeed the critical condition in which the most civilized nations are now living." [27]

THE HIERARCHY OF THE POSITIVE SCIENCES

Comte recognizes the inherent difficulty of the classification of the sciences. He concedes "that the divisions established for the convenience of scientific pursuit are radically artificial," [28] a concept defended and enlarged upon by Small.[29]

Notwithstanding its difficulties, it is necessary in order to gain that perspective which is able to satisfy the "craving of our understanding" and to establish that "Prevision" which is the basis of intelligent "Action." But however utilitarian science may be, it can be established only by its pursuit for its own sake. Two propositions are therefore laid down in order to prescribe the field: *"First,* that science being composed of speculative knowledge and of practical knowledge, we have to deal only with the first; and *Second,* that Theoretical knowledge, or science properly so called, being divided into general or particular, or abstract and concrete science, we have again to deal only with the first." [30]

Mathematics, Comte considers as "less a constituent part of natural philosophy than as . . . the true basis of the whole of natural philosophy. . . . To us it is less value for the knowledge of which it consists . . . than as being the most powerful instrument that the human mind can employ in the investigation of the laws of natural phenomena. . . . Therefore must Mathematics hold the first place in the hierarchy of the sciences, and be the point of departure of all Education whether general or special." [31]

"The true principle of classification" of the specific sciences according to Comte is one of dependence. "All observable phenomena may be included within a very few natural categories, so arranged as

[27] *Positive Philosophy,* pp. 32-36.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. 31.
[29] *Cf. The Meaning of Social Science.*
[30] *Positive Philosophy,* p. 41.
[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 49-50.

that the study of each category may be grounded on the principal laws of the preceding, and serve as the basis of the next ensuing. This order is determined by the degree of simplicity, or, what comes to the same thing, of generality of phenomena. Hence results their successive dependence, and the greater or less facility for being studied."

"We are first struck by the clear division of all natural phenomena into two classes—of inorganic and organic bodies."

"Each of these great halves of natural philosophy has sub-divisions. Inorganic physics must, in accordance with our rule of generality and the order of dependence of phenomena, be divided into two sections—of celestial and terrestrial phenomena. Thus we have Astronomy, geometrical and mechanical, and Terrestrial Physics."

"In the same manner, we find a natural division of Terrestrial Physics into two, according as we regard bodies in their mechanical or their chemical character. Hence we have Physics, properly so called, and Chemistry."

"An analogous division arises in the other half of Natural Philosophy—the science of organized bodies . . . Physiology, properly so called, and Social Physics, which is dependent on it."

"Thus we have before us Five fundamental Sciences in successive dependence Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and finally Social Physics. The first considers the most general, simple, abstract, and remote phenomena known to us, and those which affect all others without being affected by them. The last considers the most particular, compound, concrete phenomena, and those which are the most interesting to Man. Between these two, the degrees of speciality, of complexity, and individuality are in regular proportion to the place of the respective sciences in the scale exhibited. This—casting out everything arbitrary—we must regard as the true filiation of the sciences; and in it we find the plan of this work." [32]

The practical defense of this "filiation" is based upon the procedure in the parts of each science, in the spontaneous development of the separate branches of natural philosophy, and it marks the precision and relative perfection of the sciences. Comte injects a caution here, which is presented in view of the type of criticism to which his work has often been subjected: "We must beware of confounding the degree of precision which we are able to attain in regard to any science, with the certainty of the science itself. The certainty of science, and our precision in the knowledge of it, are two very different things which have

[32] *Positive Philosophy*, pp. 44-6.

been too often confounded; and are so still, though less than formerly. If the different sciences offer to us a varying degree of precision, it is from no want of certainty in themselves, but of our mastery of their phenomena." [33]

Critics have called attention repeatedly to the omission of Psychology from Comte's category of sciences. This is an omission only in name. He repudiated the psychology or "ideology" of the French, German, and Scotch schools based upon the method of "interior observation" as metaphysical in character and therefore inadmissible among objective sciences. Gall, he believed, had "fully and clearly exposed the powerlessness of metaphysical methods for the study of intellectual and moral phenomena," without himself having arrived at genuinely scientific results, but he had indicated the necessary procedure by which phrenological physiology could become a science.[34]

"Referring to the first ideas of philosophical common sense, it is at once evident that no function can be studied but with relation to the organ that fulfills it, or to the phenomena of its fulfillment: and, in the second place, that the affective functions, and yet more the intellectual, exhibit in the latter respect this particular characteristic,—that they cannot be observed during their operation, but only in their results,—more or less immediate, and more or less durable." [35]

"The practical point for the future is that strong minds, prepared by a suitable scientific education, should plant themselves on the two great principles which have been laid down as the foundation of the science, and thence explore the principal needs of cerebral physiology, and the character of the means by which it may be carried forward." [36]

"Nothing, therefore, can absolve the phrenologists from the obligation to pursue the analysis of the cerebral system by a series of vigorous anatomical labors, discarding for the time, all ideas of function, or, at most employing them only as auxiliary to anatomical exploration." [37]

"Phrenological analysis has, then, to be reconstituted; first in the anatomical, and then in the physiological order; and finally, the two must be harmonized; and not till then can phrenological physiology be established on its true scientific basis. . . . The extreme imperfection of phrenological science is manifest in the pride with which Man, from the height of his supremacy, judges the animals as a despot judges

[33] *Positive Philosophy*, pp. 47-8.
[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 382-3.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 283.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 391.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 392.

his subjects; that is, in the mass, without perceiving any inequality in them worth noticing. It is not the less certain that, surveying the whole animal hierarchy, the principal orders of this hierarchy sometimes differ more from each other, in intellectual and moral respects, than the highest of them vary from the human type. The rational study of the mind and the ways of animals has still to be instituted,—nothing having yet been done in the way of preparation. It promises an ample harvest of important discovery directly applicable to the advancement of the study of Man, if only the naturalists will disregard the declamation of theologians and metaphysicians about their pretended degradation of human nature, while they are, on the contrary, rectifying the fundamental notion of it by establishing, rigorously and finally, the profound differences which positively separate us from the animals nearest to us in the scale." [38]

Thus while Comte did not assign this branch of scientific inquiry to a separate category, leaving it as a department of biology, he nevertheless divorced it from metaphysics and thereby became one of the founders of the modern science of physiological or functional psychology —a service for which he has received scant recognition.

Incidentally, two observations based upon this objective interpretation of psychology deserve more than passing notice. First, his definition of intelligence "as the aptitude to modify conduct in conformity to the circumstances of each case," [39] is with little modification accepted by the best modern psychologists, and second, his interpretation of insanity "that the phenomena of the pathological state are a simple prolongation of the phenomena of the normal state, beyond the ordinary limits of variation" and "that it is impossible to understand anything of the different kinds of madness, if they are not examined on this principle" has freed the subject of the theological interpretation of "demoniacal possession" and has became the modern basis of the "theory and treatment of mental alienation." [40]

SOCIAL PHYSICS

Having established the law of the three stages and the filiation of the sciences, having shown the need for Social Physics to round out and complete the series of positive sciences, and having surveyed the

[38] *Positive Philosophy,* pp. 394-5.
[39] *Ibid.,* p. 386.
[40] *Ibid.,* pp. 394-5.

progress so far attained in the several departments as a basis for further achievement, Comte next proceeds to discuss the new science of society. It cannot be described for it does not exist except in potentiality. It is possible, however, to demonstrate its necessity and opportuneness, to disclose its destination, to exhibit its methods of procedure, and to coördinate its theory and practice. This constitutes the program of Book VI of *The Positive Philosophy,* only the main features of which can here be presented.

Necessity and Opportuneness of Sociology

"The theories of Social science are still, even in the minds of the best thinkers, completely implicated with the theologico-metaphysical philosophy; and are even supposed to be, by a fatal separation from all the other sciences, condemned to remain so involved forever." [41]

To destroy this error and to place social interpretation upon a rational basis a whole new order of scientific conceptions in regard to the social process must be created.

"It is not to be expected that this new science can be at once raised to a level with even the most imperfect of those which we have been reviewing. All that can be rationally proposed in our day is to recognize the character of positivity in social as in all other science, and to ascertain the chief bases on which it is founded; but this is enough, as I hope to show, to satisfy our most urgent intellectual necessities, and even the most imperative needs of our immediate social practise." [42]

The first prerequisite to the creation of such a science is the reconciliation of the concepts of Order and Progress which philosophers and statesmen have assumed to stand in opposition. "Both are indispensable conditions in a state of modern civilization. . . . No real order can be established, and still less can it last, if it is not fully compatible with progress; and no great progress can be accomplished if it does not tend to the consolidation of order. Therefore, in positive social science, the chief feature must be the union of these two conditions, which will be two aspects, constant and inseparable, of the same principle. Throughout the whole range of science, thus far, we have seen that the conditions of combination and of progress are originally identical: and I trust we shall see, after looking into social science in the same way, that

[41] *Positive Philosophy,* p. 399.
[42] *Ibid.,* p. 399.

ideas of Order and Progress are in Social Physics, as rigorously inseparable as the ideas of Organization and Life in Biology; from whence in deed they are, in a scientific view, evidently derived." [43]

A practical difficulty arises from the fact that "the different classes of society range themselves on the one side or on the other, according to their inclination to conservatism or amelioration." [44]

This is an excellent psychological analysis of the condition everywhere exhibited in the antagonistic alignments of conservatives and progressives and of the extremes to which these attitudes give rise; the party of Order accusing the party of Progress as being radical, revolutionary, bolshevist, while the party of Progress charges the party of Order as being "standpat," retrogressive and reactionary.

It is the business of social science, then, to eliminate this anarchy both in theory and practice. "As to its operation upon Order, it is plain that true science has no other aim than the establishment of intellectual order, which is the basis of every other." [45] This demonstrably has been the function of science in every domain of natural phenomena and will be welcomed with the same eagerness here when once its positive spirit shall be understood."

There is even greater certainty concerning the relation of social science to Progress. "In all its applications, the positive spirit is directly progressive: its express office being to increase our knowledge, and perfect the connection of its parts." [46] Progress in dealing with natural phenomena in every other sphere has been conditioned by the prevision which science has established. Social science, then, is the antidote to irrational and fantastic schemes of social amelioration and the essential prerequisite to intelligent social advance.

The reasons for the undeveloped state of social science, therefore, are not in its impossibility nor in its inopportuneness. They reside in certain inherent difficulties. First is "the complex and special nature of social phenomena" which presents the greatest difficulty of scientific organization. Two prerequisites conditioned its development; the perfection of the sciences dealing with simpler phenomena and the development of "cerebral physiology," by which a rational approach could be made to the phenomena of human behavior. Second, "we have not till now been in possession of a range of facts wide enough to disclose

[43] *Positive Philosophy*, p. 401.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 402.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 432.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 434.

the natural laws of social phenomena." [47] These conditions are now being fulfilled sufficiently to establish its possibility and its expectation.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POSITIVE METHOD

While the procedure of science consists primarily in its method, the method is inseparable from the material described.

"The scientific spirit is radically distinguished from the theological and metaphysical by the steady subordination of the imagination to observation; and though the positive philosophy offers the vastest and richest field to human imagination, it restricts it to discovering and perfecting the coördination of observed facts, and the means of effecting new researches: and it is this habit of subjecting scientific conceptions to the facts whose connection has to be disclosed, which is above all things necessary to introduce into social researches." [48]

Absolute and Relative Concepts

"If we contemplate the positive spirit in relation to scientific conception, rather than the mode of procedure we shall find that this philosophy is distinguished from the theologico-metaphysical by its tendency to render relative the ideas which were at first absolute. This inevitable passage from the absolute to the relative is one of the most important philosophical results of each of the intellectual revolutions which has carried on every kind of speculation from the theological or metaphysical to the scientific state. In a scientific view, this contrast between the relative and the absolute may be regarded as the most decisive manifestation of the antipathy between the modern philosophy and the ancient. All investigations into the nature of beings and their first and final causes, must always be absolute; whereas the study of the laws of phenomena must be relative, since it supposes a continuous progress of speculation subject to the gradual improvement of observation, without the precise reality being ever fully disclosed." [49]

Failing to grasp this principle of relativity men assumed a power to modify phenomena at will at a time when they possessed the least power because of their ignorance of natural law. This was particularly true in regard to social and political action. It survives in modern attempts to regenerate human nature by law.

[47] *Positive Philosophy*, p. 439.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 452.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 453.

"Introducing into the study of social phenomena the same positive spirit which has regenerated every other branch of human speculation" we arrive at rational procedures through the discovery of the limits prescribed by their nature. "Prevision of social phenomena supposes first, that we have abandoned the regions of metaphysical idealities, to assume the ground of observed realities by a systematic subordination of imagination to observation; secondly, that political conceptions have ceased to be absolute, and have become relative to the variable state of civilization, so that theories, following the natural course of facts, may admit of our foreseeing them; and, thirdly, that permanent political action is limited by determinate laws, since, if social events are always exposed to disturbance by the accidental intervention of the legislator, human or divine, no scientific prevision of them would be possible." [50]

STATIC AND DYNAMIC CONCEPTS

Comte next proceeds to subdivide the laws of social physics into social Statics, an analysis of the principle of social order, and social Dynamics, a like analysis of the principles of social progress.

"The statical study of sociology consists in the investigation of the laws of action and reaction of the different parts of the social system—apart, for the occasion, from the fundamental movement which is always gradually modifying them." [51]

In his *social statics* we have a theory of social equilibration, the law being "that there must always be a spontaneous harmony between the whole and the parts of the social system, the elements of which must inevitably be, sooner or later, combined in a mode entirely conformable to their nature. It is evident that not only must political institutions and social manners on the one hand, and manners and ideas on the other, be always mutually connected; but, further, that this consolidated whole must be always connected, by its nature, with the corresponding state of the integral development of humanity, considered in all its aspects, of intellectual, moral, and physical activity." [52]

In the elaboration of this doctrine we find profound insight into social processes mingled with crudities of observation. We may agree with Ward, that his views "of the relations of women to society are

[50] *Positive Philosophy,* pp. 455-6.
[51] *Ibid.,* p. 457.
[52] *Ibid.,* p. 459.

simply execrable" [53] without detracting from the merit of his general analysis. The backwardness of anthropological science, and the fact that the evolutionary method of investigation had not yet been applied to social institutions may be sufficient explanation for such palpable errors.

Comte discards as utterly untenable "the utilitarian origin of society." First, because the new "cerebral theory" locates the social impulses in man's nature and not in utilitarian considerations, and second, because of the perception that "utility did not, and could not, manifest itself till after a long preparatory development of the society which it was supposed to have created. . . . It is thus evident that the social state would never have existed if its rise had depended on a conviction of its individual utility, because the benefit could never have been anticipated by individuals of any degree of ability, but could only manifest itself after the social evolution had proceeded up to a certain point." [54] In other words, there must always exist an equilibration between man and his social environment.

Not only does society originate in human nature but so likewise do all social institutions, thus guaranteeing a fundamental harmony in their evolution. Marriage originates in natural impulses, "and like every other human concern, undergoes modification as human development proceeds." [55] "The constitution of the human family has undergone modifications of a progressive kind which appear to me to disclose, at each epoch of development, the exact importance of the change wrought in the corresponding social state." [56]

Political order, likewise, depends upon "the elementary tendency of all human society to a spontaneous government," [57] and there is therefore a "general correspondence between the political *régime* and the contemporary state of civilization. . . . The relative point of view, substituted for the absolute tendency of the ordinary theories, certainly constitutes the chief scientific character of the positive philosophy in its political application." [58]

"It follows from this attribute that there can be no scientific study of society, either in its conditions or its movements, if it is separated into portions, and its divisions are studied apart." [59]

[53] *Op. cit.*, p. 30.
[54] *Positive Philosophy*, p. 498.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 504.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 503.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 514.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 460.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 462.

We turn next to the consideration of *social dynamics*. "Though the statical view of society is the basis of sociology, the dynamical view is not only the more interesting of the two, but the more marked in its philosophical character from its being more distinguished from biology by the master-thought of continuous progress, or rather, of the gradual development of humanity." [60]

"The true general spirit of social dynamics then consists in conceiving of each of these consecutive social states as the necessary results of the preceding, and the indispensable mover of the following, according to the axiom of Leibnitz—*the present is big with the future*. In this view, the object of science is to discover the laws which govern this continuity, and the aggregate of which determines the course of human development. In short, social dynamics studies the laws of succession, while social statics inquires into those of coexistence; so that the use of the first is to furnish the true theory of progress to political practice, while the second performs the same service in regard to order." [61]

"In all times and places, the ordinary course of our brief individual life has disclosed certain remarkable modifications which have occurred, in various ways, in the social state. . . . Now it is the slow, continuous accumulation of these successive changes which gradually constitutes the social movement. . . . The only question is about the constant subjection of these great dynamical phenomena to invariable natural laws, a proposition about which there is no question to any one who takes his stand on positive philosophy. It is easy, however, to establish, from any point of view, that the successive modifications of society have always taken place in a determinate order, the rational explanation of which is already possible in so many cases that we may confidently hope to recognize it ultimately in all the rest. . . . Since, then, the existence of the social movement is unquestionable, on the one hand, and, on the other, the succession of social states is never arbitrary, we can not but regard this continuous phenomenon as subject to natural laws as positive as those which govern all other phenomena, though more complex." [62]

Two time-worn theories formerly employed are shown to be inadequate. "It is evident that it is on the ground of social science that the great conflict must soon terminate which has gone on for three cen-

[60] *Positive Philosophy*, p. 463.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 464.
[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 464-5.

turies between the positive and the theologico-metaphysical spirit. Banished forever from all other classes of speculation, in principle at least, the old philosophies now prevail in social science alone; and it is from this domain that they have to be excluded, by the conception of the social movement being subject to invariable natural laws, instead of to any will whatever" and "in accordance with the principles laid down at the beginning of this work, we have already seen, in various signal instances, that the chief progress of each period, and even of each generation, was a necessary result of the immediately preceding state; so that the men of genius, to whom such progression has been too exclusively attributed, are essentially only the proper organs of a predetermined movement, which would, in their absence, have found other issues. We find a verification of this in history, which shows that various eminent men were ready to make the same great discovery at the same time, while the discovery required only one organ." [63]

It is impracticable here to follow Comte through the description of the various dynamic factors of social change. A mere mention of them must suffice. They are: the action of man upon his physical environment, effects of climate, race, and political action, and duration of human life, increase of population, the order of evolution as effected by the progress of the human mind, the direction of evolution and the rate of progress.[64]

MEANS OF INVESTIGATION

In each of the prior sciences included in his category Comte discusses the procedure of investigation which he subdivides into, first, the direct means, or a study of the material of the specific science by Observation, Experiment and Comparison, and, second, the indirect means, arising from the relation of the particular science with those which precede or follow in the order of their filiation. He now applies these methods to social science. The first question is, then, how far and with what precision may the direct means be employed in sociology?

1. *Observation.* It is obvious that necessity for rational observation increases with the complexity of the facts and even greater danger will arise in social research than elsewhere in the perversion of facts or in drawing erroneous conclusions from observations. Nothing will be gained, however, in surrendering the attempt. The difficulties consti-

[63] *Positive Philosophy,* pp. 465-6.
[64] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 515-40.

tute a perpetual challenge and with better trained observers equipped with improved methods, as has been the case in the development of all other sciences, the errors will tend to disappear. Explored by competent investigators "according to a rational view of co-existence and succession, social phenomena no doubt admit of much more varied and extensive means of investigation than phenomena of less complexity. In this view, it is not only the immediate inspection or direct description of events that affords useful means of positive exploration; but the consideration of apparently insignificant customs, the appreciation of various kinds of monuments, the analysis and comparison of languages and a multitude of other resources." [65]

2. *Experiment.* The assumption that this method is inapplicable to social science arises from the failure to perceive that experiments are none the less valuable because they are not "artificially instituted." "Whether the case be natural or factitious, experimentation takes place whenever the regular course of the phenomena is interfered with in any determinate manner. The spontaneous nature of the alteration has no effect on the scientific value of the case, if the elements are known. It is in this sense that experimentation is possible in Sociology." [66]

In the field of social science, with the aid which history and contemporary observation afford, a very small amount of research will usually disclose experiments already made and ready at hand for the investigation of the social student.

3. *Comparison.* There are three types of comparison that are particularly applicable, and of the utmost importance, to sociology. First, by comparing human with animal societies we obtain the concept of the natural origin of social institutions. "There cannot be a stronger evidence of the natural character of the chief social relations." [67] Second, by viewing simultaneously the co-existing states of society in diverse locations we establish the principle "that the development of the human mind is uniform in the midst of all diversities of climate and even of race; such diversities having no effect upon anything more than the rate of progress." [68] Third, a comparison of consecutive stages is necessary to discover the order of succession or progress. When the diverse stages observable among different peoples are discovered to be successive in the history of a single people we are impressed by "the

[65] *Positive Philosophy,* p. 476.
[66] *Ibid.,* p. 477.
[67] *Ibid.,* p. 479.
[68] *Ibid.,* p. 480.

necessary influence of human generations upon the generations that follow, accumulating continuously till it constitutes the prepondering consideration in the direct study of social development." [69]

The second, or indirect means of investigation, "arises from the connection of sociology with other sciences." In all social investigations there are two considerations: man, or the agent of social phenomena, and the environment or medium in which the phenomena are developed. Sociology then "is subordinated to the whole of the organic philosophy, which discloses to us the laws of human nature, and . . . with the whole system of inorganic philosophy, which reveals to us the exterior conditions of human existence." [70]

"The whole social evolution of the race must proceed in entire accordance with biological laws; and social phenomena must always be founded on the necessary invariableness of the human organism. . . . No sociological view can therefore be admitted, at any stage of the science, or under any appearance of historical induction, that is contradictory to the known laws of human nature." [71]

It should be recalled here that Comte includes psychology within the range of the biological science and his reference to the "laws of human nature" involves both its biological and psychological foundations in the modern use of these terms.

In precisely the same sense sociology is subordinated to the inorganic sciences. "It is only by the inorganic philosophy that we can duly analyze the entire system of exterior conditions, chemical, physical and astronomical amidst which the social evolution proceeds, and by which its rate of progress is determined. Social phenomena can no more be understood apart from their environment than those of individual life." [72]

Comte enlarges upon the diverse factors of the physical environment which affect human progress in such a manner as to exhibit his familiarity with Montesquieu's theories, but points out the additional fact, of supreme importance, that man's modification of his environment which constitutes the chief factor of his material progress and of continuous social evolution is likewise based upon his increasing knowledge of the physical sciences.

The preparation required for competent social investigation, there-

[69] *Positive Philosophy*, p. 481.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 486.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 487.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 489.

fore, includes not only a familiarity with the methods directly applicable to social material, but also a knowledge of all the anterior sciences upon which the science of sociology is built. "Such discipline as this may be difficult, but it is indispensable. It is the only preparatory education which can introduce the positive spirit into the formation of social theories." [73]

"Social science must always remain inferior in all important speculative respects to all the other fundamental sciences. Yet we cannot but feel, after this review of its spirit, its function, and its resources, that the abundance of its means of investigation may establish it in a higher position of rationality than the present state of the human mind might seem to promise." [74]

We cannot bring this chapter to a close more appropriately perhaps than by appending an estimate of Comte by Ward, who, conscious of the defects of the system yet grasps adequately its significance as one of the truly great contributions to the development of social theory. After having surveyed the Positive Philosophy in some detail, and having compared it with the achievements of others he says: "Comte's system, on the contrary, is truly a system. It really seeks to coördinate the sciences. It makes a bold and gigantic stride across the whole field, and, allowing for certain defects, which have for the most part been pointed out in the previous chapter, it realizes more nearly than anything that had preceded it the ideal of a true philosophy.

But with Comte the data were still very deficient. His laborious life rendered it impossible for him to acquaint himself with the known facts of his time. The details of his system are, consequently, very imperfect—often, as already shown, erroneous. His great service, therefore, was to lay out the general scheme, and sketch the most comprehensive and fundamental laws. The best-founded charge that has been or can be made against it is that it was crude. A universal philosophy had been founded. It remained to be improved and perfected." [75]

[73] *Positive Philosophy*, p. 492.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 497.
[75] *Op. cit.*, pp. 141-2.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. In what respects did Montesquieu pioneer the way for Comte? Make a list of suggestions. *Cf.* Comte, *Positive Philosophy,* pp. 442-4.
2. Is it possible to reconcile Condorcet's theory of the progress of the human intellect with the latest theories of evolution? *Cf.* E. G. Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution,* Ch. VI.
3. In what respects was the work of Saint-Simon an advance over that of Condorcet, and what are the main ideas which he set forth that were developed by Comte?
4. Compare John Stuart Mill's logical defense of "social science" with that of Comte, noting particularly his doctrine of determinism. *Cf., Inductive Logic,* Book VI, Ch. I-VI.
5. Compare Comte's concept of "cerebral physiology" with modern developments in psychology. *Cf.* H. H. Goddard, *The Psychology of the Normal and Sub-Normal,* Part I; also, Maurice Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior,* Ch. VI-XIV.
6. Discuss Comte's explanation of insanity in the light of ancient and modern interpretations of this phenomenon.
7. What light is thrown upon Comte's explanation of the conflict of progressive and conservative ideas by S. N. Patten, in his theory of the Pain and Pleasure economy? *Cf. The Theory of Social Forces.*
8. What are the elements of Comte's theory of society which may be regarded as stimulating the application of the historic method in the study of human social institutions?
9. Compare the training necessary to the scientific study of society as proposed by Comte with that of Spencer. *Cf. The Study of Sociology,* Ch. XIII-XV.
10. Formulate a statement of Comte's conception of society as a "Social Organism" from a careful study of *Positive Philosophy,* Book VI, Ch. V, and compare this with Spencer's, in *Principles of Sociology,* Vol. I, Part II. What similarities are to be found?
11. Discuss the importance attached to "Classification" by Comte and

evaluate its importance to the scientific method. *Cf.* A. W. Small, *General Sociology,* pp. 65-74.

12. Study the summaries of Comte's influence on the development of social theory in L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation,* pp. 26-8, and E. S. Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought,* Ch. XIII, especially p. 225. Make a similar summary of your own.

CHAPTER XI

DARWIN AND EVOLUTION

SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND

IN the preceding discussions we have become familiar with the dynamic concept, or theory of progress. Increasingly among the later writers, Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte, this view became established. The static concept of an originally perfect world was no longer adequate nor indeed tenable. But while movement was obvious, the processes and regularities of progressive change remained to be analyzed and described and constituted the challenge of all thinking minds. This collective achievement, together with its immediate bearing upon social theory, must now be surveyed.

Two phases required demonstration before the applicability of the theory of evolution to social science could be perceived. First, man's place in nature had to be discovered and demonstrated. Unless man is a product of the organic process, organic laws do not apply to him, and he remains forever outside the domain of organic science. This aspect of the problem was solved by Charles Darwin in his theory of organic evolution and his demonstration of man's position in the organic series. Second, the universality of the process throughout the entire domain of human observation and experience required demonstration if the phenomena of man's collective life were to be included within the scientific purview. This was the achievement of Herbert Spencer in his theory of universal evolution.

The theory of evolution itself was an evolution. The chief incidents of this process, as it concerns Darwin and organic evolution, together with its more conspicuous early applications, constitute the material of this chapter.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Since the procedure of science in generalization from facts, a brief survey of the materials and methods of quantitative analysis seem necessary to the proper understanding of its application to social data.

The gathering of facts, even social facts, is not new. Aristotle collected historical and contemporaneous material from which he deduced the theory of the social nature of man. Early national compilations, however, in Egypt, Judea, China, Persia, and later in Greece and Rome, were based upon practical political considerations of taxation and military service. The Domesday Survey of William of Normandy in 1088, the Inventory of the crown states in Sicily by Frederic II in 1241, and the seventy-five questions of Philip II in 1575 are still later samples of similar type. They contain much sociological material but no scientific deductions were made.

The impulse for securing more accurate and extensive descriptive data Meitzen declares to have been the result of the "remarkably rapid transformation of medieval society into the form of the modern state," and to the needs of modern diplomacy "with its fabric of distrustful mutual observation. The key to success was cautious, considerate judgment, based on the best attainable information as to one's own military, financial, and political resources, and those of other powers." [1] Jean Bodin, in *The Republic,* voiced the need for the "reinstatement of the Roman census as an adjunct of the police power" and for other practical political purposes.[2]

The first systematic work of this character was the *Cosmographia* published by Sebastian Muenster in 1544. It was a historical and descriptive treatise on the geography, history, manners, and customs, industries, commerce, political and ecclesiastical organization and military strength of all known countries. This pretentious work, together with a similar treatise by Giovanni Botero in 1589, furnished the basis of the first lectures on statistics by Hermann Conring in the University of Helmstedt in 1660 and published first in 1668. In these lectures, Conring not only employed the method of comparison but established causal connections among the phenomena described.

In 1662 Captain John Graunt presented to the newly founded Royal Society a remarkable analysis of the vital statistics of London from 1629 to 1661. The work was entitled, *Natural and Political Observations upon the Bills of Mortality, chiefly with Reference to the Government, Religion, Trade, Growth, Air, Diseases, etc., of the City of London.* It was a serious attempt to arrive at scientific inductions from population statistics. He discovered that deaths due to certain diseases and even accidents "bear a constant proportion unto the whole

[1] *History, Theory and Technique of Statistics,* p. 19.
[2] *Cf. ibid.,* p. 25.

number of burials"; that the ratio of births to deaths is uniform; that there is a constancy in the number of abortions and still-births; that the death rate varies by seasons; that the sexes are relatively equal in number, 14 male births to 13 female; that war and pestilence do not disturb this ratio; that of every 100 persons born, 36 die in the first 6 years and in the succeeding decades, 24, 15, 9, 6, 5, 4, 2 and 1, respectively.[3]

The value of Graunt's work was not in the accuracy of his conclusions but in the method employed; a beginning had been made in the inductive use of quantitative data.

This work was supplemented in 1693 by the English astronomer, Edmund Halley, in similar calculations which he made from tables of "Births and Funerals" in the City of Breslaw. In a study based on the age of persons at the time of death he determined "how many of a certain number, born in a given year, will die or survive in each succeeding year." By this method he was able to construct mortality tables as a basis for life insurance. Of this Giddings says: "This was the first true inductive generalization of law in the realm of social phenomena."[4]

The work of Süssmilch, 1741, and Achenwall, 1772, and their followers, systematized and broadened the field of statistical inquiry until it came to include the general subjects of Population, Agriculture, Commerce, Taxes, in fact all the general problems of civilization.

THE MOTIVE FOR INDUCTIVE RESEARCH

In every conspicuous achievement the motive is no less important than the method. It has been pointed out that the new statescraft emphasized the need for data upon which to formulate practical political programs, the effect of which was to create "Bureaus of Statistics" in the various countries. This was especially true in the period following the French Revolution.

Even prior to this time, however, the social upheaval incident to the Industrial Revolution had created social and economic problems of a far-reaching character. The production and distribution of wealth, the growth of population, the increase of poverty, the burden of taxation, and similar problems demanded consideration or solution

[3] *Cf.* Meitzen, *op. cit.*, p. 30; also Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Ch. VI.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

not by the old method of apriori assumptions, but upon inductive conclusions based upon ascertainable facts.

A further, by no means unimportant motive for inductive investigation, was supplied by philosophy. In this field Hume was perhaps the greatest contributor. It is doubtful whether any essay ever written produced so profound an influence in stimulating inductive work as the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.* The great Scotch philosopher launched effectively the doctrine of skepticism, or more properly, to use its current equivalent, scientific criticism. He pointed out the fact that human knowledge does not possess the degree of certainty popularly attributed to it. Experience is the only guide to reason, but neither reason nor observation are infallible. In challenging the certainty of knowledge and the infallibility of experience he established the theory of probability.

A "fact" for science is a generalization from experience. Preponderance of evidence gives a high degree of probability, while universal experience creates the concept of certainty. It is the business of science to test all knowledge by this criterion, and this method must be employed in every sphere where conclusions are involved. The only procedure by which a reasonable degree of certainty can be established is by continued scientific observation and experiment.[5]

Thus the method of drawing inferences from facts, and of the constructive criticism of both the inferences and the facts, received added impulse from both practical and theoretical sources. Conditions were favorable, therefore, and the time was ripe for generalizations of conspicuous character based upon inductive investigation in a wide range of subjects.

Two outstanding contributions of this character to social interpretation at this period should be noted with special reference to the epoch-making work of Darwin.

ADAM SMITH

Adam Smith was born at Kirkcaldy, Scotland, June 5, 1723. At the age of fourteen he entered the University of Glasgow, and three years later he went to Balliol College, Oxford, where he remained six years. In 1858 he lectured on English literature at Edinburgh, where he began his long and intimate friendship with Hume. In 1751 he became professor of Logic at Glasgow and later in the same year Professor

[5] *Cf. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* Sec. IX, Part II.

of Moral Philosophy which included Natural Theology, Ethics, Jurisprudence and Politics. In 1764, at the age of 40, he left the university and devoted the remainder of his life to travel, study, writing, and public service. His two great works were his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *The Wealth of Nations,* published respectively in 1759 and 1776. It is with the latter that we are concerned. He held the public position of Commissioner of Customs at Edinburgh from 1778 until his death in 1790. Among other numerous friends besides Hume, whom he regarded as "by far the most illustrious philosopher and historian of the present age," [6] may be mentioned Turgot and Voltaire.

The Wealth of Nations

The *Wealth of Nations* was a treatise of economic research of great breadth which required ten years of painstaking labor to complete. Our interest centers not in its economic doctrines, but in its method. The association of economics and politics with moral philosophy indicates the earlier method of approach. Moreover, the current philosophy of nation-building was that one nation gained at the expense of another. From a wide range of observation and a study of economic philosophy Smith deduced the theory that personal interest or the desire of men to improve their condition constituted the urge that led to social well-being and prosperity. Hence his inquiry extended into the "Nature and causes" of the wealth of nations.

It is not assumed that Smith's ideas were entirely original. He was a product of the main tendencies of the times. He derived many of his views from the Physiocrats and other prior writers. What is original is his synthetic grasp of the human problem of making a living collectively, and his method of deriving a description of the process from an inductive survey of the entire field. He studied the vast workshop of the world, unified by the common human desire for self-improvement, and diversified by the division of labor as the means of personal and collective accomplishment, and deduced his conclusions. Success is relative to such factors as: The skill, dexterity and judgment of laborers; the portion of the population productively employed; the conditions of climate, soil, and the extent of the territory; the amount of capital employed in relation to labor. Nations are better or worse supplied according to the greater or smaller proportion of their wealth to the number of those who consume it.

[6] Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines,* p. 53.

Thus it was his positive method of investigation which transformed economic philosophy into economic science. While he does not fulfill all the conditions of such a science, his theory of *adaptation* or the equilibration of society with its economic environment constitutes the basis of modern economic theory and determines the course and method of future inductive research. Without exaggeration it may safely be asserted that the *Wealth of Nations* is the original and classic generalization of law in the field of economic science.[7]

THOMAS R. MALTHUS

Thomas Robert Malthus was born at Surrey, England, Feb. 14, 1766. His father, Daniel Malthus, was a country gentleman of scholarly tastes, who numbered Hume and other literary and scientific men among his firiends, and was the executor of Rousseau. As the youngest son of the family, Thomas was trained for the ministry, entering Jesus College, Cambridge, at the age of 19. In 1897 he was elected to a fellowship in his college, took holy orders and settled in a small parish in Surrey, dividing his time with the University. In 1798, he published anonymously his famous Essay on the *Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society.* The storm of criticism which it provoked caused him to enter more deeply into the science of the subject, spending three years on the continent in further research. In 1803 he published, over his own signature, an enlarged and revised edition with a slightly changed title: *An Essay on the Principle of Population, or A View of its Present Effects on Human Happiness.* In 1805 he was appointed professor of History and Political Economy at the college founded by the East India Company at Haileyburg, Hertfordshire, where he taught and wrote until his death in 1834.

The Principle of Population

The twenty-two years which had elapsed since the publication of the *Wealth of Nations* had added little to economic theory, but great changes had taken place in economic conditions. The rapid transition to the factory system had resulted in wide dislocation of labor. Manufacturing was succeeding agriculture as the leading industry. Dispossessed through enclosure of land for wool-growing, the peasants

[7] *Cf.* Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations;* also Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines,* pp. 50-118.

flocked into the rapidly growing cities. Many were unable to find work and poverty with its attendant misery increased by leaps and bounds. All writers agree, however, that the economic improvement in the lot of the great mass of the people, as a result of the industrial revolution, was accompanied by rapid increase in population. Problems of population and poverty became, therefore, the foci of attention among social thinkers, and conditions of human welfare were pushed into the foreground along with, and distinctly bound up with, purely economic considerations.

Two writers had approached these questions from the philosophic point of view. Godwin, in his *Political Justice,* published in 1793, explains poverty as the result of the exploitation of labor for profit under government protection. He attacks the present system of private property as the source of inequality, intrigue, and injustice. Reason, freed from political interference and the domination of the spirit of gain, he regards as competent to produce an improved economic state in which production would be increased, profits curtailed, labor adequately compensated, and the general prosperity enhanced.

A serious objection to the establishment of such favorable conditions is "the excessive population that would ensue," to which he answers: "It would be truly absurd for us to shrink from a scheme of essential benefit to mankind, lest they should be too happy and by necessary consequence at some distant period too populous." [8]

To become frightened at the prospect of over population is "to foresee difficulties at a great distance. Three fourths of the habitable globe is now uncultivated. The parts already cultivated are capable of immeasurable improvement. Myriads of centuries of still increasing population may probably pass away, and the earth still be found sufficient for the subsistence of its inhabitants." [9]

His philosophic optimism solves the problem. He refers to the "sublime conjecture of Franklin, that 'mind will one day become omnipotent over matter'" and concludes that the men therefore who exist when the earth shall refuse itself to a more extended population, will cease to propagate, for they will no longer have any motive, either of error or duty, to induce them." [10]

Condorcet, in the *Historical View of the Progress of The Human Mind,* published in 1794, took similar ground. Assuming that im-

[8] *Political Justice,* p. 115.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 115.
[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 116 and 126.

provement in social welfare will accompany human perfectibility he raises the question, "Whether these principles of improvement and increase may not, by their continual operation, ultimately lead to degeneracy and destruction? Whether the number of inhabitants in the universe at length exceeding the means of existence, there will not result a continual decay of happiness, population, and a progress toward barbarism, or at least a sort of oscillation between good and evil?" [11] To this he answers that "such a period will be remote and before it arrives the progress of reason will have walked hand in hand with that of science. . . . That men will then know the duties they may be under relative to propagation will consist not in the question of giving *existence* to a greater number of beings, but *happiness* . . . and not the puerile idea of encumbering the earth with useless and wretched mortals." [12]

It was therefore to an inductive analysis of this problem that Malthus devoted himself in his *Principle of Population.* Researches in history and biology afforded ample ground for the refutation of hasty philosophic assumptions. General familiarity with Malthus' *Law* obviates the necessity of any detailed analysis. Two postulates are laid down, viz: "First, That food is necessary to the existence of man. Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain nearly in its present state." [13] The impulses of hunger and sex are essential to the maintenance of the individual and of the race. The elimination of either would mean the extinction of mankind. But in their gratification two diverse principles are discovered. The biological law of increase sets no limit to the multiplication of population. It tends to increase by a geometrical progression. On the other hand, space sets absolute limits and subsistence can be increased only by an arithmetic ratio. The two series, then, present striking difference in the rate of increase, as:

Geometric ratio	1	2	4	8	16	32	64	128	256	512
Arithmetic ratio	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

That population has the power to double in twenty-five years was not merely a deduction from biological law but was based upon actual population growth in the United States at the time Malthus wrote. Assuming any reasonable increase in food production the power of

[11] *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind,* p. 345.
[12] *Ibid.,* pp. 346-7. *Cf.* also Gide and List, *op. cit.,* pp. 121-22.
[13] *The Principle of Population,* p. 6.

population to increase is indefinitely greater and unless artificially checked the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence is inevitable, and that at no distant date.

The checks which hold population within the limits prescribed by subsistence according to Malthus are: First, *preventive,* due to foresight and to moral restraint in deferring or foregoing marriage. Basing his observations upon England, he concluded that this method was operative only in the upper economic groups, that it was not here extensive, and where practised was accompanied by vices "involving both sexes in inextricable unhappiness." [14] Second, *positive,* involving the destruction of surplus population through malnutrition, disease, pestilence, famine, war, in a word, "Misery and vice." This is less obvious, but none the less real, because it registers itself in the excessive death rate among the poor.[15]

Despite the bitter antagonism which Malthus' theory provoked at the time, and even in view of the contempt with which it has been regarded often by later writers, we nevertheless affirm that it constitutes one of the most brilliant inductive generalizations of the human mind. That he drew unwarranted conclusions from the principle does not destroy its validity. The fact that men navigate the air in heavier-than-air machines does not annihilate the law of gravity. Voluntary limitation of the birth rate on the one hand, and machine production on the other, have served merely to offset the tendency he described. They have not eliminated it.

It would be difficult perhaps to say in what field of science the work of Malthus has exerted the greatest influence. He created two great concepts, neither of which he named: "The law of diminishing returns" in Economics, and "The struggle for existence," in Biology, and set the standard for all demographic studies in sociology. We shall content ourselves with a reference to his influence upon Darwin.[16]

CHARLES DARWIN

Charles Robert Darwin, son of Robert Waring Darwin and grandson of Erasmus Darwin, was born at Shrewsbury, Feb. 12, 1809, the same year as Gladstone, Tennyson and Lincoln. His mother died when he was eight and the year following he was placed in a boarding school where he remained seven years. Of this experience he says:

[14] *Cf. The Principle of Population,* Ch. IV.
[15] *Ibid.,* Ch. V.
[16] *Cf.* Gide and Rist, *op. cit.,* pp. 120-37.

"Nothing could have been worse for the development of my mind than Dr. Butler's school, as it was strictly classical. . . . The school as a means of education to me was simply a blank."[17] In his autobiography he speaks repeatedly of his early passion for making collections of natural objects and of his love for out of door sports. At the age of fourteen his father sent him to Edinburgh University, with his brother, to study medicine. Showing no inclination to become a physician, his father removed him after two sessions, sending him to Cambridge to become a clergyman. His studies here were no more congenial. Because of his great fondness for natural science, however, he formed an intimate friendship with Henslow, the botanist and mineralogist, whom he declared had influenced his career more than any other man, and with Sedgwick the geologist, making numerous tours with them and joining in their work.

It was upon Henslow's recommendation and the advice of his uncle, Josiah Wedgwood, that he was appointed naturalist to Captain Fitz-Roy in his famous voyages of the *Beagle*. During this voyage, 1831 to 1836, Darwin assembled much of the data for his later scientific researches. Upon his return he resided for three and a half years in London, where he studied and wrote, and where he was associated with the leading literary and scientific men of the day, chief among whom were Lyell, Hooker, Huxley, Babbage and Carlyle.

In 1839 he married his cousin Emma Wedgwood, and soon after acquired a country property at Down where he spent the remainder of his life. He was possessed of ample fortune which enabled him to devote his entire life to scientific work. His ideal home life made possible his prodigious researches despite a feeble constitution and almost continuous illness. He died on April 19, 1882, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

"THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES" AND "THE DESCENT OF MAN"

It is assumed that modern students are sufficiently acquainted with *The Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man* to render even an outline of their contents unnecessary. We may therefore devote ourselves to a consideration of the immediate scientific background and then pass at once to the application of the principles to social thought.

The idea of evolution was by no means new. In the preceding chapters we have become familiar not merely with the concept but with

[17] *Life and Letters*, p. 29.

the term evolution. This was particularly true of Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte. But the concept was vague and included no principle of interpretation by which knowledge could be generalized. While the fact of unity and progress had been established the method remained to be discovered and demonstrated.

In 1850, Herbert Spencer, in his *Social Statics,* explained the familiar facts of human progress as a continuous process of adjustment to external conditions. Five years later he elaborated these views in his *Principles of Psychology,* in which he exhibited mental processes as initiated and directed by external stimuli, and in 1857 he published in the *Westminster Review* an essay entitled *Progress, Its Law and Cause,* in which he announced his theory of universal evolution—a cosmic process of equilibration of organism with environment.[18] The precise method by which this equilibration takes place Spencer did not see. Its discovery was the work of Darwin and his co-laborers.

For many years scientists had been dissatisfied with the traditional explanation of species as immutable productions separately created. In his historical sketch as an introduction to his *Origin of Species,* Darwin cites by name, and with brief excerpts, thirty-four writers who had arrived at the concept of an organic series; that species have undergone modification; that present organic structures have evolved from original primordial forms. The mystery still to be solved, however, was the process by which the series of progressive changes was effected.

Darwin had arrived at the concept of the gradual modification of species from the careful study of the material collected on the voyage of the *Beagle,* particularly that obtained from the Galapagos islands. He says: "The subject haunted me." He had arrived also at the idea of adaptation and had studied the problem of variation and selection of plants and animals under domestication. One mystery remained. How could selection occur among living organisms in a state of nature? In his autobiography he tells us how this important discovery was made. He says: "In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened to read for amusement 'Malthus on Population,' and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on from long continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favorable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavorable ones to be destroyed.

[18] *Cf.* Giddings, *Darwinism in the Theory of Social Evolution, Popular Science Monthly,* July, 1909, p. 75.

The result of this would be the formation of new species. Here, then, I had at last got a theory by which to work." [19]

Here, then, was the key to the mystery. Malthus had described the process of the struggle for existence, viz.: excess reproduction throughout the organic sphere and consequent destruction of the surplus. But Malthus had not perceived which ones would perish or by what principle destruction would be governed. This was Darwin's great discovery. Given variation as a universal process, accompanied by struggle due to excess of reproduction, the result will be the survival of the adaptable or the fit, through a process of natural selection.

With characteristic scientific modesty Darwin hesitated to publish his discovery until its satisfactory demonstration was completed. Not until 1842 did he permit himself to make even a "pencil" sketch of the theory. In 1856 Lyell advised him to write out his views fully. He had started upon an elaborate treatise, when, in the summer of 1858, he received from Alfred Russell Wallace, then working in the Malay Archipelago, an essay entitled: *On the Tendency of Varieties to depart indefinitely from the Original Type,* which contained the same identical theory of interpretation. Lyell and Hooker insisted that Darwin should publish an abstract of his manuscript, because of the independent origin of his work, in conjunction with Wallace's essay. At first he demurred but was persuaded in the interest of science, and the joint production appeared in the summer of 1858. Notwithstanding the general interest in the subject, this work attracted very little attention, the only "published notice" being one from Professor Houghton of Dublin, "whose verdict was that all that was new in them was false, and what was true was old." Whereupon Darwin remarked that "This shows how necessary it is that any new view should be explained at considerable length, in order to arouse public attention." Accordingly, in the fall of 1858, at the urgent advice of Lyell and Hooker, he abstracted the work begun in 1856, completed the survey and published it under the title of *The Origin of Species,* in November, 1859. This he justly regarded as the chief work of his life.[20]

Immediately the public mind was aroused. The creationist hypothesis was shaken to its foundations. It was now clear to thinking minds that the theological and metaphysical interpretations were superseded by what Comte had called the positive method. A new date in history had been fixed and 1859 was destined to be regarded as the

[19] *Life and Letters,* p. 68.
[20] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 69-70.

opening of the scientific era. The intellectual storm center, however, was the new interpretation of organic processes in the field of natural science. Few saw, in the beginning, the significance of the doctrine of natural selection in its relation to man or to the problem of social evolution. Darwin saw it and stated it in a paragraph in *The Origin of Species*. "In the future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be securely based on the foundation already well laid by Mr. Herbert Spencer, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history." [21] He explains that he added this statement, "in order that no honorable man should accuse me of concealing my views." [22]

He further explains his views with reference to their application to man as follows: "As soon as I had become in the year 1837 or 1838, convinced that species were mutable productions, I could not avoid the belief that man must come under the same law. Accordingly I collected notes on the subject for my own satisfaction, and not for a long time with any intention of publishing. . . . It would have been useless and injurious to the success of the book (*The Origin of Species*), to have paraded, without giving any evidence, my conviction with respect to his origin. But when I found that many naturalists fully accepted the doctrine of the evolution of species, it seemed to me advisable to work up such notes as I possessed, and to publish a special treatise on the origin of man." [23] Accordingly, the *Descent of Man* was published in February, 1871, and a second corrected edition in 1874.

The demonstration of organic evolution was now complete. It seems scarcely necessary to say that many of the details of the system were inaccurate and incomplete. Darwin was a pioneer in a field in which observation had not yet been corrected by modern tests of scientific accuracy. The work of Weissman, De Vries, Mendel, Galton and others, was required to correct errors of detail. Applications of the theory to human society were still to be made. But the general outline of the system had been laid down. Man's place in nature as an integral part of the organic series had been established. Man, considered either individually or collectively, was brought within the domain of science. As a part and product of nature, all the principles of

[21] *Origin of Species*, p. 473.
[22] *Life and Letters*, p. 76.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 75-6.

causation which operate in every other sphere are applicable to him. Henceforth, no system of human interpretation that does not rest upon this positive foundation can either be adequate or true.

This was Darwin's imperishable contribution to social theory.

APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY

Darwin did not extend his theory of natural selection into the field of social interpretation. His interest did not lie in that direction. It was sufficient for him to include man within the broad scope of organic law. The next logical step, that of applying the principle to collective human life, was yet to be taken. From among the many and varied efforts to accomplish this task we have selected for brief analysis three of his immediate successors, who have made conspicuous and lasting contributions to the application of Darwinism to social theory, as sufficient for our present purpose.

WALTER BAGEHOT

Walter Bagehot was born at Langport, Somersetshire, England, Feb. 3d, 1826. Four years after his graduation from University College, Oxford, in 1848, he was called to the bar, but chose to enter the banking business with his father. In 1858 he married the daughter of James Wilson, founder of the *London Economist* of which he soon became editor, a position which he held till his death, Mar. 24, 1877.

In his brilliant essay on *Darwinism in the Theory of Social Evolution,* Giddings says: "It was not until the publication of *The Descent of Man* in 1871, when controversy over *The Origin of Species* had raged through twelve years of intellectual tempest, that the full significance of natural selection for the doctrine of human progress was apprehended by the scientific world. Mr. Spencer saw it when *The Origin of Species* appeared. Mr. Darwin himself had perceived that he must offer a credible explanation of the paradox that a ruthless struggle for existence yields the peaceable fruits of righteousness. But it was neither Mr. Spencer, nor Mr. Darwin who first recognized the specific phase of the life struggle in which the clue to the mystery might be sought. The gifted thinker who made that discovery was Walter Bagehot, editor of the *London Economist,* whose little books on *Physics and Politics,* or *Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of Natural Selection and Inheritance to Political Society,*

was published first as a series of articles in *The Fortnightly Review,* beginning in November, 1867. Mr. Darwin rightly calls these articles 'remarkable.' Revised and put together in book form they made a volume of only two hundred and twenty-three small pages in large type, but no more original, brilliant, or, as far as it goes, satisfactory examination of the deeper problems of social causation has ever been offered from that day until now. It anticipated much that is most valuable in later exposition." [24]

Bagehot's contributions may be summarized under four headings:

1. The essential character of group struggle in contrast to the individual struggle in the progress mankind is undergoing.

"The progress of man requires the co-operation of men for its development. . . . The rudest sort of co-operative society, the lowest tribe and the feeblest government, is so much stronger than isolated man, that isolated man, if he ever existed in any shape which could be called man, might very easily have ceased to exist. The first principle of the subject is that man can only make progress in 'co-operative groups.'" [25]

2. The superiority of compact groups in the social struggle.

"Whatever may be said against the principle of 'natural selection' in other departments, there is no doubt of its predominance in early human history. The strongest killed out the weakest, as they could. And I need not pause to prove that any form of polity is more efficient than none." [26]

"In every particular state of the world, those nations which are strongest tend to prevail over the others; and in certain marked peculiarities the strongest tend to be the best.

"Within every particular nation the type or types of character then and there most attractive tend to prevail; and the most attractive, though with exceptions, is what we call the best character." [27]

"But why is one nation stronger than another? In the answer to that, I believe, lies the key to the principal progress of early civilization, and to some of the progress of all civilization." [28] "'There is,' it has been said, 'hardly any exaggerating the difference between civilized and uncivilized men; it is greater than the difference between a tame and a wild animal,' because man can improve more. But the

[24] *Op. cit.,* p. 76.
[25] *Physics and Politics,* pp. 212-13.
[26] *Ibid.,* p. 24.
[27] *Ibid.,* p. 43.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. 49.

difference at first was gained in much the same way. The taming of animals as it now goes on among savage nations, and as travelers who have seen it describe it, is a kind of selection. The most wild are killed when food is wanted, and the most tame and easy to manage kept. . . .

"Man, being the strongest of all animals, differs from the rest; he was obliged to be his own domesticator; he had to tame himself. And the way in which it happened was, that the most obedient, the tamest tribes are, at the first stage in the real struggle of life, the strongest and the conquerors. All are very wild then; the animal vigor, the savage virtue of the race has died out in none, and all have enough of it. But what makes one tribe—one incipient tribe, one bit of a tribe—to differ from another, is their relative faculty of coherence. The slightest symptom of legal development, the least indication of a military bond, is then enough to turn the scale. The compact tribes win, and the compact tribes are the tamest." [29]

"Similarly, the best institutions have a natural military advantage over bad institutions. The first great victory of civilization was the conquest of nations with ill defined families having legal descent through the mother only, by nations of definite families tracing descent through the father as well as the mother, or through the father only. . . . The nations with a thoroughly compact family system have 'possessed the earth,' that is, they have taken all the finest districts in the most competed-for parts; and the nations with loose systems have been merely left to mountain ranges and lonely islands. The family system and that in its highest form has been so exclusively the system of civilization, that literature hardly recognizes any other, and that, if it were not for the living testimony of a great multitude of scattered communities which are 'fashioned after the structure of the elder world,' we should hardly admit the possibility of something so contrary to all which we have lived amongst, and which we have been used to think of. After such an example of the fragmentary nature of the evidence it is in comparison easy to believe that hundreds of strange institutions may have passed away and have left behind them not only no memorial, but not even a trace or a vestige to help the imagination to figure what they were." [30]

3. The group making factor.

The organic processes of continuity and variation explain, in human society, the phenomena of both order and progress. The "tendency of

[29] *Physics and Politics*, pp. 50-52.
[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 215-16.

descendants to be like their progenitors" finds its psychic and social expression in the "Cake of Custom" [31] "This needful coöperation and this requisite likeness I believe to have been produced by one of the strongest yokes and the most terrible tyrannies ever known among men —the authority of 'customary law.'" [32]

"The fixed custom which public opinion alone tolerates is imposed on all minds, whether it suits them or not. . . . Only one check, one sole shield for life and good, is then possible:—usage." [33]

The most important single factor in the enforcement of custom or usage was the religion of fear, created in early man's reaction to a physical environment which he did not understand and of which he stood in awe. "At first sight it seems impossible to imagine what conceivable function such awful religions can perform in the economy of the world. And no one can fully explain them. But one use they assuredly had: They fixed the yoke of custom thoroughly on mankind. They were the prime agents of the era. They put upon a fixed law a sanction so fearful that no one could dream of not conforming to it. . . . The customary discipline, which could only be imposed on any early men by terrible sanctions, continued with those sanctions, and killed out of the whole society the propensities to variation which are the principles of progress." [34]

In offering an explanation of the custom-forming process, Bagehot anticipated Gabriel Tarde in his *Laws of Imitation*. "Men are guided by type, not by argument. . . . The truth is that the propensity of man to imitate what is before him is one of the strongest parts of his nature." [35] This process is neither voluntary nor conscious. It is simply a native tendency of the mind. It is strongest in "savages," "children," "uneducated people," and "those who have least abstract minds." It explains the "amazing sameness" in savage society and creates conformity in all forms of social organization.

It is further supported by the "persecuting tendency" which punishes deviation from established order, and also by a selective death rate which tends to eliminate both physical and mental variations. Thus "national character is but a name for a collection of habits more or less universal. . . . In time an ingrained type is sure to be formed,

[31] *Cf. Physics and Politics*, pp. 27 and 53.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 213.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 54-5.
[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 56-7.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 90 and 92.

and sure to be passed on if only the causes I have specified be fully in action and without impediment." [36]

4. The law of Progress.

There is "a tendency also in descendants to *differ* from their progenitors" and in this fact the hope of progress lies. Men progress when they have sufficient variability in their nature" to break through the thick crust of custom and escape from its thraldom. "The beginning of civilization is marked by an intense legality; that legality is the very condition of its existence. The bond which ties it together; but that legality—that tendency to impose a settled, customary yoke upon all men and all actions—if it goes on, kills out the variability implanted by nature, and makes different men and different ages facsimiles of other men and other ages, as we see them so often. Progress is only possible in those happy cases when the force of legality has gone far enough to bind the nation together, but not far enough to kill out all varieties and destroy nature's perpetual tendency to change." [37] "The whole history of civilization is strewn with creeds and institutions which were invaluable at first, and deadly afterwards." [38] Giddings summarizes this concept as follows: "Social evolution thus proceeds through the conflict of antagonistic tendencies, on the one hand toward uniformity and solidarity; on the other hand toward variation and individuality. In some groups, one of these tendencies predominates. Contending together, group with group, in the struggle for existence, those groups survive in which the balancing of these tendencies secures the greatest group efficiency. It is not too much to say that in this interpretation, Mr. Bagehot arrived at conclusions which today we recognize as belonging to the theoretical core of scientific sociology." [39]

It is not difficult to detect the effect of Bagehot's views upon the thinking of Darwin. Without waiting for Darwin's demonstration, Bagehot assumed that man was a product of nature and that natural selection operated in the realm of his social relations. When Darwin wrote his *Descent of Man,* he perceived that mental and moral qualities, and even certain physical characters, were evolved in this social struggle which Bagehot had depicted. He lays great emphasis upon such moral qualities as patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, sym-

[36] *Physics and Politics,* p. 106.
[37] *Ibid.,* p. 64.
[38] *Ibid.,* p. 74.
[39] *Op. cit.,* p. 77.

pathy, sensitiveness to praise and blame, and benevolence in creating social cohesion. "At all times throughout the world tribes have supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one important element in their success, the standard of morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend to rise and increase." [40]

As to the origin of these social virtues neither Bagehot nor Darwin were clear. They seem to have assumed them to be spontaneous variations in the mental processes and sought chiefly to account for their development and diffusion.

JOHN FISKE

At this point in the application of Darwinism to human society, Fiske made his significant contribution.

John Fiske was born in Hartford, Connecticut, March 30, 1842. He graduated from Harvard University in 1863 and became successively Lecturer on Philosophy, Instructor in History, Assistant Librarian, and finally Overseer of that institution, 1879-91. He devoted much of his time to lecturing in the United States and Great Britain. Chief among his many writings was his *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy,* published in London in 1874 and later republished in Boston. He died July 4, 1901.

Fiske asks, "How did our social evolution originate?" The answer is by the transformation of gregariousness into sociality. Darwin, he believed, had explained the former but not the latter. "Gregariousness implies incipient power of combination and of mutual protection. But gregariousness differs from sociality by the absence of definitive family relationships, except during the brief and intermittent periods in which there are helpless off-spring to be protected." [41]

How, then, were these family relationships created? Bagehot had presupposed the family as a condition of civilization. "I at least find it difficult to conceive of men, at all like the present men, unless existing in something like families, that is, in groups avowedly connected, at least on the mother's side, and probably always with a vestige of connection, more or less, on the father's side, and unless these groups were like many animals, gregarious, under a leader more or less fixed." [42] But he likewise had found the process by which the family was formed "inscrutable." He says: "It is almost beyond imagina-

[40] *Descent of Man,* p. 148.
[41] *Cosmic Philosophy,* Vol. I, pp. 340-41.
[42] *Physics and Politics,* p. 136.

tion how man, as we know man, could by any sort of process have gained this step in civilization. And it is a great advantage to say the least of it, in the evolution theory that it enables us to remit this difficulty to a pre-existing period in nature, where other instincts and powers than our present ones may perhaps have come into play, and where our imagination can hardly travel." [43]

This was Fiske's point of attack. He undertook to explain how this step was taken—how the human family acquired the characteristics which distinguish it from incipient and transient animal families. It was due to the prolongation of human infancy.

"The increase of intelligence, in complexity, and speciality, involves a lengthening of the period during which the nervous connections involved in ordinary adjustments are becoming organized." This process Fiske had elaborated in an earlier part of his work.[44] "Even if the physical interpretation there given should turn out to be inadequate, the fact remains undeniable, that while the nervous connections accompanying a simple intelligence are already organized at birth, the nervous connections accompanying a complex intelligence are chiefly organized after birth. Thus there arise the phenomena of infancy, which are non-existent among those animals whose psychical actions are purely reflex and instinctive. Infancy, psychologically considered, is the period during which the nerve-connections and correlative ideal associations necessary for self-maintenance are becoming permanently established. Now this period which only begins to exist when the intelligence is considerably complex becomes longer and longer as the intelligence increases in complexity. In the human race it is much longer than in any race of mammals, and it is much longer in the civilized man than in the savage." [45]

The immediate effect of this phenomenon is apparent. In the entire animal kingdom the dependence of the young determines the period of parental care and, in consequence the duration of the family. The same principle holds in regard to man. "The prolonged helplessness of the offspring must keep the parents together for longer and longer periods in successive epochs; and when at last the association is so long kept up that the older children are growing mature while the younger ones still need protection, the family relations begin to become permanent." [46]

[43] *Physics and Politics*, pp. 136-7.
[44] *Cf. Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. II, Ch. XVI.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 342.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 344.

A further effect of the permanent family now becomes equally obvious. "The feature by which the most rudimentary human family group is distinguished from any collocation of kindred individuals among gregarious mammals is the permanent character of the relationships between its constituent members. Enduring from birth until death, these relationships acquire a traditionary value which passes on from generation to generation, and thus there arise reciprocal necessities of behavior between parent and children, husbands and wives, brethren and sisters, in which reciprocal necessities of behavior we have discerned the requisite conditions for the genesis of those ego-altruistic impulses which, when further modified by the expansion of the sympathetic feelings, give birth to moral sentiments. Accordingly the phenomenon which demands explanation is the existence of permanent relationships, giving rise to reciprocal necessities of behavior, among a group of individuals associated for the performance of sexual and parental functions." [47]

The most prominent among these "moral-altruistic" qualities is sympathy, or "this vivid representation of the pleasurable or painful feelings experienced by others." [48] "Sympathy . . . is manifested in a rudimentary form by all gregarious animals of moderate intelligence. . . . Given this rudimentary capacity of sympathy, we can see how family integration must alter and complicate the emotional incentives to action." [49]

Summarized, Fiske's contention is: Psychic changes have superseded in importance the physical changes in human evolution. Psychic adaptation producing necessary physical adjustment results in prolongation of human infancy. This in turn transforms the human family into a permanent relation in which sympathy develops and supplementing other bonds, converts gregariousness into sociality.

The claim of novelty which Fiske makes for his theory [50] is hardly borne out by the facts. It is true only in the sense that he combined existing suggestions into a system. From Wallace he obtained the idea of the superior importance of psychic over physical changes in man.[51] From Spencer, the concept that a prolonged period is required for the maturing of a complex psychic equipment.[52] Anciently

[47] *Cosmic Philosophy,* Vol. II, p. 360.
[48] *Ibid.,* p. 352.
[49] *Ibid.,* p. 346.
[50] *Cf. ibid.,* p. 362.
[51] *Cf.* Wallace, *Natural Selection,* pp. 311-33.
[52] *Cf. Principles of Psychology,* Vol. I, pp. 468-71.

Anaximander had pointed out the importance of the prolonged period of human infancy.[53] Locke had shown the greater duration of the Human Family as a result of consecutive parental assistance,[54] while Bagehot had emphasized the importance of family cohesion as a factor in social progress.[55]

Giddings believes, moreover, that while Fiske has made a valuable contribution he has, nevertheless, failed to explain adequately the cause of the prolongation of infancy. "Admitting that the prolongation of infancy was probably a factor in the evolution of stable family relationships, and therefore played a part in strengthening the social sentiments, we must remember that the actual social life and solidarity of the gregarious group was probably a chief cause of the prolongation of infancy itself. Demanding, as it did, a relatively keen exercise of brain and nervous system in communication, imitation and coöperation it operated to select for survival those individuals that varied in the direction of high brain power and its correlated long infancy. But this is to say that society was a factor in the evolution of man before man became a factor in the evolution of society, and the difference is important." [56]

BENJAMIN KIDD

Benjamin Kidd was born Sept. 7, 1858, of humble English parentage. He had none of the advantages of higher education but was possessed of an absorbing passion for knowledge. In 1877 he entered the English Civil Service as a means of making his living. He borrowed money to attend evening classes and studied science, law, politics, philosophy, literature and art, gaining great proficiency in these subjects. He studied Darwin and early sociological literature and became convinced that Darwinism had not explained the development of civilization. He rose from obscurity to sudden fame through the publication of his *Social Evolution* in 1894. A posthumous work on the *Science of Power* was published in 1918. He died Oct. 2, 1916.

In harmony with the same general tendency of thought, and with penetrating insight, Kidd raised the further question, viz.: upon what principle and by what method does social evolution continue?

Social progress involves a paradox not clearly perceived by prior

[53] *Cf.* Butler, *Anaximander on the Prolongation of Human Infancy in Man, in Classical Studies in Honor of Henry Drisler,* pp. 8-10.
[54] *Cf. Civil Government,* Book II, Ch. VII, Sec. 80.
[55] *Cf. Physics and Politics,* pp. 215-16.
[56] *Op. cit.,* p. 79.

evolutionary thinkers. The very process by which reason in man was evolved is itself an irrational process. The first condition of evolution is that it proceeds by the selection of the superior and the destruction of the inferior as the result of multiplication beyond the limits of existence. This blind principle of natural selection works automatically throughout nature, of which man is a part. "But now at last, science stands confronted with a creature differing in one most important respect from all that had gone before him. He is endowed with reason; a faculty which is eventually destined to gain for him, *inter alia,* the mastery of the whole earth, and to place an impassable barrier between him and all the other forms of life. As we regard the problem which here begins to unfold itself, it is seen to possess features of unusual interest. It would seem that a conclusion, strange and unexpected, but apparently unavoidable, must present itself. If the theories of evolutionary science have been, so far, correct, then this new factor which has been born into the world must, it would appear, have the effect of ultimately staying all further progress." [57]

All progress is accompanied by enormous costs. In social progress it is by sacrifice of the individual to the welfare of the group, and the more successful the group the more abject is this subordination. Several phases of this irrational process of elimination are noted. It is the inevitable consequence of progress, that a large proportion of individuals in any group cannot succeed; that inferior races are marked for extermination; that under a military organization the soldier is sacrificed for group safety; that in industrial society the weaker competitors are driven to the wall and the so-called lower classes hover on the verge of extinction." [58]

For all these individuals and classes progress has no rational sanction. It is to their interests that progress should cease. In so far as they reason at all, it would appear to them desirable to put a stop to those onerous conditions that prevent their sharing in the greater possibilities of existence and that lead, on the contrary, to their extermination. But progress has not ceased, nor have the conditions which have produced it in any way been altered. History furnishes no organized revolt. Men continue to multiply and to engage in individual and collective rivalries in full view of a process in which most must fail. What is the explanation of this paradox? This is the problem of which Kidd sought the solution.

[57] *Social Evolution,* p. 66.
[58] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 67-72.

It had been discovered that the basis of human evolution had shifted. After the physical evolution of man had reached a certain stage of equilibration, practically it had ceased, and further development had been transferred to the realm of the psychic. Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Hume, Comte, and others, had interpreted social progress as the result of the development of the human mind. Bagehot and Fiske emphasized the significance of the social sentiments as a further means of social progress.

It was at this point that Kidd called attention to the third change in the direction of human evolution. "It would appear that when man became a social creature his progress ceased to be *primarily* in the direction of the development of his intellect. Thenceforward in the conditions under which natural selection has operated his interests as an individual were no longer paramount; they became subordinate to the distinct and widely-different interests of the longer-lived social organism to which he for the time being belonged. The intellect, of course, continues to be a most important factor in enabling the system to which the individual belongs to maintain its place in the rivalry of life; but it is no longer the prime factor." [59]

This conclusion is the result of a long survey of historic and scientific material in which he anticipates many of the conclusions of modern biologists and anthropologists. He finds that "the Greeks, who developed a civilization anterior to our own, and long since extinct, are held by high authorities to have been considerably our mental superiors . . . that, despite the ascendancy our own civilization is winning in the world at the present time it is not certain that intellectual development is proceeding *pari passu* with social development therein, and that it is even probable that the tendency of our civilization has been to restrain intellectual development . . . that anthropologists are unable to establish that clear connection between social development and cranial capacity that we might have expected; that science apparently often directs our attention to instances of large brain capacity in peoples of low social development . . . that current conceptions of an immense intellectual interval between ourselves and races of lower social development are greatly exaggerated and even to a large extent fallacious . . . that certain qualities, not in themselves intellectual, but which contribute directly to social efficiency are apparently of greater

[59] *Social Evolution,* pp. 306-7. For the best modern statement of the three stages of human evolution,—physical, mental, and social, see Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution,* Ch. 6.

importance; and that in the absence of these qualities high intellectual development may even lower social efficiency to a dangerous degree, and so contribute to the decided worsting in the evolution which is proceeding, of the people possessing it." [60]

The "pregnant question" which Kidd raises is: "What, then, has become of human reason?" [61] and his answer is that men make progress, not by reason, but by faith, not because they are rational, but because they are religious. "The central feature of human history, the meaning of which neither science nor philosophy has hitherto fully recognized, is, apparently, the struggle which man, throughout the whole period of social development has carried on to effect the subordination of his own reason. The motive power in this struggle has undoubtedly been supplied by his religious beliefs. The conclusion towards which we seem to be carried is therefore that the function of these beliefs in human evolution must be to provide a superrational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual, necessary to the maintenance of the development which is proceeding but for which there can never be, in the nature of things, any *rational* sanction." [62]

In order to understand Kidd's concept of religion, however, it is necessary to divest the term of its current theological connotation. Religious beliefs, like all others, are undergoing evolution. Their content may vary or may be expressed in diverse forms, but there are certain characteristics which invariably are present. They "either have or had, directly or indirectly, a utilitarian function to perform in the societies in which they exist." "The one essential and inevitable feature must be a supernatural sanction of some kind for acts and observances which have a social significance" and "they are always associated with social conduct." [63]

Stated by Kidd in both negative and positive form, we have:

"No form of belief is capable of functioning as a religion in the evolution of society which does not provide an ultra-rational sanction for social conduct in the individual."

In other words:—

"A rational religion is a scientific impossibility, representing from the nature of the case an inherent contradiction of terms." [64]

And:—*"A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational*

[60] *Social Evolution*, pp. 305-6.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 107.
[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-16.
[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 108-9.

sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing." [65]

We cannot do better than conclude this survey by quoting Giddings' forceful and appreciative summary: "This faith by which a race, a family, or an individual lives, is not anti-rational, nor yet super-rational. It is rather sub-rational or proto-rational. It is deeper, more elemental, than reason—a fact of instinct and feeling. It is *faith in the possibilities of life,* born of actual survival in the struggle for existence. The question, therefore, which Mr. Kidd should have asked, and which we, reviewing his work, must ask in his stead, is this: May we identify our elemental faith in the possibilities of life with the tremendous social phenomenon of religion, which, in all the ages of man's progress, has been one of his supreme interests? Shall we perhaps find that, when reduced to its lowest terms, to its essential principle, religion is not, as has been supposed, a belief in gods, or in a supernatural, in any way conceived, but is rather that primordial faith in the possibilities of life which was born, and generation after generation is reborn, of success in the struggle for existence; which may gather about itself all manner of supplementary beliefs, including a belief in spirits and in gods, but which will persist as the deepest and strongest motive of life after science has stripped away from it all its mystical and theological accretions? . . . So believing I accept as a positive contribution to the theory of human evolution Mr. Kidd's proposition that religion, a thing deeper and more elemental than reason, has been a chief factor in social evolution." [66]

KARL MARX

Before concluding this chapter we must make a brief study of the contributions of Karl Marx. Marx was not an interpreter of Darwin, but a contemporary who, although he was a product of the same period and was influenced by the same scientific spirit, yet because of a different type of mind and a dissimilar personal interest and because of a very different set of surrounding conditions gave direction to a radically divergent trend of evolutionary thought. A recent writer says: "Not only were Marx and Darwin contemporaries, but their

[65] *Social Evolution,* p. 111.
[66] *Op. cit.,* pp. 80-1.

achievements form a somewhat striking parallel; Darwin explored the laws of organic evolution and Marx explored the laws of social evolution, Darwin explained man's being and Marx explained his social institutions." And again, "Both the Darwinian biological theory of evolution and the Marxian sociological theory of evolution are disputed in detail, alike by critics and adherents, but their fundamental ideas are not challenged. It is no detraction from the merit of either of the great thinkers to admit that his work needs revision in the light of the fresh knowledge that has been acquired." [67]

Karl Marx was born at Treves, in the Rhine Province, May 5, 1818. His father Heinrich Marx was a Jewish lawyer of scholarly attainments, a disciple of Voltaire and a student of Rousseau and Locke, but a conservative in politics, and a convert to Christianity. Karl was said to have been "a strong imperious lad, of fiery temper and impetuous manner and spirit." He finished the course at the Treves Gymnasium with distinction at the age of sixteen and entered the University of Bonn, from which after a disappointing year he was transferred to the University of Berlin. Here he came in contact with the "Young Hegelians" or "Philosophic Radicals" in the Doctor's Club of which he became a member—an influence which did much to shape his future thought and career. In 1841 he received his doctor's degree from the University of Jena, having failed to complete his work at Berlin. In 1842 he became editor of the *Reinische Zeitung* published at Cologne, a radical journal which was suppressed the next year because of attacks on the Prussian government. He then went to Paris where he continued writing mainly for the *Vorwärts,* and was expelled from France in 1845. He retired to Brussels where he wrote his *Communist Manifesto* in collaboration with Engels, 1847. Driven from Belgium he returned to Cologne with the opening of the revolution of 1848 and published the *Neue Reinische Zeitung* which was also suppressed. He then went to England, 1859, where he found a safe retreat but where he lived in poverty until his death on March 14, 1883.

Marx was a voluminous writer on economic and socialistic subjects. His social philosophy was formulated as a basis for his communistic doctrines and while it made a valuable contribution to theory it was incidental to his main interest. It is contained chiefly in brief statements in the *Communist Manifesto* and in his *Critique of Political Economy* published in 1859. This latter work was elaborated into

[67] Spargo, *Karl Marx,* pp. 323-5.

his masterpiece, *Capital,* often referred to as the "Bible of Socialism."

Several times we have referred to the *industrial revolution* and to its influence upon various aspects of social interpretation but so far the effects mainly have been indirect. It was inevitable that economic changes of such magnitude should challenge ultimately the attention of thinkers and that they should be made the basis for an economic interpretation of society. This was the achievement of Karl Marx.

It would seem unnecessary to trace in detail the reconstruction in modern civilization produced by the Industrial Revolution since every student is familiar with its chief characteristics. It is sufficient to note that the changed methods of production resulting mainly from the substitution of mechanical for muscular power, through the application of science to invention and to organization, gave birth to the capitalistic era, reconstructed the whole constitution of modern society, substituted civil for feudal institutions, reconstituted social classes and, in short, created "Western Civilization."

Furthermore, nothing short of the whole history of the socialistic movement, using that term in the broadest sense to include all phases of the protest against mal-adjustments in the capitalistic organization of society from Saint-Simon through Owen, Fourier, Blanc, Proudhon, Rodbartus, Lassalle, to Marx, could form any adequate background of the reaction of men's minds to existing social conditions.[68]

It is not with Marxian socialism that we are concerned. It constituted a program which any one may evaluate entirely apart from its theoretical foundation. We are interested in his *economic interpretation of the social process* and his doctrine of *class conflict* which he regarded as producing the chief tensions and vicissitudes in the life of society. It was these concepts that challenged the doctrine of ideological causation which constituted the main trend of sociological interpretation of the period.

Marx's contention was that the capitalist system was not a "wicked invention" to be overthrown by a moral revolution. It constituted a logical and necessary stage in social evolution and the institutions it created were inevitable results of the economic progress which society had achieved.

It will be best perhaps to permit Marx to state his main theoretical propositions in his own language.

[68] *Cf.* Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought,* Ch. XIV.

Class Struggle

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle.

"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

"In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold graduation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.

"The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society, has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

"Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature; it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat." [69]

In this analysis Marx has adapted to the field of social evolution the theory of struggle and survival which Darwin applied to organic evolution and thus paved the way for its further application to race and nationality so highly developed in the work of Gumplowicz and other later writers.

Small comments upon it as follows: "More crocodile tears have been shed over Marx's recourse to class conflict than over any other mooted conception in the whole field of social science. . . . No one gets through a primer of social science today without learning that class conflict is to the social process what friction is to mechanics. It is one of the elemental reactions between human beings. Its accidents only have changed and are changing. Its essentials are apparently

[69] *Communist Manifesto*, pp. 12-13.

permanent. . . . The fact of class struggle is as axiomatic today as the fact of gravitation." [70]

Economic Interpretation of the Social Process

"From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed. . . .

"The feudal system of industry, under which industrial production was monopolized by close guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class; division of labor between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labor in each single workshop.

"Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand, ever rising. Even manufacture no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionized industrial production. The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern Industry, the place of the industrial middle-class, by industrial millionaires, the leaders of whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois.

"Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.

"We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.

"Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the mediæval commune. . . .

"The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigor in the Middle Ages, which Reactionists so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man's acitivity can bring about. It has

[70] *Socialism in the Light of Social Science, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XVII, May, 1912, p. 812.

accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades.

"The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

"The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

"The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world-literature.

"The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication,

draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a world after its own image.

"The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.

"The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, become lumped together in one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff.

"The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?" [71]

Spargo's comment upon this presentation is *apropos:* "It is a superb picture of the great part played by the capitalist system and its ruling class in the drama of human progress which the *Manifesto* gives. No enthusiastic apologist of capitalism, it is safe to say, ever perceived more clearly, or described with more convincing eloquence, the enormous benefits, material and spiritual, with which capitalist pro-

[71] *Communist Manifesto,* pp. 13-19.

duction won its way. What a change of attitude for the revolutionary masses the acceptance of the *Manifesto* involved can hardly now be comprehended. From regarding it as an unalloyed curse, the creation of evil genius, bearing the cursed brand because it denied Eternal Justice, the genius of Marx and his coworker compelled the revolutionary proletariat to regard the capitalist system as a great and splendid epoch, marked by the greatest extension of man's kingdom in the universe; to see in its progress an immense stride toward the goal of human brotherhood, and in its evils only the necessary price of progress and the inevitable accumulation of failures incidental to its successes, the legacy which it must bequeath to a new epoch—just as it inherited from feudal society its failures together with its successes." [72]

Marx's own summary of his theoretical position is as follows: "The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, continued to serve as the leading thread in my studies, may be briefly summed up as follows: In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our

[72] *Op. cit.*, pp. 113-14.

opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces, for which there is room in it, have been developed; and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society. Therefore, mankind always takes up only such problems as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois methods of production as so many epochs in the progress of economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from conditions surrounding the life of individuals in society; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society." [73]

In these somewhat extended quotations we have, we believe, an adequate and succinct statement of Marx's theoretical position. Other numerous fragments are to be found scattered throughout his more extensive writings but they serve merely to elaborate the arguments here presented. A few comments, however, will help perhaps to evaluate his contribution to social theory.

First. In the public mind in general Marx's fame rests upon his epoch-making work *Das Kapital*. Without depreciating the value of this work as a contribution to economics it is safe to assert that his brief analysis of the materialistic interpretation of history is a surer foundation for enduring fame than this elaborate and involved treatise —*Capital*.

Second. Only an over-enthusiastic Marxian would venture to claim that he was the originator of the theory of economic determinism. All the elements for such a "discovery" were present. His genius is ex-

[73] *Critique of Political Economy*, pp. 11-13.

hibited in the fact that he correlated these elements into a system and gave it a cogency which made it determinative for future thinking, and thus connected it with his name.

Third. It ought especially to be made clear that his materialistic conception of history is separable completely from his socialistic program. One may regard Marxian socialism as not the only method nor the best method of social reconstruction; as neither "plausible, probable, desirable nor possible," [74] without detracting in the slightest degree from the value of the conception that economic conditions exert a determining influence upon *"morality, law and politics."* [75]

Fourth. There is a sharp difference of opinion among students of Marx over the question as to whether the theory of "economic determinism" is offered as the exclusive factor, or merely as a principal factor in social interpretation. Ellwood takes emphatically the former ground and cites numerous writers in support of his contention. He says: "There can be no doubt, then, that Marx's theory of social evolution, upon which his followers rest his claim to be considered the Darwin of Sociology, is that the biological and psychological factors in human social life are all mediated and ultimately determined in their expression by economic processes. The theory is, therefore, in spite of the objection of recent apologists of Marx to the term, essentially a theory of "economic determinism." According to this theory the economic interpretation of history, or of social evolution, is the all-sufficient interpretation; and if this is true sociologists should certainly make haste to hail Marx as the Darwin of their science." [76]

Spargo is equally positive in his assertion of the contrary opinion: "The gist of this theory is that the principal factor in social evolution is the economic one, the method of producing and distributing wealth. This has become nowadays a commonplace, but it was a revolutionary idea when Marx first proclaimed it.

"Now, Marx never dreamed of asserting that the economic force acts as the sole determinant of social evolution. In order to focus the attention of the thinkers of his time upon his theory, and in meeting the attacks of opponents, he, quite naturally, at times over emphasized this one factor. Yet he did not fail to warn his disciples against falling into the error of regarding the economic factor as the only active influence in social evolution. His followers, many of them, disregarded

[74] Small, *op. cit.*, p. 816.
[75] Loria, *Economic Foundations of Society*, p. 9.
[76] *Marx's "Economic Determinism" in the Light of Modern Psychology. American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVII, July, 1911, p. 38.

these warnings and carried the tendency to exaggerate which Marx himself manifested to the most absurd length. In their hands the theory became one of simple economic fatalism and predestination. According to their caricature of the theory, no other factors have influenced the rate or direction of the evolution of society: Race, religion, patriotism, ideals of all kinds have been meaningless." [77]

Regardless of the merits of the controversy as to Marx's intention, both writers are in substantial agreement in regard to the value of the economic interpretation as *a* theory of social evolution. With some change of emphasis Ellwood's statement perhaps would be satisfactory. "There is, therefore, no scientific warrant for an 'economic interpretation of history' except as that interpretation is but a phase of a larger interpretation which will make due allowance for other factors in social evolution. The historical process is not fundamentally an economic process, but is rather a socio-psychological, that is, a sociological process. The economic interpretation of that process *does* (changed from "may") throw a useful side-light upon social evolution, but it can never offer an adequate theory of society, because it is attempting to interpret the whole in terms of what is merely a part." [78]

Fifth. Marx's theory of class conflict is not new. We have become familiar with group and class struggle on religious and political bases although it has not been emphasized as a *social process*. What is new in the Marxian theory is this emphasis and also the concept of the economic motive as the dominant factor in class conflict. The Utopian school had described the struggle as a moral issue—a question of right and wrong, of justice and injustice. Marx's theory explains it as the necessary result of economic evolution. The objective of the struggle is always the economic gain secured through the control of the *surplus value* created in all the forms of production. As evolution in production proceeds the classes are reconstituted but the character of the process remains unchanged.

From the foregoing analysis it is obvious that Marx is to be classified with the great evolutionist thinkers of the middle of the 19th century. Like Spencer he had grasped the essential principles of evolution in advance of Darwin's demonstration and had applied them to the interpretation of industrial society. When Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared in the same year as his *Critique of Political Economy*

[77] *Karl Marx and Contemporary Socialism, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XVI, July, 1910, p. 27.
[78] *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

he regarded it as a fortunate coincidence and declared that Darwin's work made his own "absolutely impregnable."

Irrespective of the value ultimately to be assigned to Marx's theory and despite such modifications of it as increasing knowledge may require, his position as a pioneer in social science is secure.

Small dissects carefully Marx's *theory* from his *program* and while dissenting positively from the latter gives high credit to the former. He says: "Marx was one of the few really great thinkers in the history of social science. . . . Up to the present time the appellate court of the world's sober second thought has not given him as fair a hearing as it has granted to Judas Iscariot. . . . Men in dignified academic positions still refrain in public from giving Marx his due. He is worthy of the most respectful treatment which thinkers can pay to another thinker whose argument has never been successfully answered. . . . I do not think that Marx added to social science a single formula which will be final in the terms in which he expressed it. In spite of that, I confidently predict that in the ultimate judgment of history Marx will have a place in social science analogous with that of Galileo in physical science." [79]

[79] *Op. cit.*, pp. 809-10.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. Discuss the place and importance of the quantitative method in the field of modern science, particularly social science.
2. What is the present state of opinion in regard to T. R. Malthus' theory of population. *Cf.* W. S. Thompson, *Population, A Study in Malthusianism, Studies in History, Economics and Public Law,* Vol. LXIII, No. 3, Columbia University.
3. Be able to state clearly and critically the processes of organic evolution as Variation, Struggle for Existence, Natural Selection, Survival of the Fit. *Cf.* Darwin, *Origin of Species.*
4. Summarize the arguments for the organic evolution of man. *Cf. Descent of Man.* Also, W. C. Curtiss, *Presentation of the Doctrine of Evolution in the Social Sciences, Publications of the American Sociological Society.* Vol. XVII.
5. What is the essential difference in point of view between Darwin's *Descent of Man* and Henry Drummond's *Ascent of Man.* What contributions, if any, did Drummond make to evolution.
6. Explain the importance of the biological basis of sociology. *Cf.* Carl Kelsey, *The Physical Basis of Society.* Chs. IV-VI.
7. Explain clearly the contributions of Weissman, De Vries, and Mendel to the theory of evolution. *Cf.* W. E. Castle, *Genetics and Eugenics.* Chs. I-X.
8. What is the status of the Theory of Evolution as a scientific principle of interpretation in the world today?
9. State clearly the meaning of Walter Bagehot's phrase "The Cake of Custom." What is the process involved and what is its value? *Cf. Physics and Politics,* pp. 27 and 53.
10. Study carefully Bagehot's Theory of Progress. Criticise in this connection the following from Karl Pearson, "That the Reformer should often be also the martyr, is, perhaps, a not over-great price to pay for the caution with which society as a whole must move." *Grammar of Science,* p. 1.
11. Does John Fiske combine successfully the biologic and psychologic elements in his contribution to the evolution of the family?
12. What light is thrown upon Benjamin Kidd's theory in regard to superrational sanction in A. A. Goldenweiser's discussion of supernaturalism? *Cf. Early Civilization,* pp. 231-4.

13. For further analysis and criticism of Kidd's theories, *Cf.* An Article *"Mr. Kidd on Western Civilization," The Contemporary Review,* June, 1902, and republished by A. S. Pringle-Pattison, in *The Philosophical Radicals,* pp. 47-77. Also R. Macintosh, *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd,* especially Chs. XIX-XX.
14. Criticize the assertion that Marx is the Darwin of social science. *Cf.* J. Spargo, *Karl Marx,* pp. 422-30; also C. A. Ellwood, *Marx Economic Determinism, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XVII, July, 1911, pp. 35-46.
15. Evaluate Ellwood's criticism of Marx's theory "in the light of modern psychology." Does this criticism apply with equal cogency to any *single factor* in social interpretation? *Cf. Op. Cit.*
16. Does Lester F. Ward succeed in his attempt at the "Reconciliation of the Economic and Ideological Interpretation of History?" *Cf. Applied Sociology,* pp. 41-9.
17. For an elaborate statement and criticism of the Economic Interpretation of History *Cf.* A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress,* Chs. XIV-XV.

CHAPTER XII

HERBERT SPENCER

BACKGROUND; ENVIRONMENTAL AND PERSONAL

NOTHING less comprehensive than the preceding chapters of this volume can present adequately the historic, philosophic and scientific background of Herbert Spencer's work. His was the crowning achievement in the systematization of human knowledge. It would be superfluous at this time to review the stages in the process by which knowledge had been acquired and to outline its scope. Only a few salient facts may be recalled. The scientific habit of mind had been developed and had been applied in the fields of both inorganic and organic nature. The concept of progressive change or progress was accepted by all the most advanced minds. A high degree of unity throughout nature was perceived. Darwin and his co-laborers had demonstrated that man was a part of nature and therefore subject, as all other living things, to physical influences. Numerous writers were making application of scientific law to the interpretation of human society. Comte had grasped the great concept of the ultimate unity of human knowledge and the possibility of a positive interpretation of the entire cosmos.

The great synthesis was yet to be made. The type of mind capable of this achievement had not yet appeared. Two qualifications were necessary. First, the ability to grasp the content of human knowledge, second, the power of systematizing and coördinating it into a unified system. These two qualities are rarely combined in a single mind. Herbert Spencer, with the possible exception of Aristotle, is the best example which history affords of their successful combination. To quote from Ward, "His mastery of all branches of human knowledge has been justly styled 'encyclopedic.' His causality has never been equaled. To him were thus secured the two essential conditions for accomplishing the permanent object of philosophy—the synthesis of science. Without the comprehensive survey which his laborious investigations have secured for him, his great combining powers would have

been profitless; without those powers, no museum of facts, however well learned, would have yielded the broad principles of a cosmical philosophy." [1]

HERBERT SPENCER

Herbert Spencer was born in Derby, England, April 27, 1820. His father, William George Spencer, was a teacher, with particular interest in mathematics, having published a short work on geometry and later a treatise on *Lucid Shorthand*. His mother, Harriet Holmes, was of remote Huguenot and Hussite ancestry. Herbert was the only surviving child and was of delicate constitution. His early education was directed by his father, who gave him much latitude in the pursuit of his own tastes. He was little disciplined in routine studies, and developed a great fondness for natural science and a faculty for acute observation. At the age of thirteen he was sent to study under his uncle, Thomas Spencer, a liberal clergyman and scholar at Bath, who was interested much in social conditions and who published many pamphlets on the improvement of the conditions of the poor. Under his uncle he pursued his mathematical and scientific studies for three years, developing great originality in the solution of difficult problems. In physics and chemistry he displayed unusual interest in investigation and experimentation. He declined the opportunity which his uncle offered him of preparing for a university career and returned to Derby where he became an assistant in his father's school, continuing original researches and investigations in scientific subjects.

At this period, railroad building was at its height and at the age of seventeen he entered the office of Sir Charles Fox in London, to become a civil engineer. For four years he worked at railroad and bridge building, chiefly on the Birmingham and Gloucester Line, and during which time he contributed several articles to the *Civil Engineer and Architects Journal*. In 1841 he gave up engineering temporarily and returned to Derby to assist his father in perfecting some inventions, but without success. Meanwhile he had developed a keen interest in social studies and in public affairs, and in 1842, at the age of twenty-two, he contributed a series of articles to the *Nonconformist* on *The Proper Sphere of Government*. The articles appeared in pamphlet form the following year. They were remarkable in that they contained in germ many of the theories developed in his maturer work.

Unsettled as to his future career, he returned to engineering in

[1] *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 142.

1845, working intermittently for three years, but spending much of his time writing articles for various journals and in "inventing and castle-building." His most serious attempt at invention, which "came to nothing," was a means of locomotion, "uniting terrestrial traction with aerial suspension,"—an aeroplane propelled by a rapidly moving cable.[2] In 1848 he gave up engineering permanently and removed to London, accepting the position as sub-editor of the *Economist,* the most influential weekly newspaper in London, dealing with financial and economic matters. This position he held for five years. It proved to be a fortunate opportunity, affording him much leisure, bringing him into contact with the leading men of the times, and stimulating his interest in public affairs.

In 1850 he published *Social Statics,* his first great work on Social Science. The book excited widespread interest because of his advanced views. From 1852 to 1855 he contributed many articles to scientific journals, chief among which were *The Development Hypothesis, The Universal Postulate,* and *The Genesis of Science.* In 1855 his *Principles of Psychology* appeared, in which the doctrine of evolution was applied to the human mind. In April, 1857, he published in *The Westminster Review* his famous essay on *Progress, Its Law and Cause.* In January of 1858 he prepared a rough draft of his universal theory of evolution, which, modified and corrected, became the outline of *The Synthetic Philosophy.*[3] This draft was printed the following year and distributed among his friends. The appearance of *The Origin of Species* by Darwin confirmed his hypothesis in organic science, and he decided to enter upon the gigantic task of producing *The Synthetic Philosophy,* a task to which he allotted twenty years, but which required the remainder of his life.

The dates and order of publication of *The Synthetic Philosophy* follow:

First Principles. First edition, 1862; second edition, 1867; third edition, 1875; fourth edition, 1880; fifth edition, 1884; sixth edition, and finally revised, 1900. Reprinted with an additional appendix and a new index, 1904.

Principles of Biology. Vol. I, 1864; Vol. II, 1867; revised and enlarged edition, Vol. I, 1898; Vol. II, 1899.

Principles of Psychology. First edition, 1855; second edition, Vol. I, 1870; Vol. II, 1872; third edition, 1880; fourth edition, 1899.

[2] *Cf. Autobiography,* Vol. I, pp. 346-9.
[3] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 16-19.

Principles of Sociology. Vol. I, first edition, 1876; second edition, 1877; third and enlarged edition, 1885; Vol. II, Part IV, 1879; Part V, 1882. Vol. III, Part VI, 1885; Parts VII and VIII, 1896.

Principles of Ethics. Vol. I, Part I, 1879; Part II and III, 1892. Vol. II, Part IV, 1891; Parts V and VI, 1893.

Spencer recognized that the system was incomplete. Following *First Principles,* there should have been included a volume on *The Principles of Inorganic Nature.* This omission he explained as due to the fact that the scheme was already too extensive and that the other portions were relatively of greater importance.[4]

In view of his voluminous writings on subjects requiring the most arduous labor, it seems incongruous to say that Spencer, throughout his whole life, was in extremely delicate health, yet such was the fact. It was by the extensive use of secretaries that he was able to accomplish so much. He traveled little, making only an occasional trip to the continent. He visited the United States in 1882, but because of the state of his health refused all invitations to lecture.

Spencer never married. He refused all university honors and proffered degrees and declined to join any of the learned societies. In case honors were conferred without his knowledge or approval, he never made use of them in any way.[5] He died December 8, 1903, at the age of eighty-three.[6]

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

It would seem almost impossible to attempt, within the limits set by this treatise, to make any adequate survey of Spencer's system of thought, in which his social theory is implicit, or even to portray the essential features of his specific contributions to sociology. The task is undertaken, however, with full realization of the difficulties involved on the assumption that the social student already is familiar with Spencer's writings and that only a synopsis need here be given. In the absence of such familiarity the student should supply details by a careful reading of the works surveyed.

[4] *Cf.* Note, *First Principles,* p. XIV. For a complete list of Spencer's twenty volumes and one hundred ninety-five articles, letters and reviews, which appeared at various times in some forty-six different journals and periodicals, *Cf.* Duncan, *Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer,* Vol. II, pp. 366-81.

[5] For a complete list of academic and other honors offered or conferred, thirty-two in number, *Cf.* Duncan, *Op. cit.,* pp. 382-4.

[6] *Cf.* Spencer, *Autobiography,* Vols. I and II, also Duncan, *Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer,* Vols. I and II.

The order followed in the discussion is that in which the theories were developed. No attempt is made at a more logical order or coördination.

SOCIAL STATICS

At the outset several facts should be borne in mind. This was Spencer's first book. He was thirty years of age. The doctrine of evolution had not yet been formulated. *Social Statics* antedated the *Origin of Species* by nine years. Comte's work at the time was not known to the author. Furthermore it was not a part of the *Synthetic Philosophy*. The prospectus of that great work was not formulated till 1858, eight years later, and the first volume of which was not published till 1862. The originality of the work is therefore the more striking, and while some of his conclusions were tentative, and afterwards were revised, in the main it sets forth certain theories of social interpretation which form the basis of all his later work. Giddings classifies it as "The first strictly sociological treatise," and says: "It may at once be acknowledged that the *Social Statics* challenges comparison to an extent that perhaps no other writing does, with both *The Republic* of Plato and the *Politics* of Aristotle. It propounds the same problems which they discuss, and it offers solutions which, though not identical with theirs, are closely parallel to them. The object of human effort for Spencer is happiness: and as he conceives of happiness, it does not greatly differ from the joy of rational activity which was the 'good life' for Plato. Happiness depends upon external conditions, which are, namely, liberty and justice. Justice, however, for Mr. Spencer, is that limitation of liberty which equalizes it among men, whereas for Plato it was that specialization of work and opportunity which enables every man to do what he can do best, and to be what he can be perfectly. Both writers agree that to establish justice is the proximate purpose, or function, of society." [7]

Starting, then, with the assumption of the "greatest happiness" as the goal of human life and of "the common social morality," Spencer finds the first difficulty in the fact that there is no unanimity in the conception of what constitutes happiness. "The standard of happiness is infinitely variable." [8] The second difficulty is equally obvious. Even if it should be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the nature of happiness is agreed upon, nothing is more common than the failure to

[7] *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 111.
[8] *Social Statics*, p. 7.

obtain it by the means employed. Empirical attempts to acquire happiness he calls "Unguided expediency." The failure of direct legislation, of which several examples are cited, is conspicuous. "Nearly every parliamentary proceeding is a tacit confession of incompetence. There is scarcely a bill introduced but is entitled, 'An Act to amend an Act.' The 'Whereas' of almost every preamble heralds an account of the miscarriage of previous legislation." [9]

The "moral sense" which Spencer defends as comparable in the field of social behavior to those impulses which motive all needful physical action in the interest of survival, is, likewise, incapable of solving the problem. Assuming a moral sense, it can no more guide behavior than hunger can direct appetite. Like the "geometric sense" whose function is to originate geometric axioms, the function of the "moral sense" is to construct moral axioms. It can construct only a system of ideal morality. It cannot solve concrete problems. "Treating, therefore, as it does on the abstract principles of right conduct, a system of pure ethics cannot recognize evil, or any of those conditions which evil generates. It knows no such thing as an infraction of the laws, for it is merely a statement of what the laws are. . . . A geometrician requires that the straight lines with which he deals shall be veritably straight; that his circles, and ellipses and parabolas, shall agree with precise definitions. If you put to him a question in which these conditions are not complied with, he tells you that it cannot be answered. So likewise is it with the philosophical moralist. He treats solely of the *straight* man. He describes how the straight man comports himself; shows in what relations he stands to other straight men; shows how a community of straight men is constituted. A problem in which a *crooked* man forms one of the elements is insoluble by him." [10]

A radically different approach must be made, and a fundamentally different set of assumptions must constitute the basis of a rational interpretation. First, "All evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions." [11] This principle holds throughout all nature, including man. It is the explanation of all pain, physical, mental, and moral.

Second, "Equally true it is that evil perpetually tends to disappear. In virtue of an essential principle of life, this non-adaptation of an organism to its conditions is ever being rectified; and modification

[9] *Social Statics*, p. 13.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-7.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

of one or both continues until the adaptation is complete. Whatever possesses vitality, from the elementary cell up to man himself, inclusive, obeys this law." [12] Illustrations are the acclimatization of plants, altered habits of domesticated animals and the adaptability of man.

Applying these principles to "the present position of the human race," Spencer developed the principle of evolution in bold outlines. It lacked, at this point, only the concept of variation and selection to have been as complete as Darwin's organic evolution.

"By the increase of population, the state of existence we call social has been necessitated. Men living in this state suffer under numerous evils. By the hypothesis it follows that their characters are not completely adapted to such a state.

"In what respects are they not so adapted? What is the special qualification which the social state requires?

"It requires that each individual shall have such desires only, as may be fully satisfied without trenching upon the ability of other individuals to obtain like satisfactions. If the desires of each are not thus limited, then either all must have certain of their desires ungratified; or some must get gratification for them at the expense of others. Both of which alternatives, necessitating pain, imply non-adaptation.

"But why is man not adapted to the social state?

"Simply because he yet partially retains the characteristics appropriate to an antecedent state. The respects in which he is not fitted to society are the respects in which he is fitted for his original predatory life. His primitive circumstances required that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to his own; his present circumstances require that he shall not do so; and in so far as his old attributes still cling to him, he is unfitted for the social state. All sins of men against one another, from the cannibalism of the Fijian to the crimes and venalities we see around us; the felonies which fill our prisons, the trickeries of trade, the quarrelings of class with class and of nation with nation, have their causes comprehended under this generalization.

"Man needed one moral constitution to fit him for his original state; he needs another to fit him for his present state; and he has been, is, and will long continue to be, in process of adaptation. And the belief in human perfectibility merely amounts to the belief that, in virtue of this process, man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of life.

"Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead

[12] *Social Statics*, p. 28.

of civilization being artificial it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development of an embyro or the unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind have undergone, and are still undergoing, result from a law underlying the whole organic creation; and provided the human race continues, and the condition of things remains the same, those modifications must end in completeness . . . so surely must the human faculties be molded into complete fitness for the social state; so surely must evil and immorality disappear; so surely must man become perfect." [13]

From these considerations Spencer derived the theory that the "greatest happiness" must be sought indirectly; that it involves a process; that "the social state is a necessity"; that "the conditions to greatest happiness under that state are fixed"; that "our characters are the only things not fixed"; that "they, then, must be molded into fitness for the conditions"; and that "all moral teaching and discipline must have for its object to hasten this process." [14]

In the unfolding of this process, Spencer arrived at a principle, to which he adhered, though with some modification, throughout his entire work, namely, that the pursuit of happiness involves the freedom of men in the exercise of their faculties, limited only by the like freedom of every other man.[15] This doctrine identified him with the *laissez faire* school of philosophers and led him to resist all governmental interference in the interest of social amelioration. The efforts of Parliament to regulate society by direct action he regarded as transcending the "proper sphere of government," believing profoundly in the forces resident within society as the best and only natural means of social progress.

Passing over the hundred seventy pages devoted to the elucidation of this principle, in which we find a most interesting and ingenious defense of a thorough-going individualism, we pass to a review of his "general considerations."

First of all he divides social philosophy into statics and dynamics, the former "treating of the equilibration of a perfect society," the latter "of the forces by which society is advanced toward perfection." The object of the former is "to determine what laws we must obey for the obtainment of complete happiness," and of the latter "to analyze the influences which are making us competent to obey these laws." [16] In a footnote, he defends the originality of this concept. He says: "I had

[13] *Social Statics*, pp. 31-2.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 35.
[15] *Cf. ibid.*, p. 36 ff.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

seen this division of Political Economy in the work of Mr. J. S. Mill, where he refers to it as having been made by some one—a political economist, I supposed. In the above sentence, I assumed that I was giving the division a wider application; whereas it appears that I was simply giving to it the original application made by M. Comte. But at that time Comte was to me only a name."

It is in his treatment of social dynamics that Spencer arrives at a development of the evolutionary concept: "And first let us mark that the course of civilization could not have been other than it has been. Given an unsubdued Earth; given the being, Man, fitted to overspread and occupy it; given the laws of life, what they are; and no other series of changes than that which has taken place, could have taken place.

"Each member of a race fulfilling the conditions to greatest happiness, must be so constituted that he may obtain full satisfaction for every desire without diminishing the power of others to obtain like satisfactions: nay, must derive pleasure from seeing pleasure in others. Now, for such beings to multiply in a world tenanted by inferior creatures—creatures which must be dispossessed to make room—is a manifest impossibility. By the definition, such beings would lack all desire to exterminate the races they are to supplant. They would, indeed, have a repugnance to exterminating them; for the ability to derive pleasure from seeing pleasure, involves the liability to derive pain from seeing pain. Evidently, therefore, these hypothetical beings, instead of subjugating and overspreading the Earth, would themselves become the prey of pre-existing creatures, in which destructive desires predominated. Hence the aboriginal man must have a character fitting him to clear it of races endangering his life, and races occupying the space required by mankind. He must have a desire to kill; for it is the law of animal life that to every needful act must attach a gratification, the desire for which may serve as a stimulus. In other words, he must be what we call a savage; and must be left to acquire fitness for social life as fast as the conquest of the Earth renders social life possible." [17]

"Hitherto, then, human character has changed but slowly, because it has been subject to two conflicting sets of conditions. On the one hand, the discipline of the social state has been developing it into sympathetic form; while on the other hand, the necessity for self-defense partly of man against brute, partly of man against man, and partly of societies against one another, has been maintaining the old unsympathetic form. And only where the influence of the first set of conditions

[17] *Social Statics*, pp. 233-4.

has exceeded that of the last, and then only in proportion to the excess, has modification taken place.

"Regarded thus, civilization is a development of man's latent capabilities under favorable circumstances;—which favorable circumstances, mark, were certain some time or other to occur." [18]

"The forces at work exterminate such sections of mankind as stand in the way, with the same sternness that they exterminate beasts of prey and herds of useless ruminants. Just as the savage has taken the place of lower creatures, so must he, if he have remained too long a savage, give place to his superior. And observe, it is necessarily to his superior that, in the majority of cases, he does give place. For what are the prerequisites to a conquering race? Numerical strength, or more powerful nature, or an improved system of warfare; all of them indications of advancement. Numerical strength implies certain civilizing antecedents. Deficiency of game may have necessitated agricultural pursuits, and so made existence of a larger population possible; or distance from other tribes may have rendered war less frequent, and so have prevented its perpetual decimations; or accidental superiority over neighboring tribes, may have led to the final subjugation and enslaving of these: in any of which cases, the comparatively peaceful condition resulting must have allowed progress to commence. Evidently, therefore, the conquest of one people over another has been, in the main, the conquest of the social man over the anti-social man; or, strictly speaking, of the more adapted over the less adapted." [19]

In these generalizations of Spencer we have the principle of natural selection as clearly grasped as Darwin ever comprehended it, and of group survival through processes of internal cohesion as Bagehot ever saw it. The details, however, he did not at this time develop.

Summarizing, we may present Spencer's original contributions to social theory in the *Social Statics* somewhat as follows:

1. Human nature is modifiable. Through reaction to external conditions, an equilibration tends to be established, first with animals, then with men, and finally with society.

2. The process by which this equilibration is secured is natural selection through the elimination of the non-adapted. Atavistic tendencies gradually are being replaced by others socially advantageous.

3. The structures and the ideas of society are interrelated and proceed together. The one cannot develop faster than the other.

[18] *Social Statics*, p. 237.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 238-9.

4. Progress is natural and inevitable. Its ultimate goal is the "greatest happiness" secured through the reconciliation of individual liberty with social solidarity; where private interests coincide with public ones; where men derive happiness from the happiness of others.

Absolute originality certainly is not claimed for these ideas. Most of them, in more or less isolated form, were familiar. Much of the theory of the past had been built upon the concept of the development of the human mind. Bodin and Montesquieu, and later Buckle, had shown the effect of the physical environment on ideas and institutions, and Lamarck had popularized the notion of the adaptation of organism to environment. What is new is the combination of these concepts into a system by which normal evolutionary procedures, which can be rationalized and formulated, transform human nature from a condition of savage brutality into one of ethical behavior suited to an ideal civilization.

FIRST PRINCIPLES

In his *Autobiography* Spencer explains that "the advance toward a complete conception of evolution was itself a process of Evolution." [20] His first "pronounced convictions on these matters" he attributes to Lyell's *Principles of Geology,* which he read at twenty. "Two years after, in *The Proper Sphere of Government,* there was shown an unhesitating belief that the phenomena of both individual life and social life conform to law; and there was insistence on the progressive adaptation of constitution to conditions: implying the influence of the development hypothesis previously accepted." [21]

"Eight years later increased consistency and definiteness were given to these views in *Social Statics.*" [22] "Thus far, acceptance of the developmental idea had been only tacit; but soon after the publication of *Social Statics* it was avowed: the essay on the *The Development Hypothesis,* published in March, 1852, being a profession of faith." [23] The next element came from the reading of Carpenter's *Principles of Physiology,* in which he says: "I became acquainted with von Baer's statement that the development of every organism is a change from homogeneity to heterogeneity. The substance of the thought was not new to me, though its form was." [24]

[20] *Autobiography,* Vol. II, p. 13.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[22] *Cf.* Spencer's *Analysis of Social Statics, Ibid.,* p. 8.
[23] *Ibid.,* p. 9.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 9.

The Universal Postulate, 1853, *The Genesis of Science* and *The Art of Education,* 1854, reveal the increasing dominance of the idea.

A synthesis of ideas so far set forth resulted in the concept of evolution of the mental as well as physical organization and *The Principles of Psychology* appeared in 1855. Here he traced the genesis of mind "sub-human and human" in all its manifestations.

The essential unifying process remained to be discovered. Spencer explains this to have resulted from the bringing together of the "various revolutionary ideas" which had been "lying apart" in his thoughts, through the editing of a volume of his essays previously written, and from the larger influence of the general trend of science at the time. The result was the concept of universal evolution announced and outlined in 1858 and its processes formulated in the *First Principles* published in 1862.

As early as 1857, when Spencer published his essay on *Progress, Its Law and Cause,* he had perceived that if the theory of Cosmic evolution were to receive consideration on its own merits it needed to be freed from the implication of materialism, by defining clearly its place in a universal system of thought. He maintained that the theory could be held without either affirming or denying any metaphysical or theological beliefs since it concerned itself alone with the visible universe and left the mystery of its ultimate nature, its origin and destiny, unsolved.[25] Part I of the *First Principles* is, therefore, devoted to this explanation, and is not an integral division of the *Synthetic Philosophy* proper.

The Unknowable

With reference to the content of thought there are two categories—The Unknowable and the Knowable. The former is the Absolute or Unconditioned, the concept of which is real, but the nature of which can never be brought within the domain of consciousness. It forever eludes the grasp of the mind. The latter is the Relative or Conditioned, the visible and comprehensible manifestation of ultimate reality—the objects of sense perception. The former is the domain of religion, the latter, of science. "There must ever remain, therefore, two antithetical modes of mental action. Throughout all future time, as now, the human mind may occupy itself, not only with ascertained phenomena and their relations, but also with that unascertained something which phenomena and their relations imply. Hence, if knowledge cannot monopolize con-

[25] *Autobiography,* Vol. II, p. 86.

sciousness—if it must always continue possible for the mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge; then there can never cease to be a place for something of the nature of Religion; since Religion under all its forms is distinguished from everything else in this, that its subject matter is that which passes the sphere of experience. . . . We may be sure, therefore, that religions, though even none of them be actually true, are yet all adumbrations of a truth." [26]

Science is "simply a higher development of common knowledge" and "if Science is repudiated, all knowledge must be repudiated along with it." [27] Science is the progressive organization of the facts derived from common observation from which error is constantly being eliminated.

"An unbiassed consideration of its general aspects forces us to conclude that Religion, everywhere present as a weft running through the warp of human history, expresses some eternal fact; while it is almost a truism to say of Science that it is an organized mass of facts, ever growing, and ever being more completely purified from errors. And if both have bases in the reality of things, then between them there must be a fundamental harmony. It is an incredible hypothesis that there are two orders of truth, in absolute and everlasting opposition. . . . That Religion is divine and Science diabolical, is a proposition which, though implied in many a clerical declamation, not the most vehement fanatic can bring himself distinctly to assert." [28] The apparent conflict is chiefly over boundaries, viz: in the forms of religion, which are identified often with religion itself, and in the confusion of the *Unknown* with the *Unknowable*. Both distinctions are important.

It is, however, in the ultimate ideas in both Religion and Science that they coalesce, for at this limit both agree that every phenomenon is a manifestation of an unlimited and incomprehensible power which transcends intelligence. This is proved by a critical analysis of the ultimate concepts of the religious interpretation of the "Origin of the Universe" and of the "First Cause"—verbal formulæ the elements of which cannot be put together in consciousness; and of the scientific categories of Time, Space, Matter, Motion and Force, the ultimate concepts of which lie beyond the grasp of the intellect. The certainty of the ultimate in both fields is real, while its nature is unknowable. Re-

[26] *First Principles*, p. 17.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-1.

ligion rests securely on this reality, and in its evolution is ever freeing itself from error. Science frankly abandons the pursuit of metaphysics and contents itself with the accurate description of phenomena.[29]

Spencer expresses disappointment that contrary to his expectation this interpretation, which Ward regards "as the most satisfactory plan of settlement yet proposed," [30] served to intensify rather than to allay prejudice, and failed to secure the consideration which he sought for the theory of evolution unhampered by theological bias.[31]

The Knowable

The Knowable consists of the varied manifestations of the Unknowable which fall within the grasp of the mind. A somewhat arbitrary classification is made of the degrees of cognition. Knowledge of the lowest order is "un-unified knowledge." Science is "partially-unified knowledge," while Philosophy is "completely-unified knowledge." Philosophy differs from other knowledge only in degree, not in kind,—it is simply knowledge of the highest degree of generality.

Since every thought involves a whole system of thoughts, the data of Philosophy comprise all forms of contemplation which appeal to consciousness, and its function consists in establishing congruity among isolated concepts, or in other words, the complete unification of knowledge.

The most profound distinction among the manifestations which constitute the data of philosophy is the duality represented in the segregation of subject and object. Philosophy is impossible without the unquestioned postulate of the reality of the self and the not-self. Reality, Spencer defines as "persistence in consciousness." "The persistent impressions being the persistent results of a persistent cause are for practical purposes the same to us as the cause itself; and may be habitually dealt with as its equivalents." [32] Thus, the bell has sound and the flower color.

Relation, involving objective likenesses and differences, is the universal form of thought. Relations are of two distinct orders; those of co-existence, or Space, and those of sequence, or Time. The concept of Space arises from the consciousness of co-existing positions, that of Time from consecutive positions. When co-existent positions or

[29] *Cf. First Principles,* Part I, Chs. II-V.
[30] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, p. 157.
[31] *Cf. Autobiography,* Vol. II, pp. 86-7.
[32] *First Principles,* pp. 160-2

points in space offer resistance, the concept of matter arises. Body, or occupied extension, is distinguished in consciousness from unoccupied extension or Space. The change of position of co-existing resisting points which takes place successively and not simultaneously, creates the concept of motion. Space and Time are abstracts of the forms of mental relations. Matter and motion are concretes built from the contents of these relations. Motion, however, involves the antecedent concepts of Space, Time and Matter, but is not a derivation of these. It implies the further concept of Force, which is "the ultimate of ultimates." "Thus all other modes of consciousness are derivable from the experience of Force; but experiences of Force are not derivable from anything else." [33]

It follows, therefore, that "An Unknown Cause of the Known effects which we call phenomena, likenesses and differences among these known effects, and a segregation of the effects into subject and object—these are the postulates without which we cannot think." [34]

Derived from the postulates of knowledge are three principles or processes without which science is impossible. These it is necessary to establish.

1. *The Indestructibility of Matter.*

The old assumption of the creation of something out of nothing is inconceivable logically, since it is impossible for nothing ever to become an object of consciousness. The reverse also is true. Could quantities and weights be annihilated, magic could arise, but not science. Logical arguments are supplemented, however, by quantitative chemistry which harmonizes experience with the facts and makes clear the difference between the vanishing of substances from the range of vision and vanishing from space. Thus clouds may disappear or water evaporate without involving the assumption of the annihilation of matter.

2. *The Continuity of Motion.*

Likewise if motion could proceed from nothing or lapse into nothing, no science would be possible. What appears to be arrested motion is merely its transformation into change of position or strain. Molar motion, lost by friction, is converted into molecular motion. The space-element or velocity may be transformed into the force-element or

[33] *First Principles,* p. 169.

[34] *Ibid.,* p. 171. *Cf.* Ward's criticism of Spencer's "Dynamist" theory and his discussion of the theory of the "Materialist" who conceives of matter as the starting point of reality, matter being "what it seems to be" and all other relations being derived from its manifestations. *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 158 and 221 ff.

momentum, or vice versa, but its quantity is unchangeable in thought. Thus the laws of Motion may be formulated by a Newton and a science of Physics established.

3. *The Persistence of Force.*

The indestructibility of matter and the continuity of motion are manifested in terms of force. But the concept of force is ultimate. The mind cannot formulate the concept of "an isolated force beginning and ending in nothing . . . any force manifested implies an equal antecedent force, from which it is derived, and against which it is a reaction." [35] While the persistence of force involves the concept of some cause which transcends our knowledge, its concrete manifestations in experience comprise the data of the science of Dynamics which constitute its visible proof.

Four corollaries are deduced from the "ultimate universal truth that force persists":

1. *The Persistence of Relations among Forces.*

Equal forces exerted upon identical objects under like conditions produce identical results. This is simply the uniformity which is the basis of law in the science of Dynamics. To deny this would involve the assumption of uncaused effects and the creation or annihilation of force—a manifest contradiction in thought, and a denial of the persistence of force.

2. *The Transformation and Equivalence of Forces.*

The metamorphosis of physical forces is a matter of experience and observation. The motion in the hammer which strikes a stone or a bell is transformed into vibrations which produce heat, light, or sound. Electricity is converted into magnetism, heat and light. Chemical action results in various manifestations of transformed force. Vital, psychic and social forces are transformations of physical force.

The universality of this principle throughout the cosmos is demonstrated and is traced successively in the Solar System, in geological changes, in the Earth's surface, in vital phenomena, vegetal and animal, in mental processes, and in the activities of human society.

For the lack of space we omit all applications except to society. "Whatever takes place in a society is due to organic or inorganic agencies, or to a combination of the two—results either from the undirected physical forces around, from these physical forces as directed by men, or from the forces of the men themselves. No change can occur in its organization, its modes of activity, or the effects it pro-

[35] *First Principles*, p. 192 c.

duces on the face of the Earth, but what proceeds mediately or immediately, from these." [36]

Social life, power, activity, organization, vary with the size of population, the physical environment, the food supply, the amount of capital and labor, etc.

"If we ask whence come these physical forces from which, through the intermediation of the vital forces, the social forces arise, the reply is of course as heretofore—the solar radiations. Based as the life of a society is on animal and vegetal products; and dependent as these animal and vegetal products are on the light and heat of the sun; it follows that the changes going on in societies are effects of forces having a common origin with those which produce all the other orders of changes that have been analyzed." [37]

3. *The Direction of Motion.*

The laws of direction follow logically from the coexistent forces of attraction and repulsion. "Motion, then, we may say, always follows the line of greatest traction, or the line of least resistance, or the resultant of the two." [38] The direction of motion is, then, always predictable if the forces impinging are known and can be measured. The entire cosmos exhibits these phenomena. We note only those in the realm of the social.

Viewed as an organism, society exhibits all the characteristics of other organisms. It grows, thrives, migrates, fights, exhibits internal changes, consistent with, and resulting from, its environment, physical, vital, and social. The birth rate, emigration and immigration, the type of industry, commerce, the flow of capital, the movements of labor, social customs, and political and moral ideas, follow from the operation of this law, and conformable to Newton's first law of motion, tend to continue in the given direction until diverted by the introduction of new or changed forces.

4. *The Rhythm of Motion.*

Ward observes that the treatment of this subject "offers one of the most brilliant examples of strict philosophic thinking which the world has yet produced." [39]

Rhythm results from the conflict of forces not in equilibrium. The oscillation of the pendulum, the pennant as it flutters in the breeze, the waving of leaves and of grain, the ripples in the stream, the vibration

[36] *First Principles*, p. 218.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 219-20.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 226.
[39] *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

of the bow string, the ethereal undulations of heat, light, sound, and electricity, the waves and the tides, are illustrations of this law. It is universal throughout the domain of nature. Compound rhythm is exhibited in the "beats" of two musical notes and in the variation in tides due to the periodic variation of solar and lunar attractions.

Again passing over its application to the periodicity of planetary movements, terrestrial oscillations of light and darkness and the rhythmic rotation of the seasons, uniformities in physiological action in the pulse beat and the periodic need for food and sleep, and the waves of emotional reaction, we note its application to society. In annual migrations of nomadic societies, seasonal demands in production and consumption, business cycles, statistical curves in prices, births, marriages, and deaths, waves of crime, fluctuations in styles and fashions, alternative changes in political majorities, and "tidal waves" of public opinion, the principle holds good. Social rhythm, because of the combination of diverse influences, is often compound and doubly compound.[40]

The principles enunciated in the foregoing are universal and their operation simultaneous. No one alone explains the cosmos. Analysis must be followed by synthesis. A law must now be sought which describes the history of all concrete processes—the law of "the continuous redistribution of matter and motion."

Evolution

Every material aggregate of which the knowable universe consists is in a condition of incessant change. Its complete history must include two processes: "Its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible."[41] The former is evolution and the latter dissolution. The entire series of changes is described in this: "Loss of motion and consequent integration, eventually followed by gain of motion and consequent disintegration."[42] Both processes are operating constantly in antagonism—the balance constituting growth or decay, life or death. Equilibration is never established completely.

Evolution is simple when it is integrative only, that is, when perturbing influences from environing aggregates in various degrees of

[40] For further elaboration of these principles, *Cf.* Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol I, Part II, Ch. 1 and 2.
[41] *First Principles*, p. 278
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 281.

progress are absent or slight. It is compound when secondary or supplementary changes are taking place and accumulate.

These deductions are now verified by induction, and four stages, in the order of increasing complexity, are described.

1. *Evolution—Simple.*

"Evolution, then, under its primary aspect, is a change from a less coherent form to a more coherent form, consequent on the dissipation of motion and integration of matter." [43]

This generalization is displayed in the Solar System, in the formation of a planet, an organism or a nation. These integrative changes in the social order are termed "Super-organic." [44] They are exemplified in the aggregations of population, the merging of small political units into larger ones, the growth of business monopolies and trade centers. The process involves also the integration of each of the parts into which the whole is subdivided.

2. *Evolution—Complex.*

Advancing to a greater degree of complexity evolution is defined as "a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter." [45]

Mass becomes differentiated and organized. Secondary redistributions result in structural modifications. This principle enunciated and elaborated by Harvey, Wolff and Von Baer [46] is here given universal application. In social evolution, the change from homogeneity to heterogeneity is displayed conspicuously. Primitive society is homogeneous. Individual activities and functions are only slightly differentiated. Integration of tribes is accompanied by differentiation in government, religion, industry, language, arts. Progress then is toward complete aggregation of the human race and the progressive differentiation into races, nations, local subdivisions and increasing complexity of structure and function.

3. *Evolution—More Specific.*

The advance in definiteness of the secondary phenomena requires the elaboration of the definition. Evolution is "a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite coherent heterogeneity, accompanying this dissipation of motion and integration of matter." [47]

[43] *First Principles*, p. 327.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 316.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 360.
[46] *Cf. supra.*, p. 317; also *Ibid.*, p. 337.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 380.

"Along with an advance from simplicity to complexity, there is an advance from confusion to order—from undetermined arrangement to determined arrangement. Development, no matter of what kind, exhibits not only a multiplication of unlike parts, but an increase in the distinctness with which these parts are marked off from one another." [48]

The definiteness of structure and arrangement in the developed Solar System, the existing state of the Earth's crust, present flora and fauna, and modern modes of thought, no more clearly illustrate this principle than does developed society. Barbarism is far less definite in its social order than is civilization with its differentiated nations with settled territory and fixed boundaries; its differentiation of social classes with fixed rank, functions and privileges; its rigidity of custom and its codes of law; and its standardized systems of religion and education.

4. *Evolution—Final Definition.*

The redistribution of motion accompanies the redistribution of matter, and this must be emphasized in a final definition, which is: *"Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."* [49]

The integration and differentiation of mass into structures involves the integration and differentiation of their retained motion. Concrete motion results from the integration of diffused motion. In the physical universe the molecular motion through integration is transformed into the specific movements of gases, liquids and solids. The rhythmical undulations of light, heat, sound and electricity are other forms of integrated motion. In biology the process "is mainly what we understand as the development of functions" [50] and in psychological analysis, "the phenomena subjectively known as changes in consciousness, are objectively known as nervous excitations and discharges, which science now interprets into modes of motion." [51]

Likewise in the course of social evolution, "the movements of functions produced by the confluence of individual actions, increase in their amounts, their multiformities, their precision, and their combination." [52] Thus social organization increases in order and definiteness as social functions acquire precision through integration of retained motion.

[48] *First Principles,* p. 362.
[49] *Ibid.,* p. 396.
[50] *Ibid.,* pp. 387-8.
[51] *Ibid.,* p. 391.
[52] *Ibid.,* p. 394.

The Interpretation of Evolution

The next task is to exhibit the phenomena of evolution in "synthetic order," and to supplement the previous inductions by their deduction from the Persistence of Force. The elucidation of five great principles completes the summary.

1. *The Instability of the Homogeneous.*

The condition of homogeneity is one of unstable equilibrium. The slightest disturbance from the environing medium destroys the state of perfect homogeneity and initiates processes by which through increasing heterogeneity the stable equilibrium is attained.

Here, as previously, Spencer traces the application of the various principles through the entire series of phenomena. We can deal only with the social.

"Masses of men, in common with all other masses, show a like proclivity similarly caused. . . . A business partnership, balanced as the authority of its members may theoretically be, practically becomes a union in which the authority of one partner is tacitly recognized as greater than that of the other or others. . . . Nor in associations for political, charitable, literary, or other purposes, do we fail to find a like process of division into dominant and subordinate parties. . . . Barbarous and civilized communities are alike characterized by separation into classes, as well as by separation of each class into more important and less important units. . . . Its unstable equilibrium being destroyed, the uniform must gravitate with increasing rapidity into the multiform. And so supremacy and subordination must establish themselves as we see they do, throughout the whole structure of society, from the great class-divisions pervading its entire body, down to village cliques, and even down to every posse of school-boys." [53]

2. *The Multiplication of Effects.*

Force impressed upon a differentiated mass results inevitably in a variety of results. Also, while differentiating the mass the incident force is itself differentiated. "Thus, when one body is struck against another there may be, besides the mechanical result, sound, air currents, fracture, incandescence, and chemical combination." [54] Comparative homogeneity is thus reduced to greater heterogeneity and relatively uniform forces become multiform.

The advance of society toward greater heterogeneity is explainable

[53] *First Principles*, pp. 423-4.
[54] Collins, *Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy*, p. 50.

by this law. The need for food may be considered as a force operating on mankind. On the basis of physical conditions it differentiates occupations, creates the division of labor, specializes social activities, develops arts and sciences, involves nations in war and evolves races. Increased production is followed by growth of population which in turn results in migration and congestion, increases wants, intensifies functional activities and modifies social structures.[55] The Industrial Revolution amply illustrates this process.

3. *Segregation.*

The tendency toward chaotic heterogeneity is offset, however, by the segregation of similar units into homogeneous groups. This process completes the ascending series. It may result from the action of a uniform force on diverse objects or from the action of diverse forces on uniform objects. The segregation of the nebula into a solar system, orderly geologic deposits, and stratification of sediment in a stream are physical illustrations in point.

Social segregation conforms to this law. Human similarities result in class and caste divisions. Associations for economic, political, philanthropic, scientific, artistic and religious purposes reveal likenesses and diversities which constitute the essence of component groups.[56] Thus an indefinite social homogeneity is transformed into a definite social heterogeneity.

4. *Equilibration.*

"In all cases, then, there is a progress toward equilibration. That universal co-existence of antagonistic forces which, as we before saw, necessitates the universality of rhythm, and which, as we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of every force into divergent forces, at the same time necessitates the ultimate establishment of a balance. . . . Respecting the structural state simultaneously reached, it must obviously be one presenting an arrangement of forces that counterbalance all the forces to which the aggregate is subject. The state of things exhibited in the cycle of terrestrial changes, in the balanced functions of organic bodies that have reached their adult forms, and in the acting and reacting processes of fully developed societies, is similarly one characterized by compensating oscillations." [57]

In society equilibration is going on constantly between population and the means of subsistence,[58] between birth and death rates, between

[55] *Cf. First Principles,* pp. 451-6.
[56] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 476-80.
[57] *Ibid.,* pp. 484-90.
[58] *Cf.* Malthus.

supply and demand, production and distribution, between social structure and social functions, between emigration and immigration, between radicalism and conservatism, between individualization and socialization, between progress and stability.[59]

5. *Dissolution.*

The descending series is described in the term dissolution. "When evolution has run its course—when the aggregate has at length parted with its excess of motion, and habitually receives as much from its environment as it habitually loses—when it has reached that equilibrium in which its changes end; it thereafter remains subject to all actions in its environment which may increase the quantity of motion it contains, and which in the lapse of time are sure, either slowly or suddenly, to give its parts such excess of motion as will cause disintegration." [60]

The death of an organism, of a star, or of a society alike exhibits the characteristics of this process. It is speedy or long deferred according to the instability or stability of its equilibrium.

Thus Spencer brings to an end the present cosmical drama only to postulate the recommencement of another grand cycle similar to the one through which it has passed.

His own contention for the validity of the theory should not be omitted. "Having grouped the changes which all orders of existences display into inductions; having merged these inductions into a single induction; having interpreted this induction deductively; having seen that the ultimate truth from which it is deduced is one transcending proof; it seems, to say the least, very improbable that there can be established a fundamentally different way of unifying that entire process of things which Philosophy has to interpret. That the foregoing accumulated verifications are all illusive, or that an opposing doctrine can show a greater accumulation of verifications, is not easy to conceive.

"Let no one suppose that any such implied degree of trustworthiness is alleged of the various minor propositions brought in illustration of the general argument. Such an assumption would be so manifestly absurd, that it seems scarcely needful to disclaim it. But the truth of the doctrine as a whole is unaffected by errors in details of its presentation. If it can be shown that the Persistence of Force is not a datum of consciousness; or if it can be shown that the several laws of force above specified are not corollaries from it; or if it can be shown that, given these laws, the redistribution of matter and motion does not neces-

[59] *Cf. First Principles,* pp. 507-13.
[60] *Ibid.,* p. 519.

sarily proceed as described; then, indeed, it will be shown that the theory of Evolution has not the high warrant here claimed for it. But nothing short of this can shake the general conclusions arrived at." [61]

Without passing upon the validity of the theory we may agree with Ward in the closing paragraph of his admirable summary: "Such is a brief and imperfect sketch of the 'First Principles' of Herbert Spencer's Philosophy. No one has yet been found to deny that they give their author a better title to the name of philosopher than belongs to any other to whom it has thus far been applied." [62]

THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY

The reasons for presenting a brief analysis of *The Study of Sociology* at this point are the same as those which actuated Spencer in writing it. Invited by Professor Youmans of New York, founder of the *Popular Science Monthly,* who was in England in the spring of 1870 arranging for the publication of the *International Scientific Series,* to contribute a volume on that subject, he at first demurred on the ground that the task upon which he was engaged was so extensive as to demand all his time and energy, but finally consented, because it afforded opportunity to present a needed introduction to the *Principles of Sociology,* presently to be written, and also because it permitted the discussion of certain ideas not logically a part of a purely philosophical treatise, and further, as a means of creating interest in the subject which would lead to its serious pursuit. Arrangements were made for its appearance in installments simultaneously in the *Contemporary Review* and in the *Popular Science Monthly.* It was begun in 1872 and finished in 1878. At the end of the period it was revised and published in book form.[63]

In nothing Spencer has written about human society is the principle of causation more clearly or more forcefully presented.

The Need and Possibility of Social Science

The practical need of a science of Sociology arises from the fact that the relation between our social needs and the means of their accomplishment which seem so very simple are in reality very complex.

[61] *First Principles,* pp. 563-4.
[62] *Op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 168.
[63] *Cf. Study of Sociology,* pp. ix-xi.

The ease and assurance with which the "man in the street" offers unhesitatingly solutions for the difficult problems of business, government and welfare, is equaled only by the failure of the schemes proposed when put to the practical test.

A long list of current superstitions is cited, such as: That the leaving of the poker against the grate will make the fire burn, that "thirteen" is an unlucky number, that spilling salt is a bad omen, that it invites bad luck to begin an enterprise on Friday, that certain persons are habitually lucky or unlucky in the distribution of cards, upon which the comment is made that "Minds left ignorant of physical causation, are unlikely to appreciate clearly, if at all, that causation so much more subtile and complex, which runs through the actions of incorporated men. . . . Clearly, those in whom the consciousness of causation in these simple cases is so vague, may be expected to have the wildest notions of social causation." [64]

Even men trained in physical science and who are familiar with forces and processes in their specific subjects exhibit notable incongruities when they approach other orders of natural phenomena and often listen with "raised eyebrows" when scientific analysis of collective human life is attempted. Thus there passes current, and often without criticism, such erroneous conceptions as: "That the boy who studies longest will learn most," that the "restraint system" is the proper treatment for lunatics, that the "severity" of punishment reduces crime, that "legal restraints" keep men from encroachment upon their neighbors, that "beliefs in purgatory and priestly intercession" regenerate society.

The substitution of knowledge for superstition, of science for magic, has proved of incalculable benefit to mankind in the control of nature, in the treatment of disease, in the development of agriculture. A science of society should equally be valuable in social and political improvement. The "must do something" impulse is as dangerous in society as elsewhere unless directed by intelligence.

Two forms of the "passive denial" of a Social Science are discussed.

The theological interpretation reveals a state of mind in which there can be no scientific interpretation. Samples are, "The Methodist who, before going on a journey or removing to another house, opens his Bible, and in the first passage his eye rests upon, finds an intimation of approval or disapproval from heaven." "That the welfare of Eng-

[64] *Study of Sociology*, pp. 4-5.

land in comparison with Continental States, has been a reward for better observance of the Sunday, or that an invasion of cholera was consequent on the omission of *Dei gratia* from an issue of coins." [65]

Two writers, one English and the other French, are quoted at some length to exhibit a form of mind which, in the records of the past, everywhere "sees interpositions of the Deity to bring about results that appear to the interpreter the most desirable." We present but two examples: "It seemed good to the All-beneficent Disposer of human events, to overrule every obstacle; and through His instrument, William of Normandy, to expurgate the evils of the land; and to resuscitate its dying powers," and "The Revolution, moderate, cunning, sagacious, Machiavellian, diabolically clever, has been vanquished and confounded by divine justice in the person and in the government of Napoleon III." [66]

That this method of interpretation has not disappeared, notwithstanding the rapid development of the scientific habit of mind, we cite two modern instances:

"Nations, like individuals, are the tools of Providence. We may think we understand the reasons of our actions, but we do not know the aims of Providence until the results are achieved.

"The thirteen American colonies thought they knew why they revolted against England, but what they thought is rarely remembered, while the purposes of Providence, who wished to establish political freedom in the world, will be known in eternity.

"The French commune was swayed by hatred and revenge but Providence wrote equality large across the page of the French Revolution.

"The American North and South fought over the right of secession but Providence turned the War into one for the abolition of slavery." [67]

The following appeared in the Philadelphia *Public Ledger,* Oct. 21, 1918:

"With the hope of protecting Orthodox Russian Jews of Philadelphia from further ravages of the influenza epidemic, Harry Rosenberg, 711 South Fourth Street, was married to Mrs. Fanny Jacobs at the first line of graves in the Jewish cemetery, Cemetery Lane, near Cobb's Creek, at 3 o'clock yesterday afternoon.

[65] *Study of Sociology,* p. 25.
[66] *Ibid.,* pp. 26-7.
[67] Edward von Mach, *England and Providence,* in *The Fatherland,* Vol. II, No. 4, Mar. 3, 1915, p. 11.

"With the grim white and gray tombstones and monuments as background, more than 1200 Russian Jews, in silence and awe, watched Rabbi Lipschutz perform the wedding ceremony. . . .

"This marriage in a cemetery, with the idea of warding off the ravages of an epidemic, is a revival of a custom which has prevailed for hundreds of years in the heart of Russia. . . .

"When the recent epidemic of influenza began to take its toll of Russian Jews in Philadelphia by the score, some of the elders, now residents of the city, but who had witnessed the reported staying of the cholera in Russia fifty years ago by the marriage in the graveyard, determined to invoke the efficacy of the custom to save the lives of their remaining fellows."

The "Great Man Theory," or the "biographical view of human affairs," is equally extensive and unscientific. This theory is combined with the former in the assumption that great leaders are providentially raised up to solve our social and political problems. Originating in the hero worship of the savage, and surviving in the old type of history which consists mainly in the narrative of the doings of great men, it has all but universal currency among untrained minds.

Unless the great man is regarded as a natural product of that age-long aggregation of forces physical, vital, psychic, and social, and of which he is the resultant, no scientific analysis is possible.

Since social sequences have a natural and ascertainable order, and every social effect is the result of causes adequate to produce it, social science is possible, and awaits development at the hands of those who have the diligence and mental acumen to pursue it.

The Nature of Social Science

Two general principles are laid down:

1. Throughout all phenomena of matter the nature of the units pre-determines the nature of the aggregates. Identical structures cannot be made of bricks and cannon balls. The character of chemical elements determines their compounds. The nature of the seed determines the character of the plant. Likewise, the character of social units determines the nature of social aggregates. The savage and the civilized man construct different forms of social organization. Confusion results from the belief that there is one law for the rest of the Universe and another for mankind. In the *First Principles,* the *Principles of Biology,* and the *Principles of Psychology,* Spencer has overthrown this belief.

2. Results must be interpreted with reference to the external conditions to which the aggregates are exposed, viz., the environment. Chemicals act differently under varying degrees of temperature. Animal and vegetal life are modified by diverse physical factors. In the same manner, societies are affected by topography, food supply, latitude and neighboring societies. Difficulties of interpretation increase with the complexity of the phenomena. Even in the most exact sciences, prevision of absolute exactness is wanting not because of any lack of conformity to law, but because certain data are not obtainable. For example, in the blasting of a mine, the quantity of explosive, and the amount of stone that will be moved, may be predicted with relative certainty but in what direction or to what height any particular particle of stone may be hurled cannot accurately be determined. So in society, the death rate may be predictable, but which child may die in infancy or which man may die of any specific disease or from any injury, or in what month or year, may not be known because of the complexity of hereditary and environmental factors. The reliability of observations in general is sufficient to establish laws of population and to afford a sound basis for the successful operation of a life insurance society.

The concept of society as a "social organism" exhibiting the nature, structures and functions of other organisms and its conformity to the laws of life in general, we leave for its more adequate treatment in the *Principles of Sociology*.[68]

Difficulties of Social Science

"From the intrinsic nature of its facts, from our own natures as observers of its facts, and from the peculiar relation in which we stand towards the facts to be observed, there arise impediments in the way of Sociology greater than those in the way of any other science." [69]

The phenomena of society to be generalized cannot be studied by the use of the scale, the scalpel, the crucible, the thermometer, the microscope, or the clock. They require more elaborate and complex methods of observation.

At first men brought with them into the new field of social inquiry, the methods employed in more specific and concrete spheres, and these

[68] *Cf. Study of Sociology*, pp. 48-71.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

often proved inadequate and even non-adaptable in their application to the more diverse and complex phenomena of society.

Moreover, in no other instance have men investigated aggregates of which they were a part, and in which their emotional reactions were so liable to bias judgment or to derange conclusions. "To cut himself off in thought from all his relationships of race, and country, and citizenship—to get rid of all those interests, prejudices, likings, superstitions, generated in him by the life of his own society and his own time—to look on all the changes societies have undergone and are undergoing, without reference to nationality, or creed, or personal welfare; is what the average man cannot do at all, and what the exceptional man can do very imperfectly." [70]

Objective Difficulties.

These consist in the uncertainty of historical data, the confusion of newly perceived facts with new facts, the distorted medium through which facts reach us, the tendency to set down as facts mere inferences from facts, vicious uses of statistics, and the wide distribution of facts in time and space.

Subjective Difficulties—Intellectual.

These involve the apparent inability to conceive of the nature and of the behavior of other men except in terms of our own ideas and feelings, the frequent lack of sufficiently complex intellectual faculties to enable us to grasp the extreme complexity of the phenomena, and the want of sufficient intellectual plasticity to enable us to regard as natural those products of social life and experience, either past or contemporary, which may be unlike or opposed to ours.

Subjective Difficulties—Emotional.

"Passion perverts judgment" and "emotion of every kind and degree disturbs the intellectual balance." "Excited feelings make us wrongly estimate probability . . . and importance." [71] Political prejudices, race antipathies, class hatreds, industrial antagonisms are determining factors in the sway of public opinion and render it difficult to secure dispassionate consideration of questions of public importance. Witness the impatience men show in the overthrow of their cherished convictions, the excitement engendered in political and religious discussion, the frenzy of the mob or the psychology of war. Feelings of like and dislike, emotions of love and hate, make rational judgments difficult in all matters both private and public which involve ourselves.

[70] *Study of Sociology*, p. 74.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

Chapters are devoted to the elaboration of emotional difficulties involved in the Educational Bias, The Bias of Patriotism, the Class Bias, The Political Bias, The Theological Bias, which for lack of space we pass over, their implications being sufficiently clear.

Discipline Necessary to the Study of Sociology

"Right thinking in any matter depends very much on the *habit* of thought; and the habit of thought, partly natural, depends in part on the artificial influences to which the mind has been subjected." [72]

The "habit of thought" requisite to the study of Sociology which involves the phenomena of all other sciences, is acquired by no less a discipline than one which includes their entire range. The Abstract sciences, as mathematics and logic, afford the sense of the *necessity of relations.* The abstract-concrete sciences, as mechanics, physics and chemistry, produce the consciousness of *cause and effect,* while the Concrete sciences, as astronomy and geology, yield the conceptions of *continuity, complexity* and *contingency.*

To this must be added the study of the science of life and of mind. Comte is given credit for "having set forth with comparative definiteness, the connection between the Science of Life and the Science of Society." He agrees with Comte "that the facts presented by masses of associated men, are facts of the same order as those presented by groups of gregarious creatures of inferior kinds" and that "the methods of inquiry which Biology uses are methods to be used by Sociology." [73] To this he adds a more comprehensive statement: "In the first place, all social actions being determined by the actions of individuals, and all actions of individuals being vital actions that conform to the laws of life at large, a rational interpretation of social actions implies knowledge of the laws of life. In the second place, a society as a whole, considered apart from its living units, presents phenomena of growth, structure, and function, like those of growth, structure and function in an individual body; and these last are needful keys to the first." [74]

Preparation in Psychology is equally essential. Having surveyed the practical problems of legislation, education, moral discipline, and even the social and political effects likely to follow the "increase of

[72] *Study of Sociology,* p. 314.
[73] *Ibid.,* p. 328.
[74] *Ibid.,* p. 330.

feminine influence" because of differences in the psychology of the sexes, he concludes: "No one, indeed, who is once led to dwell on the matter, can fail to see how absurd is the supposition that there can be a rational interpretation of men's combined actions, without a previous rational interpretation of those thoughts and feelings by which their individual actions are prompted. Nothing comes out of a society but what originates in the motive of an individual, or in the united similar motives of many individuals, or in the conflict of the united similar motives of some having certain interests, with the diverse motives of others whose interests are different. Always the power which initiates a change is feeling, separate or aggregated, guided to its ends by intellect; and not even an approach to an explanation of social phenomena can be made, without the thoughts and sentiments of citizens being recognized as factors. How, then, can there be a true account of social actions without a true account of these thoughts and sentiments?" [75]

In conclusion, it may be said that "The study of Sociology is the study of Evolution in its most complex form." [76] If the subject involves peculiar difficulties, and requires for its pursuit unusual preparation, it thereby constitutes a superior challenge to the industry and intelligence of those who would undertake it, and its rewards are commensurate with the task.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

It has been remarked frequently by students of Spencer, that his theory of Sociology is found in the *First Principles,* rather than in the *Principles of Sociology.* This is true only in the sense that it is equally true of his theory of Biology and Psychology. The foundation for his entire system of thought was laid down in the *First Principles,* and its mastery is a necessary prerequisite to the understanding of each of these subjects. Nevertheless, minds less disciplined and erudite would with difficulty perceive the implications of the theory without its elaboration in more extensive form.

The three volumes of the *Principles of Sociology* are divided into eight parts: The Data of Sociology, The Inductions of Sociology, Domestic, Ceremonial, Political, Ecclesiastical, Professional, and Industrial Institutions. The study of social institutions falls rather under

[75] *Study of Sociology,* p. 382.
[76] *Ibid.,* p. 385.

the title of Descriptive Sociology and while their discussion contains much in the way of the application of social theory, the theory itself is contained mainly in the first and second parts, to which, for lack of space, we must alone confine our attention.

The Data of Sociology

The term "Super-Organic Evolution," first used in *First Principles*, page 316, is defined more specifically as that phase of Evolution which includes "all these processes and products which imply the coördinated actions of many individuals." [77] The principal groups of such phenomena are presented by "social insects," communities among "the Higher Vertebrata," and "human societies."

Bearing in mind the principle, implicit in the *First Principles* and formulated in the *Study of Sociology*,[78] that the behavior of every aggregate is determined by the nature of its component units and by the forces to which it is exposed, the data of Sociology must include all those factors of social phenomena which condition the life and activity of any society.

Summarized and condensed they are :

Original extrinsic factors of climate, including temperature and humidity; of surface, including fertility and configuration; of flora, both quantity and kind; and fauna, both useful and injurious.

Original intrinsic factors comprise physical traits, degrees of strength, activity and endurance; emotional traits which aid, hinder, or modify social activities; and intellectual traits, including degrees of intelligence and peculiar tendencies of thought.[79]

The secondary or derived factors include: (1) Such progressive modifications of environment as society effects. They are alterations of climate and surface produced by deforestation and drainage; of Flora by increased culture, the production of better varieties or the introduction of new species of useful vegetation; of Fauna, by destruction of injurious species, and by domestication, increase and importation of useful ones. (2) The increase in size and density of the social aggregate, accompanied by increasing heterogeneity of structure and function. (3) The reciprocal influences of society and its units. (4) The action and reaction of any society to its super-organic environment. And (5) the accumulation of super-organic products of

[77] *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 4.
[78] *Cf. supra.*, pp. 333-4.
[79] *Cf. ibid.*, p. 9.

material appliances, language, knowledge, customs, laws, and institutions.[80]

Primitive Ideas—The Ghost Theory of the Origin of Religion

Several assumptions, deducible from previously developed theory, underlie Spencer's treatment of this subject. First of all, it has been shown that social phenomena rest basically on psychic phenomena. The social bond which unites men in society is mental. Ideas, then, are the fundamental data of Sociology. Second, since society is an evolution, it arises out of primordial ideas, and these must be sought, not in developed society, but among primitive men. Third, the primitive man thinks, and thinks clearly within the narrow range of his experience. Every conception rests on some belief with regard to himself and the world in which he lives. Religious and scientific ideas are totally undifferentiated. Fourth, the laws of thought being everywhere the same, primitive ideas are natural, and under the circumstances, logical. The theories of the modern man differ from those of the savage only because of greater knowledge, more accurate methods of observation, and the higher degree of credibility of experience.[81]

We are now prepared for an inductive analysis of the phenomena presented by primitive ideas. To the untutored mind of the savage things are what they seem to be. The appearance and disappearance of clouds, of sun, moon, and stars; of meteors, lightning and rainbows, create the concept of "perceptible and imperceptible" modes of existence.

Metamorphoses in plant and animal life, such as seeds into plants, eggs into birds, caterpillars into butterflies, impresses the belief in the transmutation of one substance into another.

Shadows, reflections and echoes, without any knowledge of the refraction of light and sound, are realities which inevitably produce the concept of duality.[82]

Motion implies life, and animism is a natural deduction of the savage mind. In this way, moving objects are endowed with life or spirits. While a distinction is made between animate and inanimate objects, we

[80] *Cf. Principles of Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 8-15. For an extended discussion of these factors the student is referred to Chapters III to VII. Caution, however, should be exercised in the acceptance of conclusions drawn from the inadequate and somewhat erroneous anthropological and psychological data available to Spencer. Errors of inference, however, in no way detract from the validity of the general scheme.

[81] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 94-107; also, Ward, *Op. cit.,* pp. 193-8.

[82] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 107-24.

find here "the seed of that system of superstitions which the primitive man forms." [83]

In the absence of the abstract concept of Mind, dreams constitute realities which can be interpreted only by the notion of dual individualities. The soul departs from the body in sleep, has experiences, and returns. Somnambulism confirms this hypothesis.[84]

Swoon, coma, apoplexy, catalepsy, and other comatose states require similar interpretation. The other self remains away for indefinite periods of time and the return sometimes is more difficult to induce.

The interpretation of death follows logically. That death is sleep survives in modern terminology. The other self has not returned, but it may yet return. Insensibility varies in length and degree, and reanimation is induced with greater or less difficulty. Hence the widespread savage customs, often extending to mutilation, in efforts to revive the corpse. Immediate failure does not destroy future expectation. Resurrection is the logical deduction, and the placing of food upon the grave, the embalming of the body, and other practices evidence the intensity and extensiveness of this belief.[85]

The existence of disembodied entities, as souls, ghosts, spirits, demons, is the necessary inference. No better confirmation is needed than the appearance of the dead to the living in dreams. They are ethereal or substantial, visible or invisible, identical or transmutable. They are good or bad, friendly or malignant, in harmony with the personality to which they belong.[86]

Continued existence implies a belief in a future life. Since souls are doubles, their needs, occupations, pleasures, and social arrangements are continuous. Hence the burial of the dead man's belongings in the grave with him that he may continue in their use and enjoyment, and the extensive and varied practices of immolation. Wives, slaves, and even friends, are sacrificed, that the dead may not be deprived of his customary associations.[87]

Existence involves place. Haunting at first the familiar locality, or the grave of the body, the spirits come finally to inhabit distinct localities which become Sheol, the under-world, the sky or heaven.[88]

Recently departed spirits, continuously accumulating, form a sur-

[83] *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 133.
[84] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 134-44.
[85] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 153-70.
[86] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 171-83.
[87] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 184-200.
[88] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 201-17.

rounding but invisible population. They constitute a source of supernatural influence which affords the most natural theory of causation to the savage mind. In this way, all unaccustomed physical changes are explained, and all the exigencies in the affairs of men, their successes and their failures, are intelligible.[89]

If the departed spirit may reënter its own body it may enter the body of another. Unusual physical or mental states are thus explained. In this way arose the theory of "demoniacal possession" or the "possession of evil spirits" as the explanation of epilepsy, convulsions, delirium, insanity and disease.[90]

If a "wicked soul of the dead" may inhabit another body, so likewise may the ghost of a friend or an ancestor. Superhuman strength or intelligence may thus be acquired. Inspiration, divination, exorcism and sorcery have their origin and power explained. Magic passes insensibly into miracle and efforts to induce such powers through the establishing of amicable relations with good spirits becomes a fixed policy.[91]

The abodes of the dead awaken in the savage the emotion of fear—an emotion from which the civilized man scarcely is freed. "The original sacred place is the place where the dead are, and which their ghosts are supposed to frequent; the sheltering cave, or house, or other chamber for the dead, becomes the sacred chamber or temple; and that on which offerings for the dead are put becomes the sacred support for offerings—the altar. Food and drink and other things laid for the dead, grow into sacrifices and libations to the gods; while immolations of victims, blood-offerings, mutilations, cutting-off of hair, originally occurring at the grave, occur afterwards before idols and as marks of fealty to a deity. Fasting as a funeral rite, passes into fasting as a religious rite; and lamentations, too, occur under both forms. Praises of the dead, chanted at the burial and afterwards, and recurring at festivals, pass into praises forming parts of religious worship; and prayers made to the dead for aid, for blessing, for protection, become prayers made to divinities for like advantages. Ancestral ghosts supposed to cause diseases, as gods send pestilences, are similarly propitiated by special sacrifices; the ascribed motives of ghosts and gods being the same in kind, and the modes of appealing to those motives the same." [92]

[89] *Cf. Principles of Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 218-25.
[90] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 226-35.
[91] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 236-52.
[92] *Ibid.,* pp. 281-2.

Other corollaries from the belief in the surviving duplicate illuminate the original conceptions of a supernatural being.

Ancestor-worship, all but universal among primitive peoples, and extensive among more developed societies, arises from the natural inclination and endeavor to propitiate the ghosts of illustrious ancestors and heroes.[93]

The primitive concept that the properties of aggregates adhere to all their parts, and even to their likenesses and to associated objects, gives rise to fetish-worship. Idols, images, and relics thus become objects of religious veneration.[94]

That a being may assume a different form is a natural inference of the savage mind from the knowledge of metamorphoses with which he is familiar. Men may be transformed into animals and animals into men. Thus creatures which infest the abodes of the dead are the incarnation of departed spirits. Thus animal worship arises as a logical consequence.[95]

We have seen that delirium, insanity, or any unusual mental state is attributed to "spirit possession." Thus intoxicants produced from vegetation are "spiritous liquors," and the attribution of supernatural personality to vegetation is one of the chief roots of plant-worship, and like animal-worship is an aberrant species of ancestor-worship.[96]

The personalization of natural objects and forces results in nature-worship which is a further derivative from ancestor worship. "Partly by confounding the parentage of the race with a conspicuous object marking the natal region of the race, partly by literal interpretation of birth-names, and partly by literal interpretation of names given in eulogy, there have been produced beliefs in descent from mountains, from the sea, from the dawn, from animals which have become constellations, and from persons once on Earth who now appear as Moon and Sun. Implicitly believing the statements of forefathers, the savage and semi-civilized have been compelled grotesquely to combine natural powers with human attributes and histories; and have been thus led into the strange customs of propitiating these great terrestrial and celestial objects by such offerings of food and blood as they habitually made to other ancestors." [97]

We have observed that the savage mind identifies the incompre-

[93] *Cf. Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 285-305.
[94] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 306-28.
[95] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 329-54.
[96] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 355-68.
[97] *Ibid.*, pp. 393-4.

hensible with the supernatural. Divinity is thus ascribed to remarkable men—the remote founder of the tribe, the chief famed for bravery, the medicine-man, the superior stranger. The awe with which he is regarded during life increases after death, and propitiation of his ghost becomes an established worship. Rank among the gods is inferable from rank among men, and the "big chief" of the gods becomes the "great spirit."

"Using the phrase ancestor-worship in its broadest sense as comprehending all worship of the dead, be they of the same blood or not, we conclude that ancestor-worship is the root of every religion." [98]

Ward evaluates this remarkable theory as follows: "The theory here sketched, and which is elaborated with great care and skill by Mr. Spencer, is remarkable in a number of respects. In the first place, it is the first attempt ever made to trace the real history of religion to its original source in the phenomena of nature and the laws of thought. If true, it constitutes the genesis of religion, and explains all the most difficult facts connected with its existence and diffusion among men. In the second place, this effort is remarkable from the manner of its presentation. It is no mere theory elaborated out of the web of logic in the author's brain. In every particular he has allowed himself to drift with the current of accumulating facts. . . .

"Finally, the manner in which the facts have been marshalled by Mr. Spencer would in itself constitute a new departure. For the first time the bearing of this class of facts upon the law of evolution has been recognized and pointed out. Not only worlds, and plants, and animals, and society, but ideas themselves have been evolved according to the same universal laws. The phenomena of society rest on those of mind. It is, therefore, fitting that the first chapter in the evolution of society should be a treatise on the evolution of thought. As we have seen, primitive ideas are necessarily religious ideas. We might almost as well have said that primitive ideas are scientific ideas. They partake of the nature of both. On the one hand, they are filled with awe for the mysteries of the unknown, fear of the invisible, faith in the incomprehensible. In so far they are religious. On the other hand, they are the products of an effort to explain the unknown, they are gropings after truth, theories of the Cosmos. As such they are identical with those ideas now regarded as possessing the highest scientific purity. The truth is, that primitive ideas are the chaotic stage of thought. They are the *nebulae* of future systems, both of religion

[98] Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 422.

and of science—the confused, undifferentiated, primordial aggregate out of which in due process of evolution will come at last both the proper reverence of the Unknowable and the fullest acquaintance with the Knowable." [99]

The Inductions of Sociology

Unless society is a concrete and permanent entity, an evolving aggregate constituting a tangible individuality apart from the individuality of its discrete units, no science of society is possible. In order to establish the fact that society does constitute such a body of phenomena subject to scientific analysis, Spencer develops here the theory, frequently enunciated previously, of the fundamental analogy between society and an organism.

The chief aspects of this analogy are:

1. Growth is a process common to both organic and social aggregates. Growth involves augmentation of mass, and in each instance exhibits the common characteristics of increase from germs of minute homogeneous masses, of variability in the rate or amount, and of internal multiplication and compounding of units.[100]

2. Increase of size is accompanied by evolution of structure,—integration being accompanied by differentiation. Increase in complexity is followed also by increase in definiteness. By this process the small homogeneous primitive horde becomes the heterogeneous and complex civil society.[101]

3. Differentiation of structures involves differentiation of functions. The general function of the organism or society becomes differentiated into specialized functions. Specialization of parts and functions results in increased efficiency and a corresponding decreased adaptation to the performance of other functions.[102]

4. Differentiated organs with specialized functions in both organic and super-organic aggregates increasingly become mutually dependent. Unlike inorganic masses, change in any part produces change in all the rest. Unity is thus synchronized with diversity.[103]

5. The life of an organism or a society is produced and conditioned by the life of its units. Thus the life of the organism or the society may be destroyed without immediately destroying the life of its units,

[99] *Op. cit.*, pp. 206-7.
[100] *Cf. Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 449 and 463-80.
[101] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 449 and 471-84.
[102] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 450 and 485-90.
[103] *Cf. ibid.*, p. 451.

and furthermore, if such catastrophe does not take place, the life of the aggregate is far longer than the individual life of the units or parts of which it is composed.[104]

We turn next to the segregation of organs into mutually dependent systems. Here three fundamental similarities between the organic and superorganic bodies are disclosed.

1. The sustaining system. The alimentary system in organisms is analogous to the system of sustentation in societies. In each instance the nature and the structure of the system is adapted to the means available for sustaining life.[105]

2. The distributing system. Both physical and social "division of labor" require channels of distribution of nutrition to segregated but coöperating parts. The vascular system in organisms, and the means of traffic and communication, the "arteries of commerce," perform respectively these necessary functions.[106]

3. The regulating system. Differentiation and specialization of parts and functions involves the further necessity of a system of organization which enables the organism or society to act as a whole in the sustentation of its life and in its conflict with other organisms or societies. This function is performed respectively by the "nervo-motor" and "governmental-military" systems. The commensurate development of the nervous structure in otherwise evolving organisms is paralleled by the growth of the system of communication in evolving societies.[107]

Thus societies like organism become adjusted to their activities, and because of the diversities of constitution and of environment are segregated into types. The two predominating social types are the *militant,* with its centralized and coercive organization, and the *industrial,* characterized by freedom and voluntary coöperation. Altered social activities, due to changes in environment, result in social metamorphoses—the gradual change from one type into the other.[108]

The constant and insistent use of the term "analogy" exhibits Spencer's concept of the similarities between organisms and societies—a fact which seems to have escaped some of his critics and commentators. Likenesses do not amount to identities.

With equal clearness of comprehension he pointed out two "extreme unlikenesses." First, "The parts of an animal form a concrete

[104] *Cf. Principles of Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 453-5.
[105] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 498-504.
[106] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 505-18.
[107] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 519-58.
[108] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 549-87.

whole; but the parts of a society form a whole which is discrete." [109] This, however, does not destroy the analogy in general, since, while social units are not organically united, the social mechanism of communication secures mutual dependence of units sufficient to constitute the social aggregate a living whole.

Second, "In the one, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate. In the other, it is diffused throughout the aggregate; all the units possess the capacity for happiness and misery, if not in equal degrees, still in degrees that approximate." [110] A fundamental difference results from this fact. Since there is no "social sensorium" the welfare of society is not a consideration apart from its units as is the case in the organism.

In concluding this section it seems safe to assert that this biological analogy, while it remains an analogy and subject to all the limitations of this method of reasoning, constituted one of Spencer's chief contributions to developing social theory. It was one of the land-marks of that development. Despite its defects, it established upon an enduring foundation the organic concept and fixed it in the process of social thinking. In this connection we quote from Small: *"Not merely in sociology, but in every department of knowledge, the organic concept is the most distinctive modern note.* . . . The most intimate and complex and constructive coherence of elements that we discover, previous to our study of society, is the co-working of part with part in vital phenomena. . . . There are functional relationships between men in association that are analogous with functional relationships between parts of living bodies. No analogies seem to be closer, on the whole, to the societary facts than those in biological facts." [111]

Again Ward's estimate seems *apropos:* "The chief service that has been done in pointing out these analogies so minutely has been that of demonstrating by means of them that society is an evolving aggregate. This was the truth that most needed demonstration, being the one commonly called in question. The denial of this proposition is fatal to all attempts to study sociology as a branch of science. No one doubts now that organisms may be legitimately so studied. When, therefore, it is shown that nearly all the phenomena which a living creature presents are directly comparable to exactly corresponding phenomena in society, the strongest proof that can be presented of the scientific character of

[109] *Principles of Sociology,* Vol. I, p. 457.
[110] *Ibid.,* p. 461.
[111] *General Sociology,* pp. 74-5.

social processes has been furnished. And when it is shown that society has passed through all the stages of evolution that living creatures have, and has been subject to all the laws, principles, and processes of evolution in general, the case seems to be pretty thoroughly made out." [112]

EPITOME AND EXPLANATION

To attempt an epitome of Spencer's system of philosophy, comprising as it does ten volumes of more than 6,000 pages, would require a degree of temerity possessed by few. Besides Spencer himself, no one, it appears, has made the attempt. In the *Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy,* edited by Collins, pages viii-xi, Spencer published a series of abstract propositions covering his entire system which had been prepared previously at the request of an American friend.

In 1900, Professor Giddings prepared a scheme of compact propositions summarizing Spencer's sociological system, to which Spencer gave his endorsement in a letter dated Dec. 7th of that year. The scheme follows:

1. "Societies are organisms, or they are super-organic aggregates.

2. "Between societies and environing bodies, as between other finite aggregates in nature, there is an equilibration of energy. There is equilibration between society and society, between one social group and another, between one social class and another.

3. "Equilibration between society and society, between societies and their environment, takes the form of a struggle for existence among societies. Conflict becomes an habitual activity of society.

4. "In this struggle for existence fear of the living and of the dead arises. Fear of the living, supplementing conflict, becomes the root of political control. Fear of the dead becomes the root of religious control.

5. "Organized and directed by political and religious control habitual conflict becomes militarism. Militarism moulds character and conduct and social organization into fitness for habitual warfare.

6. "Militarism combines small social groups into larger ones, these into larger and yet larger ones. It achieves social integration. This process widens the area within which an increasingly large proportion of the population is habitually at peace and industrially employed.

7. "Habitual peace and industry moulds character, conduct, and social organization into fitness for peaceful, friendly, sympathetic life.

[112] *Op. cit.,* pp. 209-10.

8. "In the peaceful type of society coercion diminishes, spontaneity and individual initiative increase. Social organization becomes plastic, and individuals moving freely from place to place change their social relations without destroying social cohesion, the elements of which are sympathy and knowledge in the place of primitive force.

9. "The change from militarism to industrialism depends upon the extent of the equilibrium of energy between any given society and its neighboring societies, between the societies of any given race and those of other races, between society in general and its physical environment. Peaceful industrialism cannot finally be established until the equilibrium of nations and of races is established.

10. "In society, as in other finite aggregates, the extent of differentiation and the total complexity of all the evolutionary processes depend upon the rate at which integration proceeds. The slower the rate the more complete and satisfactory is the evolution." [113]

Commenting upon the lack of thoroughgoing analysis of his system and appreciation of his aim, Spencer in the Appendix to his last book, *Facts and Comments,* says: "Since the issue of the *Synthetic Philosophy,* commenced in 1860, there has, so far as I know, been only a single review article in which a concise account of its leading ideas was attempted; and that was in an American provincial paper. In no daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly periodical in England has a reviewer sought to explain what it is all about. Of one small installment a clear idea was given some twenty years ago; but a general idea of the whole, no critic has ever attempted to give during the forty years which have now passed." [114]

Only occasionally does Spencer himself speak of the aim of his work. Its first definite mention occurs in a letter written in 1878 and published in the *Autobiography* (Vol. II, pp. 369-70). He says: "I have some idea of writing and publishing as I am now doing in the *Fortnightly,* the first division of the *Principles of Morality;* showing how morality is to be dealt with from the Evolution point of view, as the outcome of all preceding investigations. I begin to feel that it is quite a possible thing that I may never get through both the other volumes of the *Principles of Sociology,* and that, if I go on writing them, and not doing anything towards the *Principles of Morality,* till they are done, it may result in this last subject remaining untreated altogether; and since the whole

[113] *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* pp. 113-14.
[114] *Cf.* Tillett, *Introduction to Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy,* p. 1.

system was at the outset, and has ever continued to be, a basis for a right rule of life, individual and social, it would be a great misfortune if this, which is the outcome of it all, should remain undone."

In the Preface to the *Data of Ethics* (p. vii) he restates the case more concisely: "This last part of the task it is, to which I regard all the preceding parts as subsidiary. Written as far back as 1842, my first essay, consisting of letters on *The Proper Sphere of Government*, vaguely indicated what I conceived to be certain general principles of right and wrong in political conduct; and from that time onwards my ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate purposes, has been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong in conduct at large, a scientific basis. To leave this purpose unfulfilled after making so extensive a preparation for fulfilling it, would be a failure the probability of which I do not like to contemplate." From this we discover that, as with Comte, the development of Sociology was a secondary aim.

Critics have attacked his religio-metaphysics in his discussion of the Unknowable, Part I of the *First Principles*. His justification for this segregation of ideas was largely an effort to repudiate the charge of materialism and of the secularization of morals. Again we quote from the Preface to the *Data of Ethics* (p. viii): "I am the more anxious to indicate in outline, if I cannot complete, this final work, because the establishment of the rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the secularization of morals is becoming imperative."

Perhaps, at the time, Spencer's choice of words was unfortunate, but a further paragraph shows him to have been neither irreverent, materialistic, nor devoid of the sense of moral obligation. "Few things can happen more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit, before another fitter regulative system has grown up to replace it. Most of those who reject the current creed, appear to assume that the controlling agency furnished by it may safely be thrown aside, and the vacancy left unfilled by any other controlling agency. Meanwhile, those who defend the current creed allege that in the absence of the guidance it yields, no guidance can exist: divine commands, they think the only possible guides. Thus between these extreme opponents there is a certain community. The one holds that the gap left by the disappearance of the code of supernatural ethics, need not be filled by a code of natural ethics; and the other holds that it cannot

be so filled. Both contemplate a vacuum, which the one wishes and the other fears. As the change which promises or threatens to bring about this state, desired or dreaded, is rapidly progressing, those who believe that the vacuum can be filled, and that it must be filled, are called on to do something in pursuance of their belief." [115]

That the pursuance of this effort would involve criticism, he clearly foresaw, but moral conviction cannot be so deterred. "Much adverse comment will, I doubt not, be passed on the theory of right conduct which the following pages shadow forth. Critics of a certain class, far from rejoicing that ethical principles otherwise derived by them, coincide with ethical principles scientifically derived, are offended by the coincidence. Instead of recognizing essential likenesses, they enlarge on superficial differences." [116]

And again: "If, however, any one wishes to insist that 'the establishing of right rules of conduct on a scientific basis' is irreligious, I shall not quarrel, but simply concede it to be an honest difference of opinion. I have at least one clergyman on my side."

The last sentence in the above quotation has probable reference to a letter written by Spencer to Mrs. Sidney Webb in which we find the following: "If you should some day get hold of a book published by a clergyman, the Rev. W. D. Ground, *An Examination of the Structural Principles of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Philosophy,* you will be astonished to find it suggested that I am possibly 'called' to reconstruct the Church of Christ." [117]

Two brief appreciations are added: "In philosophy Herbert Spencer was a great master; in biology a great organizer; in psychology a great founder; and in sociology a great pioneer. It is all very well to say that Spencer's sociology is out of date. That is true only in a little larger degree than would be the assertion that the astronomy of Copernicus, or the physics of Galileo, is out of date. Spencer's sociology is one of the rungs on the ladder by which his successors have been able to climb. As no science can be completely mastered apart from its history, the student of sociology must thoroughly study the works of its two great fore-runners—Comte and Spencer." [118]

At the close of an article in which Cooley points out certain personal defects of Spencer as a man of science and evaluates critically in the light of present knowledge his sociological theory he gives the

[115] *Ibid.,* p. viii.
[116] *Ibid.,* p. ix.
[117] Tillett, *Op. cit.,* p. 17.
[118] Lewis, *An Introduction to Sociology,* p. 88.

following general estimate: "The two strongest impressions I receive on re-reading parts of Spencer are that of the fixity of his limitations and that of the abundance of his mind within these limitations. Although, if I am right, his way of seeing and thinking was not sociological, it was large, keen-edged, and propelled by an intellectual passion almost sublime. Though commonly described as an infidel, his work was a signal act of faith. Never timid or half-hearted, he stained with his life-blood every detail of his vast scheme and defended it as a mother defends her child. He spent his whole life in the elucidation and propagation of truth as he saw it, devoting without question his spirit and all its instruments to this supreme object. Some of his chief defects were virtues in excess; as he might have been more of a man of science had he been less ardent as a philosopher and moralist. That he was a moralist, somewhat dogmatic, but sincere and ready to make sacrifices, there can be no doubt. He shone also as a critic of easy-going conventions. Bold, ingenious, iconoclastic, pungent in illustration, he loved to demolish shams and did it extremely well. He raked up and burned much theological and other rubbish, earning the gratitude of all the liberal world.

"If I have seemed to depreciate him it is perhaps because Spencer set his claims so high that any attempt to estimate them almost inevitably takes the form of lowering his own mark. But, when all is said, he remains a man of extraordinary powers and vast influence upon the thought of his day, if not altogether the equal of Darwin that we once supposed him to be." [119]

Even if we should agree with many of his critics that Spencer lacked erudition and that his moral doctrines were really dangerous, still we cannot believe him to have been deficient in moral courage. In his day, dogmatic theology held the field. To attempt the herculean task of demonstrating to a prejudiced public mind that social phenomena and ethical principles admit of scientific treatment required a degree of moral conviction and moral earnestness unsurpassed by any of his adversaries.

[119] *Reflections upon the Sociology of Herbert Spencer, American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 24, Sept., 1920, pp. 144-5.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. Compare Spencer's theory of the modifiability of human nature as set forth in the Social Statics with S. N. Patten's theory of the "pain and pleasure" economy. *Cf. Theory of Social Forces,* discussed by L. M. Bristol in *Social Adaptation,* pp. 236-44.
2. What light does Walter Bagehot throw upon Spencer's theory of the modifiability of human nature and its relation to social progress? *Cf. supra,* pp. 280-83.
3. It is stated frequently that Spencer's Sociology is contained primarily in his *First Principles* rather than in his *Principles of Sociology.* Discuss this statement critically.
4. Evaluate E. A. Ross' criticism of "Spencer's demonstration that the various propositions which make up the grand law of evolution apply to society." *Cf. Foundations of Sociology,* Ch. III.
5. What is the value of L. F. Ward's criticism that Spencer has omitted "anthropo-teleological" factors of progress and that his sociology is confined to the field of social statics? *Cf. Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, Ch. II.
6. Evaluate Spencer's thesis that social change is always the result of feeling, separate or aggregated, guided to its ends by intellect. *Cf. supra,* p. 337. Compare this with Dealey's analysis of Ward's system in *Sociology, its Development and Applications,* pp. 93-4, and quoted *infra,* pp. 378-9.
7. Make a list of the valuable concepts of Spencer as evaluated by A. W. Small. Also a list of criticisms. Estimate each of these carefully. *Cf. General Sociology,* Chs. VII-IX.
8. Read critically L. M. Bristol's explanation of Spencer's failure to emphasize "active adaptation" or "telesis." *Cf. Social Adaptation* Ch. II. Would you add to or subtract from his list of arguments?
9. Formulate a statement of the place and extent of Psychological elements in Spencer's system. Have his critics done him injustice here? *Cf.* M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society,* pp. 21-25.
10. Formulate an adequate statement of the value to sociology of Spencer's "Biological analogy." *Cf.* A. W. Small, *op. cit.,* pp. 74-5; also L. F. Ward, *op. cit.,* p. 209.
11. What is Goldenweiser's criticism of Spencer's ghost theory of the origin of religion? How far does he regard it as sound? *Cf. Early Civilization,* Ch. XV.

12. Make a list of Cooley's criticisms (a) of Spencer's personal defects and handicaps as a man of science, and (2) of the inadequacies and errors of his sociological system. Discuss these in the light of present knowledge. *Cf. Reflections upon the Sociology of Herbert Spencer, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXIV, Sept., 1920.
13. What is the value of A. A. Goldenweiser's criticism of the evolutionary theory of social interpretation? Is it contradictory or supplementary? *Cf. Early Civilization,* Introduction. Also, *Four Phases of Anthropological Thought, Publications of the American Sociological Society,* Vol. 16, pp. 50-69.

CHAPTER XIII

LESTER F. WARD

BACKGROUND—PERSONAL AND SOCIAL

ENDOWED with a brilliant and scholarly mind, and thoroughly trained in organic science, Ward entered the field of sociology with an equipment unequaled, or at least unsurpassed, by any of his contemporaries. At the time Spencer's reputation was at its zenith and his thinking dominated largely, both in England and America, the social thought. While Spencer, as we recall, entered the field of sociology from his specific training in abstract science, viz., Engineering, Ward entered it directly from his training in the concrete sciences of Botany and Geology. Although Spencer acquired profound knowledge of the entire range of the sciences and organized them into a system, still his concept of forces remained rather mechanistic than vital. Ward's range of knowledge was likewise extensive but it was natural that his views should have been colored by the character of the material with which chiefly he had dealt. In his realm the chief function of increasing knowledge was to enable man to obtain the mastery of nature and to reconcile its materials, forces and processes to his advantage,—to make nature his servant. A concept of purposive achievement in human society would seem, therefore, in perfect harmony with his scientific training and experience.

In the social environment, moreover, of which Ward was also a profound student, there resided other influences which helped to shape his social theory and to make it as clearly a product of his time as that of other writers whom we have considered. It has often been remarked that Spencer's *laissez faire* theory grew out of the competitive spirit which characterized the opening years of the industrial revolution, when the rewards of individual initiative, unhampered by governmental agencies, seemed destined to supply both the means and the methods of social advance.

So, likewise, the theory of social control by the collective intelligence of society was born in an age when that competition which Spencer regarded as the equalizer of opportunity was being limited or eliminated

through the growth of monopolistic control. Huge combinations of capital were seizing control of the natural resources of the earth and were threatening the liberty of the great majority of the people. Equality of opportunity was being destroyed. We refer to that period following the civil war in the United States which saw great railway extension and the consolidation of management and ownership. The era of small individual enterprise which had characterized the earlier industrial and commercial development was giving way to an age of large combination. With the increase of scientific knowledge, and the growth of organization, a vast augmentation and accumulation of wealth resulted. But this wealth was becoming concentrated in a few hands, and led more and more to the domination of politics and the daily life of every citizen. Combination in the management and control of industry which resulted naturally from the increase and improvement of modern facilities like the railway and the telegraph should have meant a coöperative saving for all, but instead it often meant monopolistic privileges of accumulation for the few.

There was a corresponding growth of business immorality and a general indifference to the exploitation of the national resources by business interests and favored individuals. A carnival of waste and plunder reached its climax in America from 1870 to 1890. In public office there was corruption in high places, and evidences were abundant to show that the great business interests of the country were controlling the government for their own private benefit. The capitalists who financed the railroads, the mines, the oil fields, the steel mills, the packing houses, the grain elevators, and the commercial establishments, received from Congress favors and immunities which throttled free competition and tremendously increased private fortunes. This bred in many men the belief that the government existed primarily for the protection of private property and as a convenient agency for increasing private wealth.

This condition produced its natural reactions in the minds of thinking men, and early in the period there set in a new tide of moral earnestness, a movement for social justice against vested wrong and special privilege. A new social consciousness was developing. With this gradual awakening came the realization that the nation was enmeshed in a net of intangible chains, with which it was unable adequately to grapple and from which it could with great difficulty free itself. The struggle may be seen in the efforts to deal with the trusts and the railroads, and with political corruption. The need for intelligent control of our economic

development was apparent and urgent, but the means of its accomplishment were not so clear. In the absence of a social science which might furnish guidance, the trial and error method had to be followed. Witness the experimentation revealed in the Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and other similar legislation.[1]

One other influence with future possibilities should not be overlooked. At the same time the new passion for education was being aroused. The public high school was just taking possession of its field. Scholars were appearing who sought to link education with the daily life of the people. Scientific knowledge was making tremendous strides, and as we have seen was invading, with clearness of perception and with marked energy, the social field.

It appears, therefore, that social elements, scientific, economic, and educational, which were destined to produce a new phase in social theory, were converging and Ward's great mind was the vehicle through which it found expression. He thus became the spokesman for his generation in the overthrow of the *laissez faire* theory, and in the emphasis upon the possibility of the conscious control and direction of social forces in the interest of human welfare through the dissemination of scientific knowledge. "Few realize that Ward's daring arraignment of the supposedly perfect methods of Nature and his justification of the ways of mind in his *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, published in 1893, furnishes the philosophy that lies at the base of the recent great extension of functions by contemporary governments." [2]

LESTER F. WARD

Lester Frank Ward, the Nestor of American sociologists, was born in Joliet, Ill., on June 18, 1841. His limited early education was obtained in the schools of his native town. The economic status of his family rendered it necessary for him early to become self-supporting which he did by working on the farm and afterwards as a wheelwright. Being fond of books he utilized his leisure and acquired a liberal fund of knowledge. Convinced of the need of college training he studied in a preparatory school in Towanda, Pa., 1860-62. The outbreak of the Civil War put an end to his studies temporarily. He entered the Union Army in which he served till the end of the war. At the close of the war, in 1865, he went to Washington, where he secured a position in the

[1] *Cf.* Muzzey, *American History*, pp. 510-625.
[2] Ross, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX, July, 1913, p. 64.

United States Treasury Department. His public service in numerous civil positions lasted from 1865 to 1906, some of his earlier employments consisting of Chief of Division of Navigation and Immigration. Librarian of the Bureau of Statistics, Honorary Curator of fossil plants in the United States Natural Museum.

Meanwhile he pursued his studies in Columbian University, now George Washington University, from which he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1869. Following this he studied law in the same institution, acquiring the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1871. He next took up the study of Botany and in 1873 he received the degree of Master of Arts, with his major work in that subject. In 1897 the university conferred upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws. In 1881 he become assistant geologist in the Department of the Geological Survey, having charge of Paleo-Botany. In 1888 he became geologist in the same department. During a portion of this time, 1884-6, he was Professor of Botany at Columbian University.

During the entire period from 1873 to 1906 he carried on original researches in the field of Botany, Geology and allied sciences. In this connection, Ross remarks: "The bibliography of his writings would make a fair sized pamphlet. The total number of his distinct publications amounts nearly to six hundred, in this respect showing his kinship with great European scholars like Virchow and Metchkinoff." [3]

His work, however, was not confined to the pure sciences. Through the influence of Comte, Spencer and others, he became interested in sociology, and it is upon his writings in this field that his enduring reputation as scientist and philosopher depends.

In the year of his graduation he formulated and in the following year he outlined an extensive work on Social Science which culminated in the publication of his *Dynamic Sociology,* two volumes, in 1883. Ten years later, 1893, appeared his *Psychic Factors of Civilization,* in 1898 his *Outlines of Sociology,* in 1903 *Pure Sociology,* and in 1906 *Applied Sociology.*

When the American Sociological Society was organized in 1905 he became its first president and also a consistent contributor to its publication, the *American Journal of Sociology.* In 1903 he served as president of the *Institut International de Sociologie.*

In 1906 he resigned from governmental service and accepted the position as Professor of Sociology in Brown University, making what Bogardus calls the interesting experiment of beginning to teach Soci-

[3] *Op. cit.,* p. 64.

ology at the age of sixty-five.[4] Here he lived, taught and wrote for the brief period of seven years—till his death on April 13, 1913. His only other academic work was limited to lectures at several university summer sessions, among them Columbia and Johns Hopkins.

DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY

The appraisal of this work by Small and the position he assigns to it in Ward's system will serve as an admirable introduction to its treatment. He says: "I have often said, and it remains my estimate, that, everything considered, I would rather have written *Dynamic Sociology* than any other book that has ever appeared in America. . . . I must confess that I have never been able to learn from Dr. Ward's later works anything of first rate importance which I did not find in *Dynamic Sociology*. Unless I misunderstood his own estimate, my reaction was strictly in accord with his own view of his writings. He thought he had said in substance in his first book everything which his later writings contained, but that the greater elaboration was necessary in order to make his message carry. I think he would have endorsed my opinion that the later books were justified pedagogically, but that they exhibited a scientific anti-climax." [5]

In the preface of this work Ward states what he regards as its object: "The real object of science is to benefit man. A science which fails to do this, however agreeable its study, is lifeless. Sociology, which of all sciences should benefit man most, is in danger of falling into the class of polite amusements, or dead sciences. It is the object of this work to point out a method by which the breath of life may be breathed into its nostrils." [6]

He epitomizes his contribution to sociological theory in the following succinct fashion: "If, in the detailed unfolding of this system, any comprehensive principles have been announced, to which attention has not heretofore been specially directed, the chief of these will, perhaps, be recognized in:

1. "The law of Aggregation, as distinguished from that of Evolution proper.

2. "The theory of the Social Forces, and the fundamental antithesis which they imply between Feeling and Function.

3. "The contrast between these true Social Forces and the guiding

[4] *A History of Social Thought*, p. 278.
[5] *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX, pp. 77-8.
[6] *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. vii.

influences of the Intellect, embodying the application of the Indirect Method of Conation and the essential nature of Invention, of Art, and of Dynamic Action.

4. "The superiority of the Artificial, or Teleological, Processes over Natural, or Genetic, Processes; and, finally—

5. "The recognition and demonstration of the paramount necessity for the equal and universal Distribution of the extant Knowledge of the World, which last is the crown of the system itself.

"While there certainly have been adumbrations of many of these truths, it is believed that thus far no one of them has been systematically formulated or distinctly recognized." [7]

These subjects are not treated consecutively in *Dynamic Sociology,* but are generalizations derived from the material presented.

THE LAW OF AGGREGATION

I. Primary Aggregation or Cosmogeny—Genesis of Matter—Chemical Relations

Science tends constantly to increase the number of known facts and to reduce the fundamental concepts by which the facts are explained. As phenomena are multiplied their laws are unified. Attempts at complete unification of the laws of phenomena have resulted in two alternative theories, one of which Ward thinks must be true. "Those who would resolve matter into centres of force may be said to constitute the school of *dynamists,* while those who would reduce all forms of energy to modes of motion in matter should be satisfied with the designation *materialists.*" [8]

Ward, in contrast with Spencer, accepts the latter theory as the more plausible, particularly in view of the development of the atomic theory. More recent discoveries in radium and the rise of the theory of electrons, seem at present to point in the opposite direction.[9]

Assuming, then, that "matter is what it seems to be," [10] the phenomena of the visible universe are best described as a series of relations among particles of matter. Matter, philosophically considered, is infinitely divisible, but never can be reduced to zero in thought. There is always the ultimate molecule, atom, or electron, or some tangible subdivision which constitutes the beginning point for science.

[7] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. vii-viii.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 221.
[9] *Cf.* Thompson, *Outlines of Science,* Vol. I, Ch. 8.
[10] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, p. 223.

On this hypothesis force is conceived to be "molecular impact." "It is simply the *effect which matter in its motion through space exerts upon other matter with which it comes in contact.* . . . Everything which is not matter is some relation between discrete parts of matter. The only reality is matter." [11]

"Setting out with matter assumed to exist in a wholly unaggregated and homogeneous state, but endowed with indestructible motions operating in obedience to these two laws (the gravitant and radiant forces) the necessary result must be that in certain parts of space certain kinds and degrees of aggregation of matter will take place. . . . The condition of homogeneity would be broken up and one of heterogeneity would result. . . .

"On this principle there is no difficulty in accounting for any degree of aggregation without assuming an excess of concentrative over dissipative motion in the Universe. For there must be supposed to exist the same rhythmic ebb and flow in these fundamental conditions of matter as are observable throughout all the higher manifestations of these conditions which we are able to study. . . . And while it may be certain that the time must come when the aggregates now formed will all be swept away by the great ebb tide of dissolution, compensated by a corresponding flood tide of evolution in another region of the universe, still there is no necessary limit short of the infinite, either to the duration or to the degree of cosmical progress in those parts in which it has begun. But on the same principle it can be shown that in no part of the universe can the unaggregated state exist for an appreciable period of time. Such a state is one of absolute homogeneity, whose inherent instability is constantly able to overthrow it and bring about the only possible state of heterogeneity—a state of greater or less aggregation. The cosmical fluctuations are not therefore between the aggregated and the unaggregated state, but between states of greater aggregation and states of less aggregation." [12]

The function and scope of science is now clear. It is to study material aggregates, of which no practical limits exist to their variety, form, size, or relations. Different orders of aggregates as molecules, organisms, societies, result from the principles of compounding of previously formed aggregates through a process of segregation due to *selection* or adaptation, and possessing varying degrees of stability.

Assured, then, that matter as we know it is an aggregation of

[11] *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 230-31.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 232-3.

previously formed aggregates, whose complete analysis falls within the domain of experimental science we may pass over its lower stages and proceed to the consideration of its more complex and developed forms.

First we note a class of aggregates, of such minute particles as to be perceptible only in the mass, and of such stability as to create the impression that they constituted originally the ultimate basis of matter, and which were designated chemical elements. Eighty-seven of these so far have been analyzed. They possess different molecular and molar properties and qualities and combine in specific ratios under varying conditions to form tangible material. Every known substance, gaseous, liquid, or solid, non-vital or vital, from the most unstable and homogeneous nebula to the most concrete and differentiated organism, and which in their seemingly limitless forms we designate matter, may be resolved into these elements. This Ward calls primary aggregation.[13]

II. Secondary Aggregation or Biogeny, Psychogeny and Anthropogeny

1. *Biogeny—Genesis of Organic Forms—Vital Relations.*

Chemical elements doubtless were formed under intense heat, some probably in a temperature as high as 6000° Centigrade, which accounts for their stability. Compounding of elements increases with diminution of heat and increase in complexity is followed by decrease in stability.

Unstable compounds are continuously forming at the temperatures now prevailing at the surface of the earth. They are composed chiefly of oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen and carbon in varying proportions and are called "organic compounds," although they are formed from inorganic elements. The albuminoids and other organic substances, forming the materials of living bodies, do not themselves exhibit the phenomena of life. It requires a further recompounding of these elements. This substance was discovered by Oken in 1809, recognized by Dujardin in 1835, studied thoroughly and named protoplasm by Mohl in 1846. It is an organic compound of which the exact chemical formula is known. Further aggregation of protoplasmic substance produces "plasson bodies," and these evolve, by the same process, into the "biologic cell," which is the basis of all higher organic development. Thus *"life is the result of the aggregation of matter."* [14]

"The biologist has the following facts as the data from which to infer the development of living organisms from inorganic matter: He

[13] *Cf. Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 239-44.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 318.

has, first, the protein, or albuminoid substances, which contain all the elementary matters that are found in the tissues of organized beings. He has, secondly, large amorphous masses of undifferentiated protoplasm existing at the bottom of the sea, and presenting all the phenomena of life without organization. This substance is identical with the matter found in nerve-cells, blood-cells, and muscle-cells, as also in the cells of plants, and which, wherever identified, possesses this same property of spontaneous activity. He has, thirdly, individual plasson bodies composed of this same substance and endowed with the same activities, but possessing specific dimensions, so as to constitute them distinct individuals. These vary in some respects sufficiently to be classified into genera, and even families, and possess the power of locomotion, nutrition, and reproduction; they are *living things,* though as yet wholly unorganized. He has, fourthly, simple living cells, differing from these plasson bodies in nothing but the possession of a nucleus at the centre of the mass of protoplasm of which they are composed. This nucleus consists itself of protoplasm, and differs only in its consistency, color, etc. *Amoebae* and other unicellular creatures of this class swarm in all waters, both salt and fresh, and have long been known, named, and classified by systematists. Finally, the biologist has the further fact that all organized beings whatever, whether animal or vegetable, are made up of combinations of these cells, which constitute the morphological units of biology." [15]

"The central fact which it has been sought to impress is, that life is the result of chemical or molecular aggregation, which has for its product a substance whose properties are in fact the phenomena of life —in short, that life is a property of a particular substance called protoplasm, which is as truly chemical as is water or lime, and whose properties are as inseparable from it; that just as water may form into spherules or crystals under appropriate conditions, so may this substance by virtue of its properties develop living organisms." [16]

2. *Psychogeny—Genesis of Mind—Psychic Relations.*

All protoplasmic substances possess the distinguishing properties or qualities of contractibility and extensibility which result in change of form. This phenomenon is denominated irritability or motility,[17] "a

[15] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 335-6.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 355.
[17] *Cf. Pure Sociology,* pp. 116-19.

purely vital phenomenon, and constitutes in the last analysis the sole fact in the idea of *life*. But this is also the point at which the phenomena of *mind* take their origin, and from which the departments of biology and psychology diverge. It is, indeed, also true that in the most abstract sense life and mind are but two sides or phases of one common truth. This truth is neither irritability nor sensibility, but the *molecular change* which underlies and occasions both." [18]

"Every manifestation of the phenomena of irritability is necessarily accompanied by the phenomena of sensibility. . . . Underlying the idea of feeling and embracing it, is the more comprehensive idea of *consciousness*. . . . The essence of sensation is consciousness," and "The property of consciousness must therefore be assumed to inhere in every molecule of protoplasm to a certain limited degree." [19] "Chemical or molecular organization produces a substance possessing vital properties strong enough to be detected by the human faculties. Morphological organization continues these effects to the highest point reached in the organic world. Psychic phenomena go hand in hand with vital phenomena, and are inseparable from them. Protoplasm is the 'physical basis of life.' It is also the physical basis of mind. It constitutes the nerves." [20]

Nerves are "protoplasmic tracks" along which communication runs in the coördination of the parts of a differentiated organism. A system of afferent and efferent nerves constitute a ganglion and the resulting muscular activity is styled reflex action and constitutes the simplest mental process. The development of the nervous system results from the specialization and compounding of these elementary systems capable of reflex activity into those of higher order including the brain.

Here, then, we have the explanation of the mental processes in what is termed functional or physiological psychology. Later investigations in this field have served merely to amplify the outlines presented.

"Psychic phenomena are the relations which subsist among the material molecules of the brain and nervous system and between these and the material objects of the outside world which appeal to them by means of actual mechanical contact. . . . Mind is immaterial because relational, but like all relations it has matter for its basis—the organized matter of the living body, actuated by the coördinated mechanism of a brain and nervous system." [21]

[18] *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 363.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 365-7.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 370-71.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 408-9.

3. *Anthropogeny—Genesis of Man—Human Relations.*

The continuity of the cosmic processes is unbroken. It includes man. "Among all the forms of organic life there is not one which differs so widely from the rest as to raise a suspicion of having originated in a different way. . . . However widely men may differ as to the origin of animal life and of species, the fact of their relationships and homogeneity cannot be gainsaid, and whatever has been the history of one has been the history of all." [22]

Zoölogically classified, using all the correlative characters by which such classifications are made, man belongs to the department Vertebrata, to the class Mammalia, to the sub-class Placentalia, to the genus Homo.

The fact that man is identified in the Zoölogical series is evidenced by the familiar arguments of the likeness of tissues, the similitude of structure, the identity of life processes; his place in the evolutionary series, from homologies of structure, similarities with anthropoids, embryology and fossil remains. Natural selection is sufficient to account for changes in bodily structure, cranial capacity and erect position. Special attention is given to both quantitative and qualitative brain development and to the use of speech.

Three questions connected with the origin of man are discussed, viz. (1) The monogenetic or polygenetic origin, (2) the place of origin or origins, and (3) the antiquity of man. Summarized, his answers are, respectively:

(1) "At the present time this theory (previously discussed) of the descent of the human races from a single primordial stock may be said to be the only one which possesses any degree of respectability either inside or outside of scientific circles." [23]

(2) "The nearest approach to a positive declaration that can perhaps be made would be that most or all of these modifications (constituting man) must have taken place while the creatures inhabited warm or tropical regions, in which nature supplied the means of subsistence without labor either in producing or preparing them." [24]

(3) "If any time-measures of this period (of human evolution) are ever obtained, they will be deduced from the comparison of fossil remains yet to be discovered, and of the geologic strata in which they

[22] *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 412-13.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 443.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 444.

shall be found—Unquestionably, human remains have been found in both the Pliocene and the Miocene formations of the Tertiary period which throw all numerical calculation into the background, and establish man as a product of geologic time." [25]

III. Tertiary Aggregation or Sociogeny—Genesis of Society—Social Relations

Human society is the final stage in the "long, unbroken series of cosmical aggregations leading from the ultimate atom up to the social aggregate." [26] Like all other aggregates it is the product of natural selection or adaptation. There is no reason to assume in man any innate inclination to association. Here as everywhere there are attractive and repellent forces, which in this sphere we designate social and antisocial, and the degree of association anywhere exhibited is the resultant or balance of these forces.

Strangely enough, Ward regards "superior sagacity" or "perception of utility" among animals and men as the chief socializing factor.[27] "The development of the cerebral hemispheres, of speech, and of society, must have gone on simultaneously, each mutually reacting in a favorable manner upon the others." [28] Four stages of social evolution are logically discernible as the result of this assumption.

First is the solitary or *autarchic* stage in which the "associative influence" of man's superior mental powers was neutralized by their "antisocial influence." Either by mutual destruction through conflicting pursuits or mutual withdrawal through fear of injury, men were rendered solitary or as nearly so as was consistent with the propagation of the species. Increasing human sagacity soon overcame these destructive forces.

The second or *anarchic* stage resulted from rapid multiplication producing a "forced association" in which the elements were uncongenial. Intellect served selfish ends alone, and though free, the individual was utterly insecure. Moral qualities had no existence.

The third, or *politarchic* stage, arose through the "paramount necessity" for the regulation of sexual and proprietary interests. Rudimentary forms of law and government resulted. Nations thus arose possessing varying degrees of advancement.

[25] *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 445-7.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 451.
[27] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 451-4.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 454.

The fourth, or *pantarchic* stage, tends to result from further integration of conflicting groups or nations through diminution of national prejudices and inter-group wars. This is the achievement of "superior intellect."

These stages "constitute a great cycle within which all the social forces, statical and dynamical, progressive and retrogressive, have operated and must continue to operate." The first stage is "strictly theoretical," the last "wholly ideal." "There is a philosophic ken that professes to see in the future of the race that triumph of humanitarian sentiments which would no doubt also be a triumph of practical interests, that shall sweep away the present barriers of language, national pride, and natural uncongeniality, and unite all nations in one vast social aggregate with a single political organization." [29]

The emphasis here laid upon the rational factors and the perception of utility in the origin and development of society point directly to the philosophic doctrines of the Social Contract school and seem somewhat inconsistent with the further development of his thought. By the time he wrote the *Pure Sociology,* 1903, his views had certainly undergone some change. Here he adopts without reserve the conflict theories of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer as the explanation of the origin of society.[30]

Principles of Aggregation

Before leaving the subject of aggregation it seems necessary to add certain concepts not clearly worked out in the author's mind at the time but developed in *Pure Sociology.*

1. *The Filiation of the Sciences.*

In *Dynamic Sociology* (Vol. I, pp. 147-9) Ward had discussed the classification of the sciences by Comte and Spencer,[31] and had shown that, while Comte's was *phenomenal* and Spencer's *logical,* there was no essential difference in the order of arrangement. Spencer objected to Ward's comments and the correspondence is published in *Pure Sociology* (pp. 66-9). Here Ward reaffirms his position and presents the two classifications as follows:

[29] *Cf. Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 364-7.
[30] *Cf. Pure Sociology,* pp. 203-4 and 215.
[31] For the original discussions *Cf.* Comte's *Hierarchy of the Sciences, Positive Philosophy,* Introduction, Ch. II, and Spencer's *Classification of the Sciences.* Also, *The Organization of the Sciences,* Fiske, *Positive Philosophy,* Vol. I, Ch. VIII.

System of Comte	*System of Spencer*
1. Astronomy.	1. Astronomy.
2. Physics. }	2. Geology.
3. Chemistry. }	
4. Biology (including).	3. Biology.
5. Cerebral Biology.	4. Psychology.
6. Sociology.	5. Sociology.
7. Ethics.	6. Ethics.

In further confirmation of Ward's contention it should be noted that Comte was the first to use the term "filiation" to explain his concept of the relation of the sciences.[32] Spencer merely emphasized the same idea in the "mutual dependence" of the sciences represented in the "family relation."[33] Had Comte used the word "Hierarchy" in its ordinary connotation involving the notion of subordination and rank and which often has been imputed to him by his critics, it would have been misleading, but such was not the case. The controversy, then, over the word Hierarchy is merely one over terminology which thus loses point or importance.

There is a serial order of the sciences which may not be ignored, but since it is one of filiation or of mutual interdependence, all difficulties of assigning rank are obviated and the relationship of sociology to all other sciences is made clear.

2. *Sympodial Development.*

Ward's knowledge of botany provided him with the means for a supplementary contribution of great importance to the theory of evolution. The science of botany familiarizes us with two modes of branching. "In monopodial branching the stem or main trunk gives off at intervals subordinate stems called branches containing a comparatively small number of the fibro-vascular bundles of the main stem, which thus continues to diminish in size by the loss of its bundles until all are thus given off and the stem terminates in a slender twig. In sympodial branching, on the other hand, the main stem or trunk rises to a certain height and then gives off a branch into which the majority of the fibro-vascular bundles enter, so that the branch virtually becomes the trunk, and the real trunk or ascending portion is reduced to a mere twig, or may ultimately fail of support altogether and disappear through atrophy.

[32] See *supra*, pp. 249-50.
[33] *First Principles*, p. 328; also, *Autobiography*, Vol. II, p. 124.

This large branch at length in turn gives off a secondary branch containing as before the bulk of the bundles and the first branch is sacrificed in the same manner as was the original stem or trunk, and this process is repeated throughout the life of the tree or plant. As might be naturally expected, the resulting series of branches of different orders is zigzag." [34]

The former type was the one originally employed to describe the process of organic development and this constituted one of the weaknesses of the evolutionary theory. It did not square with many of the facts of science and of history. These difficulties vanish, Ward believed, with the employment of the process involved in the second type. Omitting its general application it has the following significance for sociology: "We may look upon human races as so many trunks and branches of what may be called the sociological tree. The vast and bewildering multiplicity in the races of men is the result of ages of race development and it has taken place in a manner very similar to that in which the races of plants and animals have developed. Its origin is lost in the obscurity of ages of unrecorded history, and we can only judge from existing savages and the meager data of archeology and human paleontology, how the process went on. But we know that it did go on, and when at last the light of tradition and written annals opens upon the human races, we find them engaged in a great struggle. . . . That out of this struggle new races have sprung, and that these in turn have struggled with other races, and out of these struggles still other races have slowly emerged, until at last, down toward our own times and within the general line of the historic races, the great leading nationalities—French, English, German, etc.—have been evolved. Now every one of these races of men, from the advanced nationalities last named back to the barbaric tribes that arose from the blending of hostile hordes, is simply an anthropologic sympode, strictly analogous to the biologic sympode that I have described." [35]

3. *The Creative Synthesis—Synergy.*

In the analysis of the universal process of aggregation discussed previously (*cf. supra*, p. 360 *ff.*) there is a conspicuous lack of a consistent principle by which the process is explained. Force is assumed, but there is nothing corresponding to Spencer's dissipation of motion as a

[34] *Pure Sociology*, p. 72.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-7.

cause of integration of matter. In the *Pure Sociology,* Ward's thought in this regard had clarified. He says: "That there is a universal principle, operating in every department of nature and at every stage in evolution, which is conservative, creative, and constructive, has been evident to me for many years, but it required long meditation and extensive observation to discover its true nature. After having fairly grasped it I was still troubled to reduce it to its simplest form, and characterize it by an appropriate name. I have at last fixed upon the word *synergy* as the term best adapted to express its twofold character of *energy* and *mutuality,* or the systematic and organic *working-together* of the antithetical forces of nature. The third and equally essential and invariable quality of creation or construction is still lacking in the name chosen, unless we assume, as I think we may do, that work implies some product, to distinguish it from simple activity. Synergy is a synthesis of work and this is what is everywhere taking place. . . . Synergy is the principle that explains all organization and creates all structures. These products of cosmic synergy are found in all fields of phenomena. Celestial structures are worlds and world systems, chemical structures are atoms, molecules and substances, biotic structures are protoplasm, cells, tissues, organs and organisms. There are also psychic structures—feelings, emotions, passions, volitions, perceptions, cognitions, memory, imagination, reason, thought, and all the acts of consciousness. And then there are social structures. . . . These are the products of the social forces acting under the principle of social synergy." [36]

"Just as in biology the world was never satisfied with the law of organic evolution worked out by Goethe and Lamarck until the principle of natural selection was discovered which explained the workings of that law, so in sociology it was not enough to formulate the law of social evolution, however clear it may have been, and the next step has been taken in bringing to light the sociological homologue of natural selection which explains the progress of social evolution. That principle is not the same as natural selection, but it serves the same purpose. It also resembles the latter in growing out of the life struggle and in being a consequence of it; but, instead of consisting in the hereditary selection of the successful elements of that struggle, it consists in the ultimate union of the opposing elements and their combination and assimilation. Successively higher and higher social structures are thus created in a process of natural synthesis, and society evolves from stage to stage." [37]

[36] *Pure Sociology,* pp. 171-6.
[37] *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XII, p. 585.

The process resulting from the operation of the principle of Synergy is called the *Creative Synthesis*. The term was borrowed from Wundt, who defined the central idea as follows: "There is absolutely no form which in the meaning and value of its content is not something more than the mere sum of its factors or than the mere mechanical resultant of its components." [38] It is by this law that Ward interprets his entire theory of aggregation or recompounding of simpler elements into higher forms which are new products. "The moment we recognize that it is *creative,* although it thereby acquires no quality that it did not possess before, a flood of light is shed on the entire process, and we then see how it can be that an infinite variety may spring from relatively few elements, or, indeed, from an assumed unitary substratum of the universe." [39]

To develop the complete application of this principle would be to recapitulate much of the preceding material. It would trace the operation of the law of Synergy producing creative syntheses from its beginning in nebular chaos until man and society were produced. This, of course, we cannot do, but a few specific illustrations seem illuminating at this point:

(1) The application of the principle of creative synthesis to the filiation of the sciences.

"The natural order of the sciences is due to the fact that the more complex phenomena of the higher sciences are the creative products of phenomena of a lower order . . . that each of the higher sciences is a product of the creative synthesis of all the sciences below it in the scale. Each science is thus distinct, though not independent. . . . Sociology is not psychology, still less biology. It is a science, new in two senses, viz.: those of being newly created and newly discovered. . . . This principle also explains the relation of sociology to the special social sciences. It is not quite enough to say that it is a synthesis of them all. It is the new compound which their synthesis creates. It is not any of them and it is not all of them. It is that science which they spontaneously generate. It is a genetic product, the last term in the genesis of science." [40]

(2) Application to the concept of the social consciousness or collective mind.

[38] Quoted by Ward, *Pure Sociology,* p. 79.
[39] *Ibid.,* p. 81.
[40] *Ibid.,* pp. 90-1.

"The social mind is a product of spontaneous creative synthesis of all individual minds. In this sense it is real. That it differs widely from any individual mind has been abundantly shown by many writers. In this case the resulting compound, in so far as it can be compared to the component units, somewhat represents their average." [41] Just as Ward conceives of the mind in man as the synthetic product of all the elements of human personality, so the social mind is the product of the integration of human personalities, through the operation of the law of social synergy.[42]

(3) The principle of creative synthesis operates in the realm of *forces* as effectively as it does elsewhere. "The synthetic creations of nature have their characteristic properties or modes of acting, and it is through these that they produce effects. Taken together these active properties constitute the forces of nature. These separate and apparently different forces are, however, so many modalities of the one universal force, but it is not only convenient but practically correct to treat them as distinct." [43]

Feeling or desire is one of these synthetic creations of force in the psychic realm and constitutes the dynamic agent. "Every true science is a domain of forces, and the nature of the forces differs with the science. Indeed this difference in the forces is what constitutes the difference existing among the sciences. . . . Man possesses feeling in common with the lower animals, and the fact which it is important to note just at this point is that feeling constitutes the dynamic agent. . . . In the associated state of man it is the social force, and with it the sociologist must deal. Under this agency social phenomena take place according to uniform laws which may be studied in the same way that the laws of any other domain of phenomena are studied. Sociology is thus a true science, answering to the definition of a science, viz.: a field of phenomena produced by true natural forces and conforming to uniform laws. But feeling as the dynamic agent manifests itself in a variety of ways, and just as it is convenient and practically correct to speak of a plurality of natural forces, the modalities of the universal force, so it is convenient and practically correct to speak of a plurality of social forces, the modalities of the general social force or dynamic agent." [44]

[41] *Pure Sociology*, p. 91.
[42] *Cf.* Follet, M.P., *The New State*, Ch. I-II.
[43] *Pure Sociology*, pp. 98-9.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

The Social Forces—Feeling or Desire—The Dynamic Agent

Returning now to *Dynamic Sociology* we pursue the main theme of Ward's theory.

"All beings which can be said to perform actions do so in obedience to their mental states which are denominated desires. In the absence of desire there will always be absence of what are called voluntary movements. . . . We will therefore rest content to assume that desire is the essential basis of all action, and hence the true *force* in the sentient world; and consistency as well as truth requires us to predicate this equally of man and of all things lower in the scale of animal life." [45]

"In the organic world nature may be said to possess two primary objects, viz. the preservation of the individual and the continuance of the species or race. These ends are secured by means of desires inhering in the individuals, leading them to perform the necessary acts. The two *functions* absolutely essential to life are nutrition and reproduction. To these correspond in all sentient beings two classes of desires. These may be denominated the *gustatory* and the *sexual* appetites. . . .

"Against these objects of nature may be set the corresponding objects of the organism, or, confining ourselves to the human race, they may be called the objects of man. The end of nature is the preservation and perpetuation of life; that of man is the satisfaction of desire. The former is objective, and constitutes a biologic process; the latter is subjective, and is a moral or sociologic process." [46]

Here we have the "original and essential" social forces. There are, however, derivative forms of these original desires that broaden out into all phases of economic and family life until their diversified aspects are hardly recognizable as resting upon this original foundation.

"Beside these essential forces of society, either original or derivative, there are others, chiefly derivative, which may be called *non-essential,* as having no direct connection with the great functions of nutrition and reproduction, but certain of which in the developed state of mankind, have really become very important.

"These are: first, the *æsthetic* sentiments, . . . secondly, the *emotional* or *moral* forces, . . . and thirdly, the *intellectual* forces." [47]

In *Pure Sociology* (p. 260) the essential forces, preservative and

[45] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, p. 468.
[46] *Ibid.,* pp. 468-9.
[47] *Ibid.,* p. 471.

reproductive, are called *ontogenetic* and *philogenetic* respectively, and the non-essential, *sociogenetic*.

All of these forces have their seats in the human body and are therefore physical or physiological. The ontogenetic or hunger forces have their seat in the stomach, while the office of securing satisfaction is performed by specialized nerves constituting the senses of taste and smell, located in the tongue, palate, and nose. The seat of the philogenetic forces is in the loins, with specialized nerve plexuses in the generative organs and other glands. All of the organs of sense are more or less involved in the sociogenetic forces, the esthetic and moral, being primarily emotional, are centered in the sympathetic nervous system and the intellectual in the cerebral cortex.[48]

"The sociological importance of these facts lies in their scientific bearing, as showing that the phenomena manifested by organized beings have definite and tangible properties, such as inhere in other classes of phenomena, and by means of which they may be investigated, comprehended, and controlled by the appliances of art. Like other phenomena, social phenomena flow from definite antecedents, depend upon conditions within the reach of science, and hence may be affected, as physical phenomena are affected, by the intelligent alteration of those antecedent conditions." [49]

The final form of classification of the social forces is given in *Pure Sociology* (p. 261), as follows: [50]

THE SOCIAL FORCES ARE:—

- Physical Forces. (Function bodily.)
  - Ontogenetic Forces.
    - Positive, attractive (seeking pleasure).
    - Negative, protective (avoiding pain).
  - Philogenetic Forces.
    - Direct, sexual.
    - Indirect, consanguineal.
- Spiritual Forces. (Function Psychic.)
  - Sociogenetic Forces.
    - Moral (seeking the safe and good).
    - Esthetic (seeking the beautiful).
    - Intellectual (seeking the useful and true).

To the genesis and development of human society through the action of the social forces Ward devotes the remainder of Vol. I of *Dynamic*

[48] *Cf. Pure Sociology*, pp. 261-3, also *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 472-3.
[49] *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 473.
[50] *Cf. Pure Sociology*, pp. 256-60, for the history of the development of this classification in the author's mind.

Sociology, pages 474 to 706, and pages 266 to 448 of *Pure Sociology*. Through this intricate maze of interpretation we cannot follow. The work is fascinating and illuminating but lies chiefly outside the range of our study. It is application, rather than development of theory.

Under the division of Philogenetic forces, however, we come upon a fragment of theory possessing a degree of originality sufficient to render it conspicuous and to demand its consideration.

The Gynaecocentric Theory.

In contrast with the Androcentric theory [51] of the relation of the sexes, almost universally taken for granted among biologists and anthropologists, and which assumes the primacy of the male, the female being an unimportant accessory except for the function of continuing the species, Ward develops a new hypothesis. He says: "The Gynaecocentric theory is the view that the female sex is primary and the male sex secondary in the organic scheme, that originally and normally all things centre, as it were, about the female, and that the male, though not necessary in carrying out the scheme, was developed under the operation of the principle of advantage to secure organic progress through the crossing of strains." [52]

The development of the theory in brief is as follows: Sexuality is not essential to reproduction. More than half of all organic beings are reproduced asexually. On an ascending scale of complexity the pre-sexual processes of reproduction are (1) cell division or fission, (2) germination or budding, (3) germinal budding or polysporogonia, (4) spore formation or monosporogonia, (5) parthenogenesis or virgin reproduction. These forms result in quantitative reproduction. But nature possesses a dynamic principle which tends to qualitative reproduction and this results in the differentiation of sex and the more complicated process of fertilization. "This is the true meaning of sex, which is not at all that of securing or perfecting reproduction but the secondary effect of securing variation and through variation the production of better and higher types of organic structure—in a word, organic evolution." [53]

This process of conjugation or zygosis is termed amphygonia by Haeckle, and amphymixis by Weissman.

While organisms that reproduce asexually can scarcely be thought

[51] *Pure Sociology*, p. 291 ff.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 296.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 309.

of as possessing sex, concepts arising out of later sex differentiation are projected backward and a creature producing offspring by whatever process is classed as female. Thus the biologist speaks of "mother" and "daughter" cells. The female is therefore the primary and original sex while the male is "a mere afterthought of nature."

A wealth of illustrative material is cited from the lower forms of both vegetal and animal life to confirm this hypothesis and he concludes: "All these facts from both kingdoms, and the number that might be added is unlimited, combine to show that the female constitutes the main trunk, descending unchanged from the asexual, or presexual, condition; that the male element was added at a certain stage for the sole purpose of securing a crossing of ancestral strains, and the consequent variation and higher development; that it began as a simple fertilizer, assuming a variety of forms; that for reasons hereafter to be considered, the male in most organisms gradually assumed more importance, and ultimately came to approach the size and general nature of the female. . . . The change, or progress, as it may be called, has been wholely in the male, the female remaining unchanged." [54]

The theory is adduced to explain in human society a wide group of sociologic phenomena ranging from early metronymic social organization and primitive forms of gynaecocracy down to the sexual irregularities of modern society.

Original female superiority is therefore natural and needs no further explanation. It is male domination in human society that presents the enigma. The problem is solved, however, by a careful study of the changes which sexual selection has undergone in human evolution.

The different functions performed by the two sexes in the reproductive process involves a fundamental difference in sex desire—a fact generally noted, but the significance of which is not clearly perceived. In the male it is relatively constant and aggressive. In the female it is periodic and relatively passive. This results in females choosing among competitive males. Through the development of "taste" there arises a selection of variations in size, strength, courage, beauty, which produces what Ward calls "male efflorescence" or specific sex limited characters, while the superior qualities generally occurring are transferred through the ordinary processes of heredity to the stock. This, however, does not mean male supremacy. The female retains the power of choosing her mate. There is nothing akin to androcracy in the animal world.

[54] *Pure Sociology*, p. 322.

The transference of the power of sexual choice to the male in human society, with all its revolutionary consequences both physical and social, is explained, not upon biological, but upon psychological grounds.

Throughout the animal kingdom the females regulate sex relations absolutely, and upon the basis of physiological desire, which is limited to periods of ovulation, and which males have no power to arouse at any other time.

In this regard, in the realm of the human, men have gained complete mastery over women, to the reversal of nature's processes, through the use of instrumentalities lacking in lower creatures. By stirring the imagination through the employment of secrecy and of curiosity, through violations of modesty, and facilitated by the suggestibility of clothing and the privacy of shelter, they have succeeded in arousing sexual impulses in women, not spontaneously supplied by nature during the agenetic period and even during pregnancy.

If appeals to imagination fail, reason may be employed to gain consent in the absence of impulse—a radical violation of nature and a condition practically unknown among females of lower orders. There are always a variety of other satisfactions that may be bartered. Persuasion through appeals to vanity, promises of material or other advantages, allurements of social prestige, and in its grossest form, money compensation, often are sufficient to obtain that which nature withholds.[55]

Thus was lost to woman that exalted position to which nature had entitled her, and although the change to male sexual selection may have conferred reciprocal benefits in enhancing her beauty and physical attractiveness, it resulted in fixing upon her, aided, it scarcely seems needful to remark, by the superior physical strength of men, and by the exigencies of developing civilization, an inferior and dependent economic, domestic, and social status, which exhibits some of the most gloomy and tragic aspects of human history and from which she is only now recovering.

The Directive Factor—Intellect or Purpose

Following Ward's outline of his contributions to social theory we consider next the functions of intellect.

No student of Ward's sociology speaks with quite the same authority

[55] *Cf. Pure Sociology,* pp. 325-32. Also *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 606-8.

as Dealey, who in addition to a profound study of Ward's work enjoyed personal association with him during his professorship at Brown University. We quote his summary of Ward's psychological analysis:

"Lester F. Ward, in his *Dynamic Sociology,* was the first American sociologist to turn away definitely from the biological bias of Spencer and to suggest a psychological basis for his system of Sociology. In substance his conclusions are as follows : The historically fundamental part of the mind is the feelings, which supply to the individual and to society dynamic energy. These feelings, evolved from the simple fundamental hunger-feeling of undifferentiated biological organisms, in evolutionary process become the mass of physical, emotional, and intellectual desires and aspirations now recognized in human nature. As an aid to the organism in the struggle for survival, intellect slowly evolved as a guide to the feelings; first, in its unconscious intuitional forms, then, in its capacity for semi-conscious or fully conscious reasoning, and finally into a grasp on broad generalization and a deep insight into truth. Applying this teaching to sociology, he then argues that the social mind, which is merely the generalization of the individual minds that compose the group, may be considered as made up of social feelings and a social intellect. The social feelings are the social forces or desires, and ever seek by activity to satisfy the cravings of society. Such feelings may be physical or cultural in aim. Through the physical feelings society craves race survival through food, and race continuance through sexual reproduction. Hence, the primary social activities are food-getting and mating, and from these arise, in due process, secondary physical desires and also cultural or spiritual desires for what is good, beautiful, and true.

"If, however, feelings fundamentally dictated activity, society would be involved in a constant struggle of conflicting human desires, without harmony except through force, and ultimately self-destruction would ensue through emphasis on pleasure to the neglect of safety. Hence arises by slow evolution the intellect, which perceives ways and means of attaining ends and shows the advantage of individual self-restraint and social cooperation. Slowly the social intellect works out restraints and regulations, laws and customs, ideals and principles, and guides the energy of physical feelings into higher emotions and ambitions. From that time forth society strives not merely to satisfy physical feelings, but to gratify also its desire for moral standards, aesthetic ideals, and intellectual truths, thus passing from a physical to a cultural basis. As the intellect gains a larger place in the mind, it becomes able to formulate

ideals, not simply for individual guidance, but for social guidance also, and hence society passes into the stage of 'collective telesis' and deliberately plans out its future. This it accomplishes by formulating for itself a goal for social energy; it then ascertains the best methods of attaining this and guides the activity of the social feelings or forces in the desired direction." [56]

Admirable as this statement is, some further elaboration seems desirable. The seeming inconsistency of classifying intellect among the social forces is explained by the fact that Ward here means to include merely "the pleasure of intellectual activity" as thirst for knowledge and the joy of intellectual achievement, and not its function as "guide and director." In this latter capacity it is "no longer a true natural force, but a condition to the production of results by the true social forces." [57]

Feeling or desire, as we have seen, constitutes the initial factor in all sentient phenomena, and, in its diversified forms, comprises the social forces. But natural social forces, operating under the general laws of evolution, although dynamic in character, produce only such progress as is characteristic of organic evolution. It has been sufficient to create society and to account for its development thus far. This Ward calls *passive* or *negative* progress.[58] There is, however, another type which he designates *active* or *positive,* which is due to the extrinsic factor of intellect. "To the regular course of the social phenomena as determined by the laws of evolution, we must conceive added a new force limiting and directing these into special channels and for special ends. Its chief quality as distinguished from other forces is *purpose.* In short, it is the teleological force, the abstract conception of which is familiar to all, having formed the basis of the theological philosophy. . . . The pure processes of nature, conceived as unintelligent, have never been deemed sufficient to account for social phenomena. A teleological force has always been believed to preside over, control, limit, and direct the affairs of men, to special progressive ends. . . . The only thing new about the idea under consideration is the *source* of this influence. . . . Nor must it be forgotten that the very idea of a teleological force is an anthropomorphic conception. But for this known power of man to modify nature, to his own ends, no such power would have ever been ascribed to his divinities. . . . It is this reality that it is sought here to recognize

[56] *Sociology, its Development and Application,* pp. 93-4.
[57] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, p. 473.
[58] *Cf. ibid.,* p. 56.

and rehabilitate and to bring forward as the true active or positive force in social dynamics." [59]

The rise of the objective factor of intellect and its function as a directive agent are described at length in *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. II, Ch. viii, and in *Pure Sociology,* Chs. xvi and xvii. It will be sufficient here to note a few of its general characteristics.

The Guiding Function of Intellect or Mind-Force

"The mind-force, as popularly understood, is no force, but only a *condition.* It does not propel, it only directs. It is not mind, except within the narrow limits of this definition, that achieves the vast results which civilization presents, and which, it must be admitted, could not be achieved without it. It is the great social forces which we have been passing in review that have accomplished all this. Mind simply guides them in their course. The office of mind is to direct society into unobstructed channels, to enable these forces to continue in free play, to prevent them from being neutralized by collision with obstacles in their path. In a word, mind has for its function in civilization to preserve the dynamic and prevent the statical condition of the social forces, to prevent the restoration of equilibrium between the social forces and the natural forces operating outside of them." [60]

The Economy of Intellectual Processes

"The prodigality of nature is now a well understood truth in biology, and one that every sociologist and every statesman should not only understand but be able to apply to society, which is still under the complete dominion of these same wasteful laws. No true economy is ever attained until intellectual foresight is brought to bear upon social phenomena. Teleological adaptation is the only economical adaptation." [61]

The Rapidity of Intellectual Achievement

"Noetic phenomena are far more rapid than genetic. . . . It requires millions of years to produce an organic structure. Social structures, even the purely genetic ones, grow, evolve, and change far more rapidly

[59] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 57-8.
[60] *Ibid.,* p. 698.
[61] *Ibid.,* pp. 74-5. *Cf.* also *Psychic Factors of Civilization,* Ch. XXXIII, and *Pure Sociology,* pp. 469-70.

than organic structures. But telic structures are comparatively of mushroom growth. . . . The law of telic phenomena seems to be a geometrical progression, every new structure breeding a brood of younger and better ones." [62] Through artificial selection man accomplishes in a few years what nature requires ages to produce.

The Indirect *vs.* The Direct Method

"All desires are blind. The social forces are all blind forces. They impel to direct action toward the objects of desire. If obstacles intervene, they are simply arrested and never attain these objects." [63] It is the function of intellect to institute the transition to the indirect method. "The transition constitutes one of the great leaps which nature has taken along its course of evolution, and the first break in that process since the development of protoplasm. Henceforth the possibilities of vital existence are to be multiplied, and the rate of organic progress enormously accelerated. . . . Interposed barriers are evaded by circuitous routes of approach. Powerful natural forces are by appropriate adjustments made to do the work of overcoming resistance, and what is wholly unattainable in the present is, by the necessary adaptation, secured in the future." [64]

The Superiority of the Artificial Over the Natural

"The progress to which dynamic sociology points is an *artificial* progress. . . . The successful in this field is not that which most closely imitates nature, but that which most completely alters it and bends it to the advantage of man. Useful art is a departure from, and improvement upon, nature. . . . All progress is brought about by *adaptation.* . . . But adaptation is of two kinds: One form of adaptation is *passive* or *consensual,* the other form is *active* or *previsional.* The former represents *natural* progress, the latter *artificial* progress. The former results in a *growth,* the latter in a *manufacture.* The one is the *genetic* process, the other the *teleological* process. In passive adaptation the means and the end are in immediate proximity, the variation takes place by infinitesimal differences; it is a process of *differentiation.* In active adaptation, on the contrary, the end is remote from the means;

[62] *Pure Sociology,* p. 471.
[63] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, p. 487.
[64] *Ibid.,* Vol. II, pp. 99-100.

the latter are adjusted to secure the former by the exercise of *foresight.* It is a process of *calculation.*" [65]

In order to guard against any inference that the artificial is in any sense unreal or removed from the domain of causation, Ward reminds us that both the agents and the materials of achievement belong to the realm of the natural. "Viewed in the widest sense, man is of course but a product of nature and his acts are the effects of complicated antecedent causes." [66] His purposes, therefore, are the results of his nature reacting within his environment and furthermore, *"The only means by which the condition of mankind ever has been or ever can be improved, is the utilization of the materials and the forces that exist in nature."* [67]

Teleological Progress *vs.* Natural Progress

There is a difference in kind between the processes of blind adaptation secured through natural selection and those of purposive achievement obtained through artificial selection. To this latter process Ward applies the term *telesis,* and to its product, *teleological* or *anthropo-teleological* progress. "In fact, so far as the phrase 'social evolution is concerned, I would restrict it wholly to this aspect (the genetic process) and would exclude from it any and all effects that can be shown to have been consciously produced. Such effects do not belong to evolution. They are products of social or collective telesis, and may be called *institution.*" [68]

Summarizing, then, we say that feeling or desire constitutes the dynamic force, and intellect the directing force, the resultant of which is human achievement or civilization. Upon this thesis Ward is emphatic. "And when I assert that all the control that can ever be exerted over mankind must, in the future as in the past, emanate from the side of feeling and not of intellect, and promise a mitigation of the hardships of existence at the same time, I unqualifiedly maintain that all the true progress which has in fact taken place in the world has come from the side of intellect and not of feeling." [69]

Two corollaries follow naturally from these conclusions.

(1) The kind of effort which is needed in human society is

[65] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, pp. 71-2, *Cf.* also *Applied Sociology,* p. 11.
[66] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 29.
[67] *Ibid.,* p. 18.
[68] *Pure Sociology,* p. 545.
[69] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, p. 15.

teleological effort. The possibilities here stir the imagination. "For its realization would certainly accelerate the rate of social advancement in some such way as the artificial development of domesticated animals and cultivated vegetables, through human foresight and intelligence, has accelerated their natural development due to the blind struggle for existence. For it is just this blind struggle for existence that society, as a great organism, has been thus far making and is still making, while the proposed system is nothing more than the application to society of that foresight and intelligence which artificial selection applies to organic nature." [70]

(2). The phenomena of human achievement constitute the data of sociology. "My thesis is that the subject matter of sociology is human *achievement.* It is not what men are, but what they do. It is not the structure but the function. . . . Structures and organs are only means. Function is the end. . . . It is this fact of permanent human achievement that makes the broad distinction between animal and human societies . . . *the environment transforms the animal, while man transforms the environment.* . . . The artificial modification of natural phenomena is the great characteristic fact in human activity. It is what constitutes achievement. No animal is capable of it." [71] The *motif* of this achievement is the *"interest,"* a term borrowed from Ratzenhofer,[72] to embody the content of the social forces. The method is *"invention,* in the Tardian sense." [73] Civilization is built up not through any change in man but through the accumulation of a vast mechanical equipment of "acquired aptitudes." Inventions pass into arts and institutions and become the permanent possessions of society.

"This is why human labor and animal activity are generically distinct, and one of the principal reasons why sociology cannot properly include the study of the so-called animal societies, produced and continued by reflex and instinctive forces." [74]

It is clear, then, that both man and the society which he creates, are in the realm of the natural, and offer the data for a science of society. But the essence of society is in its psychic character and its understanding involves the study of the phenomena of the social mind which is composed of the social feelings or the dynamic social forces, and the social intellect or the agency by which the natural processes of

[70] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. I, p. 27.
[71] *Pure Sociology,* pp. 15-17.
[72] *Cf. Ibid.,* p. 21.
[73] *Cf. Ibid.,* p. 25.
[74] *Ibid.,* p. 29.

social evolution are converted into the purposing achievements of social progress. The analysis of this process must now claim our attention.

The Social Process—Conation

It is necessary to understand the relation which "man and nature mutually sustain to each other" before considering the thesis "that society can and should seriously undertake the artificial improvement of its condition upon scientific principles strictly analogous to those by which the rude conditions of nature have been improved upon in the process which we call civilization; . . . to adopt an aggressive reform policy guided entirely by scientific foresight rendered possible by an intelligent acquaintance with the fundamental laws of human action." [75]

Self-directed progress requires a clear understanding of the attitude which nature assumes toward man and of that which man should assume toward nature. In the first instance it is the relation "of the whole to a part." Man is not only an integral part of nature and subject to its laws but he is a product of the great unconscious cosmic process. In the second instance it is twofold, first, "that of a student," and, second, "that of a master," and mastery is in direct proportion to experimental knowledge.[76]

This understanding establishes the rationality of the teleological concept, but it fixes also the limits within which teleological phenomena can be produced.

The characteristic aspects of teleological phenomena are: They are conscious achievements, they involve purpose, and they require effort.

"Confining our attention for the future to the *effort* itself, we observe that all living organisms are incessantly striving to secure the ends of being. This universal *nisus* in the organic world extends to man, and constitutes one of the great factors in the problems of social science. . . . The term *conation* will be employed in this work to represent the efforts which organisms put forth in seeking the satisfaction of their desires, and the ends thus sought will be designated as the *ends of conation.*" [77]

Conation, however, has two aspects which it is necessary to distinguish. (1) The *direct,* characteristic of the genetic process, and (2) the *indirect,* secured through the instrumentality of intellect. It

[75] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. II, p. 2.
[76] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 2-13.
[77] *Ibid.,* p. 93.

is the latter that characterizes human conation and its development that constitutes the social process.

The Ends of Human Conation

According to Ward there are six theorems of dynamic sociology and their order is in a fixed series admitting of no alteration. They are:

"A. Happiness is the ultimate end of conation.

"B. Progress is the direct means to Happiness; it is, therefore, the first proximate end of conation, or primary means to the ultimate end.

"C. Dynamic Action is the direct means to Progress; it is, therefore, the second proximate end of conation, or secondary means to the ultimate end.

"D. Dynamic Opinion is the direct means to Dynamic Action; it is, therefore, the third proximate end of conation, or tertiary means to the ultimate end.

"E. Knowledge is the direct means to Dynamic Opinion; it is, therefore, the fourth proximate end of conation, or the fourth means to the ultimate end.

"F. Education is the direct means to knowledge; it is, therefore, the fifth proximate end of conation, and is the fifth and initial means to the ultimate end." [78]

Only the briefest epitome of these theorems can be attempted.

A. Happiness is the goal of all human endeavor, and the problem of dynamic sociology is "the *organization of happiness.*" The fundamental basis of happiness is feeling—the love of pleasure and the fear of pain.[79] This is not the abstract love of life nor the fear of death. Man alone makes this connection. It is rather the positive and negative satisfaction of desire secured through organic or instinctive reactions to the stimuli of safety, nutrition and reproduction. To these necessary motives of behavior, human social life adds another which becomes the dominant and conscious purpose of social achievement, viz., to increase the sum of pleasure or happiness. Here causal necessity requires the mechanical adaptation of means to ends and is conditioned upon the exercise of the intellectual faculties. This "greater happiness" may be sought directly by the individual but is obtained indirectly through society.

[78] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. II, pp. 108-9.

[79] *Cf. The Pain and Pleasure Economy, Pure Sociology,* pp. 283-9; also, S. N. Patten, *The Theory of Social Forces,* Supplement to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. VII, No. 1, Jan., 1896, p. 75 ff.; also Bristol's analysis of Patten's theory, *Social Adaptation,* pp. 236-44.

What, then, is the process of its acquisition? [80]

B. The first proximate end, through which it is achieved, is Progress. Progress is defined as "whatever increases the sum total of human happiness" and is secured through "success in harmonizing natural phenomena with human advantage." Progress is possible because potentiality is always in excess of opportunity. There is always a residuum of desire striving for more complete satisfaction. Reproduction encroaches on nutrition, population presses on the means of subsistence. Animal evolution is limited by the "wall of circumstances." As brain power develops, dissatisfaction with limitations arises. It is the removal of these barriers by artificial means that constitutes progress. The chief human means to this end have been the development of communication and the expansion of the creative arts. Human progress is therefore teleological—it is artificial progress. Among the products of art, however, there arise institutions or agencies, at first progressive or intended to be progressive, but which in time "lithify" and become non-progressive. Chief among these, Ward places Government and Religion.[81]

Since progress is the source of increasing happiness, we may ask, next, what is the source of Progress?

C. The immediate means of Progress is Dynamic Action. Since progress is an artificial phenomenon, as distinguished from genetic phenomena, it is entirely the result of human action. The essential thought here is contained in the term "dynamic." All action does not lead to progress. Actions emanating from natural impulses are involuntary and static. They produce the social order. Dynamic actions originate in intellectual conation; they produce social progress. They are purposive, indirect, inventive and mediate. This type of conation may be expended upon the inorganic factors in the development of physical appliances, upon the biologic factors in the improvement of the race, or Eugenics, and upon the social factors in the increase of welfare.

Dynamic actions may be individual or collective. Ward lays special emphasis upon the possibilities of the future when dynamic action, so far chiefly confined to a few individuals or small groups of individuals, becomes socialized—when individual telesis is supplemented or superseded by collective telesis.[82]

But what is the basis of dynamic action?

[80] *Cf. Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. II, Ch. IX.
[81] *Cf. ibid.,* Ch. X.
[82] *Cf. ibid.,* Ch. XI.

D. Opinion is the direct means to progressive action. (The term opinion is used practically synonymously with belief, idea, or judgment.) "Opinions determine action," that is, "what men do depends upon the views they entertain." The value of these actions depends upon two qualities residing in opinions: (1) "their correctness," and (2) "the importance of their subject matter."

In the first case, it is not the unity or general acceptance but the correctness of opinions which guides progressive action. Witness the burning of witches as the result of widespread but false ideas. The tragedy of history is that men hold false views to the injury of society when the means for their correction are available.

In the second case, it is necessary to realize that opinions are not held by an act of will. Example: "Imagine a Roman Catholic zealot philosophizing with himself whether he could, by an act of will, accept the heresies of Martin Luther! And yet nothing was more clearly established in his mind than that those heretics could return to the doctrines of the Universal Church the moment they should will to do so." [83] Opinions are products of experience, conditioned, it is true, by subjective factors both ante-natal and post-natal, but over which the will has no jurisdiction. Hence the futility of coercion. They are important or unimportant on the basis of the value or worthlessness of the causes which produce them.

The four great bases of dynamic opinion are Cosmological, Biological, Anthropological, and Sociological. In all these realms it is a matter of utter indifference to nature what men think. Their processes are immutable. But it is of the utmost importance to men that their views are correct. By this alone is progress achieved.

How, then, are correct opinions obtained? [84]

E. Knowledge is the immediate data of opinion. Since men cannot think rationally by any act of volition, the resort must be to intelligence which is "intellect plus knowledge." (It should be observed here that Ward uses the older terminology of the psychology of his time. Present usage gives to the word intelligence a connotation similar, though not identical, with the former meaning of the term intellect.) Intellect is mental power and knowledge is the material on which this power is exerted.[85]

There are two possibilities, therefore, for the expenditure of con-

[83] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. II, p. 421.
[84] *Cf. ibid.,* Ch. XII.
[85] *Cf. ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 405.

scious social effort in the increase of intelligence. That of increasing the amount of intellect, and that of increasing the amount of knowledge. The former end can be achieved only through the slow process of biological selection or Eugenics. The latter, through the relatively simple and available method of increasing correct information. Both of these possibilities exist for the future, but the immediate and practical problem is of quite different nature.

In the average mind, present intellectual capacity is far in excess of the amount of useful knowledge possessed and the present accumulation of useful knowledge is far in excess of its general distribution. The result is that general intelligence is far below present possibilities, with all the social consequences which this condition implies.

The solution of this problem is obvious.

F. Education is the direct road to knowledge—the ultimate end of conation. This, we recall, is what Ward regarded as the crown of his sociological system.[86] The secret of success in transforming the social order into social progress is correct knowledge of the means to be employed. The process of this acquisition is called Education, although the term is confessedly inadequate. Current concepts are catalogued and criticized. (1) The "Education of Experience," or the method of trial and error, while original and still necessary in certain matters, is uneconomical in time and effort. It is unnecessary for the individual to rediscover by experience knowledge which the race already has acquired. Moreover, experience and education stand related to each other as that of the genetic and teleological method. (2) The theory of "Education of Discipline" or "mental gymnastics" as a means of modifying brain-tissue is a survival of naïve medieval psychology and already is exploded. One does not learn to think by thinking, but by contact with objective realities. "Nothing could be more false than that the study of mathematics strengthens the reasoning faculties." [87] (3) The "Education of Culture," or "accomplishment," is desirable and "is capable intrinsically of affording pleasure." Relating to the esthetic or non-essential knowledge it is secondary to practical or dynamic knowledge. It is not, therefore, the primary concern of education. (4) The "Education of Research" or the discovery of truth, is an essential. It is the means by which knowledge is advanced. But the discovery of knowledge carries with it no guarantee of its dissemination. Thus ignorance prevails as the great barrier to progress while the

[86] *Cf. supra.*, p. 360.
[87] *Applied Sociology*, p. 311.

means of progress are available. (5) We come, then, by a process of elimination, to Ward's own contribution, viz.: "Education of Information" or "a system for extending to all the members of society such of the extant knowledge of the world as may be deemed most important." [88]

There are three cardinal principles upon which this theory rests:

First, "its exclusive devotion to the *contents* of the mind and its entire disregard of its *capacity*." (This thesis was based upon the opinion, seemingly well established when Ward wrote, that mental capacity was approximately equal in all normal members of civilized societies. The knowledge since accumulated upon the different "levels of intelligence" in the population would require some modification of this principle in respect to capacity, but would leave relatively unaffected the theory in regard to content.) This thought is best expressed by himself: "The object *is* to fill the mind with truth: not to *cram* it, nor to force it, but to store it in such a systematic way with knowledge that it may make use of its stores in the production of rational thought. The idea that the mind breaks down because crammed beyond its capacity with knowledge is a gross misconception of the primary principles of psychology. It is based on some such crude assumption as that the brain is a hollow sphere and that thoughts are material gases introduced into it. The fact is that the lowest town gossip has a larger number of items of information stored away in his brain than Humboldt ever had. It requires no greater effort to know something important than something unimportant. It is not the quantity of knowledge but the quality, not the number of truths but their value, which should be chiefly considered, and the ability of the mind to acquire them forms no part of the problem." [89]

Second, "that it shall be the exclusive work of society itself." Thus Ward, as against Spencer and with Comte, takes his stand on the side of state-conducted or public education. Frankly against private education as less efficient and sometimes anti-social because of the emphasis on class distinctions, he defends the public system as superior because of the independence of teachers who are free from private control and responsible only to the public, because of its democracy—all pupils meet on "a footing of strict equality" and are judged according to merit, and because it best disseminates the knowledge society needs. The function of deciding what knowledge "may be deemed most important"

[88] *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 568.
[89] *Ibid.*, p. 571.

cannot be entrusted to the individual. "No tribunal short of that which society in its own sovereign capacity shall appoint is competent to decide this question." [90]

The state may fail to create and carry on an ideal system. What then is the alternative? There is none. Society must be made competent. This involves the next point.

Third, "that it must be *universal.*" It is the business of Education to impart knowledge, since civilization is the product of knowledge. The difference between civilized men and savages is not in what they *are* but in what they *know.* To the extent to which civilization carries a burden of ignorance in any portion of its population, its progress is to the same degree retarded. In addition to the general effect of hastening progress and diminishing its costs, there are many specific results that will follow the equal distribution of knowledge. It will eliminate the present encroachments of the intelligent upon the ignorant and of the ignorant upon the intelligent by destroying the distinction, and Ward does not decide which evil is the greater. It will increase social welfare directly by widening the scope of collective telesis and indirectly by diminishing the waste of failure through ignorance of the means of achievement. It will tend toward the equalization of the objects of desire, for the *"initial means"* to the more equitable distribution of wealth is the distribution of intelligence. He therefore charges the socialists with "working at the roof instead of the foundations of the structure which they desire to erect." [91]

Ward advocates *compulsory* education, the equal education of men and women, and discusses the *matter, means,* and *methods* of education, but these are practical considerations and involve no contribution to the theory.

The whole problem of education is, in fine, reduced to this: "Whether the social system shall always be left to nature, always be genetic and spontaneous, and be allowed to drift listlessly on, intrusted to the by-no-means always progressive influences which have developed it and brought it to its present condition, or whether it shall be regarded as a proper subject of art, treated as other natural products have been treated by human intelligence, and made as much superior to nature in this only proper sense of the word, as other artificial productions are superior to natural ones." [92]

[90] *Dynamic Sociology,* Vol. II, p. 591.
[91] *Ibid.,* p. 597.
[92] *Ibid.,* p. 633; also *ibid.,* Ch.XIV; also, *Applied Sociology,* pp. 307-13. For

PURE AND APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

We have now completed the analysis of Ward's contributions to social theory on the basis of his own earlier estimate.[93] In the preface to *Applied Sociology* he explains his purpose, as set forth in his entire system, and condenses it into one comprehensive aim. The student will form his own judgment after comparison with prior and subsequent systems, as to how successfully he has accomplished his end. He states: "The central thought is that of a true science of society, capable in the measure that it approaches completeness, of being turned to the profit of mankind. If there is one respect in which it differs more than in others from rival systems of philosophy it is in its practical character of never losing sight of the end or purpose, nor of the possibilities of conscious effort. It is a reaction against the philosophy of despair that has come to dominate even the most enlightened scientific thought. It aims to point out a remedy for the general paralysis that is creeping over the world, and which a too narrow conception of the law of cosmic evolution serves rather to increase than to diminish. It proclaims the efficacy of effort, provided it is guided by intelligence. It would remove the embargo laid upon human activity by a false interpretation of scientific determinism, and, without having recourse to the equally false conception of a power to will, it insists upon the power to act." [94]

There remains now only to consider the fundamental classification which Ward makes within the science of Sociology itself, viz., that of Pure and Applied Sociology.

This distinction is best stated in his own language.

"By pure sociology, then, is meant a treatment of the phenomena and laws of society as it is, an explanation of the processes by which social phenomena take place, a search for the antecedent conditions by which the observed facts have been brought into existence, and an aetiological diagnosis that shall reach back as far as the state of human knowledge will permit into the psychologic, biologic, and cosmic causes of the existing social state of man. But it must be a pure diagnosis, and all therapeutic treatment is rigidly excluded. All ethical considerations . . . must be ignored for the time being, and attention concentrated upon the effort to determine what actually is. Pure sociology has no concern with what society *ought* to be or with any social ideals.

the adverse theory, *Cf.* Spencer's essay, *Feeling versus Intellect,* in *Facts and Comments,* pp. 35-43.

[93] *Cf. supra,* pp. 359-60.

[94] *Applied Sociology,* p. iii.

. . . The pure method of treatment keeps aloof from all criticism and all expressions of approval, from all praise or blame, as wholly inapplicable to that which exists of necessity. . . . This strictly objective treatment also necessitates the looking of facts in the face, however ugly they may be. It is no more the part of pure sociology to apologize for the facts, than to extol or condemn them. Still less can it afford to deny what really exists, or attempt to minimize it or explain it away, merely because it is abhorrent to certain refined perceptions of highly developed races." [95]

"Just as pure sociology aims to answer the questions, What, Why, and How, so applied sociology aims to answer the question, What for? The former deals with facts, causes, and principles, the latter with the object, end, or purpose. The one treats the subject-matter of sociology, the other its use. However theoretical pure sociology may be in some of its aspects, applied sociology is essentially practical. It appeals directly to interest. It has to do with social ideals, with ethical considerations, with what ought to be. While pure sociology treats of the 'spontaneous development of society,' applied sociology 'deals with artificial means of accelerating the spontaneous processes of nature.' The subject matter of pure sociology is achievement, that of applied sociology is improvement. The former relates to the past and the present, the latter to the future. Achievement is individual, improvement is social. Applied sociology takes account of artificial phenomena consciously and intentionally directed by society to bettering society. Improvement is social achievement. In pure sociology the point of view is wholly objective. It may be said to relate to social function. In applied sociology the point of view is subjective. It relates to feeling—the collective well-being. In pure sociology the desires and wants of men are considered as the motor agencies of society. In applied sociology they are considered as sources of enjoyment through their satisfaction." [96]

"That sociology may become an applied science no one will dispute who believes that it is a science at all. And although its phenomena are the most complex of all and the most difficult fully to understand, when understood, if they ever are, the results their study promises in the direction of their modification in the interest of man are beyond calculation.

"But applied sociology is not government or politics, nor civic or

[95] *Pure Sociology*, pp. 4-5.
[96] *Applied Sociology*, pp. 5-6.

social reform. It does not apply sociological principles; it seeks only to show how they may be applied. It is a science, not an art. The most that it claims to do is to lay down certain general principles as guides to social and political action. But in this it must be exceedingly cautious. The principles can consist only of the highest generalizations. They can have only the most general bearing on current events and the popular or burning questions of the hour. The sociologist who undertakes to discuss these, especially to take sides on them, abandons his science and becomes a politician." [97]

The distinctions here drawn are invaluable in clarifying much of the preceding discussions and in defining the functions of sociology as a science, in both its pure and applied aspects. An unfortunate result, however, has accrued but for which Ward is in no way responsible. The term applied sociology or its more popular expression, practical sociology, in the hands of those who have never read Ward or who have never grasped his meaning, has been made synonymous with social pathology and social reform and it has been made to appear that these constitute a part of sociology. Social reform is the art of social improvement, of which Sociology is one, if not *the* most important, underlying science, just as the practice of medicine is an art, resting upon the sciences of chemistry, anatomy, etc. In view of the vagaries and crude theories often paraded under the guise of true social reform, and because of this supposed relationship, sociology has been subject to much needless and undeserved criticism.[98] It seems almost needless to say that sociology in the Wardian sense, whether pure or applied, is the antidote to irrational and impractical therapeutic social schemes. The confusion in the popular mind is due largely to the uncritical use of the word "sociological" when "social" is meant. Thus social problems are often designated sociological problems. Even sociologists have not always been discriminating in the use of these terms.

APPRECIATION

As a fitting close to this chapter we quote a few brief testimonials from contemporary sociologists as to Ward's personal worth and his contributions to sociology.[99]

[97] *Applied Sociology*, pp. 9-10.

[98] *Cf.* Henry Jones Ford, the *Pretentions of Sociology, American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, July, 1909, pp. 96-110.

[99] The citations are from the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX, July, 1913, pp. 61-78, in which appears a series of tributes of esteem written at the

"Since the death of Tarde, Dr. Ward has been generally recognized as the foremost living social philosopher. . . . When one considers the vast range of his intellectual interests, the number and variety of his original contributions to science, and his great power of generalization, one feels that if Aristotle had chanced to be born in Illinois about the middle of the Nineteenth Century, his career would have resembled that of Lester F. Ward more than that of any other American of our time. . . . Like Spencer he was a man who early conceived a disinterested life purpose and carried it through to a triumphant conclusion. . . . For thirty-five years he labored like a Hercules at his self-imposed task of proving the practicability of 'telic' social progress. . . . With sentimentalists he was patient, but he never mixed with them, for he realized that what is lacking is not the will to social progress but the way."—*E. A. Ross.*

"His fame will grow as the years pass. . . . His productiveness was remarkable. . . . In paleobotany his achievement would have been a worthy life record for a scientific specialist devoted to that one subject. . . . To Sociology he gave his devotion and the best powers of his superbly equipped mind. . . . Throughout them all (his sociological writings) runs one dominating and organizing thought. Human society, as we who live now know it, is not the passing product of unconscious forces. It lies within the domain of cosmic law, but so does the mind of man; and this mind of man has knowingly, artfully, adapted and readapted its social environment, and with reflective intelligence has begun to shape it into an instrument wherewith to fulfill man's will. With forecasting wisdom man will perfect it, until it shall be at once adequate and adaptable, to all its uses. This he will do not by creative impulse evolving in a void, but by constructive intelligence shaping the substantial stuff of verified scientific knowledge. Wherefore, scientific knowledge must be made the possession of mankind. Education must not merely train the mind. It must also equip and store, with knowledge.

"This great thought Dr. Ward apprehended, expressed, explained, illuminated, drove home to the mind of all who read his pages, as no other writer, ancient or modern, has ever done. It is his enduring and cogent contribution to sociology."—*F. H. Giddings.*

"The most obvious of Ward's contributions to sociological construction work was undoubtedly his share in fixing the terminology of the new science. It is true that not all the terms suggested by Ward

time of his death by his colleagues "among whom his primacy was always uncontested."

have been accepted as final. . . . But there remains a store of those which, being real contributions to scientific clarity and precision, will permanently enrich sociological literature. . . . Examples are telesis, sociocracy, synergy, meliorism, achievement, improvement, opportunity.

"But the need for a distinctive terminology was subordinate in Ward's mind to a conviction that sociology must vindicate its claim as a genuine science. To do this it must have its own special equipment. . . . It was in this matter of the proper placing of sociology among the sciences that Ward's own equipment in general science, always the envy of his fellow-sociologists, was of peculiar value. . . . To me the thing which bulks largest (among the features of his system) is his consistent and masterful working-out of the nature and method of collective telesis. . . . His insistence on the predominance of the psychic factors is the outgrowth of a large and sane scholarship little concerned with the vagaries of social psychology as such. It is because mind is the directive agent that the psychic element is of primary importance. Even in his theory of social forces, his attention is always directed toward social improvement as the end."—*U. G. Weatherly.*

"The passing of Lester F. Ward removes from the scene of action the last of the great sociological giants of the Nineteenth Century. Professor Ward will always rank with the other two great founders of our science—Comte and Spencer. In some ways his work for sociology was second only to that of August Comte. If there were errors in both his premises and generalizations, as I believe there were, this fact in no wise detracts from the epoch-making character of his work, nor does it give him any lesser place than we have indicated. . . . The distinctive significance of Ward's work was . . . to get for the psychic factor in human society due recognition, and adequate formulation. . . . Ward undertook to show that the psychic factor is the dominant one in human society, that it is the factor which must receive chief attention from sociologists; and that, through it, human progress may even be artificially controlled. Thus Ward became one of the founders of modern psychological Sociology."—*C. A. Ellwood.*

"Dynamic Sociology did not seem to me to push the frontier of the ontological problem any further back toward ultimates than hundreds of philosophers had reached. It did make me feel more secure in accepting the working necessity of dealing with orders of phenomena in accordance with their last discoverable traits even if this procedure leaves us with practical duality. It enabled me to think of so-called physical and psychical phenomena as equally real, as equally instru-

mental in their place, as functioning in orders of experience which are somehow related whether we are able to formulate the relationship or not. It placed psychical causation on a plane of plausibility as convincing as the presuppositions of physical causation, without resorting to anything extra-phenomenal in support of the one more than of the other. It located social causation within human beings, instead of outside, above, beneath, or beyond them. It punctured the bubble of metaphysical philosophy of human experience, and exposed the literal problems of human relationships under the aspect of psychology as the ultimate analysis."—*A. W. Small.*

Bell Sch

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. State clearly and critically the two contrasted philosophic theories which Ward calls the schools of Dynamists and Materialists.
2. Has Ward's theory of "The Genesis of Mind" been altered as the result of more modern studies in psychology? *Cf.* H. H. Goddard, *The Psychology of the Normal and Subnormal,* Part I, also Maurice Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior,* Chs. VIII to XVI.
3. What valuable aid is given to the study of Ward in W. B. Bodenhofer's *The Comparative Role of the Group Concept in Ward's Dynamic Sociology and Contemporary American Sociology, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXVI, Nov., 1920, Jan., Mar. and May, 1921.
4. Compare Ward's concept of "The Social Mind" with that of M. P. Follett, *The New State,* Chs. I-IV.
5. Criticize the concept of "the social mind." *Cf.* J. E. Boodin, *The Existence of Social Minds, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XIX, July, 1913.
6. Compare further the contribution of Emile Durtheim to the theory of the "social mind." *Cf.* C. E. Gehlke, *Emile Durkheim's Contribution to Sociological Theory,* Columbia University Thesis, 1915.
7. Make a list of A. W. Small's points of general approval of Ward's system and also his chief reasons for dissent from his work as a whole. *Cf. Note on Ward's Pure Sociology, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. IX, Mar., 1904, pp. 703-7.
8. Note carefully the valuable criticisms of J. M. Gillette in regard to special doctrines of Ward. *Cf. Critical Points in Ward's Pure Sociology, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XX, July, 1914.
9. State clearly Ward's doctrine of the "Social Forces" and criticize it in the light of E. A. Ross' discussion. *Cf. The Social Forces, Foundations of Sociology,* Ch. VII.
10. Read and evaluate E. C. Hayes' contention in regard to the fallacy of the "Social Forces Concept." *Cf. The Social Forces Error, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XVI, Mar., 1911.
11. Make a digest of L. M. Bristol's analysis of Ward's contributions to Sociology, noting also the nature of his criticisms. *Cf. Social Adaptation,* pp. 221-36.

12. Criticize Ward's emphasis on education as a means of social progress in the light of A. J. Todd's discussion of *Some Educational Implications of Social Progress,* in *Theories of Social Progress,* Ch. XXXIII.
13. What is the difference between the popular concept of practical Sociology and that of Ward in *Applied Sociology?*
14. For additional treatment of Ward's Sociology *cf.* E. S. Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought,* Ch. XVII.

CHAPTER XIV

GABRIEL TARDE

BEFORE proceeding further it should be noted that the period of sociological development now under review includes, beside Ward, a large number of contemporary writers. In harmony with our general scheme, however, we have limited our survey, too rigidly for some no doubt, to three additional writers whose contributions seem most conspicuous and consequential.

Those included are: Tarde 1843-1904, Gumplowicz 1838-1909, and Ratzenhofer 1842-1904. In any complete analysis many others should be included but in comparison with these, their contributions, for the most part, are in the nature of elaboration or modification of the theories considered rather than original, outstanding or comprehensive systems. Moreover, some of these are our own contemporaries also and with these we are not dealing in this present volume. Since a chronological order in the treatment of those selected is impossible we have resorted to what seems to be a logical arrangement.

BACKGROUND—PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL

Social theory as we have seen is a reflection of the social environment, but it is always refracted by the medium of the mind which produces it. In the progress which theory has undergone the relative importance of these factors has changed. Objective factors have diminished in importance and subjective factors have increased. This does not mean that ideas are not produced objectively or that they are uninfluenced by external conditions. What we wish to emphasize is that with the increase in the breadth and complexity of knowledge the elements of thought combined in any new synthesis or invention become more important than the environment in which the product grows.

This seems to be more characteristic of Tarde's theory than of most of the writers so far considered. It was less the outgrowth of the incidents of contemporary history than of philosophic contemplation based upon current social thought.

There are, however, two sources, the one remotely suggestive, if not determinative, the other immediately influential. The first, the conditions of change in current French history, the second, the processes of social action. If the former did not produce his theory it was at least corroborative. The latter was more directly causative.

Tarde lived during two great political upheavals in France—the revolution of 1848 and the establishment of the second French Republic which occurred during his boyhood, and which was followed a few years later by the assumption of complete control by Louis Napoleon. This, we should observe, was in keeping with the monarchical feeling or tradition that was still dominant in France. The new régime strengthened itself in two successful foreign wars, the Crimean, 1853-6, and the Italian war with Austria, 1859, but lost caste almost completely in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. Then came the third Republic, the work of urban masses, and without the sentiment of the majority of the people to support it. The new government, however, survived its turbulent infancy and grew gradually in confidence and favor with the people.[1]

There is ample material here for the illustration of the working of the principle of action and reaction in custom and fashion imitation and of crowd psychology. The causes of social change and of revolution lay deep in the economic and political situation but the conspicuous aspects of social movement appealed strongly to the philosophic mind. Tarde's works on *Les Transformations du droit, Les Transformations du pouvoir, and L'Opinion et la foule* were undoubtedly influenced directly by these national events and his general theory finds much confirmation if not immediate suggestion from this source.

Very early Tarde's mind was attracted by a phenomenon exhibited by the abnormal behavior with which he dealt in the routine of his work as a magistrate. He was impressed deeply by the repetition of similar criminal acts which resulted in waves of crime and in the duplication of modes of criminality. While similarity in anthropological types might serve as a condition and might constitute a predisposition, the real cause of the phenomenon of regularity observed in criminality he believed was due to the high potential of suggestibility in criminals. Thus it was this process which produced results in an orderly fashion which for him became the subject-matter of scientific study. Having grasped this principle it was but natural that a mind characterized by a broad philosophic bent should range over the wider field of social

[1] *Cf.* Bracq, J. C., *France under the Republic,* Ch. I-III.

phenomena for the confirmation or disproof of the theory involved. The study of the development of civilization—the evolution of language, of art, of law, and of institutions—revealed to him the working out of the principle of suggestion and imitation, and with the ardor of a discoverer he proclaimed it as the elemental social fact.

Moreover, the time seemed propitious for such an achievement. The extant theories of social interpretation were, in the main, objective. The protagonists of sociology were Comte and Spencer and their respective followers. The Comtians, though laying the foundations for a broader system, had advanced little beyond the demonstration of the place of sociology in the "hierarchy of the sciences" and its proper location in the third category of developing thought. The Spencerians, minimizing or neglecting the subjective psychological elements of Spencer's system, were concerned chiefly in establishing the biological analogies and the objective facts of social evolution. Ward's theories had not yet become known.

The decisive fact in the development of a specific science is the discovery of a principle or law by which its phenomena may be generalized, as *natural selection* in biology and *gravitation* in astronomy. Tarde believed that if sociology were to become a science it would be accomplished not by determining its logical position among the sciences, nor by the demonstration that its phenomena were analogous to those of other sciences, but by the discovery and elucidation of its own processes and laws.

GABRIEL TARDE

Gabriel Tarde was born March 12, 1843, in the village of Sarlat, department of Dordogne, Southern France. His early education was secured at the Jesuit college of Sarlat, and which consisted largely of classical and philosophic studies. Instead of pursuing a university career for which he was prepared he went to Toulouse and later to Paris for the study of law. At the age of twenty-six he was appointed judge of the Tribunal of First Instance in his native town, and six years later to the position of "Juge d'instruction" or magistrate, a position which he held for over eighteen years, his entire judicial career covering a quarter of a century. His high conception of the duties of his office, coupled with his keen intellectual perception, developed in him not only an absorbing interest in the practical problems of his somewhat restricted professional environment but also in their philo-

sophic aspects. Through inclination and leisure to combine his technical and scientific interests he became a profound student of criminal statistics and penology and gained at first a national, and then an international reputation as a criminologist. His literary and scientific career dates from 1880 when he began a series of articles in the *Revue Philosophique,* in which he attacked the anthropological theories of criminological interpretation by Lombroso, whose views were just becoming popularized. The brilliancy of these articles led Professor Lacassagne of the University of Lyon to secure his collaboration in the work of founding the *Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle* in 1886. In 1893 he became coeditor of this journal—a position which he held till his death—and to which he contributed many articles. By 1894 his attainments drew him into the public service and he was called to Paris as head of the Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Justice. While holding this position he lectured to students, taught in the School of Political Sciences and took an active part in sociological and other scientific societies. In 1900 he retired from public office and became Professor of Modern Philosophy in the College of France, a position which he held for the brief period of four years. He died in Paris, May 12, 1904.

Like Ward he combined a long public service with literary and scientific achievement, and like Ward, also, he derived his sociologic theories largely from the field of his original scientific interest. His writings also fall into corresponding groupings. His first book on criminology, *La Criminalité,* published in 1886, set forth his views of crime as chiefly a social phenomenon in contra-distinction to the theories of organic causation. These ideas were elaborated more fully in the *Philosophie Pénale* [2] which appeared in 1890.

His sociological writings were numerous and besides his books comprised many articles published in scientific journals. His system of social theory, however, is contained in *Les Lois de l'Imitation* [3] *La Logique,* 1895, *L'Opposition,* 1897, and the synthetic treatment of the material of these three volumes delivered first in the *Collège libre des Sciences* as a series of lectures and published under the title *Lois Sociales,* [4] also in 1897.

[2] Translated as *Penal Philosophy* by R. Howell, in the *Modern Criminal Science Series* and published by Little, Brown and Company, Boston, under the auspices of the *American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology* in 1912.

[3] Translated under the title *The Laws of Imitation* by Elsie Clews Parsons, 1903.

[4] Translated by H. C. Warren, entitled *Social Laws,* in 1899.

THE THEORY

To what extent the concept of laws of imitation, which Tarde proposed, as fulfilling the conditions of a genuine social science, was independent and original with him it is somewhat difficult to determine. Neither the knowledge of the psychological process of imitation nor its application to the interpretation of animal and human life individual and social was new.

That Tarde was indebted to Cournot is evidenced by the dedication of *The Laws of Imitation* to him and by his own statement. "I am not the pupil or even the disciple of Cournot. I have never met him. But I take it as one of the happy chances of my life that I read a great deal of this writer after I left college. I have often thought that he needed only to have been born in England or Germany and to have had his work translated into French teeming with solecisms to be famous among us all. Above all, I shall never forget that at a dreary period of my youth, when I was suffering from my eyes, and limited of necessity to one book, it was Cournot who saved me from mental starvation. . . . Cournot was the Sainte-Beuve of philosophic criticism; possessed of originality and discrimination, he was a thinker of universal erudition as well as insight; . . . an Auguste Comte, purified, condensed, and refined." [5]

The following passage from Cournot presents views which are familiar to students of Tarde and with which he must have been familiar:

"In all the phenomena of life there is a manifest tendency to imitation, to the repetition of similar acts. To this tendency is apparently related the production of particular varieties (of plants and animals) in the course of successive generations. . . . Within the individual the repetition of similar acts engenders habit, and becomes the principle of education of the senses, of the regular play of all functions, of the perfection or perversion of the faculties and the instincts. Imitation creates all in a piece so to speak, the specific qualities of individuals, or it develops them from the germ which was innate in the individual. Considered among the higher animals, even of the highest order, the tendency to imitation, in a word habit, becomes the principle of association of sensations, of ideas, in so far as the species may have them, and

[5] *The Laws of Imitation*, p. xi.

of all the phenomena of imagination and of memory in that degree which the nature of animals permits." [6]

Commenting upon this quotation Davis remarks: "Here are suggested Tarde's ideas (1) of imitation as a form of repetition, (2) of imitation as the social analogy of habit, and (3) of the analogy between imitation and reproduction or generation." [7]

Another writer whom Tarde quotes for confirmation rather than for the suggestion of his views, but whose priority is recognized, is Espinas. He says, "M. Espinas expressly states in his admirable work on *Sociétés Animales,* a work which was written long before the first edition of this book, that the labors of ants may be very well explained on the principle *'of individual initiative followed by imitation.'* This initiative is always an innovation or invention that is equal to one of our own in boldness of spirit." [8]

Several other French writers, notably Paul Jolly, *Hygiène Morale,* Paris, 1877, and A. Bordier, *La Vie des Sociétés,* Paris, 1887, whose works antedated Tarde's and with which he may easily have been familiar, although he made no mention of them, make specific use of the terms and concepts of invention and imitation.[9]

Furthermore, Tarde's theory of imitation seems to have been developed simultaneously with that of Bagehot's but quite independent of it. A French translation of *Physics and Politics* was published in Paris in 1877 and may have been known to Tarde, but he does not refer to it. He probably had not seen it.

In his chapter, "Nation Making," Bagehot posits imitation as one of the chief processes. Aside from the race-making factors of environmental selection, it is of chief importance. "The imitative propensity at once insures uniformity. . . . The same patronage of favored forms and persecution of disliked forms, are the main causes, too, I believe, which change national character . . . men are guided by *type,* not by argument . . . it is the life of teachers which is catching, not their tenets. . . . The truth is that the propensity of man to imitate what is before him is one of the strongest parts of his nature. . . . We must not think that this imitation is voluntary, or even conscious. On the contrary, it has its seat mainly in the very obscure parts of the mind, whose notions, so far from having been consciously produced, are

[6] Quoted by Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society,* pp. 111-12.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 112.
[8] *Laws of Imitation,* p. 3.
[9] *Cf.* Davis, *op. cit.,* pp. 115-16.

hardly felt to exist; so far from being conceived beforehand, are not even felt at the time." [10]

Thus he contends that we "inhale" our beliefs from the infectious atmosphere of belief that surrounds us. "The mere presentation of an idea, unless we are careful about it, makes us believe it; and this is why the belief of others adds to our belief so quickly, for no ideas seem so very clear as those inculcated on us from every side. . . . In this way the infection of imitation catches men in their most inward and intellectual part—their creed. But it also invades men—by the most bodily part of the mind—so to speak—the link between the soul and body—the manner . . . we all know how a kind of subtle influence makes us imitate or try to imitate the manner of those around us.[11]

Bagehot perceived with great clearness, however, that imitation is not the only aspect of this process.

He continues: "I want to bring home to others what every new observation of society brings more and more freshly to myself—that this unconscious imitation and encouragement of appreciated character, and this equally unconscious shrinking from and persecution of disliked character is the main force which moulds and fashions men in society as we see it." [12]

Imitation explains the "amazing sameness" in savage society. "Savages copy quicker, and they copy better." The tendency to mimicry is strongest in children, in uneducated people, and in those of least abstract minds. But another tendency is discerned.

"The persecuting tendency of all savages, and, indeed, of all ignorant people, is even more striking than their imitative tendency. No barbarian can bear to see one of his nation deviate from the old barbarous customs and usages of their tribe." [13]

Persecution here stands for the attitude of mind which results from conflict or opposition between new and old ideas, between fashion and custom imitation, between the new inventions and the previously adopted invention. Here a third principle is discovered.

"It may be said that these two tendencies of the early world—that to persecution and that to imitation—must conflict; that the imitative impulse would lead men to copy what is new, and that persecution by traditional habit would prevent their copying it. But in practise the two tendencies coöperate. There is a strong tendency to copy the most

[10] *Physics and Politics*, pp. 89-93.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 93-6.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 97.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

common thing, and that common thing is the old habit. Daily imitation is far oftenest a conservative force, for the most frequent models are ancient. Of course, however, something new is necessary for every man and for every nation. . . . New forces will impinge upon us. . . . But the persecuting habit and the imitative combine to insure that the new thing shall be in the old fashion; it must be an alteration, but it shall contain as little of variety as possible. . . . The doctrine of development means this, that in unavoidable changes men like the new doctrine which is most of a 'preservative addition' to their old doctrines. The imitative and the persecuting tendencies make all change in early nations a kind of selective conservatism, for the most part keeping what is old, but annexing some new but like practise." [14]

This is the process "of breaking the cake of custom," and of escaping the ossifying effects of habit, of tradition, and of customary law. [15]

In these passages Bagehot has anticipated Tarde's three great principles of Repetition, Opposition and Adaptation, but since the assumption that Tarde appropriated them without due acknowledgement is inconsistent with the integrity of his mind, it seems fairer to assume that they were unknown to him and that he arrived at them almost simultaneously by similar methods of thought.

What is new in Tarde's theory, then, is not the discovery of imitation as *a* social process, but that, together with its correlated processes, it constitutes *the* social process.

In the two preceding chapters we have considered the two great comprehensive systems of sociology. Both Spencer and Ward laid claim to having presented completed systems. Between Plato and Aristotle and these two writers no one had attempted a complete analysis of society. More or less successful attempts, as we have seen, had been made by men who had devoted their energies to the development of principles, processes, or procedures which were invaluable prerequisites to social interpretation. Comte unified these concepts and proved the possibility of a synthetic science of society but did not make the application. He created the science of sociology but did not develop it. The logical outcome was the work of Spencer and Ward. From now on the reverse process is observed, and we find men working in segments of the field, devoting their thought to specific aspects of the general subject for which their diverse abilities and inclinations qualify them.

[14] *Physics and Politics,* pp. 103-4.
[15] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 27 and 53.

This procedure in sociology is in common with that of the development of science as a whole or with that of the specific sciences in particular. Generalization is followed by specialization. After fundamental principles or working hypotheses have been laid down, specialized studies are pursued both for the purpose of testing or correcting the theories or of applying them to the interpretation of the phenomena to be described. Ultimately minute and intensive researches in concrete material are carried on independently within the general scope of the science and the facts brought to light are checked up with previous theory. But this stage of sociological science falls within the scope of contemporary sociology and with it we are not now concerned.

Resuming then our study of Tarde we find that he limits his field of inquiry. In the preface to the first edition of the *Laws of Imitation* he says: "In this work I have endeavored to point out as clearly as possible the *purely social* side of human phenomena as distinct from their vital and physical characteristics." Thus while recognizing other factors which render men competent to associate and the environmental influences which, to some extent, determine the character of their association, he nevertheless concentrates upon the process of association—the relation of mind to mind—which creates society. This he regards as the "purely social" aspect which for him constitutes "pure" or "general" sociology. This position is sustained throughout all his writings and classifies him at once with those who approach sociology from the point of view of psychology, and as one of the chief pioneers in this field. In the exposition of Tarde's theory we follow the logical order, which is also the chronological order of his prior work, and presented coherently in the *Social Laws.*

There are three great processes exhibited by phenomena throughout the entire domain of science, viz.: Repetitions, Oppositions, and Adaptations. In the first place,—"Science is the coördination of phenomena regarded from the side of their *repetition.*" [16] There is no science of the individual. Unless phenomena repeat themselves no generalizations can be made.

"But in addition to the question of *reproduction,* the phenomena involved in *destruction* are of interest to science. And hence, in every sphere of fact to which she directs her attention, science must attempt to discover, in the second place, the *oppositions* that exist there and are germane to her object. Thus, she must consider the equilibrium of

[16] *Social Laws,* p. 3.

forces, the symmetry of forms, the struggle of living organisms, and the strife among all creatures." [17]

In the third place "The *adaptations* of phenomena, and their relations in creative production (the creative synthesis of Ward) must above all be dealt with." [18] These "are the three keys which science employs to open up the arcana of the universe. . . . These are three different species of laws, which must certainly not be confounded; yet they are quite as closely connected as they are distinct." [19] These are the processes which elucidate the evolution of science in general and of sociology in particular. We pass at once to their consecutive consideration.

THE REPETITION OF PHENOMENA

For the elaboration of this principle and its application to society we must perforce turn in the main to his original treatise, *The Laws of Imitation:*

First of all, Tarde defends the thesis of its universality. The concept of quality implies resemblance and *"all resemblance is due to repetition."*

1. "All resemblances which are to be observed in the chemical, or physical, or astronomical worlds, . . . can be caused and explained solely by periodic, and, for the most part, vibratory motions.

2. "All resemblances of vital origin in the world of life result from hereditary transmission, from either intra- or extra-organic reproduction. . . .

3. "All resemblances of *social origin* in society are the direct or indirect fruit of the various forms of imitation—custom imitation or fashion imitation, sympathy-imitation or obedience-imitation, precept-imitation or education-imitation, naïve imitation, deliberate imitation, etc." [20]

The sciences in these various spheres began when men discovered the regularity of phenomena due to their repetition. They progressed as true repetitions were substituted for false ones, or when those which were vague were replaced by those which are definite and those which were general by those which are specific.

In sociology "The first incoherent attempts were made when, amid the distracting chaos of social data, men discerned, or believed that

[17] *Social Laws,* pp. 4-5.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 5.
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[20] *Laws of Imitation,* p. 14.

they discerned, something periodic and regular." [21] The ancient concept of the "Great cyclic year" or cycle of repetition of all natural and social phenomena was the point of departure. Aristotle specialized this general concept in his order of succession of the forms of government. Arrested at this stage, sociology began again in Vico's revised theory of the "cycles of antiquity" and in Montesquieu's similarities of civilizations evolved under like climatic conditions. Progress in social analysis has been continuous but sociology can become a pure science only when it abandons finally the concept that social phenomena repeat themselves *en masse* and of logical necessity and, segregating its own peculiar phenomena of repetition, it analyzes them on the basis of the initial process by which they are constituted; when it gives up the method of the *"philosophy of history,"* which deals with "collective character" such as "the genius of a people or race" and "the far-fetched" analogies of the "social organism" and substitutes for these the study of "the general laws of imitative repetition which are to sociology what the laws of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to physics." [22]

The ultimate form to which all social phenomena can be reduced, according to Tarde, is the relation existing between two persons, "one of whom exerts a mental influence upon the other" and this influence "always consists, at bottom in an imitation of one by the other," [23] or in other words "the inter-cerebral relation of two minds, the one reflecting the other." [24] This constitutes the origin of society. "It began on the day when one man first copied another." [25]

"It is this relation, then, that the sociologist must adopt as his own peculiar data . . . it is here that he must seek the key to the social mystery; it is from this that he must endeavor to derive the few simple but universal laws, which may be distinguished amid the seeming chaos of history and human life." [26]

THE LAW OF IMITATION

There are of necessity two aspects to this process. Organic evolution proceeds by the dual processes of variation and selection. Without variation there would be nothing upon which the selective processes

[21] *Social Laws*, p. 24.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 61.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 47.
[25] *Laws of Imitation*, p. 28.
[26] *Social Laws*, p. 47.

could work. By analogy the social process may similarly be explained. Individual initiative and social assimilation are the corresponding phenomena. Stimulation must precede response. To the former—the origin of social action—Tarde applies the term *invention.* To the latter —the method or process of social action—*imitation.*

I. Invention Is the Innovating Process

In the Tardean sense an invention is a new mental product. It is a discovery, an origination. It may take the form of an idea or a procedure and may be expressed by word or by example.

In the origin of invention Tarde admits an element of chance, not in the sense that causation is absent, but because of the fortuitous appearance of the inventor at any particular juncture of influences, and because of the specific combination of factors made from among the relatively infinite number of possibilities.

The actual process involves a creative synthesis among previously existing ideas. "Every invention and every discovery consists in the interference in somebody's mind of certain old pieces of information that have generally been handed down by others. . . . From that as a starting point, we may say, that the generic term, of which invention is but a species, is the fruitful interference of repetitions." [27] Darwin's theory of natural selection is cited as an illustration of the fortunate combination of the known facts of competition and struggle with those of variability and heredity.

Invention is the source of social change. While it is true that invention is often the result of vague desire, it is likewise true that desire cannot become effective in the absence of the objects of satisfaction. Now it is invention which produces, consciously or unconsciously, these objects of desire either physical or mental, and by making desire specific transforms it into a social force. "Inventions are far from being, then, the simple effects of social necessities; they are their causes." [28]

Furthermore, there are intrinsic and extrinsic factors which affect the rate of origination of invention. On the one hand progress is self-accelerating. Every new invention makes possible a host of others. Growth of population increases the chances of the appearance of superior ability. Widening opportunity enlarges the field for inventive genius.

[27] *Laws of Imitation,* p. 382.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. 93.

On the other hand, as invention proceeds its problems become more abstruse, requiring higher types and different orders of ability. Relative barrenness or prolificacy of inventive imagination differentiates races. National isolation due to geographic barriers, or racial prejudices, limits the tendency to innovation. Davis, in his schematic presentation of Tarde's theories summarizes this aspect as follows:

"The origin of invention is influenced by: (*a*) The inherent difficulty of combining mentally the ideas whose combination *is* the invention; (*b*) The grades of innate mental ability in the society; and (*c*) The social conditions favoring mental alertness and the expression of ability." He further expresses the opinion, in a footnote, that Tarde should have added another point, viz., "That the social needs of a time and the amount of social prestige attaching to the various spheres of activity, affect powerfully the sort of inventions which will be made, because they direct ability to certain problems rather than to others." [29]

II. Imitation Is the Socializing Process

Imitation is the means by which the invention becomes socially adopted. It creates society either potentially or actually. "Society may, therefore, be defined as a group of beings who are apt to imitate one another, or who, without actual imitation, are alike in their possession of common traits which are ancient copies of the same model." [30]

In actual operation "Society is imitation." [31]

Tarde pays relatively little attention as we have noted to the vital and psychic processes by which the individuals become capable of imitation. These are due to hereditary influences and belong to the biologist and psychologist. It is the distinctly social process that concerns him.

Furthermore, the analogy of social facts with those of different orders, as for example, those of society with an organism is not an explanation of the social facts. Nor have we solved the problem when we have noted the effects of physical environment, such as that of climate, fertility or situation, in determining to a degree the type of social adaptation. These are all valuable facts for sociology, but the purely social aspects of social phenomena require interpretation through distinctly social processes. These alone are found in the phenomena of imitation. "Our problem is to learn why, given one hundred innova-

[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 97.
[30] *Laws of Imitation*, p. 68.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

tions conceived at the same time . . . ten will spread abroad, while ninety will be forgotten." [32]

There are certain general laws of imitation that are analogous to those governing the phenomena in the two other great orders of repetition.

Just as the vibrations of light, heat, or sound tend to spread in all directions from the point of radiation, and as organisms tend to multiply in a geometric ratio, so the "self-spreading contagion" of an invention tends to reproduce itself through imitation by a similar multiple progression throughout society.

This process is modified, however, in each sphere first, by rival tendencies, viz., the conflict of physical forces, the struggle among organisms, and the competition among inventions, and second, by the contact with the media or environment as the refraction of light, natural selection, and the influence of race or existing social forms respectively. Thus "Imitations are modified in passing from one race or nation to another, like vibrations or living types in passing from one environment to another." [33] There are "linguistic," "artistic" idea and custom "refractions."

In dealing with the more specific social aspects of imitation Tarde develops at some length two distinct types of influence which he designates the logical and non-logical or extra-logical laws. We can consider them only in outline.

1. Logical Laws

"Logical causes operate whenever an individual prefers a given innovation to others because he thinks it is more useful or true than others, that is, more in accord than they with the aims or principles that have already found a place in his mind—through imitation of course. In such cases, the old or new inventions or discoveries are themselves the only question; they are isolated from any prestige or discredit which may have attached to those circulating them or to the time and place of their origin." [34]

Every new invention, then, has a direct bearing upon preëxisting beliefs or desires. "Societies are organized according to the agreement or opposition which reinforce or limit one another. Social insti-

[32] *Laws of Imitation*, p. 140.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

tutions depend entirely upon these conditions. Societies function according to the competition or coöperation of their desires or wants. . . . *Progress,* then, is a kind of collective thinking, which lacks a brain of its own, but which is made possible, thanks to imitation, by the solidarity of the brains of numerous scholars and inventors who interchange their successive discoveries." Tarde here, in parentheses, draws a valuable analogy between the individual and the social mind. He remarks: "The fixation of discoveries through writing, which makes possible their transmission over long stretches of time and space, is equivalent to the fixation of images which takes place in the individual brain and which constitutes the cellular stereotype-plate of memory.

"It follows that social like individual progress is affected in two ways, through substitution and through accumulation. . . . Hence we have logical *combats* and logical *alliances.*" [35]

(1) *The Logical Duel.* This is the conflict between alternatives, either in the form of yes or no, for or against, or in the form of choice between rivals. The former aspect is illustrated when an invention is offered as a substitute for one existing, the latter when a plurality of inventions seek to satisfy the same desire. This is illustrated on the one hand by the rise of a new word, a new religion, a new industrial process, or a new social form and on the other by the competition among languages, creeds, political platforms, styles of architecture, or social systems. It is the social process of transforming irresolution into resolution and is achieved by one of three different methods: the suppression of one adversary by the "prolongation of the other's progress; through resort to force or in non-military matters by "vote or decree": or through reconciliation of antagonists or voluntary withdrawal.[36]

(2) *The Logical Union.* Instead of fighting and replacing each other inventions often "aid and add to each other." This is the process of accumulation instead of substitution. Customs, languages, religions, political ideas, industrial processes and social reforms graft themselves upon existing systems. One might characterize this as the evolutionary, in contrast with the revolutionary, method of progress. The nature of inventions and the type of existing forms, determine which method is most likely to be employed.[37]

[35] *Laws of Imitation,* pp. 146-9.
[36] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 169-70.
[37] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 173-88.

2. Extra-Logical Laws

"But logical action is very rarely untrammeled in this way. In general, the extra-logical influences . . . interfere in the choice of the examples to be followed, and often, . . . the poorest innovations, from the point of view of logic, are selected because of their place, or even date of birth." [38]

"We have now to study the non-logical causes of preference or aversion which are back of different kinds of rival imitations and which determine their victory or defeat." [39]

There are two preliminary observations upon the modes of imitation which throw light upon the action of extra-logical processes. First, imitation grows in preciseness and second it becomes more involuntary and unconscious. "Imitation is to such an extent the primal soul of social life, that among civilized men skill and facility in imitating increases even faster than the number and complexity of inventions . . . social life is bound to lead, in its prolongation, to the formation of etiquette, that is, to the complete triumph of conventionality over individual fancy. . . . This need of conventionality after it has reached a certain degree of strength becomes conscious of itself and adopts violent and expeditious means for its satisfaction." [40] "Just as with the individual unconscious habits were originally conscious and self-determined acts, so in the nation everything that is done or said by tradition or custom began by being a difficult and much questioned importation . . . man is wrong in thinking that he imitates because he wishes to. For this very will to imitate has been handed down through imitation." [41]

There are three aspects or forms of extra-logical imitation: *"The logical or teleological values being by hypothesis equal,* (1) the subjective model will be imitated before the objective, (2) the example of persons or classes as well as of localities that are thought superior will prevail over the example of inferior persons or classes or localities, . . . a like presumption of superiority attaches (3) at times to the present, at times to the past, and is a potent factor and one of considerable historic significance in favor either of the examples of our fathers, or of those of our contemporaries." [42]

[38] *Laws of Imitation,* p. 141.
[39] *Ibid.,* p. 189.
[40] *Ibid.,* pp. 189-92.
[41] *Ibid.,* pp. 192-3.
[42] *Ibid.,* p. 194.

(1) *Imitation from Within to Without.*

This is easier described than defined. "The soldier's tendency to keep step and march with his fellows is innate before it is obligatory." People of the same village "walk on an average at the same rate of speed. . . . Every city retains a characteristic accent long after its food and dress have become like other cities. . . . The scholar imitates his master when he repeats his spoken words. . . . An energetic and authoritative man wields an irresistible power over feeble natures. . . . The common people have always been inclined to copy kings and courts and upper classes according to the measure in which they have submitted to their rule. . . . This progress from *within* to *without,* if we were to express it more precisely, means two things: (1) That imitation of ideas precedes imitation of their expression. (2) That imitation of ends precedes imitation of means. Ends or ideas are the *inner things,* means or expressions, the outer." [43]

(2) *Imitation of the Superior by the Inferior.*

This is the personal aspect of the influence of prestige. Imitations spread from *above* to *below.* "The conquered never fail to copy their conquerors." The influence of the upper classes upon the lower, of townsmen upon rustics, of colonial whites upon native blacks, of adults upon children, of upper classmen upon lower, is felt even in the matter of accent, . . . of writing, gesture, facial expression, dress and custom." "If the nation is on an aristocratic basis the thing is very simple. Given the opportunity, a nobility will always and everywhere imitate its leaders, its kings or suzerains, and the people likewise, given the opportunity, its nobility." "In democratic countries . . . majorities as well as capitals have prestige. . . . Since the majority becomes the real political power, the universally recognized superior, its prestige is submitted to for the same reason that that of a monarch or nobility was formerly bowed down to. . . . When an idea arises in triumph from the ballot box we should be infinitely less inclined to bow down before it if we realized that nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of the votes that it polled were but echoes. . . . Nothing is a better indication of the intensity of the imitative impulse." [44]

(3) *Custom and Fashion Imitation.*

Here we have the impersonal side of prestige, and we deal with the time rather than the place element. It is in the very nature of society that no final equilibrium is ever established between the forces making for

[43] *Laws of Imitation,* pp. 195-207.
[44] *Ibid.,* pp. 215-30.

order and for progress. There is a sort of irregular rhythmic swing between the imitation of the familiar and of the novel. "The habit of taking on faith one's priests and one's ancestors is superseded by the habit of repeating the words of contemporary innovators. This is called substituting the spirit of investigation for credulity. Actually, it is merely a welcoming of foreign and persuasive ideas following upon a blind acceptance of traditional and authoritative affirmations." [45] There are, then, "epochs and societies in which the prestige of antiquity rules," and others which are "controlled by the prestige of novelty." The former process Tarde calls "custom imitation," and the latter "fashion imitation." "In periods when custom is in the ascendant, men are more infatuated about their country than about their time. . . . In ages when fashion rules, men are prouder, on the contrary, of their time than of their country." [46]

In time, however, the "fashion" is transformed into "custom" through imitation, "but this final return from the spirit of fashion to that of custom is in no sense a retrogression." [47] It is the method of progress of every civilization in general and of its "secondary waves" in particular, that is, of language, religion, government, law, industry, art, and morality.[48]

To summarize in the briefest possible space the extra-logical influences we may say with Davis:

"Ideas are transmitted before means; imitation goes from interior to exterior;

"Imitation proceeds from the socially superior to the socially inferior;

"Ages of custom, in which the past has peculiar prestige, alternate with ages of fashion, in which prestige is possessed by the novel and the foreign." [49]

THE OPPOSITION OF PHENOMENA

Turning now to the second great process of phenomena we find universal oppositions which are of as great interest to science from a practical point of view as repetitions are from the theoretical. There is conflict among physical elements, as attraction and repulsion; among vital organisms exhibiting the struggle for existence; and among

[45] *Laws of Imitation,* p. 245.
[46] *Ibid.,* p. 247.
[47] *Ibid.,* p. 251.
[48] *Cf. ibid.,* p. 254.
[49] *Op. cit.,* p. 98.

social ideas and forms resulting in war, competition and discussion. Here, too, "the progress of science consists in doing away with the small number of superficial gross oppositions that were perceived or imagined at first, and replacing them by countless profounder and subtler oppositions, that are exceedingly difficult to discover." [50] This is illustrated in the sciences of astronomy, physics and chemistry, biology, physiology, sociology, and economics.[51]

Opposition as used by Tarde does not mean the "maximum degree of difference" nor "assumed natural contrarieties." It implies "a relation between two forces, tendencies, or *directions*." [52]

Among the numerous distinctions between oppositions the chief one, for social interpretation, is that "where the terms are simultaneous and the case where they are consecutive. In the former there is collision, strife, and then equilibration; in the latter there is alternation and rhythm." [53]

1. Oppositions of Conflict

This in a broad sense is equivalent to the "logical or teleological dual" in the phenomena of repetitions. It is a meeting of opposing "rays of imitation" which reach by a long process from the original inventor down to the person affected. New ideas or beliefs arise in the mind of the individual through the conflict of imitation rays by the psychological process of balancing the probabilities in their respective favor, accompanied usually by some degree of hesitation. This process becomes socialized through imitation. "A new party always consists of a group of persons who, one after another and copying one another, have adopted a notion or course contrary to that which had hitherto reigned in their midst, and with which they themselves had been imbued. On the other hand, this new dogmatism, becoming more intense and intolerant as it spreads, raises against itself a coalition of those who, remaining faithful to tradition, have made exactly the opposite choice, and thus two fanatical parties find themselves face to face." [54] The scope of this phenomenon is as wide as the interests which divide men in society.

There are three principal forms of social conflict under which Tarde generalizes this subject, viz., War, Competition and Polemics. Only

[50] *Social Laws*, pp. 68-9.
[51] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 69-84.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 88.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 92-3.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

in a very broad logical sense may these be regarded as stages, i.e. consecutive. Practically they are contemporaneous. Before discussing separately these forms it is necessary to make an observation which explains their method of treatment. In accordance with the principle laid down, viz., that oppositions tend toward equilibration, or that "shocks of interference apparently serve only as preparations for their unions," i.e., adaptations, he says: "The strife of opposition in human society . . . proves obedient to one and the same law of development, through ever widening areas of pacification, alternating with renewals of discord more centrally organized and on a larger scale, and leading up to a final, at least partial, agreement. It would appear from this . . . that the strife of opposition fulfills the rôle of a middle term in the social, as it does in the organic and inorganic, worlds, and that it is destined gradually to fade away, exhaust itself, and disappear, as a result of its own growth, which is merely a progress toward its own destruction." [55]

(1) *War.*

War is the resort to force when oppositions become absolute; when they involve or are believed to involve, the problem of existence itself. In the main wars are the result of social oppositions of the political type. They are the deadly conflicts of groups, clans, tribes, cities, states, empires, each the product of prior combinations of imitation rays, over sites and resources, over religious dogmas and political systems. They settle opposition by vanquishing or by treaty. The method in general, however, is self-eliminating.

"If history be correctly interpreted, it shows that war is forever developing in one direction, and that this course, . . . seems to indicate its ultimate disappearance, after it has gradually become rarer. . . . From a countless number of very small but exceedingly bitter wars between petty clans, we pass to a smaller number of somewhat larger and less rancorous wars: first between small cities, then between large cities, then between nations that are continually growing greater, till finally we arrive at an era of very infrequent but impressive conflicts, quite devoid of hatred, between colossal nations, whose very greatness makes them inclined to peace . . . War as a whole has diminished, or, at least, been transformed in a manner tending toward its ultimate disappearance. . . . The development of war is in fact, a gradual extension of the area of peace." [56]

[55] *Social Laws*, pp. 132-3.
[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 110-13.

(2) *Competition.*

Even when war ceases, and meanwhile during the process of its elimination, there are other forms of social conflict, those of the economic, in contrast with the political type. They have to do with sustentation rather than with security. Competition results in either *joint action* or *contest,* and is either advantageous or disadvantageous.

There are three forms in which opposition appears under the general term competition: "as among the producers of the same article, as among the consumers of the same article, and between the producer and consumer of the same article."

The growth of civilization with its increasing wants and satisfactions achieved through the processes of invention and imitation, intensifies all these conflicts but the same law of development is exhibited. "Like war, competition proceeds from the small to the great, and from very numerous instances of the very small to very infrequent instances of the very great." [57]

The transition from hand to machine, from individual to social production, the growth of great producing and distributing corporations replacing the smaller, the rise of "consumers' coöperative societies" combining the functions of producer and consumer, are facts too obvious to need further explanation.

"Competition only resolves itself temporarily into association, in the form of rivalries between associations, corporations, syndicates, and so on. But in this way we finally arrive at a certain limited number of gigantic associations which not being open to further growth, can only associate together, after having fought one another awhile." [58]

(3) *Polemics.*

This is verbal discussion in contrast with discussion "in deeds of blood" and "in deeds of ruin." It is the conflict of ideas or of intellectual imitation rays in general. While present in both of the preceding forms it possesses a distinct function of its own. "Verbal" is meant to include not only the purely verbal but written and printed forms as well.

"Groups are first split up into an endless multitude of little coteries, clans, churches, forums, and schools which combat one another; but at length, after many polemics they are welded into a very small number of great parties, religious, parliamentary groups, schools of philosophy,

[57] *Social Laws,* p. 115.
[58] *Ibid.,* p. 125.

and schools of art, which engage one another in mortal combat." [59] These combats resolve themselves into three great productions, that have gradually been wrought out by centuries of discussion, namely, "Religion, Jurisprudence, and Science," [60] and in each of these the same general process is observed.

The one great cause, operating throughout the entire range of social oppositions, is the tendency of dogmas, phrases, moral maxims, industrial processes, political theories, scientific principles, etc., to spread in a geometric ratio by imitative repetition, and is analogous to that of the increase of organisms by hereditary repetition. The results of the inevitable overlappings is struggle and elimination through the teleological duel and the hybridization and cross fertilization of cultures through logical syntheses.

2. Oppositions of Rhythm

Considered very briefly, these are the oppositions of logical union. They have to do with the "rise and fall," the "come and go" of forces. It is the form of conflict that involves, not yes *or* no, but yes *and* no alternately. They are not the forces of "paralysis and mutual destruction," but those of acceleration and retardation. "Rhythm appears to be a normal play of forces which voluntarily accommodate themselves to one another, whether it be in quantitative or qualitative rhythm." [61]

There is ample historic material for the illustration of this principle in waves of immigration or of crime, in alternative periods of prosperity and depression, in the rise and fall of empires and of civilizations, but Tarde does not extend the discussion here beyond its statement.

THE ADAPTATION OF PHENOMENA

Adaptation or natural harmony Tarde regards as "the profoundest aspect under which science views the universe." It is the end of the social process as repetition is the method, and as opposition is the means. It is what Darwin called "natural selection," Spencer, "the evolutionary process" and Ward, "the creative synthesis." It is the law of aggregates,—a new balance of oppositions,—a harmony that repeats itself.

"Any aggregation whatsoever is a collection of individuals jointly adapted, either some adapted to the remainder or all to a common

[59] *Social Laws*, p. 126.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 131.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

function. An aggregate means an adaptate. Moreover, different aggregates which have relations with one another may be coadapted; this constitutes an *adaptate* of a higher order, and an infinite number of such degrees may be distinguished. For the sake of simplicity, let us distinguish merely between two degrees of adaptation: adaptation of the first degree is that which the elements of a system have among themselves; adaptation of the second degree is that which unites these elements to the systems that surround them, that is, to what is vaguely denoted by the term *environment*. The adjustment with one's self differs greatly, in phenomena of every sort, from the adjustment with others, just as self-repetition (habit) differs from the repetition of others (heredity or imitation), and as self-opposition (hesitation and doubt) differs from opposition to others (strife or competition)." [62]

Here, as elsewhere, the progress of science consists in "first discovering or imagining a vast harmony of the whole, or a few grand but vague external harmonies, and in replacing these gradually by countless internal harmonies, forming an infinite number of fruitful, infinitesimal adaptations." [63]

This process is illustrated in astronomy and in biology, and must become that of sociology.

Astrology passes into astronomy through the abandonment of the original magnificent but imaginary "geocentric illusion" and the substitution of concrete internal harmonies. "Henceforth, the religious mind need turn no longer far away to the vast vault of heaven, there to find and worship the fathomless wisdom that moves the universe; rather it must gaze into the chemist's crucible, and discern the mystery of those physical harmonies that are surely the most exact and marvelous of all—far more wonderful even than the scattered disorder of the stars: I mean the chemical combinations. If, by means of some powerful microscope, we could perceive the interior of a molecule, how much more fascinating after all would appear the great network of elliptical and circular motions that in all probability make it up, than the extremely simple play of the great celestial tops." [64]

Likewise, must be dissipated the "anthropocentric illusion," which represented the "palaeontological series as a straight ascent toward man," and of which "augury and totemism" are natural products,

[62] *Social Laws*, pp. 148-50.
[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 144-5.
[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 153-4.

through the substitution of the observation of the behavior of individual organisms. "There is no *single* end in nature—no end in relation to which all others are means; but there is an infinite number of ends which are seeking to utilize one another. Every organism, and in every organism every cell, and in every cell, perhaps, every cellular element, has its own particular Providence, for itself and in itself. Here, then, as before, we are led to consider the harmonizing force . . . not as something unique, external, and superior, but as indefinitely repeated, infinitesimal, and internal. In reality, the source of all these harmonies of life, which become less striking the farther we get from the starting-point and the wider the field we embrace, is the fertilized germ; this last is a living representation of the intersecting lines that meet in it, forming often a felicitous cross-breed, it is the germ of new talents, which are destined to spread broadcast, and to propagate themselves in turn, thanks to the survival of the fittest, or the elimination of the least fit." [65]

The social analogy of the foregoing "illusions" is found in what we might designate as a sociocentric illusion in early sociology. "The theologians, who have ever been the most prominent sociologists, though without knowing that they were sociologists, frequently picture the stream of the history of all peoples of the earth as converging, from the beginning of humanity, toward the advent of their own cult." [66] Even with Comte, whose system was the last word in the philosophy of history, "the entire history of mankind converged toward the era of his own Positivism." Spencer's theory was a step in advance. "His formula of social evolution applies, not to a single drama, but to a considerable number of social dramas." The notion still obtains, however, that "in order to see a gradual dawn of regularity, order, and logic in social phenomena, we must go outside of the details, which are essentially irregular, and rise high enough to obtain a panoramic view of the general effect; that the source and foundation of every social coördination is some general fact from which it descends gradually to particular facts, . . . in short, that man acts, but a law of evolution guides him." [67]

While not denying the validity of this method of observation for purposes of generalization, nor its importance as a method of discerning "slopes" and "streams" in social evolution, Tarde nevertheless believed

[65] *Social Laws*, pp. 155-7.
[66] *Ibid.*, p. 157.
[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 159-60.

that the true scientific approach was from the opposite direction. He says: "The final outcome . . . of this final preponderance of a single line of social evolution . . . is the series of scientific discoveries and industrial inventions that have gone on ceaselessly accumulating and making use of one another; these have become bound together in a system or bundle, whose real logical interrelation, though not without intricacies of its own, seems vaguely repeated in the interrelation of the races which have contributed to its formation. If we follow up this great scientific and industrial stream, we find its source in the mind of every genius, whether obscure or celebrated, who has added some new truth, some new means of activity, to the enduring legacy of humanity, and who has made the relations among mankind more harmonious by this contribution, by promoting community of thought and collaboration of effort. And so . . . I maintain that the details of human events alone contain striking adaptation; that the basis of these harmonies which are less noticeable in a vaster domain here comes plainly to view, and that the more we rise from a small but closely united social group, such as the family, the school, the workshop, the rural church, the convent, or the regiment, to the city, the province or the nation, the less complete and striking does this solidarity become." [68]

"Shall we not say, then, that the *fundamental social adaptation* is, in the last analysis, that of two men, one of whom answers, by word or deed, the question of the other, whether silent, spoken, or tacit? . . . that this fundamental harmony consists in the relation between two men, one of whom teaches, while the other learns—one of whom commands, while the other obeys—one of whom produces, while the other buys and consumes—one of whom is actor, poet, or artist, while the other is spectator, reader, or amateur, or better, that it consists in the relation between two who work together to produce the same result? . . . We must carry this analysis still further, and . . . seek the fundamental social adaptation in the brain of and individual mind of the inventor. Invention, if we limit the term to that which is destined to be imitated, for what remains locked in the mind of its creator, has no social value . . . is a harmony among ideas, which is the parent of all the harmonies among men." [69]

The circle, or better, the spiral of invention, imitation and adaptation is now complete. The new adaptation, in all its essential characteristics

[68] *Social Laws*, pp. 161-2.
[69] *Ibid.*, pp. 165-6.

is a new invention and the entire process is recapitulated, but on an ascending scale, which is the essence and method of progress.

"We have just observed that the development of sociology, here as elsewhere, has brought it down from the dizzy heights of grand but vague causes, to real and precise acts of infinitesimal size. We have now to demonstrate, or rather point out . . . that the evolution of social facts, reversing the order of social science, consists in their gradual passage from a host of very small harmonies to a lesser number of greater ones, and then to a very small number of very great ones, till, in some indefinite future, the culmination of social progress is reached in a single, all-embracing civilization, which is also the most harmonious possible." [70]

It is now desirable to state a little more exactly the method of this process of adaptation upon which the growth of society depends.

"Any mental association of two inventions that gives rise to a third . . . required necessarily the function of imitation to bring the notions together within the same mind, just as previously, its elements had to be brought to the mind of its author by the radiation of various examples. And, further, every new synthesis of inventions requires, generally, an imitative radiation of wider scope than the preceding. There is a constant inter-weaving of these two growths; the unifying growth of imitation, and the systematizing growth of invention." [71]

"When the mind passes from one judgment to another which is more complex, or from some volition to another which is more comprehensive, it is because, by dint of mental repetition in that dual form of self imitation called memory or habit a judgment is compressed into a notion, so that its two terms, coalescing, are welded together and become indistinguishable, and a volition or aim is transformed into a reflex involving ever less of consciousness. By this inevitable transformation which operates socially on a large scale under the revered titles of tradition and custom, our former judgments are fitted to enter, under the guise of notions, into the substance of some new judgment, and our former aims into the substance of some new aim. From the lowest to the highest operation of our understanding and will, this process occurs unaltered. . . . Through this rhythm, which is at once social and psychological, there have gradually been raised the many grand structures of accumulated discoveries and inventions that so excite our

[70] *Social Laws*, p. 169.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 172.

admiration: our languages, religions, sciences, codes, and administrative systems, as well as our military organization, industries, and arts." [72]

In the unfolding of this process we find, standing out in bold relief, beside the process itself and as a corollary of it, Tarde's answer to the question, which has emerged again and again, either implicit or explicit, from Plato on, namely, of the priority of the individual or of society in the social process.

Tarde's answer is unequivocal. "Just as each, consciously or unconsciously, adds his own little invention to the enduring heritage of social material of which he is the temporary repository, so, too, each has his own imitative radiation in a sphere more or less contracted, which nevertheless, suffices to prolong his discovery beyond his own ephemeral existence and pass it on to future workmen who may make some definite use of it. Imitation, which socializes the individual, also perpetuates good ideas from every source, and in the process of perpetuating them brings them together and makes them fertile." [73]

"It is because the material and plans of every social construction are all individual contributions, that I am unwilling to admit the despotic and resistless nature of the constraint placed upon the individual, which has been considered the essential and distinctive character of social phenomena." [74]

We should not close this discussion of adaptation without noting Tarde's fundamental agreement with Spencer in regard to the origin and persistence of the social ills which afflict society.[75] Tarde's "disharmonies" and "inadaptations" are for all practical purposes synonymous with Spencer's "non-adaptation." "I need scarcely insist upon the fact, unfortunately only too plain, that, as these adaptations multiply and become more definite, at the same time certain distressing and perplexing social *inadaptations* come to light, which justify so many of man's complaints. . . . It is because perfect adaptation and perfect opposition are but the two limits of an infinite series, between which are countless intermediary positions." [76]

"Disharmonies are to harmonies as dissymmetries are to symmetries and variations to repetitions. It is from the midst of exact repetitions, absolute contrasts, and perfect harmonies, that the best examples of

[72] *Social Laws*, pp. 181-3.
[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 188-9.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[75] *Cf. supra.*, p. 313.
[76] *Social Laws*, pp. 194-5.

general diversity, picturesqueness, and disorder appear, namely, the individual characteristics of things." [77]

APPRECIATION

At the close of the most comprehensive critical analysis of Tarde's theories that has yet been made Davis makes the following comment and with it we are content to close this chapter.

"This man won success as criminologist, teacher, and litterateur, as well as sociologist. Artist by temperament at least as much as scientist, he puzzles and perturbs those who approach his work with the intellect alone. With a litterateur's and a Frenchman's sense for the piquant, he enjoys making statements keen in point but small in base. It is immensely more forcible to say: 'Society is imitation,' than that: 'Society is a continuing process of interaction between individuals, in which their initiatives become mutually influential and are harmonized and correlated into useful coöperative action.' Yet the second statement is not only more true than the former, but it represents more closely what Tarde's sociological theory really is, as we gather it from his works as a whole.

"We cannot understand Tarde's true contribution to the interpretation of life, unless we regard his work as more than an abstract sociology, much less than as the mere theory that 'Society is imitation.' Tarde *has* illuminated social function. His fundamental standpoint is sanely, wisely chosen. He pins us always to the commonsense fact that society is made up of individuals, and that the source alike of social order and social change is an individual action. We are not tantalized by collective selves, nor by world principles whose gradual unfolding makes the cosmos. We perceive that progress results from the action, far-sighted *and* short-sighted, of men living their individual lives under their individual conditions. We see that there can be formulated certain general principles of the interaction of these myriad initiatives. Tarde does not formulate them completely, nor always correctly; but he casts upon the chaos a light which enables us to see at least glimpses of order. The conception of imitation, and the 'logical theory' correlating ideas and institutions, enable us to classify and coördinate a host of social phenomena whose relations we should otherwise fail to understand. Every day that passes, every book we read, offers new facts which, by the use of these conceptions, can be fitted into already labeled

[77] *Social Laws*, pp. 199-200.

pigeonholes of the mind. William James rightly called the *Laws of Imitation* a work of genius. Though Tarde has been sometimes inaccurate and often inadequate, yet probably no social thinker of his generation, except Marx or Spencer, has put forth a thought which has a greater clarifying power for so large a mass of human facts." [78]

[78] *Op. cit.*, pp. 141-2.

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDIES

1. Discuss the rôle of imitation in the formation of the "folkways" and the "mores" in the work of Wm. G. Sumner. *Cf. Folkways,* Ch. I.
2. Read Walter Bagehot's complete discussion of imitation in *Physics and Politics,* pp. 87-101. What are the similarities and differences as compared with Tarde?
3. What light does J. M. Baldwin throw upon the process of invention and imitation in his chapter on that subject? *Cf. Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development,* Ch. III.
4. Note the chief points of divergence in the theory of Baldwin from that of Tarde as presented by C. A. Ellwood in his article on *The Theory of Imitation in Psychology, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. VI, May, 1901, pp. 721-25.
5. Analyze Wm. McDougal's discussion of imitation as a "non-specific innate tendency." *Cf. Social Psychology,* Ch. IV. Is imitation instinctive?
6. What light does C. H. Cooley's contention as to the artificiality of the concept of conflict between the individual and society throw upon Tarde's doctrine of "opposition" or "conflict" and his assumption of the priority of the individual? *Cf. Human Nature and the Social Order,* Ch. I.
7. Are Tarde's generalizations on war confirmed or disproved by the facts of the world war? *Cf.* F. A. Woods and A. Baltzley, *Is War Diminishing?*
8. What support does Karl Marx offer for the theory of economic evolution described by Tarde? *Cf. supra,* pp. 295-9.
9. Consider carefully the four points in which L. M. Bristol concludes that Tarde's theory is open to criticism. *Cf. Social Adaptation,* pp. 190-91.
10. Be prepared to discuss critically each of C. A. Ellwood's four concrete criticisms of Tarde and Baldwin. *Cf. op. cit.,* pp. 725-41.
11. Evaluate the contribution of E. A. Ross to the theory of imitation as a means of social interpretation in his book on Social Psychology, particularly the following chapters:

    VIII The Laws of Conventionality Imitation.

    XII Custom Imitation.

XIV The Fields of Custom Imitation.

XV Relation of Custom Imitation to Conventionality Imitation.

XVI Rational Imitation.

12. What is the essence and importance of A. W. Small's criticism of Tarde's theories? *Cf. General Sociology,* Ch. XXXIX.

13. For an elaboration of the development of psycho-sociological thought *cf.* E. S. Bogardus, *History of Social Thought,* Chs. XXII-XXIII.

CHAPTER XV

GUMPLOWICZ AND RATZENHOFER

OF the quartette of contemporaneous and original thinkers referred to in the preceding chapter Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer remain to be studied. The reasons for their treatment in a single chapter grow out of their common nationality, their reactions to the same political and social environment and the similarity of their approach to the basic problems of social interpretation. Furthermore, their fundamental differences, which constitute the essence of their respective contributions to social theory, may be shown better by the method of comparison and contrast than by consecutive treatment.

NATIONAL AND RACIAL BACKGROUND

The development of scientific interest and its application to society, described in previous chapters, need not be repeated here. Both of the writers under review come under the spell of this influence. But as Tarde would say, sociological thought was refracted by the Austrian medium. Our search is for those elements of personality and training and of environment which produced this refraction. Two such factors, at least, in the Austrian situation, seem to shed light on our problem—the national and the racial—each so intricately interwoven with the other that no attempt is made to disentangle them.

Austria, as a sort of "monarchial machine," rather than a nation, was almost entirely immune from the forces which made for nationalism in Western Europe during the early decades of the 19th century. The chief bond of union in the conglomerate of nations was the House of Hapsburg. While the German element comprised only about one-fifth of the population, it had control of the government, which relied on coercion rather than popular loyalty. The modernizing effect of the French Revolution in western Germany was neutralized in contact with the absolutism of Austria. Feudal lords still held their grip upon the masses. During the first third of the century, under the Metternich policy of repression, journals, books, plays, schools, and universities

were censored and the price paid was "intellectual stagnation." Political and industrial conditions likewise were bad. The political crisis of 1848 was complicated and influenced in its course by an antecedent industrial crisis. Vienna, "the citadel of despotism," was the storm center of both the revolutionary and the reactionary influences. "Whenever a blow at democracy was to be struck, Austria could be depended upon to strike it." Both Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, in their boyhood days, must have been familiar with the sanguinary conflicts of this period.

The loss of Lombardy in the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 was a blow to absolutism and resulted in some necessary concessions to democracy in order to prevent popular uprisings. In the "February Patent" of 1861 the Reichsrat conceded limited representation of the people in the government, but among the non-German and the poorer classes it was exceedingly small. Race antagonisms further complicated the situation. Hungary was dissatisfied with the constitution of 1861 and demanded a separation of powers in a coöperative alliance. This "deadlock" resulted finally in the new constitution of 1867 by which the Dual-monarchy was established with separate governments under a common sovereignty and a common flag.

For the next decade the Reichsrat, which met alternate years in Vienna and Budapest, was under the control of German liberals who advocated "centralism," the exclusive use of the German language, and governmental freedom from interference on the part of the Roman Catholic Church which had been one of the most important influences in unifying the heterogeneous racial elements, all of which measures encountered violent opposition, and the country was kept in a state of turmoil.

The war with Denmark in 1864, in which Austria joined forces with Prussia, was easily a success for the allies, but the clash over the distribution of the spoils brought the two countries to the verge of war in 1865. Through the strategy of Bismarck, however, war was declared in 1866, but lasted for only seven weeks and resulted disastrously for Austria. Following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, Bismarck's policies were offensive to Russia and on account of this menace, friendly relations were established with Austria as the most natural ally and the treaty of 1879 was concluded.

If national interests seemed at times to predominate and to obscure those of race, it was due merely to their conspicuous character. The "accidents of history," had brought together under the rule of the

Hapsburgs, Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Hungarians, Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Roumanians, and Italians. A dozen distinct languages were spoken besides numerous dialects. No historian has failed to note that the conflict of races and languages has constituted a most serious problem in Austrian politics and social life for a century. Inter-race struggles have been so bitter that cities and districts, as Prague in 1893, have been placed by the government under "martial law" or declared to be in a "state of siege." In common with all other nations Austria has had her social stratifications on the basis of political power and wealth, but whereas among relatively homogeneous peoples these have been the predominating factors of social strife, here they have been comparatively unimportant as contrasted with racial antagonisms.

These, then, are the social problems which call most loudly for interpretations, and it would be most natural to expect that the minds of thinkers reared in such an atmosphere should be influenced by it, and that their philosophy of society should reflect, in some measure at least, the conditions which shaped them. Nowhere is this process better illustrated than in the theories of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer.[1]

The "conflict theory" of social interpretation, however, though popularized and grafted upon modern sociology by these writers, by no means originated with them. Without any attempt to trace the history of the theory[2] we may refer to a few instances of its occurrence in the course of our survey. The struggle for control between the "Two Powers" was, as we have seen, the determining factor in the problems with which Dante and St. Thomas dealt and which they sought to solve by justifying each in their respective claims to the right of social control[3] Machiavelli, whose practical philosophy of statescraft reflected the prolonged and bitter struggles among the Italian city-states, not only assumed that the State originated in force, but that its continued existence depended upon its ability to conquer and command.[4] In the writings of Jean Bodin we came upon the interesting theory that the unit in social organization was not the individual, but the lesser social aggregates or primary groups, whose conflicting interests were reconciled in the social whole. The similarity of this view to

[1] *Cf.* Schapiro, J. S., *Modern European History,* Ch. VII and XVI.
[2] *Cf.* Barnes, H. E., *The Struggle of Races and Social Groups as a Factor in the Development of Political and Social Institutions, Journal of Race Development,* Vol. IX, 1918-19, pp. 394-419.
[3] *Cf. supra.,* Ch. V.
[4] *Cf. supra.,* Ch. VI.

that of Gumplowicz's agglomeration of syngenetic hordes is unmistakable.[5]

Among the writers of the Social Contract school it was Hobbes who championed the theory that the state of nature was a state of war, that the intolerable conflicts in this state forced men into society, and that the "Leviathan" acquired thereby a right to compel obedience in the interests of peace. While the State arose as an instrument of reconciling individual antagonisms by force, the process might with equal logic extend to the amalgamation of antipathetic groups or nations as well.[6]

However immediate or remote the influence of these and similar concepts may have been upon the minds of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, it is certain that some of more recent origin had a profound effect.

So revolutionary have been the processes of thinking which resulted from the work of Darwin and his co-workers in the field of biology that the modern scientific age has often been dated from the publishing of the *Origin of Species* in 1859. The *struggle for existence* among men, which Malthus made the basis of his *Principle of Population,* Darwin seized upon as the key to natural selection in the entire organic realm and established it as a category of scientific thought. Bagehot reapplied it to social and political interpretation with invincible logic, and Spencer elaborated it into one of the foundation-stones of his theory of universal evolution.[7] From this time on the concept of *struggle* for *existence* and for *advantage* has been a tool in the hands of the candid and impartial social scientist, and as well, of the impetuous and aspiring politician who sees in it the justification of his schemes. In view, therefore, of the often repeated observation that social theory reflects the character of the social environment, and in view of the obverse and equally obvious fact, namely, that social and political theories take root and thrive on the basis of their congeniality or serviceableness within a given social environment, it is not surprising to find, on the one hand, that the conflict theory acquired its most concrete form and highest development as a scientific theory of social control and that it found its chief champions in Austro-Hungary—the country of ceaseless racial struggles and national conflicts, and on the other hand, that the pseudo-scientific application of the theory in the form of Neo-Darwinism has found its greatest congeniality and widest ac-

[5] *Cf. supra.,* p. 167.
[6] *Cf. supra.,* p. 192.
[7] *Cf. supra.,* Ch. XII.

ceptance in the land of ultra-racial egoism, militarism, and Machtpolitik—the modern Germany of Bismarck, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi.

LUDWIG GUMPLOWICZ

Ludwig Gumplowicz was born March 9, 1838, in the city of Krakau, on the Vistula—the Russian border—in the extreme North of Austria. His parents were Polish Jews, of considerable prominence, and were of Russian origin. After the usual preliminary educational training, and at the age of twenty, he entered the university of Krakau and later that of Vienna. While still in the latter university he began his journalistic career which culminated in the editing of his own magazine, *Kraj* (*The Country*) from 1869 to 1874. In 1875, at the age of thirty-seven, he was appointed lecturer on the Science of Administration and Austrian Administrative Law, at the university of Graz. In 1882 he was advanced to the rank of professor extraordinary, equivalent to our associate or assistant professor, and in 1893 to that of professor, a position which he held for fifteen years. As a result of ill health and advancing age he resigned in 1908, having served this one university for a consecutive period of thirty-three years.

Kochanowski says: "His students called him an angel, and this title was no exaggeration applied to a man who—without willing it—surrounded himself with the halo of a great soul and a noble mind." [8] His writings covered a wide range, including history, jurisprudence and politics, but his reputation as thinker and scholar depends in the main upon his work in the field of sociology. His first sociological treatise, *Race and State,* appeared in 1875, his fundamental work, *Race Struggle,* in 1883 and his *Outline of Sociology* in 1885.

The wide appreciation of the value of his work is attested by the fact that his principal writings have been translated into many languages. A minor but interesting incident of this recognition was the making of his seventieth birthday, on the part of many eminent scholars, an occasion for showering him with ovations, and of the founding of a sociological society in Graz in his honor.

His death was tragic. In 1907 his health began to break and in November he wrote Ward, his great American friend and admirer, that he was suffering from "nervous prostration" but did not state its cause. In October, 1908, in another letter he explained that the cause

[8] An article entitled *Ludwig Gumplowicz,* tr. by Mrs. Unger, *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XV, p. 405.

had been an injury to his tongue from a sharp corner of a broken tooth and that the doctors had pronounced it cancerous, but that the trouble had subsided. He explained also that had the diagnosis proved true he had intended to take his life. In March, 1909, in a gloomy letter he explained that he should not survive to see *Applied Sociology* translated into German, that his wife also was ill and that life was a burden to them. It was he and not the doctor who was mistaken, and on August 20th, they took poison and ended their lives together. "The double suicide of this remarkable man and his accomplished wife Franciska," says Ward, "was a deliberate act on the part of both, without any brain-softening or the slightest tinge of an unbalanced mental state on the part of either. They were a devoted couple, and his prolonged sacrifice for her during so many years of her invalid life would form the subject for a romance of heroism, could it be written. Life for either without the other was impossible, and the dread malady would soon, as both knew, have left her alone. Simultaneous death was far preferable." [9]

An interesting side light may be thrown upon this event, either from the side of the family philosophy of life, or from that of hereditary qualities, by the fact that a son, Dr. Max Gumplowicz, a successful young physician, committed suicide in 1894.

GUSTAV RATZENHOFER

Gustav Ratzenhofer was born July 4, 1842, in Vienna. His father, a watch-maker by trade, died early, leaving the family in poor circumstances. Finding it necessary to support himself and to assist the family, he left school after but a few sessions and, following the business of his father, became an apprentice watch-maker. His inclination toward military service, coupled with differences with his stepmother, and with business difficulties caused him at the age of sixteen to join the army as a private cadet. Here he was surrounded with intellectual and moral dangers. Foolish pranks and love intrigues made up much of the life of the soldier and his numerous duels indicate that he did not fail to participate in these. In one of his duels he received a severe injury which caused him much trouble throughout his life and finally led to his death. His rise in the service from cadet to the highest military position in Austria was rapid. He was lieu-

[9] An article entitled *Ludwig Gumplowicz,* by Lester F. Ward, *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XV, pp. 410-13.

tenant in 1864 and distinguished himself in the campaign in Bohemia and especially in the battle of Königgräz. The fatal July 3 made a deep impression on his mind and he decided to give his country his best in a trained service. In 1868 he entered a military academy. In 1872 he was assigned to the general staff. In 1878 he took charge of the military archives. Here he worked for several years, laying the basis for his writing of articles, pamphlets and books on military subjects. This was interrupted by his participation in the campaign of 1878. For several years he held important military offices in various parts of the empire, becoming Oberst in 1889, and in 1898 president of the military-supreme court in Vienna and Field Marshal-Lieutenant. Mental conflicts in his military-legal work on account of its arbitrary and contradictory character led to his voluntary retirement in 1901. He was pensioned by the government and chose Vienna as his home. His military life covered a period of forty-two years.

Intellectually Ratzenhofer was a self-made man. Very early he developed philosophic and scientific interest in social and political life. He read extensively and covered a wide range of subjects. His social thought was influenced greatly by Comte, Mill, and Spencer and later by Gumplowicz. His first literary work in 1871 was a prize essay which grew out of his interest in the results of the Franco-Prussian War. For more than a decade his writings and lectures were mainly on military subjects. In 1893 his first great sociological work, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik,* was published. This was followed in 1898 by *Sociologische Erkenntniss. Sociologie,* edited and published posthumously by his son, Dr. Gustav Ratzenhofer, in 1908, was the climax of his work.

In 1904 he visited America to deliver an address on *Sociology and its Problems* at the Congress of Arts and Sciences held during the St. Louis Exposition. He died on board the steamship *Wilhelm III* on his return voyage on October 8 and was buried in Vienna October 14.

THE THEORY

I. FUNDAMENTAL POINTS OF AGREEMENT

Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer are in substantial agreement with each other and with their great French contemporary in their efforts to discover a comprehensive unitary principle underlying and conditioning the social process. Each discovered such a principle, developed it con-

sistently, and applied it logically to the interpretation of society. With Tarde, they constitute a trio of social theorists, each of whom isolated the *social process* as the distinctive social phenomenon upon the interpretation of which a true scientific sociology is to be constructed.

Both agree as to the origin and nature of the phenomenon to be generalized, viz., that of human society. To this Ward also agrees: "Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer have abundantly and admirably proved that the genesis of society as we know it has been through the struggle of races. I do not hope to add anything to their masterly presentation of this truth, which is without any question the most important contribution thus far made to the science of sociology. We at least have a true key to the solution of the question of the origin of society. It is not all but it is the foundation of the whole, and while the edifice of sociology must be built upon it, its full recognition and comprehension will demolish all the cheap and worthless rookeries that have occupied the same ground. It is the only scientific explanation that has been offered of the facts and phenomena of human history. It proceeds from a true natural principle which is applicable to man everywhere, and which is in harmony with all the facts of ethnology and anthropology. Finally, this principle proves to be a universal one, and is the one on which are also explained all other natural phenomena. If I succeed in contributing anything to the subject it will consist in pointing out this truth and showing that the struggle of races is simple and typical social synergy and that it is the particular way in which synergy as a cosmic principle operates in the social world." [10]

Comparing the process of the cross-fertilization of cultures through conquest with similar processes of conjugation in biology which he calls "Social Karyokinesis," he continues: "This process has been fully described and illustrated by both Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, and they not only agree as to what the successive steps are but also as to the order in which they uniformly take place. I therefore need only enumerate these steps and refer the reader to the works of these authors, especially to Gumplowicz's *Rassenkampf* and Ratzenhofer's *Sociologische Erkenntniss*. The following are these steps arranged in their natural order: 1. Subjugation of one race by another. 2. Origin of *Caste*. 3. Gradual mitigation of this condition, leaving a state of great individual, social, and political *inequality*. 4. Substitution for purely military subjection a form of *law*, and origin of the idea of legal *right*. 5. Origin of the *State*, under which all classes have both rights and duties.

[10] *Pure Sociology*, pp. 203-4.

6. Cementing of the mass of heterogeneous elements into a more or less homogeneous *people*. 7. Rise and development of a sentiment of *patriotism* and formation of a *nation*." [11] "Whatever may happen in society after it is fully formed, the truth remains that thus far there has been only one way by which society has been formed, and that is through social assimilation by conquest, struggle, caste, inequality, resignation, concession, compromise, equilibration, and final interaction, cooperation, miscegenation, coalescence, unification, consolidation, and solidarization." [12]

Again, both united in fixing attention upon *group* phenomena as the specific and ultimate facts which require intensive investigation if a rational explanation of society is to be made. The group for each is an aggregation of individuals united and integrated by a common bond of interest. It is the original and distinctively social unit. This concept was valuable in at least two important respects. While still consistent with the notion that social interpretation must be reduced to a single process, it nevertheless departed from the more or less metaphysical attempts to interpret society as a whole, and it aided materially in establishing the view that certain processes may be classified as distinctively social in contrast with those that are purely physical, organic, or psychic. It is here, however, in dealing with the group concept, that we come upon the wide divergence of views between the two writers which constitutes respectively their distinctive and individual contributions to social theory. These it may be well to epitomize before taking up their systems as a whole.

POINTS OF DIFFERENCE

Gumplowicz is concerned with the *inter-action*, and Ratzenhofer, with the *intra-action*, of groups; that is, Gumplowicz thinks of social phenomena as arising out of the relations between groups, Ratzenhofer, from the group-making process. Gumplowicz assumes groups as the starting point of sociological investigation. Their origin may be left to the student of natural history or to the biologist. Like chemical elements for the chemist, groups for the sociologist are the original morphological units of society, whose compounding and recompounding is the social process. Ratzenhofer sees the process originating farther back, and hence the problem for him is to discover the essence of group

[11] *Pure Sociology*, p. 205.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

solidarity; the elements which constitute the group a distinct association; the processes which result in group cohesion. It is not intended here to imply that these views are mutually exclusive. The contrast is drawn sharply, perhaps overdrawn, for the sake of emphasizing the dominant characteristics. Gumplowicz discusses "the group-making factors," classifying them as *material*—common place of residence, sociableness, consanguinity and relationship, *economic*—similarity of possessions and callings, and *moral*—language, religion, nativity, political allegiance, and nationality; the degree of permanency constituting the relative group solidarity,[13] while Ratzenhofer considers "the blood bond" as the origin of all "social interrelation" and the "absolute hostility" arising from this fact, as a fundamental factor in the processes of individualization and socialization.[14]

It is in the divergent angles of approach and in the relative importance assigned to these factors which result in the different concepts of what constitutes the essence of society and the nature and scope of its appropriate science, sociology.

With Gumplowicz society consists of an "aggregation of groups." The social process is conflict and struggle among groups, and it is that which characterizes the activities of the "collective whole." In the large, society may be viewed as "a continually changing kaleidoscope of social groups, with certain groups always striving for the mastery over others," [15] and it "begins at the moment when one group permanently subjects another." [16] From this point of view the term "society" may have an elastic connotation. It may refer to any concrete aggregation of units, from that of an isolated group to all-embracing humanity.

With Ratzenhofer, society is "a process of all individual phenomena in which the law of reciprocal relations is fulfilled: In other words society is not a fixed unit, but a process, a 'becoming.' It arises from the universal process of socialization, and this happens "wherever men are thrown together or mutually submit to each other. . . . The entirety of those men and social structures who stand in inter-relation with one another, or who are suited for material inter-relation forms 'the society,' and *a* society consists in the social structures, which, interchanging with one another, form out of this exchange higher unities. . . . The essential characteristic of society is associa-

[13] *Cf. Outline of Sociology*, pp. 141-3.
[14] *Cf.* Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 189-95.
[15] Jacobs, *German Sociology*, p. 29.
[16] *Outline of Sociology*, p. 7.

tion, and this viewed, not as a fixed or constant factor, but as a constantly changing relation." [17]

The term "society" then cannot be applied to "humanity"—an ideal concept not justified in experience—since by the terms of the definition all men constituting a society must be in actual association.

Jacobs summarizes this contrast of views thus: "It is one thing to view humanity as an accumulation or aggregation of groups, even if within the groups sufficient room for associations be allowed. It is quite a different thing to consider it as an association, with the fundamental element in the process being not the group, but the association and the inter-relation of the members of the group." [18]

These divergent views as to the meaning of "society" and the nature of the social process give rise to equally divergent views as to the nature of sociology as a science.

Sociology for both Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer is the science which deals with the social process. They agree that its function is to discover and to describe the laws of this process. It is not therefore in the general concept or method, but in the material or phenomena which constitutes the social process, that they differ.

For Gumplowicz, the social phenomena are those "which appear through the operation of groups and aggregates of men on one another . . . as soon as one group is exposed to the influence of another the interplay of mutual forces ensues and inevitably the social process begins." [19] Since sociology deals exclusively with these factors of "becoming" it has nothing to do with "the genesis of things." "Hence none of the questions about the ultimate origin of human associations belong in Sociology, if indeed they belong in any science whatever! Sociology begins with the countless different social groups of which, as can be irrefutably proven, mankind is constituted. The question how they came to be does not belong within its forum." [20]

"There can, therefore, according to Gumplowicz, be no social phenomena, no social processes, no social facts, no social laws, and hence no sociology outside of the realm of inter-group action. Sociology is the science whose business it is to find out what are the laws of group action. With all the world of facts and laws, governing human relations outside of this sphere, sociology has nothing to do.[21]

[17] Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 32.
[19] *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 83-5.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 86.
[21] Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

For Ratzenhofer, sociology is *"the science of the reciprocal relationships of human beings."* [22] It is these human reciprocal relations that constitute its phenomena and they are "subject to a regularity which is immediately contained in no other order of regularity." Like Gumplowicz he limits sociology to a specific process. Epistemology deals with the "causality of all problems." Even "insight into the origin of the reciprocal relationships of human beings . . . remains within the boundaries of philosophy." Sociology investigates neither "the numberless incidents of social life" nor "single social phenomena." Its province is "to work over the results of minute investigations of particular types of occurrences, for the purposes of arriving at a unified survey and comprehension of the coherent regularity of all social phenomena; . . . to investigate the societary life in its conformity to law." [23]

A further brief observation should be made concerning the data of sociology. While both writers, as we have seen, concentrate attention upon group phenomena, Gumplowicz, emphasizing inter-group relations, finds his chief data in the field of ethnology; while Ratzenhofer, stressing intra-group relations, deals primarily with biological and psychological data.[24]

With these generalizations in mind we may now proceed to the discussion in somewhat more detail of the separate theories of these two writers.

GUMPLOWICZ' CONFLICT THEORY

GENERAL LAWS

Inducted into the field of sociology largely through the influence of Comte and Spencer it was but natural that Gumplowicz should feel the necessity of relating sociology to the general field of science, and to discover the universal laws by which "the world of Phenomena" including the social of course could be generalized. Classification of phenomena, as a means of increasing knowledge, has advanced with the resulting increase. The simplest observation distinguished between "the inanimate and the animate." The discovery of a new class, perceived by the senses, resulted in a new order, material and mental. The subdivision of the first term in this series gave a threefold classi-

[22] *The Problems of Sociology, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. X, September, 1904, p. 177.
[23] *Cf.* Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-6.
[24] *Cf.* Jacobs. *ibid.*, pp. 59-61.

fication, "inorganic, organic and psychic." This in turn proved defective when a new type of phenomena was observed which could not legitimately be organized within existing categories. He repudiated alike both "organic" and "psychic" interpretations of society, not so much for their inaccuracy as for their inadequacy. Social phenomena "constitute a unique group distinguished by several fundamental traits." This necessitated, as with Comte and Spencer, a reclassification into "physical, mental, and social," an order which he accepts as final.

Accepting without qualification the "monistic conception" that there are unitary laws underlying these three classes of phenomena he proceeds to their statement, his specific problem being their application to the "social domain."

At this stage of our discussion it seems superfluous to follow their elaboration. Furthermore, their similarity to those of Spencer makes it the more unnecessary. We therefore merely reproduce them with Spencer's in parallel columns.

Universal laws of Gumplowicz [25]	*Universal laws of Spencer* [26]
(a) The Law of Causation	(a) The Indestructibility of Matter
(b) The Law of Development	(b) The Continuity of Motion
(c) Regularity of Development	(c) The Persistence of Force
(d) The Law of Periodicity	(d) The Persistence of Relations among Forces
(e) The Law of Complexity	(e) The Transformation and Equivalence of Forces
(f) Reciprocal Action of Foreign (*Heterogen*) Elements	(f) The Rhythm of Motion
(g) Adaptation to an Obvious End	(g) Evolution
(h) Identity of Forces	(h) The Instability of the Homogeneous
(i) Similarity of Events	(i) The Multiplication of Effects
(j) Law of Parallelism	(j) Segregation
	(k) Equilibration
	(l) Dissolution

[25] *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 76-82.
[26] *First Principles*, Table of Contents.

Unlike Spencer, however, Gumplowicz does not build upon these laws a complete descriptive sociology. He seldom refers to them. They constitute rather a basis for his thoroughgoing determinism than for his sociological system. His was a decidedly different interest and more limited in scope.

ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL PROCESS

In the beginning were groups.

In his *Race Conflict* (*Rassenkampf*) Gumplowicz lays the foundations for the great science of the future,—"the natural history of mankind." The futility of the theological and anthropological methods of interpretation employed in the past is obvious. If the procession of human events is either the expression of the will of Deity, or of free human will, working toward conscious ends, then manifestly no such science is possible. Only upon the assumption of humanity as a non-free part of nature can a scientific interpretation be posited. Even though individual freedom might be assumed, a proposition which Gumplowicz denies although he admits this thesis has not been worked out philosophically in a convincing manner, this freedom of will is not true of ethnic or social groups. These are absolutely governed in their relation to each other by rigid and inflexible laws as definite as those that govern the planets in their orbits, or the development of an organism.

It is in the social process that we discover the unique and fundamental law of human association. Whenever two groups come into contact every more powerful ethnic or social element seeks to coerce every weaker element within its sphere of power to serve its own purpose or advantage. It attempts to use the enemy as a means of satisfying its own wants. This group conflict for mastery in all its forms is the motive power of history, its driving principle; it is the pivot around which all the occurrences of human association rotates. Society, nationality, civilization, as well as all internal social organization and institutions, come to pass through this struggle.

This hypothesis involves the assumption of an inherent deadly hatred—absolute hostility—among different groups, peoples or races. The cause for this antagonism is to be found in the theory of *Polygenesis*—the multiple origin of mankind instead of descent from one parent couple.

This thesis is supported by deductive logic—a method fatal to

this portion of Gumplowicz' theory, as we shall see presently. "Laws are revealed objectively. Substrata are necessarily presupposed. It is by the forms in which bodies appear, or in which forces manifest themselves in and on bodies that we are able to discover laws. . . . So the question arises: What are the substrata of social laws? What are the media through which force is manifested when we infer social laws from its behavior? Obviously the medium is not the individual, on whom a psychical or a physical law may be manifested, but not a social. . . . If mankind is conceived to be a unit, the condition necessary for the action of opposing forces is by supposition absent. Besides, nowhere on the earth, and at no time either in the present age or in remotest antiquity has mankind been found to be a simple substance. It always consists in a countless number of distinct (*heterogen*) ethnical elements. Hence I was led to seek the starting point of sociological investigation in the hypothesis that there was originally an indefinitely large number of distinct (*heterogen*) ethnic elements."

These original ethnic groups he calls "syngenetic hordes" or "swarms" bound together by ties of consanguinity, locality, or common interest, which "severally represent the various race-characteristics which have persisted unchanged in penetration." [27] "If race characteristics pass from generation to generation only by inheritance; if no new ones arise and only the old ones appear over and over again; if they are countless today and penetration and inheritance are still spreading them, though many have disappeared forever; if they prove to be as permanent as the tombs; must we not conclude that there was at the beginning a countless number of distinct human hordes, each one an individual race or society?" [28]

This invincible logic(?) is supported by two types of evidence, viz., "good authorities" and historical observation.

He says "it gives me satisfaction to note that good authorities consider the polygenetic hypothesis established." [29] In this connection he cites passages from the writings of Bastian, Vogt, Virchow and Kollmann.[30]

History furnishes unmistakable proof, and several lines are traced.

(*a*) *Races.* The farther back into history we go, the greater the number of stocks we find. History shows a steady tendency to force a unity of races—a process of amalgamation of tribes into larger

[27] *Outlines of Sociology,* pp. 92 and 100.
[28] *Ibid.,* pp. 100-1.
[29] *Ibid.,* p. 92.
[30] *Cf. ibid.,* pp. 92-100.

and larger units. All modern races are conglomerates of races, and each of the elements of which they are composed are similar compounds of still more diverse groups, and so on by assumption back to the original units where the process had its beginning.

(2) *Languages.* The farther back, the more numerous. Each group or horde developed its own language. When group amalgamation took place dialects and jargons resulted, and finally a new tongue. Languages are steadily growing fewer in number and each bears indisputable evidence of its composite origin—a characteristic also of the elements of which it is composed.

(3) *Religions.* Just as language evolved as an aid in conquering the environment so religion developed in the effort to explain it and is likewise universal. Every group or horde had its religion. Religions, constantly fewer in number, point to polygenesis in their development. Complicated mythologies are hybrid structures. Religious hierarchies are the result of group conquest. The gods of conquered peoples are added in subordinate capacities. Roman hospitality received into the Pantheon the gods of conquered nations.

The historic process further corroborates the foregoing assumptions.

(1) Syngenetic *Hordes* manifest the herd feeling. Each original swarm or horde felt itself to be "the chosen people." This feeling of group superiority is the outgrowth of success or survival in the struggle for existence or for advantage and is characteristic of all groups simple or complex, as Jews *vs.* Gentiles, Greeks *vs.* Barbarians, natives *vs.* foreigners. Inferior groups are fit only to be made use of or to be despoiled. The evolutionary stages are (a) Cannibalism, probably the only use one group could make of another in the earliest stages, and this led to the extermination of many groups. (b) Slavery, which arose with agriculture chiefly, the weaker group being made to work for the stronger, and (c) Taxation, where the fruits of labor are taken, as in modern methods of exploitation. The wars of nations are but organized predatory raids to loot other peoples, even though carried on under the guise of nationality, balance of power or humanity.

(2) The *tribe* arises when two equally strong groups, after a period of strife, unite for the purpose of crushing a third group. This leads to triple and quadruple alliances, but always for warlike purpose. The proof that tribes are not expanded families lies in the division of labor. Class distinctions and differences of rank point to prior subordination of groups.

(3) The *State* takes its rise through the consolidation of tribes. Civilization begins in the forcible differentiations that result. The leisure class develops mentally and culture arises. The existence of two classes, lords and slaves, is an unstable condition of latent war. All government is the rule of a minority representing the leaders in wars of conquest, over the majority—the conquered. The origin of the middle class is due to trade and industry. All trade, however, is but a form of exploitation. Witness the exportation of whiskey to Asia and Africa and the opium trade in China.

All stratifications in society had their beginnings in conquest and clashing of racial and group interests. They are perpetuated by the same process—each caste or rank endeavoring to keep the other in its place by seeking its own advantage through exploitation of the other and keeping its own interests distinct.

The unifying factors within the large amalgamated group are language and religion. The conquerors usually take over the language of the conquered, since the ruling families are widely scattered and few in number in comparison. They usually proclaim their gods as superior, however, admitting the gods of conquered peoples to inferior rank. This leads to a common religion which is a mighty engine in aiding the lords to retain their power. Through these two agencies a further development of group solidarity is secured which fosters common economic, political, and national life, and antagonisms are now directed outwardly to other states.

Thus while the process widens in its scope, it never changes its character. There may be finally "one shepherd and one flock" including all mankind but that future is so infinitely remote that we may speak of the "eternal conflict of races." [31]

DEDUCTIONS

Among the many corollaries deducible from the general thesis we consider but two which we deem the most important and sufficient for our purpose.

The Individual and the Group

As might be expected from the rigidity of his determinism Gumplowicz sees the individual as a group product. Society creates the individual. His is the psychology of "group ascendency."

[31] *Cf. Outlines of Sociology,* Part III; also *Der Rassenkampf,* general thesis.

"The great error of individualistic psychology is the supposition that man thinks. It leads to the continual search for the source of thought in the individual and for the reason why the individual thinks so and not otherwise; and prompts naïve theologians and philosophers to consider and even to advise how men ought to think. A chain of errors: for it is not man himself who thinks but his social community; the source of his thoughts is in the social medium in which he lives, the social atmosphere which he breathes, and he cannot think aught else than what the influences of his social environment concentrating upon his brain necessitate. . . . What we think is the necessary result of the mental influences to which we have been subjected since childhood. . . . the social medium which the child enters at birth, in which he lives, moves and has his being, is fundamental. . . . Like a piece of coin, he is complete when he steps out into the world. . . . The whole belief in the freedom of human action is rooted in the idea that man's conduct is the fruit of his thoughts and that his thoughts are exclusively his own. This is an error. He is not self-made mentally any more than he is physically. His mind and thoughts are the product of his social medium, of the social element whence he arose, in which he lives." [32]

It is not quite fair to quote these positive assertions without qualification. They constitute "the mental make-up of the ordinary or 'average' man." . . . Only an insignificant minority continue their education by receiving their mental impressions and influences from without their social group," [33] and although he recognizes these exceptions they are as unimportant as biological "sports" were for Darwin. He does not depend upon these to explain the differences between social groups as Tarde does. The "effective agents" in the creation of different social types are quite different. "Life in turn, social life, produces them. As it differs from zone to zone and land to land among men of different races and different ethnical composition so their thoughts, their entire conceptions and their efforts, are different and difference of type follows necessarily. As a people's conceptions and thoughts stand also in the perpetual stream of evolution and alter from time to time, there arises the well-known variety of type among members of the same fold in successive generations." [34]

[32] *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 156-60.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 157-8.
[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 162-3.

Pessimism in Regard to Progress

Bristol says: "Nowhere is the passive, purely mechanical character of social evolution better expressed than in these words: 'Out of frictions and struggles, out of separations and unions of opposing elements, finally come forth as new adaptation products the higher socio-psychical phenomena, the higher cultural forms, the new civilizations, the new state and national unities . . . and this merely through social action and reaction, entirely independent of the initiative and will of individuals, contrary to their ideas and wishes and social striving. To Gumplowicz is to be given credit for a clean-cut demarcation of the sociological field,—the field consisting of the two-fold mechanical process by which all the modern races and social groups with their socio-psychical products have been evolved, on the one hand by inter-group conflict, and on the other by intra-group differentiation and struggle." [35]

A few of Gumplowicz' typical statements set forth his position:

"We have learned that social evolution is always partial, local and limited in time; and it has been especially emphasized that we can form no conception of the evolution of mankind as a unitary whole because we have no comprehensive conception of mankind as a whole. . . . The polygenetic view . . . necessarily does away with the conception of a unitary genealogical evolution." [36]

The cyclical rather than the unilateral theory, he believes, conforms to historical fact.

"Men's wants and desires, as we have seen, cause them to raise themselves by groups and societies from a primitive condition to a condition of culture and civilization; and, having once attained it, so to conduct themselves that their fall necessarily follow through other groups and societies in a progressive state." [37]

"But such hordes are not necessarily external, and if they were they alone would not be able utterly to destroy powerful civilized states. But unfortunately every state conceals in its own bosom, and the higher it rises in the scale of civilization so much the more, barbarian hordes enough who only await the given signal, the critical moment of civil or foreign war, to begin the work of destruction. The fall of many a powerful civilized state under the assault of rather small barbarian hordes could not be comprehended if it were not known that

[35] *Social Adaptation*, p. 168.
[36] *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 203.
[37] *Ibid.*, 205.

domestic social enemies of the existing order let the secretly glimmering hatred of the property and ruling classes burst into flame in the moment of danger; and this alone is often sufficient to turn the toilsome labor of centuries into dust and ashes. The inner enemy necessarily increases with the development of civilization so that every centre of civilization, apart from the danger threatening it from without, fosters the seeds of destruction within itself." [38]

"But if any one believes that we are safe from such catastrophes he is perhaps yielding to an all too optimistic delusion. There are no barbaric tribes in our neighborhood to be sure—but let no one be deceived, their instincts lie latent in the populace of European states. The deeds of anarchists are only scattered flashes of lightning—who will guarantee that the storm will not sometime break?" [39]

His attitude toward progress may now be stated.

"But the fact of cyclical development in state and folk is also decisive of the question of 'progress' in the sphere of human activity. Two assertions which I made in 'Rassenkampf' have given considerable offence and provoked lively contradiction, viz., that there is no progress and that there can be nothing essentially new in the realm of mental knowledge.

"That I of course recognize progress in the development of an isolated centre of civilization, each time beginning and running to its end, has been brought out conspicuously by the briefest of my reviewers in the English periodical 'Mind': 'The general conclusion to which he finally comes,' it reads, 'is that there is no such thing as either progress or regress in the course of history taken as a whole, but only in the particular periods of a process that is going on forever in a circle—in particular countries where the social process is forever recommencing.' " [40]

"So it is of course impossible to deny progress in the field of invention and discovery—but it would be a mistake to explain it from the greater perfection of the human intellect." [41] He assumes a "fixed and inexpansible upper limit" to human intellect which has often been reached by individual geniuses, but there has been no qualitative change in human intellect in the historic period. It merely has an accumulated supply of material on which to work.

Proof of the stability of the human intellect is found in the fact

[38] *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 206.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 209.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 207.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 208.

that "In spheres which have no connection with invention and the discovery of natural forces, in moral and social philosophy, not only is there no indication of progress but nothing new whatever has been said for four thousand years. 'There is nothing new under the sun' and nothing new can be 'invented.' Our cognitions respecting virtue and custom, human happiness and social relations are no more mature than those of the oldest peoples of antiquity; on the contrary we often become aware that we are behind them in many things." [42]

Nowhere is his "fatalistic determinism" more rigidly applied than in his discussion of "justice in history." "Historical events are not brought about by men any more than natural events by God; and if they have no author whose conduct can be regulated according to the value of the objects affected nothing can be said about justice or injustice in connection with them . . . natural human groups under the action of history and nature play precisely the part of any other natural objects exposed to the workings of natural forces. . . . In life and in history every man suffers whatever fate is conditioned by his natural constitution. Yet his natural constitution depends not on him, but, as we have seen, upon the social medium from which he emerges. This is to blame if individual fates are so seldom proportional to individual merits. For fate strikes the individual in proportion to the merits of species, so to speak. His own merits may be different. Historical development cares nothing for that. . . .

"Hence the alpha and omega of sociology, its highest perception and final word, is: human history a natural process; and even though, shortsighted and captivated by traditional views of human freedom and self-determination, one should believe that this knowledge derogates from morals and undermines them, yet it is on the contrary the crown of all human morals because it preaches most impressively man's renunciatory subordination to the laws of nature which alone rule history. By contributing to the knowledge of these laws sociology lays the foundation for the morals of reasonable resignation, higher than those resting on imaginary freedom and self-determination of the individual and those unreasonable aspirations which find expression in horrible crimes against the natural law of order." [43]

Manifestly it would be unfair to Gumplowicz to close this analysis of his theory without reference to his radical change in views in regard to his "pessimism" and to his "polygenic" hypothesis as the result of

[42] *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 209-10.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 112-13.

Ward's visit to Graz in 1903, and described in a most graphic manner in Gumplowicz's article *An Austrian's Appreciation of Lester F. Ward,* in the *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. X, pp. 643-53. He was compelled to admit, through the force of Ward's argument, that the "eternal iron laws" of the "social nature-process" are modified by the help of the human intellect, itself "also a natural force," and that polygenism corresponds to the integration-process of "our present geological period"; that back of it lay the reverse differentiation-process through which the human race, having "a single birth place and of common heredity" was broken up into "innumerable homogeneous hordes." [44]

These modifications, however, are supplementary rather than contradictory and leave unshaken his general thesis of "race struggle" as an enduring contribution to social theory.

RATZENHOFER'S THEORY OF INTERESTS

EPITOME OF HIS THEORY [45]

Omitting all reference to a general world philosophy, "The social process of men exhibits (*a*) forces operating throughout its extent, (*b*) regular procedures, and (*c*) inner necessities; all of which are to be regarded as manifestations of conformity to law in the sociological realm." Thus:

1. "The sustentation and the multiplication of human beings are the occasions of all social contracts," creating "the impetus to the peaceful relationships and the hostile interruptions." "In social reaction they manifest themselves as the instinct of self-preservation (rivalry for food—*Brotneid*) and the sexual instinct (hence the blood-bond—*Blutliebe*). All possible motors of social contact are modifications or evolutionary forms of these natural impulses."

2. "In every creature the instinct of self-preservation and the sexual impulse are in juxtaposition with the life conditions, to which species and individuals must adapt themselves, and which they strive to exploit in accordance with their inborn capability."

3. "Every creature has originally the disposition to fulfill *without hindrance* his primal impulses. It would eat without labor and without

[44] *Cf.* article cited.

[45] Somewhat abbreviated from *Ratzenhofer's Epitome of his Theory,* Small, *General Sociology,* Chapter XIII.

struggle and it would reproduce itself without limits. This impulse leads men to spread over the earth's surface, in order to be unhindered in finding food and abode."

4. "The limitations upon exchange of life conditions which are introduced by increase of population force upon individuals and upon social structures the struggle for existence."

5. "Although man, like all other creatures, would prefer to feed and propagate at peace with his kind, yet progressive increase of numbers and the need of sustenance develop his individual interest into *absolute* hostility toward all fellow-men. In so far as men constitute a community of interests through the blood-bond, or coöperation in labor or war, this hostility is silent; only to break out, however, at every disturbance of the community of interest. . . . *Absolute hostility is the psychical guardian over the continuance of a community of interests.*"

6. *"The origin of all social interrelations is the blood-bond.* Hence all primitive social structures are based on community of origin. Through increase of numbers and the quest for food, the primitive social structure is forced into *spatial* differentiations; which further leads, through the various life conditions, to race-differentiation. Contacts between differentiated men lead to flight or to battle. The latter has for its purpose the destruction of opponents, in order to get control of their food-supply and their abodes, or the conversion of them into servants. The last is a social compromise between destruction and culture. Hence it leads to a higher step in the social process, in which the social structure no longer rests principally upon the blood-relationship, but upon *culture* and a system of control."

7. "The social structures of like origin are always simple. *Subjugation by rulers is the beginning of social articulation, and of the State.*

"Since sustentation and multiplication lead to continual expansion, and thence to subjugation of some people by others; since the conditions of life tend to become progressively more complex in their effects; and since culture enriches without limit the forms of human requirements, there begins with this first articulation, *an incalculable differentiation of social structures.* . . . The differentiation and the blending of social structures is the practical content of the social process."

8. "The social process is a continuous rhythm of the *individualization* of structures arising anew out of others already in existence . . . and . . . of the *socialization* of social structures already existing. . . .

Both individualization and socialization have their roots in the inborn interests of the individual, or in turn, in the concrete interest of each social structure. . . . In the individualizing side of the process, variation asserts itself. In the socializing side, the evolution of the social structure is foremost."

9. "*Differentiation* (or impulse to individualism) has its boundaries in the number of individuals; i.e., differentiation can go on up to the *atomization of society,* because each individual may regard *his own* interest as the content of the social structure. *Socialization* (or impulse to form communities) is bounded only by 'humanity,' i.e., 'humanity' may become a social structure, if throughout that most inclusive range a unifying interest comes to be felt as a need."

10. "Differentiation, consequently, frees men from irksome social restraints" and "fluctuates along the line of social necessity, between variations of the individual will."

"Socialization, on the other hand, confines men in restraints" and "vibrates along the line of social necessity, between voluntary submission for the sake of a social interest, and forcible subjugation under an alien interest."

11. "For differentiation, as well as for socialization, *social necessity* is either the interest involved and implicit in the immanent capabilities of men, or that which is prescribed by the life conditions and determined by the social situation."

12. "The more men spread over the available places of abode (life-conditions) in consequence of increase in numbers . . . the more variations in individual choice . . . will occur in the social process, so that socializing constraint (subjugation) is necessary in order to bring social necessity to its proper influence. Every subjugation determines a relation of control. The social type of this reciprocal relationship is the State."

13. "The species of control in the State depends upon the evolutionary stage of the social process. The transition from the simple to the complex social structure, the progress from the destruction of all alien social structures to varying blending of them, is marked by the State in which conquerors rule. The predominance of peaceful interests, on the basis of a community character assured by conquest, opens the culture-State. This state attempts to bring the necessity of control over the subjugated into harmony with creative culture-freedom."

14. "Struggle and war, in general social disturbances, consolidate social structures. They are, consequently, sources of political power.

Culture and commerce weaken the social bond. They are, consequently, sources of social differentiation and of political dismemberment, but at the same time they occasion extension of the social relationship."

15. "Just as variation leads to relative perfection and complexity of organisms, so social differentiation produces a more highly developed and complicated combination of social structures. . . . While social structures originally occupied a kind of isolated position within their environment, contacts between them became later more frequent, until at last men are surrounded by a web of *social relationships,* which may sometimes make 'humanity' take on the appearance of a social structure. Propagation, sustentation, and exploitation are the *causes;* war, culture, and commerce, the *means;* harmonious satisfaction of interests, the *end* of this social development."

16. "While the web of social relationships grows closer, violent disturbances of social conditions diminish, because every disturbance in the complex framework of the reciprocally dependent social structure is felt on many sides, and presently on all sides, as opposed to interest. . . . The culture-State comes into the foreground in consequence of the greater density of the society, and, by the side of violent subjugation, industrial exploitation by means of capital gains influence. What sort of controlling system follows this mixture of political and industrial control is not yet disclosed by the social process."

17. "That absolute hostility imbedded in the nature of individuality, which at first did not come to expression on account of the absence of social contacts (with the exception of those consequent upon blood-relationship) which, however, become dominant during the extension of the social process throughout mankind, is suppressed again by universal socialization. . . . Absolute hostility breaks out again, however, when unlike social structures with like interests encounter each other in the struggle for existence, if no superior power controls them, or if no interdependence of interest brings them to agreement."

18. "In the degree in which the cultural-State takes the place of the conquest-State, the differences among men in the satisfaction of interests equalize themselves. Political, social, and industrial inequality among men transform themselves again into such equality in participation of enjoyment as prevailed in primitive social conditions. General socialization of men complicates the social structure, to be sure. It tends, however, to produce concord of interests through increasing perfection of the social organization; nevertheless, with existing varieties of life-conditions it cannot remove all occasions for social conflict.

"Social order is an organizing of the struggle for existence, for the purpose of assuring sustenance and the propagation of wholesome generations. It is, accordingly, justifiable to assume, as the conclusion of social development, a condition in which, in spite of manifoldness of individualities in adaptation to their occupations, there will ensue a cultural, political, and social equality of men under the leadership of individuals who are intellectually and morally the most perfect. Under a system of control by ethical and intellectual authority, social development without degeneration of inborn and acquired interests might be possible; but the inequality must remain for an incalculable period modified by inequality and by changes of life conditions."

ESSENCE OF THE SOCIAL PROCESS

"In the beginning were interests." [46]

In the foregoing "epitome" reference was made repeatedly to subjective factors which conditioned the objective, or, in Ratzenhofer's terminology, to "inner necessities" which are the "forces" which result in "regular procedures." Throughout the universe there is manifested an "original force" *Urkraft,* a synthetic creative process, approximately equivalent to Ward's "synergy" which motives progressive adaption or evolution in conformity to law. In organic nature, including human society, this *Urkraft* is not a mechanical process, but one of vital and psychic character expressed in the term *interests.* In its original unconscious and undifferentiated form it constitutes the organic urge of the evolutionary process which results in increasing adaptations and in differentiation of species. In its higher development in semi-conscious and conscious forms it leads, through the reactions of organic structure to physical environment, to increasing self-expression and self-realization, i.e., to individual and social differentiation.

It is, therefore, upon this concept of *interests* that Ratzenhofer builds his theory of the social process. "It is the key of interests that unlocks the door of every treasure house of sociological lore. Back of all structural or even functional relations of society, there stand the interests of the individuals who compose the group, and these, when analyzed in turn, will explain all structure and function. 'Nothing can be apprehended, nothing thought which does not lie in the attached interest.' Social life is a huge mass or bundle of interests, and society is formed through the constant conflict, adaptation, and reciprocal

[46] Small, *op. cit.,* p. 196.

interplay of the interests of individuals. 'The utilization of the law of interests in the judgment of social phenomena, and the observation of interest-development and activity in social life are the scientific methods of sociology." [47]

Whether we consider the undifferentiated *Urkraft* or endowment capacity of effort forever increasing development, or the diverse manifestations of individual interest, the roots are to be found in the physiological nature of man. From the simplest unconscious effort of the human infant or the most primitive savage up to the highest purposive activity of civilized man the motive-force is physiological necessity. It rises gradually to the state of consciousness through the development of personality in the reaction of the individual to his physical and social environment.

We may now proceed to Ratzenhofer's subdivision of the "innate interest," inherent in every fertilized germ cell, into its diversified forms which explain the processes of social evolution.

(1) *The Racial Interest.* This roots in the physiological impulse of sex—the sexual interest. It guarantees the continuance of the species. It is the basis of those social structures which are expressed in the family, the nationality or race.

(2) *The Physiological Interest.* Reference here is to the activity which is concerned with nutrition, with "keeping alive," and centers in the food-quest. It expands into all the associated forms of self-preservation. Primarily it is the foundation of the economic order.

(3) *The Individual Interest.* The physiological interests are essentially individualistic in character. Inherited instincts impel the individual toward their gratification. They are imperious demands for satisfactions irrespective of all other considerations. This is the explanation of the process of "individualization."

(4) *The Social Interest.* The race interest, while originally physiological and individualistic, because of the relations of consanguinity which it establishes, and with its collective reactions to environment, easily expands into the social interest. Selfish interests are subordinated to group welfare. Hence the rise of the process of "socialization."

(5) *The Transcendental Interest.* As a result of the effort to satisfy his physical needs and of the struggle between individual and collective interests there develops in man an interest in the ultimate, the absolute. It takes the form of dependence upon the "unseen," the

[47] Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

"original" power, and is expressed in the forms of religion. This Ratzenhofer calls "the transcendental interest." [48]

Here, then, we have the essence of the group-making process. The "interests" are "desires" in the Wardian sense. They are the real forces of individual and social action. An unrealized need produces a feeling of mal-adjustment, of discomfort and unrest. Hence men are impelled to activities through which satisfactions may be obtained. Subjectively, the interests are conceived of as motives and their satisfaction yields those pleasurable sensations which are the object of strivings. Objectively the means of their satisfaction lie in the physical and social environment.

Implicit in every individual, as a differentiation of the original *Urkraft*, and in varying degrees of intensity, are the specific interests which motive all individual and collective effort, and the grouping of men on the basis of these interests *is* the social process. "In other words, *the social process is a continual formation of groups around interests, and a continual exertion of reciprocal influences by means of group-action.*" [49]

There are two aspects of this process differentiated by the degree in which individual interests coalesce or collide, viz., the conjunction of interests or the conflict of interests. "The former type occurs when it is necessary for the purpose of the persons in question in some way to further each other's interests in order to promote their own interests. The latter type occurs when it is necessary for the persons in question to oppose each other's interests in order to promote their own. . . .

"Without affirming that either conflict or conjunction of interests is the essence of the social process, we may say that, *in form, the social process is incessant reaction of persons prompted by interests that in part conflict with the interests of their fellows, and in part comport with the interests of others.*" [50]

The history of civilization, for Ratzenhofer, is the continuous process of the grouping and regrouping of men about the ever-changing and diversifying human interests. In contrast with Gumplowicz he assumes the monogenetic origin of the human race in the Tertiary period and traces its evolution through a series of stages characterized by developing interests.[51]

Small accepts the theory of interests as the most valuable contribu-

[48] *Cf.* Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-9; also, Bristol, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-3.
[49] Small, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 205.
[51] *Cf.* Bristol, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-6; Small, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-2.

tion to social theory. He says *"The latest word of sociology is that human experience yields the most and the deepest meaning when read from first to last in terms of the evolution, expression, and accommodation of interests."* [52] And again: *"Sociology might be said to be the science of human interests and their workings under all conditions. . . . Our knowledge of sociology, i.e., our systematized knowledge of human processes, will be measured by the extent of our ability to interpret all human society in terms of effective interests."* [53]

Viewing the subject from the angle of the individual, Small has made a comprehensive classification of the interests as follows:

"Speaking somewhat roughly and symbolically, we may say again that all the acts which human beings have ever been known to perform have been for the sake of (a) *health,* or (b) *wealth,* or (c) *sociability,* or (d) *knowledge,* or (e) *beauty,* or (f) *rightness,* or for the sake of some combination of ends which may be distributed among these six. *. . . First the human individual is a variation of the sixfold interests, i.e., desires (subjective); and second, the conditions of human satisfaction consist of variations of the sixfold interests, i.e., wants (objective).*[54]

DEDUCTIONS

Very briefly, we may note, in contrast with Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer's theory of the individual and his attitude toward progress.

1. His psychology is that of "individual ascendency." The individual is primary. The essence of the theory of interests is that the group is the product of the coördination of individuals of like interests in reciprocal relations. The individual is the product of his own "inherent interest-capacity," and even the "social interest" which creates the group can exist nowhere except in the individual himself. Obviously, as a member of a social group, the individual is influenced by it. But if, on the one hand, his group exerts upon him a limiting and constraining social pressure, on the other hand it stimulates and inspires him to superior effort. If it moulds him, he in turn moulds it. "Ratzenhofer made of his individual more than an automaton and gave to the tyrant group some strict constitutional limitations." [55]

This is just the antithesis of Gumplowicz's thesis. For him, the individual is but a differentiation of the group life. He is group-made

[52] *General Sociology,* p. 282.
[53] *Ibid.,* p. 442.
[54] *Ibid.,* pp. 444-5. For the elaboration of this scheme, *cf. ibid.,* Ch. XXXII.
[55] Jacobs, *op. cit.,* p. 82.

from his physical form to his ideas and his motives. The group is primary.

2. In fixing attention upon the social process of "becoming," of its development into "higher unities," Ratzenhofer allows full scope for the idea of social progress. In his development of the successive stages from savagery to civilization he has outlined its course. Its motive force is the *Urkraft* with its inherent capacity to work toward increasing development. The individual interests are tending constantly to be broadened into the social through the ascendency of the processes of socialization over individualization. The conflict of interests, through resulting integration, moves toward the coördination of interests and a consequent social life characterized by more harmonious relations.

PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGY

Since Ratzenhofer's address before the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences contains his last contribution to the subject of Sociology, and because it exhibits his interest in both the theoretical and practical aspects, it seems appropriate to present an epitome of it here.[56]

He begins by defining sociology as *"the science of the reciprocal relationships of human beings,"* and sets for its task the twofold object, "to discover the fundamental tendencies of social evolution and the conditions of the general welfare of human beings."

"Sociology is a *philosophical discipline,* not on a *basis of pure reasoning* merely, but rather on the basis of all the real and intellectual facts correlated by the causality of all phenomena. Social life can be scientifically understood only on the basis of this monistic view of the world; that is, in the light of a philosophy which *subordinates all phenomena to a unifying principle.* . . . Without this *positive monism* a sociological regularity is impossible."

1. The fundamental problem of sociology is to demonstrate the *peculiar* sociological regularity and to distinguish it from the regularity of the phenomenal world in general.

2. Closely connected with this general problem is "the world problem of the relation of the increase of the human race to subsistence or *"the question of the transformation of matter."* He ventures the remark that "the economic processes of the world are to-day in the childhood of thoughtless robber methods, in respect to which North America particularly indulges in very dangerous optimism."

[56] For the address in full, translated by Small, *cf. American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. X, pp. 177-88.

3. As an "advisory science" sociology must answer the question "Has the *human will an influence upon social development?*" If answered optimistically "there open before society the most tremendous prospects," if pessimistically "there would have to be acquiescence in despair for everything noble, great, good, and beautiful. . . . The solution of the problem demands analytical insight into the whole complex of social facts. . . . From the standpoint of sociology men will learn . . . to recognize as scientific no research until, as is always the case with the natural sciences, it strives after future control of the phenomena." . . . This influence upon coming social development involves the solution of the fourth problem, namely:

4. "What form will social evolution take? This problem can be solved only on the basis of knowledge of previous social evolution. Its purpose is to gain prevision of the social necessities, in order to measure the inevitable and to learn the extent to which the interposition of the human will can have effect." This involves the question of:

5. "The *reciprocal relationships between individualism* (*subjectivism*) *and socialism* (*communalism*). The realization of the typically human is unquestionably the work of individualization which has rescued man from the communalistic horde condition. . . . Does social evolution permit the unlimited process of individualization, or is it demanded that it shall be limited by a socialization in the common interest, and how may men succeed in bringing individualization and socialization into harmony?" This involves the nature of man and there is at once presented:

6. "The tremendous race-problem," subdivided into the following:

a. "Is the origin of the human race such that it can be regarded as a unity? . . .

b. "What *value* has the race-concept for social evolution in general, and in particular in given times and places?

c. "What differences of value are to be attributed to the *pure races,* which have developed the permanent forms of racial mixtures through in-and-in breeding, and what values are to be assigned to the *mixed races* with fluctuating traits?

d. "What consequences for social development follow from the fact of *race difference,* and of the *variety* of *inherited talents,* as products of biological development, of history, of locality, of environment, and of prevailing ideas?"

Connected with the race problem is:

7. "The problem of public hygiene, which in the last analysis is the

question of rooting out pathological tendencies. . . . In consequence of the increase of population and the crowding of habitable regions, with the consequent increasing of all legal relationships, there is need of energetic protection for society against the excesses of the socially unfit."

The whole range of thought presents the next problem:

8. "In what ratio should the political principles of *freedom* and *authority* share in the work of civilization; and in what ratio the political systems of centralization and autonomy? . . . Social evolution presses more and more toward an organizing order, if it is to be possible to lead the majority of men into satisfying conditions."

In closest connection with the race problem stands:

9. "The problem of war and peace. . . . It is more and more evident that wars are the consequence of social development; that is (a) of the increase of population in reaction upon life-conditions . . . and (b) of racial antitheses. Profound insight into the nature of politics shows that it would be much more profitable for society if we would treat this question without attempting to damn war off-hand, but if we would try to remove the causes of war.

"The solution of the two problems last mentioned will, however, be possible only when the whole realm of politics is raised from its present sphere of dilettantism, of diplomatic intrigue, or of personal interest, to a scientific discipline upon the basis of sociological intelligence."

Next to the biological and the political problem in significance stands:

10. "The problem of positive ethics. It may be expressed in the question: To what extent is the prosperity of races, nations, states, and societies dependent upon their morality? We know that the current anthropological conception credits morality with no significance in the destiny of peoples. This is because, from lack of a comprehensive sociological insight, it is not recognized that "good" and "bad" are in closest connection with the prosperity of the species."

Tributary to this question is:

11. "The problem of the morals and education of men: which may be divided into the problem of the school, of the family, of the relation of the sexes to each other and in society. Let me merely observe in passing that the question of women's rights is passing through a phase which an age sociologically mature will look upon as the most incomprehensible confusion of humanity."

These problems inevitably raise:

12. "The religious problem, respecting the philosophical truth of the religious need of mankind, of the ethical and ideal value of religion in general," and

13. "The civic problem. This is the question of the political divisions of mankind and of their territories. With this problem the question as to the sociological idea of the state will be answered. In accordance therewith the practical fulfilment of all the scientific synthesis of sociology is to be found in the state as the organization of power. Among these syntheses belong also the theories as to the relations of the state and of its citizens to society, and to humanity, because the latter make use of the State in order to make progress in satisfying their developing interests."

"We see therefore that sociology discovers the principle that governs all social affairs. To solve in principle all social problems is its task. Sociology can do this because it takes account of the relationships in which these problems appear in their essential connection with all existence. Sociology sets bounds to the arrogant narrowness of unlimited specialization. Sociology attempts to secure for the common weal the application of the tremendous results that have been reached by the special positive sciences.

"The problems of sociology are thus also the problems of civilization, of humanity.

"If the world is really a product of imminent regularity, then social development cannot afford to be without a science which shall bring to recognition, over and above all special knowledge, this general regularity."

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TOPICS FOR CRITICAL STUDY

1. Formulate a brief and concise statement of the similarities and contrasts in regard to the respective group concepts of Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer and Tarde.
2. In what respects may the theories of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer be regarded from the psychological point of view, as representing the ideas of "individual and social ascendency" as discussed by E. A. Ross. *Cf. Social Psychology,* Ch. I. Where does Tarde classify on this basis?
3. Discuss Gumplowicz' "scientific determinism." Is the general theory sound? *Cf.* Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science, Chs. III-IV; also for its application to human behavior *cf.* R. M. McConnell, *Criminal Responsibility and Social Constraint,* Part II.
4. What contribution does Lester F. Ward make to the theory of conflict in his article *Evolution of Social Structures? Cf. American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. X, Mar., 1905.
5. What is the weight of A. J. Todd's criticism of Gumplowicz' Race Conflict theory? *Cf. Theories of Social Progress,* Ch. XVIII. For a discussion of *Race Differences, cf.* Karl Kelsey, *The Physical Basis of Society,* Ch. VII.
6. Note carefully L. M. Bristol's four points of criticism of Gumplowicz' theory and weigh their significance. *Cf. Social Adaptation,* pp. 162-70.
7. Review critically and evaluate A. W. Small's amplification of Ratzenhofer's doctrine of interests. *Cf. General Sociology,* Chs. XIV-XVI and XXII-XXIII.
8. What contribution has E. A. Ross made to the doctrine of interests in separating desires from interests? *Cf. Foundations of Sociology,* Ch. VII.
9. How far does Ratzenhofer's inclusion of practical social problems in his *Problems of Sociology* indicate a similarity of approach to that of Lester F. Ward in his *Applied Sociology?*
10. For a treatment of the theory of conflict in its broad aspects read *Schmoller on Class Conflicts in General,* tr. by Small, *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XX, Jan., 1915. Also the series of articles by George Simmel on *The Sociology of Conflict, American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. IX, Jan., Mar. and May, 1904.

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INDEX

Abortion, Aristotle, 48; Plato, 24
Absolute Hostility, Gumplowicz, 445; Hobbes, 185-186; Ratzenhofer, 445
Academy, founding of, 9; Aristotle at, 32
Achievement, 382, 392; the data of Sociology, 383
Adaptation, active and passive, 381; of constitution to conditions, 312-314; law of, 407, 408, 421 ff.; process of, 425; psychic, 286; social, 424; theory of, 276
Age of Pericles, 5
Aggregation, distinguished from evolution, 359; law of, 360 ff.; principles of, 367
Alexander, 32, 34, 62; relation to Aristotle, 34-35
Alexandrian School, 77, 79
Analogy, Biological. See Social Organism
Ancestor-worship, 342-343
Anglicanism, 159, 178
Anthropogeny, 365
Anthropo-teleological Progress, 382
Applied Sociology, defined, 392-393
Applied Sociology, 358
Aquinas, Thomas, 105, 434; biography of, 108-109; social philosophy of, 109 ff.
Aristotle, 111, 115, 193, 206, 207, 229, 267, 307, 394; biography of, 33-34; contrasted with Plato, 51-52; physical characteristics of, 33; reference, 150; scientific views of, 33-34; social philosophy of, 35 ff.; writings of, 35
Art, function of, 18
Artificial, superiority over natural, 381
Athenian Civilization, 4, 58
Athens, conditions in, 4
Athletes, food tabus for, 19; training of, 20
Augburg Confession, 159
Austria, conditions in, 432-434

Bagehot, Walter, 287, 316, 405, 435; biography of, 279-280; reference, 305, 353, 430; social theory of, 279 ff., 405 ff.
Baldwin, J. M., reference, 430
Barker, Ernest, quoted, 10, 17, 20; reference, 30
Barnes, H. E., 54; quoted, 90, 91, 209-210, 243; reference, 54, 123, 205
Bill of Rights, 180
Biogeny, 362
Biologic Factors, Aristotle, 52; Spencer, 344 ff; Vico, 210; Ward, 362 ff.
Boas, Franz, reference, 72
Bodenhofer, W. B., reference, 398
Bodin, Jean, 111, 210, 218, 231, 267, 317, 434; biography of, 165-166; social philosophy of, 166 ff.
Bogardus, E. S., reference, 93, 124, 150, 205, 235, 266, 299, 358, 431
Boniface, conflict with Philip the Fair, 126
Booth, A. J., quoted, 241, 242
Brinton, D. G., reference, 93
Bristol, L. M., quoted, 450; reference, 353, 399, 430, 466
Brotherhood of Man, 58, 68, 82, 83, 85, 206
Brunches, J., reference, 176
Bryce, Jas., quoted, 101
Buckle, T. H., 45, 111, 317; reference, 54, 176, 234
Burnet, J., quoted, 9
Bury, J. B., quoted, 88-89

Cake of Custom, 282, 407
Calvin, John, biography of, 159; social philosophy of, 161 ff.
Capital, 293, 299
Carlyle, A. J., quoted, 67, 71
Carver, T. N., reference, 176
Castle, W. E., reference, 305
Catholics, persecution of, 178
Causation, concepts of scientific, Bodin, physical, 170 ff.; Montesquieu, physical, 218 ff.; Polybius, emphasis on, 64; Spencer, principles of, 330; Ward, physical and psychic, 396
Cerebral Physiology, 251
Champernowne, H., reference, 151
Charlemagne, 97, 101, 104, 119
Cheyney, E. P. quoted, 179; reference, 205
Children, communism of, 23; training of, 18

Chivalry, 103
Christian Fathers, 70, 90
Christianity, 60, 68, 79; a state religion, 88, 95, 99; ecclesiastical development of, 98; effects of climate on, 223; expansion into Western Europe, 96; genesis of, 85; moral revolution of, 84, 206; persecution of, 87, 88; social philosophy of, 73 ff., 85 ff.
Church, The, conflict over taxation, 126; conflict with State, 105 ff.; dignity impaired, 127; ecclesiastical development in, 98; feudal organization of, 154; internal weakness of, 154; priority of, 113; schism in, 127; supremacy over State, 112; universal, 125
Church Councils, Constance, 126; Lyons, 109; Nicea, 126; Pisa, 126; Trent, 163
Church, W. R., quoted, 120
Cicero, biography of, 65; social philosophy of, 66 ff.
City-State, 3, 6, 7, 57
Civic life, Greek idea of, 6
Civil Government, 181; analysis of, 187 ff., 195 ff.
Civilization, artificial structure of, 314; determinism in regard to, 315; development from man's latent capabilities, 316; evolution of, 212, 242
Class Conflict, between Church and State, 206 ff.; Marx's Theory of, 293, 294 ff., 301; Gumplowicz's theory of, 443 ff.
Classical Economists, 209
Classification, a process of Science, 443
Climate, social effects of, Aristotle, 46; Bodin, 171 ff.; Montesquieu, 218 ff.; and domestic slavery, 222-224; and political slavery, 224-225; and Religion, 225-226; and slavery, 220-222; and sobriety, 219
Commercial Revolution, 153, 209
Commonwealth, English, 179, 183, 202
Communist Manifesto, 292, 298
Communism, Plato's Theory of, 20-24; Aristotle's attack on, 42-45; modified in *The Laws,* 25; primitive, 70
Community of property, 21; of wives and children, 22
Comte, August, 212, 307, 315, 336, 350, 407, 423; biography of, 243-244; estimate of, by Ward, 262; indebtedness to Coudorcet, 240; indebtedness to Saint-Simon, 241; quoted, 230-231, 240; reference, 264; social philosophy of, 245 ff.
Conation, defined, 384; ends of human, 385 ff.
Condorcet, M. de, 212, 272; biography of, 238-239; estimate of, by Comte, 240; quoted, 273; social philosophy of, 239-240
Conflict Theories, Bodin, 167; Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, 434, 445
Conklin, E. G., reference, 264
Constantine, 88, 95, 119
Conybeare, F. C., reference, 93
Cooley, C. H., quoted, 350-351; reference, 54, 354, 430
Cosmic Philosophy, Outlines of, 284; analysis of, 284 ff.
Cournot, A. A., quoted, 404-405
Creative Synthesis, 369; applied to filiation of sciences, 371; applied to realm of forces, 372; applied to social mind, 371-372; defined, 370
Critique of Political Economy, 292, 301
Cromwell, Oliver, 179
Crowd Psychology, 401
Crusades, 103
Curtis, W. C., reference, 305
Cust, Henry, quoted, 127, 130, 131
Cycles, historic, 410, 451; Polybius, political, 64, 65; Spencer, of the universe, 329; Ward, of the cosmos, 367

Dante Alighieri, 434; biography of, 114-115; social philosophy of, 115 ff.
Darwin, Charles, 212, 266, 280, 283, 284, 287, 291, 294, 300, 301, 307, 316, 421, 435, 449; biography of, 274-275; evolutionary theory of, 275 ff.; reference, 305
Data of Ethics, 349
Davis, M. M., quoted, 247, 405, 417, 427-428; reference, 353
Dealey, J. Q., quoted, 378-379
Deistic Philosophy, 209
Desire, as a social force, see Feeling
De Monarchia, 147; analysis of, 115 ff.
Descent of Man, The, 275, 278, 279, 283
Determinism, Gumplowicz, scientific, 445, 448, 452; Marx, economic, 299, 300; Spencer, in social evolution, 315
Dexter, E. G., reference, 234
Diet of Worms, 157-158
Dinsmore, C. A., quoted, 114, 120-121
Direct Method, inferior to indirect, 381
Discourse on Inequality, analysis of on State of Nature, 190-192, 200

Dissolution, process of, 329
Divine Right of Kings, 112, 117-118, 120, 180, 202, 236
Domestic Communism, 24, 42
Drummond, H., reference, 305
Drummond, Jas., quoted, 80
Drunkenness, 119; in relation to climate, 219
Dunning, W. A., 54, 115, 118, 119; quoted, 30, 62, 82-83, 97-98, 99, 101, 161, 228-229; reference, 30, 54, 123, 150, 205, 235
Dynamic action, 385, 386; opinion, 385, 387; sociology, goal of, 385
Dynamic Sociology, 358, 367, 373, 378; analysis of, 359 ff.
Dynamists, School of, 360

Economic Communism, Aristotle, attack on, 44; Plato, defense of, 21, 22, 24
Economic Determinism, Marx, 299, 300
Economic Factors, Marx, 393, 395 ff.
Economics, development of, 238
Education, Aristotle, 47, 48, 54; breadth of, 50; content of, 49; of children, 48; public, 49; Plato, emphasis on, 20; physical, 19; public, 20; system of, 20; theory of, 17, 18; Ward, compulsory, 390; content of, 389; means of knowledge, 385, 388; public, 389, 390; purpose of, 389, 394; types of, 388-389
Effects, multiplication of, 327
Ellwood, C. A., quoted, 35, 50, 300, 301, 395; reference, 235, 306, 430
Emile, 190
Empire, conflict with Papacy, 105; prior to church, 119
England, conditions in, 125, 178-180, 202; Deistic philosophy of, 209
Enlightenment, 208
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 269
Environment, influence of, Aquinas, 111; Aristotle, 45, 46; Bodin, 170 ff.; Comte, 261; Montesquieu, 217 ff.; Plato, 27; Spencer, 317, 323, 338; Stoics, 59
Epicureanism, 60; social philosophy of, 61 ff.
Epicurus, biography of, 60; social philosophy of, 61-63
Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy, 347
Equality, Human, 68, 72, 187-188
Equilibration, Comte, 256; Spencer, 276, 314, 316, 328
Espinas, M., quoted by Tarde, 405
Ethnic Factors, Aquinas, 111; Plato, 27
Eugenics, Aristotle, 47, 48; Plato, 23, 24, 26; Ward, 386
Evil, Cause of, Spencer, 312; Tarde, 426
Evolution, 242, 266, 275, 278; Bagehot, application of, 279 ff.; Darwin, demonstration of, 278; discovery of by, 276-277; Fiske, application of, 284 ff.; Kidd, application of, 287 ff.; Marx, application of, 294, 295 ff.; Saint-Simon, civilization a product of, 242; Spencer, Concept of, 313, 315, 317; definition of, 325-327; interpretation of, 327 ff.; mental, 318; theory of, 324 ff.; Vico, Theory of, 211-212

Facts and Comments, 348
Family, The, Aristotle, attack on Plato's communism of, 42-43; origin of, 36, 37, 42; Bodin, prior of, to society, 166; Fisk, duration of, 284-285; origin of, 285; Locke, duration of, 287; voluntary compact of, 196; Plato, communism of, 23, 24, 26; Rousseau, a contract, 199
Farnsworth, Ellis, reference, 150
Feeling (or Desire), Ratzenhofer, a social force, 459; Spencer, initiates all social change, 337; Ward, a social force, 372, 373 ff., 378, 379, 382, 383; social, 383, 459
Feudalism, 102, 103, 154
Filiation of the Sciences, Comte, 250, 252; Ward, 367-368
First Cause, 319
First Principles, 309, 310, 318, 333, 337; analysis of, 337 ff.
Fiske, John, biography of, 284; reference, 305; theories of, 284 ff.
Florence, conditions in, 127-128
Force, Ratzenhofer, original (*urkraft*), 458-459, 461; Spencer, persistence of, 322; relations of, 322; transformations of, 322; ultimate, concept of, 321; Ward, theory of, 369.
Ford, H. J., reference, 392
France, Conditions in, 164, 181, 202, 236, 401; seat of Papacy, 126
French Revolution, 68, 201, 236, 238, 268, 432

Gehlke, C. E., reference, 398
Geographic Factors, Aquinas, 111; Bodin, 170 ff.; Montesquieu, 218 ff.
Ghibellines, 107, 114, 115

Ghibellinism, 107, 115, 120
Ghost Theory of Religion, Spencer's, 339 ff.; evaluated by Ward, 343
Giddings, F. H., 54, 63, 212; quoted, 27-28, 30, 146, 147, 229, 279-280, 283, 287, 291, 311, 347-348, 394; reference, 30, 54, 150
Goddard, H. H., reference, 264, 398
Godwin, Wm., quoted, 272
Golden Age, Bodin, 167; Dante, 117; Seneca, 69
Goldenweisser, A. A., reference, 306, 353
Government, Aquinas, natural sphere of, 111, 115; Aristotle, origin in human nature, 38, 40; origin in the family, 39; Bodin, origin of, 167; revolutions in, 169-170; Calvin, functions of, 159-160; Comte, spontaneous origin of, 257; Dante, correlative power with Church, 115, 120; divine right of, 117; Hobbes, irrevocable, 195, 200, 201; origin in covenant, 192 ff.; Locke, ends of, 198; dissolution of, 198; limited powers of, 198, 200; origin in social contract, 195 ff.; Plato, origin in human need, 13; Rousseau, origin in compact, 198 ff.; right of revolution in, 200; Spencer, proper sphere of, 314
Great Man Theory, 333
Greece, Conditions in, 3 ff., 31 ff., 55
Greek Civilization, 4 ff., 31 ff., 55, 289
Gregariousness, instincts of, 110, 284
Group Conflict, Theory of, 445 ff.
Group Factors, 381, 283
Group Phenomena, Gumplowicz, analysis of, 445 ff.; Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, 440-442
Guardians, communism of, 21-22; nature and functions of, 15; training of, 18, 20; wives of, 23-24
Guelphs, 107, 114, 115, 128
Gumplowicz, Ludwig, 167, 400, 434; biography of, 436-437; points of agreement with Ratzenhofer, 438 ff.; points of difference with Ratzenhofer, 440 ff.; social theory of, 443 ff.
Gymnastics, 49, 50; a part of education, 18
Gynæcocentric Theory, 375 ff.

Hall, T. C., reference, 93
Hallam, Henry, quoted, 166, 174, 231-232
Happiness, Spencer, conditions of, 315; dependent on external conditions, 311; goal of human life, 311; Ward, end of conation, 385; goal of human endeavor, 385; organization of, 385
Hayes, C. J. H., quoted, 153, 154-155
Hayes, E. C., reference, 398
Health, 46, 47
Hellenic People, History of, 3
Henry IV, conflict with Hildebrand, 106
Hetaerae, 7, 60
Hierarchy of Sciences, 402; Comte, 449 ff.; Ward's Criticism of, 367-368
Hildebrand, 98, 102; Conflict with Henry IV, 106
Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind, 238, 240, 272; analysis of, 239-240
Hobbes, Thomas, 64, 167; biography of, 181; Social Contract, 192 ff.; State of Nature, 185-187, 192, 195
Holy Roman Empire, 97, 98
Homer, 3, 37
Homogeneous, instability of the, Spencer, 327; Ward, 361
Household, composition of, 39; management of, 40
Howard, G. E., quoted, 162; reference, 177
Human Brotherhood, 7, 58, 60, 68, 82, 85
Humanists, 152, 154
Hume, David, 184, 269; social theory of, 269
Huntington, E., reference, 176, 234
Huss, John, 127, 153, 156

Imitation, Theory of, Bagehot, 405 ff.; Cournot, 404-405; Tarde, basis of social life, 415; extra-logical laws of, 415-416; logical laws of, 413-415; social process of, 412
Indirect method, superiority over direct, 381
Individual Ascendancy, Epicureanism, 62; Ratzenhofer, 460; Tarde, 426
Individualization, 454, 455
Indulgences, 152
Industrial Revolution, 153, 209, 237, 238, 268, 292, 328
Inequality, human, 41
Infancy, prolongation of, 285, 287
Insanity, definition of, 252
Institutes of the Christian Religion, analysis of, 159-160
Intellect, The, Comte, stages in development of, 245 ff.; Condorcet, progress of human, 239; Kidd, limits to the development of, 289;

Spencer, directive factor of, 337; Ward, directive factor of, 377, 380, 382
Intellectual Processes, economy of, 380; rapidity of, 380-381
Intellectual Revolution, 242
Intelligence, defined, Comte, 252; Ward, 387
Interests, 457; Ratzenhofer, classification of, 458; Small, classification of, 459-460; Ward, achievement through, 383
Intoxication, 19, see Drunkenness
Invention, a social process, 411 ff.
Investigation, Comte, means of, 259; preparation necessary for, 261; Spencer, difficulties of, 334-336; discipline necessary to, 336 ff.
Italy, Conditions in, 127, 140

Jacobs, P. P., quoted, 442
Jastrow, Morris, reference, 93
Jesuit Order, 163
Jesus, birth of, 74; biography of, 78; Christianity of, 87; identified with Logos, 86-87; moral revolution of, 87; social teachings of, 79, 83 ff., 87, 90
Jowett, Benjamin, quoted, 16
Judaism, doctrines of, 75 ff.; rise of, 74
Justice, Theories of, 12-13; Cicero, basis of, 67, 68; Dante, basis of, 116; Gumplowicz, in history, 452; Plato, functions of, 28; nature of, 14, 16, 20; Platonic, 17, 28

Kelsey, Carl, reference, 305, 466
Kent, C. F., reference, 93
Kidd, Benjamin, biography of, 287; reference, 305; social theory of, 287 ff.
King, H. C., reference, 93
Knowable, The, 318; analysis of, 320 ff.
Knowledge, Comte, The Three Stages of, 245-246; Saint-Simon, order of development of, 241-242; Spencer, nature of, 318-319; postulates of, 321 ff.; Ward, data of opinion, 387; means of dynamic opinion, 385
Kochanowski, quoted, 436

Laissez Faire, doctrine of, 314, 355, 357
Law, Aquinas, doctrine of, 109-110; Montesquieu, new concept of, 216; of nature and society, 217 ff.; relation to environment, 219, 224, 226
Laws, The, of Cicero, 66; of Plato, 3, 8, 42; analysis of, 24 ff., 45; contrasted with *Republic,* 26
Laws of Imitation, The, 282, 404, 408, 409, 428; analysis of, 409 ff.
Lecky, quoted, 161-162
Leo X, 152, 158; conflict with Luther, 156 ff.
Leviathan, The, 181; analysis of, 185 ff., 193 ff.
Lewes, G. H., quoted, 246
Lewis, A. M., quoted, 350
Life, genesis of, 362
Lindsay, T. A., quoted, 157, 158
Littlejohn, J. M., quoted, 112-113; reference, 123
Locke, John, 64, 167; biography of, 182; Social contract, 195 ff.; State of Nature, 187 ff., 195
Logos, The, concepts of, Philo, 78, 80, 81, 86; St. John, 86; Stoics, 59, 109
Loos, I. A., quoted, 35
Lorenzo, 128, 129, 132, 140
Luther, Martin, biography of, 155 ff.; social philosophy of, 161 ff.; writings of, 156

Macaulay, T. B., quoted, 141, 142, 147-148
Macedonian Empire, 31, 32, 55, 57
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 161, 201, 434; biography of, 128 ff.; ethics of, 143-148; social philosophy of, 131 ff.
Macintosh, R., reference, 306
McConnell, R. M., reference, 466
McDougal, Wm., reference, 430
Magna Charta, 180
Malthus, T. R., 277; biography of, 271; social theory of, 271 ff.
Man, Aristotle, a political animal, 37; organic nature of, 37; Bagehot, his own domesticator, 281; Cicero, natural equality of, 68; Hobbes, equality of, 185; Locke, freedom and equality of, 187; Rousseau, original state of, 190-192; Saint-Simon, new view of, 241-242; part of organic series, 242; Seneca, original innocence of, 69-70; Spencer, aboriginal, 315; social adjustment of, 313; Ward, antiquity of, 365-366; attitude of, toward nature, 365; attitude of nature toward, 365; end of, 373; genesis of, 365; monogenetic origin of, 365; polygenetic origin criticised, 365; Vico, original state of, 211
Marriage, Aristotle, monogamous, 48; Comte, origin of, 257; Luther, civil

contract, theory of, 163; doctrine of, 162; Sacramental theory of, repudiated, 162; Montesquieu, effects of climate on, 223, 227-228; Plato, communal, 26
Marx, Carl, 238; biography of, 292-293; reference, 430; social philosophy of, 293 ff.
Materialists, school of, 360
Matter, Spencer, concept of, 321; indestructibility of, 321; Ward, character of, 360-362
Mathews, Shailer, quoted, 82, 83
Matrimony, rules for, 23; sacredness of, 23
Medici, 129; Cardinal de, 130; Piero, de, 132
Medieval Universities, 105
Meitzen, A., quoted, 267
Messianic Hope, doctrine of The, 66-67, 80, 85
Messiahship, of Jesus, 82, 83, 85-86
Military Systems, 133-134
Mill, J. S., 245, 315; quoted, 244; reference, 264
Mind, Comte, progress of, 245, 253-255; Condorcet, progress of, 212, 238-239; Kidd, denial of progress of, 289; Rousseau, progress of, 191; Saint-Simon, 241; Ward, Genesis of, 363-364; nature of, 389
Mind force, 380
Mind, Social, see Social Mind
Monasticism, 104
Montesquieu, M. de, 45, 111, 231, 317; biography of, 213-214; change to social science in, 208, 229-230, 231; reference, 54; social philosophy of, 215 ff.
Morley, Henry, quoted, 130, 138, 141, 142, 148, 182, 244
Motion, Continuity of, 321; direction of, 322; rhythm of, 323
Music, a part of education, Aristotle, 49, 50; Plato, 18, 19
Mythology, 211

National Safety, foundations of, 133, 138 ff.
Natural Selection, in society, 280
Nature, Concept of, Stoic, unity in, 59; revived in Cicero, 68; Ward, end of, 373; universal principle in, 370
Nature, Human, modifiable, 316; slow changes in, 315
Nature, State of, see State of Nature
Neill, C. P., quoted, 131
Neo-Darwinism, 435-436
Nettleship, R. L., quoted, 11
Non-resistance, doctrine of, Stoic, 60; Reformers, 160-161

Opportunism, Machiavelli's, 147, 148
Opposition, 407, 408; forms of, 419 ff.; of phenomena, 417 ff.
Organic forms, genesis of, 362
Origin of Species, The, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 301, 309, 435

Papacy, conflict with Empire, 105 ff.; conflict with Reformers, 152 ff.; corruption of, 127, 152, 154; power to depose rulers, 113; rise to political power, 100-102, 104, 107; seat of, transferred to France, 126
Papal Power, rise of, 98 ff.
Parenthood, qualifications of, 48
Parliament, English, 178, 179, 180
Parliament, French, 138
Parmelee, Maurice, reference, 264, 398
Patten, S. N., reference, 94, 264, 353
Pearson, Karl, reference, 72, 234, 305, 466
Pericles, 5; Age of, 5, 73, 147
Persecution, Religious, 180; of Catholics, 178; of Protestants, 164, 180
Persian Empire, 4, 57
Peschel, O., reference, 176
Pessimism, of Gumplowicz, 450; overthrown by Ward, 452-453
Philip of Macedon, 32, 34, 56; relation to Aristotle, 34
Philip the Fair, conflict with Boniface, 126
Philo, biography of, 79; doctrine of Logos, 80, 81; teachings of, 80, 81, 86
Philosophic Method, 207; of Plato, 12, 51, 52; of Social Contract Theorists, 201 ff.
Philosophy, Modern, 237, see Positive Philosophy
Philosophy of History, 207, 423
Phrenological Physiology, 251
Physical Education, 19
Physics and Politics, 279; analysis of, 280 ff.; 405 ff.; evaluated by Giddings, 279-280
Physical Factors, Aquinas, 111; Aristotle, 46; Bodin, 170 ff.; Montesquieu, 218 ff.
Physiocrats, 164, 209, 270
Physiological Factors, Aristotle, 52; Saint-Simon, 242; Spencer, 322-323, 338
Physiological Psychology, 212, 252

Physiology, cerebral, 251; Gall's contribution to, 251; need for development in, 242; phrenological, 251
Plato, 206, 229; biography of, 8-10; contrasted with Aristotle, 51-52; practical test of theories, 9, 10; social philosophy of, 10 ff.
Platonic justice, 17, 28
Political Cycles, 64, 65
Political justice, 272
Political Society and Government, Aquinas, 111 ff.; Calvin, 160; Comte, 257; Locke, 198; Luther, 160
Political Slavery, effects of climate on, 224-225
Politics, development of science of, 238; meaning of term, 10, 11, 35, 36
Politics, The, 147, 311; analysis of, 35 ff.
Polybius, biography of, 63; social philosophy of, 64 ff.
Polygenesis, doctrine of, 445 ff.; proofs of, 446-448; Ward's overthrow of, 452-453
Population, Aristotle, limits of, 45; Condorcet, on increase of, 272; Godwin, on increase of, 272; Malthus, Principles of, 171 ff.; Montesquieu, as affected by climate, 227-228
Positive Method, characteristics of, 255; concepts of, 255-256
Positive Philosophy, Comte, aims of, 247 ff.; concept of, 244 ff.; Saint-Simon, first use of term, 242
Positive Philosophy, analysis of, 245 ff.
Poverty and wealth, 25, 272
Powers, The Two, 434; conflict of, 105 ff.; doctrines of, 107, 123
Preparedness, 134
Prince, The, 143, 145, 148; analysis of, 131 ff., 146, 147; estimates and criticisms of, 141 ff.; evaluated by Cust, 131
Princes, character of, 135 ff., 145
Principles of Population, 271, 435; analysis of, 271 ff.
Principles of Psychology, 276, 309, 318
Principles of Biology, 309, 333
Principles of Ethics, 310, 348
Principles of Sociology, 310, 330, 333, 348, 349; analysis of, 337 ff.
Pringle-Pattison, A. S., reference, 306
Progress, costs of, 288
Progress, Theory of, Bagehot, 280, 283; Comte, 253-255, 266; Condorcet, 240, 266; Gumplowicz, 450; Kidd, 287 ff.; Saint-Simon, 242, 266; Spencer, 313 ff., 317; Tarde, 414; Ward, 379, 381, 382, 385, 386, 394
Proper Sphere of Government, The, 308, 317, 349
Property, Hobbes, no natural right of, 187; Locke, foundation of, 189
Protestant Reformation, 152, 163
Protestantism, spread of, 159, 163
Protestants, persecution of, 164, 180
Psychic Factors of Civilization, 357, 358
Psychogeny, 363
Psychologic Factors, Bodin, 172; Comte, 251-252; Plato, 52; Spencer, 318, 336, 339; Ward, 382, 395
Psychology, Comte, department of biology, 252; use of term, 251; Gumplowicz, error in, 447; Spencer, a founder of, 350; necessary to study of Sociology, 336; Tarde, approach to Sociology, 408; Ward, the ultimate analysis in society, 396
Pure Sociology, defined, 391-392
Pure Sociology, 358, 370, 373, 374
Puritanism, 178
Puritans, 179
Purpose, a telic force, 379
Pythagorean Psychology, 16

Quantitative Analysis, development of, 266

Race Conflict, Theory of, 445 ff.
Race Conflict, 436, 445
Ratzenhofer, Gustav, 400, 434; biography of, 437-438; points of agreement with Gumplowicz, 438 ff.; points of difference with Gumplowicz, 440 ff.; social theory, 453 ff.
Reasons of State, 135
Reformation, Protestant, conditions leading to, 153-155; effects on social thought, 161-163; leaders of, 155 ff.; political significance of, 161
Religion, Bagehot, in relation to custom, 282; Bodin, effect of climate on, 173; Hebrew, concept of, 75; Kidd, relation of, to progress, 290; nature of, 319; Montesquieu, effects of climate on, 225-226; Spencer, ghost theory of, 339 ff.; root of, 342; Vico, origin of, 211
Reign of Terror, 202, 236, 240
Renaissance, The, 127
Renan, reference, 93
Repetition, 407, 408; imitation, a form of, 410 ff.; of phenomena, 409
Republic, The, of Bodin, 170, 174, 267; analysis of, 166 ff.; of Cicero, 66;

analysis of, 66 ff.; of Plato, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 26, 28, 42, 184; analysis of, 10 ff.
Research, education of, 338; motive of, 64, 268-269
Revolution, Bodin, theory of, 169; Rousseau, right of, inalienable, 200
Revolution, English, The, 180, 183
Robinson, E. Van D., reference, 30
Robinson, J. H., quoted, 103; reference, 123, 176
Rogers, A. K., quoted, 62, 104-105, 127
Roman, architecture, 74; constitution, 67; Empire, 118; mind, 63; Republic, 57; writers, 63
Rome, history of, 55-56, 65, 73-74; empire of the East, 96; empire of the West, 96, 99 ff.
Roosevelt, T. R., 134
Ross, E. A., quoted, 357, 394; reference, 353, 398, 430-431, 466
Rousseau, J. J., 64, 167; biography of, 183; Social Contract, 198 ff.; State of Nature, 190 ff., 200-202

Saint Paul, 7, 86; biography of, 81; teachings of, 82, 83, 89
Saint-Simon, biography of, 240-241; social philosophy of, 241 ff.
Savonarola, 128, 129, 132, 153
Schism, the great, 126, 127
Schmidt, N., quoted, 81, 84, 86-87
Schaefer, H., reference, 93
Schmoller, reference, 466
Scholasticism, 104
Science, advance in, 237, 241; beginning of, 409; classification in, 443; defined, 319, 408; development of, 154, 208; evolution of, 242, 266; method of, 207; need for reconstruction in, 241; progress of, 442; scope of, 361; stages of, 245-246; synthesis of, 307; unitary principle of, 402
Sciences, classification of the, 249, 368; filiation of the, 250, 252, 367-368; hierarchy of the, 249, 368
Scientific era, beginning of, 277, 435
Scientific method, Aristotle, 36, 45; Comte, 255 ff.; Machiavelli, 147; Montesquieu, beginning of in, 229-230, 231; Plato, 26
Scientific movement, impetus in Social Contract, 203
Secularization, of ecclesiastical estates, 153; of intellect, 161; of morals, 349
Segregation, law of, 328
Semitic ideas, 75, 77
Semple, E. C., reference, 234
Seneca, biography of, 68-69; golden age, 69; social philosophy of, 69
Shaftsbury, 182, 183
Simon, quoted, 130
Six Books of a Commonweale, The (Republic), analysis of, 166 ff.
Slavery, Aristotle, 41, 42; Bodin, 168; Cicero, 68; Montesquieu, 220-222
Small, A. W., 249; quoted, 294-295, 302, 346, 359, 395-396, 459, 460; reference, 234, 265, 353, 398, 431, 466
Smith, Adam, biography of, 269-270; social theory of, 270-271
Soares, T. G., reference, 93
Social Ascendancy, Aristotle, state prior to individual, 39; Gumplowicz, 448-449, 460-461; Stoic, doctrine of, 59, 62
Social Contract, 38, 112, 167, 202, 203, 217; foreshadowed by Plato, 52; Hobbes, 192 ff.; Locke, 195 ff.; Rousseau, 198 ff.
Social Contract, The, analysis of, 190 ff., 198 ff.
Social Control, 355; Aquinas and Dante, 206-207; Aristotle, 38; Social Contract, 202
Social Dynamics, Comte, 258-259; Spencer, 314, 315
Social Evolution, Bagehot, 280-283; Comte, 261; Fiske, 284; Kidd, 287, 289; Marx, 295 ff.; Spencer, 326; Tarde, 424; Ward, 366-367
Social Forces, blindness of, 381; classification of, 374; Ward's theory of, 359, 372, 373 ff.
Social instincts, 39
Social Institutions, Aristotle, origin of, 38; Comte, origin of, 257; Luther, historical criticism of, 162
Social Laws, 403, 408; analysis of, 408 ff.
Social Mind, Durkheim, reference, 398; Tarde, nature of, 414; Ward, product of creative synthesis, 371-372
Social Movement, 258
Social Order, function of, 16; organization of struggle for existence, 457
Social Organism, Comte, reference, 264; Small, value of organic concept, 346; Spencer, 323, 334; analysis of, 344 ff.
Social Phenomena, difficulties of scientific organization of, 254
Social Philosophy, 3, 6, 27, 35, 36; abandoned in Montesquieu, 229; contributions to, 206 ff.; change to scientific method, 207, 229; defined.

206, 207; embodied in political, 10, 11, 207; pursuit of, 206
Social Physics, 240, 248, 252; static and dynamic concepts of, 256; see also Sociology
Social Process, Gumplowicz, 441, 442; elements of, 445 ff.; Ratzenhofer, 441, 442, 453 ff., 461; essence of, 445-447; rhythm of, 454-455; Tarde, of invention, 411 ff.; Ward, 360, 384 ff.
Social Progress, Bagehot, 280-282
Social Reform, new zeal for, 238
Social Science, beginning of, 229; defense of, 331; defined, 206-207; difficulties of, 262, 334 ff.; nature of, 333 ff.; need and possibility of, 330; purpose of, 209, 212; relation of to progress, 254
Social Statics, Comte, 256-257; Spencer, 314-316
Social Statics, 276, 309; analysis of, 311 ff., 317; evaluated by Giddings, 311
Social Theory, Contributions to, Aquinas, 109 ff.; Aristotle, 38, 50, 51, 52; Bagehot, 280-283; Bodin, 166, 173 ff.; Calvin, 161-162; Christian Fathers, 90, 91; Christianity, 285 ff.; Comte, 262, 407; Condorcet, 239; Dante, 120; Darwin, 278-279; Fiske, 287; Gumplowicz, 439, 453; Hume, 269; Jesus, 84, 85, 90; Kidd, 291; Luther, 161-162; Machiavelli, 148; Malthus, 274; Marx, 298, 301-302; Montesquieu, 229, 230, 231; Plato, 28, 51, 52; Ratzenhofer, 439, 459-460; Saint-Simon, 241-242; Smith, 271; Social Contract theorists, 202-203; Spencer, 351; in *First Principles,* 329-330; in *Social Statics,* 316-317; in *Principles of Sociology,* 346; in *Study of Sociology,* 330; Tarde, 407, 427-428; Vico, 211-212; Ward, 359, 394-396
Social unrest, 153
Social vs. Sociological, 393
Socialism, Marxian, 293, 300, 302
Socialization, process of, 454-455, 456
Society, Aristotle, organic concept of, 206; Cicero, instinctive basis of, 66-67; Gumplowicz, an aggregation of groups, 441; Plato, a fabric of the mind, 206; Ratzenhofer, reciprocal relations in, 441; Spencer, organic concept of, 345, 346; Ward, cosmical aggregation, 366
Society, Origin of, Aquinas, 110-111; Aristotle, 36, 38, 51-52, 206; Bodin, 166-167; Cicero, 66, 110; Comte, 257; Gumplowicz, 439, 441; Hobbes, 192 ff.; Locke, 195 ff.; Montesquieu, 217; Plato, 13, 206; Ratzenhofer, 439, 441; Rousseau, 192, 198 ff.; Seneca, 69, 70; Stoics, 59; Tarde, 410, 412, 424; Ward, 366 ff., 439; Vico, 211
Sociogeny, 366
Sociology, Comte, aim of, 248-249; first aim of positive philosophy, 247-248; first use of term, 240; necessity and appropriateness of, 353 ff.; static and dynamic concepts of, 256 ff.; Gumplowicz, data of, 443; natural history of mankind, 445; Ratzenhofer, data of, 443; problems of, 461 ff.; Spencer, data of, 338 ff., 343; inductions of, 344 ff.; need of, 330; study of, 330 ff., 337; Tarde, development of, 425; illusions of early, 423; procedure in, 408, 409; pure, 408; Ward, data of, 283; psychological basis of, 378; pure and applied, 391-393
Socrates, 6, 9
Sophists, 7
Spargo, John, quoted, 291-292, 297-298, 300-301; reference, 306
Sparta, 3, 4, 5, 31
Spencer, Herbert, 212, 266, 276, 301, 355, 360, 369, 394, 407, 421, 423, 426, 435, 444; aim of his work, 348-349; biography of, 308-310; reference, 264, 353; social philosophy of, 310 ff.
Spirit of Laws, The, 147, 181, 214; analysis of, 215 ff.; evaluated by Giddings, 229
State, eternal design of, 111; function of, 111-112, 159-160; growth of national, 125; highest form of, 25; necessity of, 111; origin of, in human need, 13; prior to individual, 39; psycho-physical product, 111; rise of, 448; second best form, 25, 26; work of nature, 37
State of Nature, Bodin, 167; Hobbes, 185 ff., 192 ff., 201; Locke, 187 ff., 195 ff., 201-202; Montesquieu, 217; Polybius, 64; Rousseau, 190 ff., 198 ff., 202; Seneca, 69-70
Statistics, development of, 266 ff.
Stewart, quoted, 166
Stoics, The, 58; concept of nature, 59, 68; social philosophy of, 59 ff.
Study of Sociology, The, 325; analysis of, 330 ff.
Super-Organic, environment, 338; evolution of, 338

Summa Theologica, 147
Sumner, W. G., reference, 430
Superstition, 61, 331; modern survival of, 332-333
Swinney, S. H., quoted, 211-212
Sympodial development, 368-369
Synergy, 369, 370, 371, 457; social, 439
Synthetic Philosophy, The, 309, 318, 348

Tacitus, 63
Tarde, Gabriel, 282, 400, 449; biography of, 402-403; social theory of, 404 ff.
Teleological process, 360, 381, 384; progress, 382 ff.
Telesis, 382; collective, 382
Theanthropic concept, 77-78
Theological Interpretation, Comte, 245-246, 259; Darwin, effect on, 277; Jewish, 332; Spencer, 331, 351; von Mach, 332
Theocratic concept, 75-76, 90
Thompson, W. S., reference, 305
Thoughts of a Statesman, 144-145
Three Stages, law of, 212, 259; analysis of, 245-247
Tillet, A. W., quoted, 350
Todd, A. J., reference, 235, 306, 399, 466
Towns, rise of, 125
Tyrants, rule of, 3

United States, conditions in, 356-357
Universal laws, Gumplowicz, 444; Spencer, 444
Universe, origin of, 319
Unknowable, The, 318, 349; analysis of, 318 ff.

Vico, Giambattista, biography of, 210; social theory of, 210 ff.
Villari, P., quoted, 127, 128
Voltaire, 238, 270; quoted, 141, 213
von Baer, 317, 325

Wace and Buckheim, quoted, 163
Walford, E., quoted, 35, 36
War, Hobbes, state of, 185-187, 192; Gumplowicz, a form of conflict, 447; Montesquieu, state of, 217; Plato, economic cause of, 14, 15; Ratzenhofer, origin of, 445-446
Ward, Lester F., 30, 403, 407, 421, 457; aim of, 359, 391; biography of, 357-359; quoted, 243-244, 247, 256, 262, 307, 320, 330, 346-347, 439-440; reference, 30, 306, 335, 353, 398, 399, 466; social theory of, 359 ff.
Wealth of Nations, analysis of, 270-271
Weatherly, U. G., quoted, 394-395
Wells, H. G., reference, 93, 150
Williams, David, quoted, 230
Women, Aristotle, attitude toward, 40; Comte, relation of to society, 256; Montesquieu, effect of climate on, 222-224; Plato, education of, 22; ideas about, 26; status of, 22; Ward, concepts of, 375 ff.
Woodruff, C. F., reference, 234
Woods and Baltzley, reference, 430
Wunt, W., quoted, 371
Wycliffe, 127, 152, 156

Yoacum and Yerkes, reference, 30

Zeller, E., quoted, 59, 62
Zeno, biography of, 58; social philosophy of, 59-60

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